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After the wave of comparative studies inspired by the Europeanisation of national 
administrative systems,1 and by the emergence of ‘global’ rules and proceedings of 
administration, comparative administrative law got a new impetus in recent years2 
when the comparison has been focused on particular administrative principles like 
legitimacy,3 or protection of legitimate expectations.4 In this book, we want to con­
tinue this work studying the principle of effective legal protection, another fundamen­
tal principle of administrative law. Procedural fairness is a substantial requirement of 
the rule of law principle whenever public power is exercised. According to this prin­
ciple, the government – and its agencies – are bound by law, and it can prevail only 
if procedural rules are respected by all public authorities. It has significance not only 
for the better acceptance of the individual decisions of state institutions, but also for 
building a democratic consensus and legitimacy in society. 
We explore this principle at European and national levels as well, but our main 
objective in this book is to study the various national understandings and practices 
of effective legal protection in administrative law. For this purpose, we examine how 
this principle has been developed and used by the European Court of Justice and 
the European Court of Human Rights, and what it means in the general interna­
tional law. Then, the institutions, procedures and rights of effective legal protection 
are analysed in 14 national jurisdictions. These countries represent all legal cultures, 
administrative systems and regions of contemporary Europe. 
Studying our topic, we use a comparative and legal method. By a general com­
parison of the national situations we examine if there are general trends in the 
development and the application of this principle. In order to compare the relevant 
legislation and practice of the various countries, all authors of these chapters used a 
common analytical framework. It meant the use of certain standard elements and, as 
far as it was possible, similar methodology in describing and analysing the national 
situations. Thus, each country report follows more or less the same structure describ­
ing the historical development of this principle, the current constitutional landscape 
1 E.g. Karl-Heinz Ladeur (ed.), The Europeanisation of Administrative Law: Transforming National Decision-
Making Procedures (Ashgate, Aldershot 2002). 
2 Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth (eds.), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar, Chel­
tenham, Northampton 2010). 
3 Matthias Ruffert (ed.), Legitimacy in European Administrative Law: Reform and Reconstruction (Europa Law 
Publishing, Groningen 2011). 
4 Kari Anneken Sperr and Diana zu Hohenlohe-Oehringen (eds.), The Protection of Legitimate Expectations in 






analysing the most important domestic instruments and procedures, and the relevant 
effects of European law. Secondly, we apply a legal approach to public administration, 
rather than a managerial-organisational or political outlook.5 This follows from the 
inherently legal nature of the procedural fairness that is the subject of this enterprise. 
In the course of our research project, we combined two approaches of the system 
of effective legal protection of individual rights and legitimate interests. The so-called 
‘rights-based perspective’ has provided a conceptual framework for expounding the 
available rights of individuals to legal remedy in national jurisdictions. For this objec­
tive, we have defined and elaborated those rights which have relevance here. Since 
there are significant differences between the examined countries in defining these 
rights, and in their importance, we did not give a closed list of the ‘relevant’ rights, 
rather, we used a ‘functional’ approach to assist the identification of them. 
Apparently, the effective legal protection of rights in administrative law presup­
poses an institutional system guaranteeing or enforcing individual rights. The ‘institu­
tional approach’ relates to mechanisms of institutional settings existing in the various 
countries. In this part of the research, the organisation, the scope of responsibility, 
or the working method of the various courts, tribunals or other institutions were rel­
evant, but only as far as they have importance for the protection of individual rights 
of the citizens. 
This book follows in three major parts the research project as introduced above. 
Part I begins a conceptualisation of the principle of effective legal protection in 
administrative law, defining core issues and elaborating the conceptual framework 
of our research. The other studies of this part analyse this principle on a European 
level, mainly in the jurisprudence of international/European courts. Part II includes 
collections of the country studies analysing the present situation of this imperative in 
the national administrative jurisdictions of the Western and the CEE countries. As a 
matter of fact, characteristic differences have not been revealed between these groups 
of countries. In the last section, Part III, we finally provide comparative studies and 
share some conclusions. 
After all, this book does not only present a detailed study of a core principle of the 
administrative law in Europe, but can also contribute to a general scholarly debate on 
the minimum requirements of basic rights in those situations, when individuals come 
into contact with governmental authorities, and when the exercise of public power 
directly affects their rights and interests. 
This book is based on a research project of the Institute for Legal Studies of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and was partially financed by the National Univer­
sity of Public Service, Budapest. The first drafts were discussed by the participants of 
the research project in an international seminar held in Budapest in June 2014. 
We would like to thank all contributors to this book and participants of the Buda­
pest conference. Moreover, we thank Alison Kirk for her professional support in pub­
lishing this book with Routledge. 
Zoltán Szente and Konrad Lachmayer 
Budapest/Vienna 
5 For these possible approaches of administrative studies see David H. Rosenblom, ‘Public Administration 
Theory and Separation of Powers’ in Julia Beckett and Heidi O. Koenig (eds.), Public Administration and 
Law (M. E. Sharpe, Armonk 2005) 7–21. 
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1 Conceptualising the principle 




1 The concept of effective legal protection 
The principle of effective legal protection as such is primarily known from, and seems 
to be the product of, European supranational law. As we will see in the following 
chapters, this fundamental requirement has been developed by the jurisprudence of 
the European courts, with some of its elements codified by the primary legislation of 
the European Union. 
However, this book does not focus on the supranational approach of this prin­
ciple; rather, it explores its meaning and application in the national administra­
tive law systems all over Europe. Despite the great diversity of the national legal
systems in this respect, it is generally accepted that this principle is one of the
major tenets of the principle of the rule of law as enshrined in many European
constitutions. 
The elasticity and versatility of this term makes its conceptualisation particularly 
important. For this purpose, we begin by briefly examining what this concept means 
within European law, and then investigate its basic characteristics in the national 
systems of administrative law, attempting to provide a working concept to be used 
throughout this book. 
1.1 The principle of effective legal protection in European supranational law 
The concept of effective legal protection is deeply entrenched in the European
Union’s legislation and in the case law of the European Court of Justice, and is also
familiar in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Art. 19(1)
of the Treaty on European Union states that the ‘Member States shall provide rem­
edies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union
law’. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in its Art. 47,
again in the fields covered by EU law, provides the right to an effective remedy and
to a fair trial for everyone whose rights guaranteed by the law of the Union have
been violated. 















In the absence of a general code of common European administrative law,1,2 
the most important procedural guarantees have been developed by the European 
courts.3 While the founding treaties contain some substantial and procedural princi­
ples for EU administrative law, the secondary legislation of EU law relates mostly to 
sectoral areas. The ECJ, on the basis of the legal traditions of the Member States, has 
therefore had a prominent role in elaborating the administrative principles which are 
more general in nature. The Court has created a positive obligation of the member 
countries to evolve efficient mechanisms and procedural conditions for safeguarding 
remedies intended to provide legal protection of interested parties who have been 
adversely affected by the infringement of EU law.4 Thus, the principle of effective 
judicial protection is so deeply entrenched in EU law that some think it has a quasi-
constitutional status.5 In spite of the lack of a European code of administrative law or 
a separate and specialised system of administrative courts in the continent,6 several 
attempts have been made so far to summarise the common standards of administra­
tive law and procedures.7 
1 The term ‘European administrative law’ can be used in two different ways. First, it indicates the admin­
istrative rules of the European Union (including direct administrative implementation of EU law by the 
EU institutions, and the indirect application of these norms by the national authorities of the Member 
States); secondly, the concept can express the body of a commonly used European administrative law 
(ius commune). Jürgen Schwarze, Europaisches Verwaltungsrecht: Entstehung und Entwicklung im Rahmen der 
Europaischen Gemeinschaft (2nd edn., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2005) 51. 
EU administrative law is discussed in a huge range of literature, see in particular Jürgen Schwarze, 
European Administrative Law (Sweet and Maxwell, London 2006); Paul Craig, European Union Administra­
tive Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006); Herwig C. H. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe and Alexan­
der H. Türk (eds.), Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2011); Jean-Bernard and Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère (eds.), Traité de droit administratif européen
(2nd edn., Bruylant, Bruxelles 2014). 
In recent years, the administrative ius commune – focusing on the national administrative law systems 
and their common features – has become a fashionable topic in academic literature. See Armin von 
Bogdandy, Sabino Cassese and Peter M. Huber (eds.), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum: Band V Verwal­
tungsrecht in Europa: Grundzüge des Verwaltungsrechts in Europa (C. F. Müller, Heidelberg 2014). 
2 Schwarze (n. 1) 40. 
3 Alexander H. Türk, ‘Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Judicial Review’ (2013) 19 European Law 
Journal 126, 129. 
4 Linda Maria Ravo, ‘The Role of the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in the EU and Its Impact on 
National Jurisdictions’ in Edizioni Universitá di Trieste (ed.), Sources of Law and Legal Protection (Edizioni 
Università di Trieste, Trieste 2012) 101, 108. 
5 Trakis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 4. For the history 
of the principle in EU law, see Brunessen Bertrand and Jean Sirinelli, ‘Le principe du droit au juge et à 
une protection juridictionnelle effective’ in Jean-Bernard and Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère (eds.), 
Traité de droit administratif européen (2nd edn., Bruylant, Bruxelles 2014) 568–587. 
6 Martin Shapiro, ‘The Institutionalization of European Administrative Space’ in Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne 
Sandholtz and Neil Fligstein (eds.), The Institutionalization of Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2001) 95. 
7	 Recommendation Rec(2004)20 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on judicial review of administra­
tive acts; Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)7 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on good administra­
tion; For the EU law: René Seerden and Frits Stroink (eds.), Administrative Law of the European Union, 
Its Member States and the United States: A Comparative Analysis (Intersentia, Antwerpen-Groningen 2007); 
Anne Meuwese, Ymre Schuurmans and Wim Voermans, ‘Towards a European Administrative Procedure 
Act’ (2009) 2 Review of European Administrative Law 3–35. The most important initiative is the Research 
Network on EU Administrative Law, founded in 2009, which is a research network of over 100 scholars, 
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Without denying the autonomous development and innovative role of European
law-making and judicial practice, the central argument of this book is that the whole
process of the Europeanisation of administrative law is based on values and prin­
ciples of the national administrative law systems. All the relevant parts of EU law,
the ECHR or the jurisprudence of the ECJ as well as the ECtHR originate in the
common constitutional traditions of the Member States, as is explicitly recognised
both by the founding documents of European integration and in the practice of
European courts. 
1.2 Effective legal protection in national legal systems 
In fact, the principle of effective legal protection in this form does not appear in 
the constitutions of the European countries. However, as we will see in the chapters 
about the various national administrative systems, it is regarded in all countries as 
an abstract constitutional principle in itself, or as a conglomerate of several guaran­
tees and requirements with constitutional status. Indeed, what are mostly judicially 
inspired guarantees at European level are deeply-rooted and well-established consti­
tutional principles and legal safeguards in the national legal systems. 
The concept of legal protection originates from the different manifestations of 
the idea of rule of law; it is a core idea in the doctrine of the German Rechtsstaat and 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition as well as in their equivalent concepts in some Western 
European countries (Stato di diritto, État de droit, Estado de derecho). Despite the diver­
sity of the path-dependent development of the national administrative laws, it was a 
common feature that, as the extended powers of the executive branch of government 
were taken for granted, there was a natural need for establishing guarantees for per­
sonal freedoms, rights and legitimate interests vis-à-vis state intervention. 
To conceptualise this principle, it is advisable to examine all of its definitive ele­
ments separately. 
1.3 Legal protection 
The legal protection of individual rights against illegal state intervention is a key issue 
in all modern democracies. There is no doubt that it is a very general concept. How­
ever, the claim for legal protection may always arise whenever the exercise of public 
power adversely affects the rights or interests of the citizens. Therefore, it must exist 
in all branches and areas of law. The general functions of legal protection are: (1) to 
defend the rights and legitimate interests of citizens (and their groups and organisa­
tions) against arbitrary actions of government agencies, and (2) to monitor the objec­
tive legal order. 
Thus, the first goal of legal protection is always to protect the individuals’ rights, 
freedoms and legitimate interests against overarching and unlawful state interven­
tion, while the second is to ensure the general legality and rule of law by providing 
external checks of the public authorities. These two sides of legal protection can be 
contributions see www.reneual.eu. See in particular Herwig C. H. Hofmann, Jens-Peter Schneider and 
Jacques Ziller (eds.), ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure, http://www.reneual.eu/ 
images/Home/ReNEUAL-Model_Rules-Compilation_BooksI_VI_2014-09-03.pdf. 









   





conceptualised as a subjective and an objective aspect of the same phenomenon: the 
protection of individual rights and for guaranteeing the objective legal order. 
The various instruments of legal protection may be used to defend the subjec­
tive rights and the objective legal order to a different extent; for instance, in some 
countries, the ex officio procedures of public prosecutors are useful mechanisms for 
promoting public interests, whereas the constitutional right of the citizens to appeal 
against governmental actions is a valuable instrument for protecting and enforcing 
the individual rights. 
In this context, the protection has a legal character which means that it is real­
ised by institutions and via proceedings laid down by law. Of course, certain indi­
vidual rights and interests may also be defended by other means, such as through
democratic accountability, moral obligation or other informal rules. The classic
form of this principle is judicial protection, but the concept has a wider scope than
this, since the enforcement of individual rights also has non-judicial tools, such as
general principles, substantive and procedural rights during the administrative (or
other kinds of) procedure and other institutional guarantees (e.g. ombudsman-type
protection). 
1.4 ‘Effective’ legal protection 
While legal protection has long been a well-established concept in the national sys­
tems of administrative law, the requirement of ‘effectiveness’ had, for a while, distinc­
tive implications in EU law, where in its original form, this principle related to the 
Community institutions and the Member States’ obligation to ensure the effective 
implementation (effet utile) of EU law, rather than the protection of individual rights.8 
Recently, however, there has been a shift of its meaning from the requirements of 
equivalence and effectiveness9 towards a human rights-based approach using the prin­
ciples of necessity and proportionality for balancing the rights of individuals and the 
justification of the relevant provisions.10 According to a more permissive approach, 
there is only a difference in degree of the strictness of the relevant requirements, in 
that the new concept of effective judicial protection demands more sophisticated 
procedural guarantees for the rights of individuals conferred on them by EU law 
than the old standard of effectiveness and equivalence.11 In any case, the principle of 
effectiveness in EU law imposes duties on the Member States ‘to ensure judicial pro­
tection of an individual’s rights under Community law’,12 and it means ‘that a national 
procedural rule should not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to 
exercise EU law rights’.13 Accordingly, legal protection is effective if individuals have 
effective access to courts enforcing the rights conferred on them by EU law and these 
8 Ravo (n. 4) 113. 
9 For these concepts see the Görisch report in this volume. 
10 Ravo (n. 4) 112. 
11 Sacha Prechal, ‘Redefining the Relationship Between “Rewe-effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Pro­
tection’ (2011) 4 Review of European Administrative Law 31–50. 
12 Case C-286/06 Impact [2008] ECR I-2483. para 47–48, and Case C-63/08 Pontin [2009] ECR I-10467. 
13 Johanna Engström, ‘The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection After the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 4 
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courts have at their disposal effective remedies to eliminate the violation of law.14 It 
is worth noting that, as the Charter is legally binding for the member countries, they 
all have to ensure effective judicial protection of the rights recognised by the Charter. 
However, the national legal systems know and apply this principle not only because 
EU law requires it, but primarily as a result of their own organic development. 
Although it is very difficult to come up with a unified definition of effectiveness from 
the different conceptions of national administrative laws,15 it can surely be said that it 
involves the real availability of legal remedies for the parties of administrative proce­
dures. Thus, the first criterion of effectiveness is that the use of these tools cannot be 
impossible or excessively difficult for those whose rights are negatively affected by an 
act of an administrative authority. In other words, legal protection cannot be merely a 
theoretical possibility for those involved, and they must be able to resort to its institu­
tions and processes. 
Furthermore, in its modern approach, legal protection, whatever specific instru­
ments it consists of, must be more than the mere possibility to take action against 
the activities of state agencies. It must provide, in theory at least, feasible tools for 
protecting individual rights and legitimate interests. Certainly, the legal protection 
of rights may not guarantee that private parties will attain their goals in administra­
tive or judicial proceedings, or that any decision making body should decide in their 
favour. However, the available institutions and processes must be able to give remedy 
against the illegal actions of governmental agencies when this unlawfulness violates 
individual rights or legitimate interests. 
In summary, the exercise of public power imposing sanctions or duties on people 
cannot be immune to any legal review, but it must be subject to controlling mecha­
nisms to protect individual rights and the objective legal order. 
1.5 Effective legal protection in administrative law 
According to a famous and catchy quotation, ‘administrative law is a concretised con­
stitutional law’.16 Nevertheless, if we focus on the principle of effective legal protection 
in the field of administrative law, first, it must be clear exactly what the object of that 
protection is, and secondly, it should also be clarified what threatens the protected 
values. In this book, we use the concept of administrative law in its most common 
sense, presenting it as a special area or branch of law which is a set of legal principles 
and rules governing the powers, organisations and procedures of public administra­
tion, as well as the remedies against illegal administrative actions to protect individual 
rights and public interests.17 
14 For a comparative view, see Rob Widdershoven, ‘European Administrative Law’ in René Seerden and 
Frits Stroink (eds.), Administrative Law of the European Union, Its Member States and the United States: A Com­
parative Analysis (Intersentia, Antwerpen-Groningen 2007). 
15 Certainly, effectiveness may also be used in different connotations in administrative law. Most fre­
quently, it means a condition of a capable and well-functioning government or, alternatively, an effica­
cious administrative action that achieves its goals. 
16 Fritz Werner, ‘Verwaltungsrecht als konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht’ (1959) 74 Deutsches Verwaltungs­
blatt 527–533. 
17 John S. Bell, ‘Comparative Administrative Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 1262. 








The substance and forms of effective legal protection are deeply influenced by
the major development paths of European administrative law, that is, according to
mainstream literature and widely-held opinion, the traditions of French droit admin­
istratif, English administrative law and German Verwaltungsrecht.18 Although all of
them are based on a specific concept of the rule of law, and have special legal insti­
tutions and administrative cultures, the essential components of legal protection
are similar. 
First and foremost, legal protection is mostly suitable for defending constitutional 
and legal rights. Evidently, those rights that are explicitly or implicitly recognised 
by law can be legally protected. Presumably, the more specific the legal claim, the 
more effective the protection, in particular in administrative law, where the exercise 
of public power is most noticeable in everyday life. Administrative authorities most 
often decide in individual cases and they impose obligations or take action on rights 
as concrete legal entitlements (in legal phraseology: to do or not to do something, or 
to require the same from others). However, this may not always be true. As we will see 
in the country reports, normative acts may also be reviewed by courts in many coun­
tries, while the respect of general principles of law, like proportionality or the equal 
treatment of citizens, may be controlled as well. 
While the protection of fundamental (constitutionally or legally recognised) rights 
is straightforward, the concept of legitimate interest is not so clear-cut: a legal right is 
itself a legally protected private interest, but in general, administrative law provides 
some protection for private interests even if they are not specified as a particular legal 
entitlement. It is much more a legal standard where the subject of a procedure or an 
action has a tangible stake for the affected persons. As parties in all legal procedures 
must be treated as persons of equal dignity, public authorities must always consider 
all of the relevant circumstances of the case and find a solution which respects the 
individual rights and personal interests to the greatest extent. A private interest is 
‘legitimate’ if it is worthy of protection, that is as far as it exceeds the public interest 
or other private interests. 
In reality, not only individuals or groups of people but also legal persons can be 
involved in administrative procedures, as far as they may also have certain rights and 
legitimate interests recognised by law. Thus, most procedural principles are applied 
to them as well. Perhaps the provision of legal aid is the only due process instrument 
from which legal persons may not benefit. 
The next basic question concerns what encroachments these rights and legitimate 
interests should be protected against. Legal remedies may be given mainly against 
administrative acts. Normally, administrative authorities have to formalise their 
actions when they affect the rights and obligations of any private person. Otherwise, 
public authorities could decide at will whether to issue a formal act or not in the case, 
and, as only the formal administrative acts may be submitted for legal control, the 
scope of legal protection would depend on decision making of the public authority. 
Although there is a great variety of definitions of administrative acts in the various 
countries, in the most general terms, these are legal acts – including individual and 
18 Bernardo Sordi, ‘Révolution, Rechtsstaat, and the Rule of Law: Historical Reflections Ont He Emergence 
of Administrative Law in Europe’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth (eds.), Comparative 
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normative ones – of administrative bodies, which are passed in the exercise of pub­
lic authority and which may affect the rights and legitimate interests of citizens and 
legal persons. These are legal acts having a public law character (which means that 
they can be enforced by legitimate force) with the aim of having a legal effect. They 
must be enacted in the course of a formalised law-making process (regulations, nor­
mative acts) or administrative procedure19 (individual decisions). In this respect, the 
interested parties are the persons and their groups and organisations whose interests
are directly affected by an administrative act. Paradoxically, as far as legal protec­
tion is concerned, the absence of a decision – either because of a refusal to act, or 
an omission to do so – is also to be considered as an act, when an administrative 
body is obliged by law to make a decision in a case before it. The ‘silence’ of public 
administration, after a time specified by law, must be open to judicial review. In this 
case, the competent agency has to explain the reasons why it has not conducted the 
appropriate procedure or made a decision. It is also to be noted that certain fields 
of administrative activity are exempt from the accepted forms of legal protection. 
The actions of public authorities having a purely civil law character do not fall within 
the category of appealable decisions. Policy guidelines, concluding public contracts, 
public service delivery, organisational measures, management decisions and internal 
processes of governmental authorities are usually also exempt from legal challenges 
within the scope of administrative law, as these administrative actions do not normally 
directly affect individual rights or private interests. Yet this does not mean that even 
these actions are entirely immune from any external control. Civil law claims may 
be enforced by civil litigation, while internal actions can be subject to administrative 
supervision. But these actions and processes do not fall within our field of interest 
here, as they do not belong to the sphere of public power and are beyond the scope 
of administrative law. 
One of the primary elements of the rights of fair process is surely the administrative 
procedure. This is a legally established mechanism of administrative decision making, 
adjudication and regulation concerning the rights and duties of private parties (natu­
ral persons or corporate organisations). The administrative procedure is understood 
as the decision making process of administrative bodies as defined by law. 
The other domain of procedural rights is the judicial review of administrative acts. 
In this context, a judicial review involves the checking of the legality of an admin­
istrative act by a court with the power to adopt appropriate measures for restoring 
lawfulness, if necessary. A judicial process is also a legally binding procedure, but it 
has a lot of features that are distinct from those of the administrative procedure. First 
of all, the administrative authority and the court exert various kinds of powers and 
exercise different state functions. The administrative procedures usually have a non-
adversarial character, this being the main difference from the judicial process. Some­
times the same sub-principle or right of legal protection is treated or used differently 
19 Although the terms ‘administrative process/procedure/proceeding’ are usually used indiscriminately 
to refer to the formal and legalised way of decision making of public authorities in individual cases, in 
this book, we prefer the term ‘administrative procedure’, distinguishing it from the law-making pro­
cess and judicial proceeding. It is to be noted that in some languages, the administrative and judicial 
proceedings are designated by different notions (like Verwaltungsverfahren versus Verwaltungsprozess in 
German). 
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in the administrative procedure and in the judicial process. The hearing, for example, 
does not form part of a cross-examination in the former, but it can be used instead 
for consultation or cooperation between the decision making body and the affected 
private parties. It is another distinctive characteristic of administrative procedures 
that they have two equally important objectives, as they are designed not only to pro­
tect individual rights and legitimate interests, but also to realise public interests. The 
latter must be achieved not only by defending the objective legal order, irrespective 
of the benefits of the private parties, but also through the most rational, effective and 
efficient administrative conduct. Although this dualistic rationale of administrative 
procedure is also characteristic of the judicial process, its mechanism is usually set 
in motion at the initiative of the directly interested parties in order to achieve their 
individual aims. In contrast, the administrative procedure is obligatory under certain 
circumstances, and can often be launched ex officio. 
The dual purpose of administrative procedures is reflected in the multifunctional 
character of some fair process rights. Thus, while the participatory rights of the pri­
vate parties are an important means for achieving the individual aims and protecting 
the clients’ rights, they also provide tools for the fact-finding process of the admin­
istrative authority to ascertain the relevant circumstances of the given case. Further­
more, the indispensable right of the parties to represent their interests might also 
effectively contribute to the finding of the proper legal arguments necessary for the 
correct administrative decision. 
In this book we explore all tools of effective legal protection in administrative law. 
While mainstream literature has for a long time concentrated on the judicial protec­
tion of rights, we examine the relevant instruments in all areas of administrative law, 
including the administrative decision making process itself, and other forms of rights-
protection (like the ombudsman-type protection). Only the parliamentary account­
ability of government agencies is not discussed here, although it might have some 
legally relevant mechanisms, or might be able to promote individual rights. But the 
political control of administrative policy or decision making do not fall within the 
scope of administrative law, so it is not part of our focus here. 
2 Justifications for the principle of legal protection 
2.1 Rule of law justifications 
For our purposes, the principle of effective legal protection means procedural fair­
ness requiring the respect of a certain set of procedural rights. This is a require­
ment and component of the underlying principle of rule of law: the fundamental 
premise of this tenet is that the exercise of the public power is legitimate only if it is 
exerted according to and within the limits of the law. Although the classical versions 
of the rule of law (like the German Rechtsstaat, or the English rule of law) have some 
specialities, all manifestations of the principle have a common basis: public power 
is bound by law, and the rights of individuals must be protected against the illegal 
encroachment of the state. The major requirements of the principle of rule of law 
in administrative law are to keep public authorities within the sphere of their powers 
and responsibilities, and to ensure that they follow the relevant rules of decision mak­
ing procedures. They require that a balance has to be struck between the individual 
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public interest for the efficient and effective operation of public administration. This 
balance appears, albeit with different emphases, throughout the whole process of 
administrative cases both in their administrative and judicial phases. 
The principle of rule of law has direct implications for the justification of these 
rights, since in functional terms the procedural rights seem to have merely an instru­
mental role for guaranteeing the substantive rights of the private parties. Thus, if the 
desired outcome has been reached in a proceeding, the possible procedural irregu­
larities do not make sense. Or even when the procedural error has apparently not 
influenced the final decision (whatever that may be), the faulty act should not be 
quashed. It might be said that in such cases the private or public interest for whose 
safeguard these guarantees were required have been ensured in another way. But 
the fair and due process has an inherent value for the rule of law, especially for legal 
certainty, as one of its most essential components. If this is so, this value must be 
irrespective of the particular outcome of a procedure, at least in the case of a serious 
breach of these principles. 
Certainly, the proper application of procedural requirements itself does not make 
the decision legally valid or correct, as the substantive principles or rules might have 
been violated. Observing the requirements of fair process is a necessary, though not 
always satisfactory, condition for the right decisions in administrative law. 
Even within their scope of responsibilities, administrative bodies can have a dif­
ferent degree of freedom to act. However, the procedural justice preserves its full 
importance when discretionary power (freies Ermessen, pouvoir discrétionnaire) is exer­
cised. This is the case when no single right answer (or a sole legally binding decision) 
follows from the situation and, within the legal framework, some degree of choice is 
allowed to the administrative body. Discretionary powers can be conferred on public 
authorities for several reasons, for example, when the relevant circumstances cannot 
be foreseen, or the factual situation is so complex that the right decision can be taken 
only after the due consideration of all relevant facts of the case. The significance of 
compliance with fair process is particularly appreciated to avoid the arbitrariness of 
the administrative decision. 
The importance of procedural fairness comes from the intrinsic position of the 
citizens and other private parties facing the administrative body, which acts in the 
administrative procedures as a representative of the state exercising public power. 
In administrative cases, the decision maker and the addressees are in a hierarchical 
relationship, as the former may make actions of its own imposing duties on the latter 
in a one-sided manner. This asymmetry needs to be counterbalanced in a fair trial, 
and the procedural rights of the clients are appropriate tools for this purpose. Never­
theless, there must be a delicate balance between the efficient and effective work of 
administration and the affected basic rights. 
2.2 Human rights-based justifications 
The other possible form of justification comes from a rights-based approach,20 with 
the administrative procedural rights claiming that human dignity is only respected if 
20 See e.g. Eva Storskrubb and Jacques Ziller, ‘Access to Justice in European Comparative Law’ in Franc­
esco Francioni (ed.), Access to Justice as a Human Right (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 178–204. 







   
the individuals are treated fairly by the public authorities of the state. Those persons 
who cannot present their views in the procedure, or cannot rely on the impartiality of 
the public authorities in the course of the administrative adjudication in which their 
rights and interests are affected, are deprived of equal respect of dignity.21 
The compliance of the administrative decision making with the requirements of 
both the standards of rule of law and fundamental rights is necessary to accept the 
adoption of administrative acts as the legitimate exercise of public power.22 Even 
though a properly conducted procedure is only a necessary condition of legitimacy, 
though not sufficient on its own, the term of ‘procedural legitimacy’ seems to have 
become a widely-used autonomous concept.23 
Legal protection has a particular significance in administrative law where the per­
sons who are the addressees of the decisions of public authorities are inherently in a 
non-equal position with the decision maker. So the core value of this principle is that 
the affected citizens and corporate entities must be treated fairly in the processes of 
administrative activities. 
3. What rights make up procedural fairness? 
Procedural fairness is a set of procedural rights available to citizens for defending 
their rights against illegal actions of administrative bodies. These rights have different 
characters and importance even for the same people, depending on their position 
and the nature of the proceedings in which their cases are being settled. 
In this book, we are interested in those ‘procedural rights’ which are employed 
to protect private rights and interests vis-à-vis the public authority or the adversarial 
party. 
3.1 Substantive versus procedural rights 
Effective legal protection as a basic entitlement encompasses a whole series of rights 
and procedural requirements. These rights can have different relevance, or the same 
rights can have more or less different functions in the various processes of adminis­
trative law. For our purpose, the ‘relevant’ rights are the so-called procedural rights, 
rather than substantive ones. Although this sort of differentiation is widely-used in 
subject literature,24 these two categories often emerge without distinction, as a con­
glomerate of fundamental principles having different characteristics.25 In fact, both 
21 Sérvulo Correia, ‘Administrative Due or Fair Process: Different Paths in the Evolutionary Formation of 
a Global Principle and of a Global Right’ in Gordon Anthony, Jean-Bernard Auby, John Morison and 
Tom Zwart (eds.), Values in Global Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2011) 321. 
22 For a discussion of the legitimating function of decision making procedures in general terms, see Niklas 
Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 2001). 
23 Matthias Ruffert, ‘Comparative Perspectives of Administrative Legitimacy’ in Matthias Ruffert (ed.), 
Legitimacy in European Administrative Law: Reform and Reconstruction (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 
2011) 353–360. 
24 See e.g. Hanns Peter Nehl, ‘Administrative Law’ in Jan M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 2006) 24–25. 
25 See for example: European Principles for Public Administration. SIGMA Papers No. 27. OECD Publish­
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European and national courts frequently refer to all of them together as the princi­
ples of administrative procedures without such a differentiation. 
Conceptually, substantive rights are frequently held to exist for their own sake, con­
stituting the ‘material’ part of administrative law.26 In other words, they involve core 
values and interests of the relevant parties, and relate to the substance of the meas­
ures, like equality before the law, the right to sound (or good) administration, the 
principle of accountability, or such requirements as the principles of proportionality 
or the protection of legitimate expectations and vested rights. 
Our work focuses on procedural rights of private parties enabling them to rep­
resent their legitimate rights and interests. The basic function of these rights is to 
enforce the substantive rights, providing formal tools and procedures for those who 
are affected by administrative decisions. These rights have a procedural character 
inasmuch as they influence administrative actions regardless of the merit of the par­
ticular cases.27 As a matter of fact, they have an instrumental role as far as they provide 
tools for achieving and enforcing individual rights or other interests. These rights not 
only prevent administrative agencies from going beyond the boundaries of their legal 
mandate (i.e. they cannot do anything ultra vires), but also ensure the fair treatment 
of the parties throughout the whole decision making process.28 
There is sometimes a differentiation between the thin and thick meaning of rule 
of law, that is between formal and substantive rule of law. In this project, the thin or 
formal aspects of rights, that is to say procedural rights, are highlighted. There are 
other classifications of rights and principles of administrative justice, placing due pro­
cess rights under the heading of ‘sound’ or ‘good’ governance,29 or differentiating 
‘material’ and ‘formal’ principles.30 Others postulate a new or ‘fourth’ generation of 
human rights as requirements or principles of ‘good administration’, on the 
grounds that the most important rights are entrenched in the European Charter of 
Administrative Space’ as follows: the principle of administration through law; the principles of pro­
portionality, legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations, non-discrimination, the right to 
a hearing in administrative decision making procedures, interim relief, fair conditions for access of 
individuals to administrative courts, non-contractual liability of the public administration. For the 
commonly shared ’European’ principles of administrative law, see: Martin Shapiro, ‘The Institution­
alisation of European Administrative Space’ in Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sadholtz and Neil Fligstein 
(eds.), The Institutionalisation of Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 99–110; Peter M. Huber, 
‘Grundzüge des Verwaltungsrechts in Europa – Problemaufriss und Synthese’ in Armin von Bogdandy, 
Sabino Cassese and Peter M. Huber (eds.), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum: Band V Verwaltungsrecht 
in Europa: Grundzüge Grundzüge des Verwaltungsrechts in Europa (C. F. Müller, Heidelberg 2014) 15–18. 
26 However, some scholars claim that the principles of administrative law ’are largely procedural in char­
acter’. Carol Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’ (2006) 17 The 
European Journal of International Law 187, 192. 
27 Anna Simonati, ‘The Principles of Administrative Procedure and the EU Courts: An Evolution in Pro­
gress?’ (2011) 4 Review of European Administrative Law 45, 46. 
28 Shapiro (n. 25) 94. 
29 See e.g. Mark I. Aronson, Bruce D. Dyer and Matthew Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action
(3rd edn., Law Book Co, Sydney 2004) 1; Carol Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for 
Principles and Values’ 195. 
30 Karl-Peter Sommermann, ‘Prinzipien des Verwaltungsrechts’ in Armin von Bogdandy, Sabino Cas­
sese and Peter M. Huber (eds.), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum: Band V Verwaltungsrecht in Europa: 
Grundzüge Grundzüge des Verwaltungsrechts in Europa (C. F. Müller, Heidelberg 2014) 878–889. 















Fundamental Rights.31 Nevertheless, the classification of individual rights according 
to their substantive or procedural nature can better serve our undertaking of a wide-
ranging comparison of the existing systems of rights-protection in administrative law 
than any other theoretical framework. 
Certainly, it is often difficult to differentiate between ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ 
rights, and other conceptualisations may, of course, be plausible. Due or fair admin­
istrative process32 could also be used for a conceptual framework. Whenever these 
concepts are explored or analysed, very similar components are discussed, like the 
principles of audi alteram partem or nemo iudex in causa sua, which are crucial issues in 
this book as well, since the right of the parties to participate in the proceedings where 
their rights and obligations are determined, or the impartiality of adjudication plays 
an important role in the system of procedural rights as they are understood here. 
However, we abandoned the general use of the term ‘due process’ as it primarily 
refers to the American constitutional terminology insofar as the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the US Constitution require ‘due process of law’ for protecting the 
‘life, liberty or property’ of citizens. It is worth noting that its American concept 
embodies not only procedural requirements but also substantive rights which fall out­
side the field of interest of this book.33 
Another conceptual problem raises the question of how to distinguish the various 
procedural rights from each other. The particular rights can interrelate with each 
other, and do so in a complicated way. There is no authentic order of these rights, so 
the same lists of rights do not appear in national administrative law. The most usual 
procedural rights are: 
•	 the right to be a party (and right to intervention); 
•	 the right to be heard; 
•	 the right to access to the relevant documents; 
•	 the right to legal counsel; 
•	 the duty to give reasons (for administrative decisions); 
•	 the right to an administrative act within a reasonable time (as a guarantee against 
the ‘silence’ of the administrative body); 
•	 the right to access to the court; 
•	 the right to appeal. 
A special category of these rights are ‘participatory’ in their nature, as they provide 
direct involvement of the parties in the decision making process.34 Other rights ena­
ble the interested parties to seek justice via various institutions, so we refer to this col­
lection of rights as ‘access to justice’. In reality, these two groups of rights are closely 
31 Klara Kanska, ‘Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU: Impact of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights’ (2004) 10 European Law Journal 296. 
32 Correia (n. 21) 313–361. 
33 Jerry L. Mashaw, ‘Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory’ (1981) 61 Boston Uni­
versity Law Review 885–931, and Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (Yale University 
Press 1985); Peter L. Strauss, An Introduction to Administrative Justice in the United States (Carolina Aca­
demic Press, Durham 1989) 32–33. 
34 Sabino Cassese, ‘A Global Due Process of Law?’ in Gordon Anthony, Jean-Bernard Auby, John Morison 
and Tom Zwart (eds.), Values in Global Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2011) 20–48. 
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linked, and indeed are often meaningless without the other. The simple entitlement 
to get involved in litigation without any more participatory rights, for example, does 
not provide real protection for the parties. 
Sometimes, other procedural rights (or, alternatively, the public authorities’ duties) 
are claimed, like the notice of the bringing of proceedings, the right to present evi­
dence, the right to be notified of the final decision, etc. But the precise and complete 
list of the relevant rights depends on the criteria applied for identifying them, as they 
are of different levels of abstraction. The rights listed above are all ‘composite’ in the 
sense that they absorb many other accessory rights and instruments. Moreover, not 
all of these rights are available in each case, even when all of them are recognised by 
a national legal system. Their application can depend on the nature of the affected 
interests or can vary in the different phases of the various administrative proceedings. 
In certain cases, for example, the decision making body, balancing the competing 
interests, may determine which procedural requirements can be used and to what 
extent. Sometimes the costs of the administrative procedure, or the benefits to be 
expected, are more significant than providing a special tool for the private parties to 
promote their own rights or interests. 
A lot of procedural principles and rules are not discussed in this book, even if they 
can be significant in the relevant proceedings. However, despite the fact that they are 
‘procedural’ in their nature, they fall outside our field of interest since they have no 
protective function for private rights and interests, promoting instead effectiveness, 
efficiency or some other property of the administrative machinery. In addition, the 
majority of procedural rules are technical requirements imposing duties on admin­
istrative bodies to conduct affairs in a rational and transparent way, as well as on the 
private parties in order to ensure their cooperation with the decision making body 
during the whole process. 
As has been mentioned, procedural rights can be divided into two groups. On 
the one hand, some of them ensure the effective participation of the citizens and 
other private parties in the administrative procedure. On the other, they open the way 
for parties to seek administrative justice by enforcing administrative acts in the cases 
affecting the clients’ rights and legitimate interests, and to access to court as external 
controller of administration. 
3.2 Participatory rights 
Although the right of standing is especially important for access to legal remedies, 
and thus to administrative justice, it should not be forgotten that the right to be 
a party also has great significance for the original decision making process as well. 
Frequently, people may promote their interests and attain their goals by submitting 
an application to the competent body, requesting the legal recognition of an exist­
ing relationship or legal entitlement for doing (e.g. using or possessing) something. 
In this way, the administrative procedure itself often has a function of protecting or 
facilitating individual rights or private interests. In addition, this right also matters 
in the case of ex officio procedures or in any other administrative decision making 
processes when rights and legitimate interests of parties (be they citizens, groups or 
corporate organisations) are affected by an administrative act. 
As we have seen above, the principle of rule of law requires that public authorities 
exercise their powers in a transparent way, complying with the related procedural 





    
 
rules and issuing legal acts. This requirement allows citizens to represent their inter­
ests by becoming parties in those procedures which directly influence their own lives. 
To support this kind of rights-protection, the operation of competent administrative 
authorities must be transparent for the public, and they must be obliged to notify all 
possible interested parties about the ongoing procedures, as well as clearly designat­
ing their administrative procedures or acts as such. 
It is another matter how conditions are set by law for standing. Just as in review 
proceedings, the competent body has to check whether these conditions are met. 
However, once the right to be a party in the relevant procedure has been refused by a 
public authority, this must be considered in the same way as if the competent admin­
istrative body refused to make a decision in an ongoing case, and as such, it must be 
open to judicial review. 
The law-maker may also provide this right for other people than those directly 
involved, if an administrative action affects a lot of people or has a great impact on 
their general interests, even though it only indirectly influences their lives. Thus, the 
law may allow certain social groups or organisations representing collective interests 
to take action against administrative acts that affect the protected area of life. Simi­
larly, public authorities (mainly public prosecutors and ombudsmen) might be per­
mitted to intervene in administrative procedures in order to protect public interests. 
For the sake of effective legal protection even in this early stage of administrative 
cases, the right to be a party should be supported by some other sub-principles and 
rights. Thus, ‘equality of arms’ and the right to use the mother tongue (or at least the 
language that the client understands well) are indispensable elements of the princi­
ple of fair trial or procedural fairness.35 While the former means that all parties have 
equal opportunity for access to the documents of the case or to submit evidence, the 
latter is a precondition for exercising participatory rights in the procedure. It is worth 
noting that the principle of equality of arms, on account of the inherent unequal 
position of the persons involved in the process compared to the decision making 
body, has a special significance in administrative disputes before the court. Thus, the 
proceeding is only to be considered fair if equal opportunities have been provided for 
the affected parties to influence the final administrative decision,36 which is a prereq­
uisite for fair and equal treatment of persons. 
The right to be heard also belongs to the group of participatory rights. This 
appears to be so self-evident that one may be surprised that its general recognition in 
the national systems of administrative law only occurred in recent decades in many 
countries: in Austria in 1925, in Germany in 1978 and in Italy in 1990, while in France 
and the UK it has not yet been recognised by any statute.37 Nevertheless, it might 
apply in administrative law, since the legal maxim of audi alteram partem or audiatur et 
altera pars (‘listen to/hear the other side as well’ or ‘no man should be condemned 
unheard’) was known already in ancient collections of legal maxims and law books.38 
35 See e.g. Bruno Oppetit, Philosophie du droit (Dalloz-Sirey, Paris 1999) 117. For the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR, see Pieter van Dijk, Godefridus J. H. Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, Boston 1998) 430. 
36 Correia (n. 21) 327. 
37 Cassese (n. 34) 59. 
38 See e.g. Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims, Classified and Illustrated (T. & J. W. Johnson & Co., 
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This participatory right involves a guarantee that, if an administrative authority takes 
a decision, it must hear the view of the interested parties and it has multiple benefits. 
On the one hand, the parties may present their proposals and legal statements on the 
merit of the case and they may submit evidence in support of their position. Further­
more, this right enables the parties to check whether the facts in the case have been 
correctly established or described. Equally, the parties’ statements allow the authority 
to obtain relevant information about the facts of the case and about the interests and 
legal opinions of the clients. The right must imply the obligation of the administrative 
authority to give due consideration to these opinions and suggestions – which must 
be reflected in the statement of reasons for the final decisions of the administrative 
authority in such a way that the appellant body or the court may check whether due 
consideration has taken place and the information and arguments of the parties have 
been correctly taken into account. 
The active participation of the private parties is usually not required. However, if 
the applicant (or in a later phase, the complainant) refuses to take part in the pro­
cedure (e.g. refusing to make information available to the competent body), he or 
she has to bear the consequences of this, including the possible rejection of his/her 
application or appeal. 
The hearing of the parties may be omitted in the case of a favourable decision, 
except when they possess information relevant to the final decision. 
There are some special and additional functions of the right to be heard in the law­
making process that are involved in administrative rule making. In such cases, per­
sons or organisations who represent general interests or other values for the sake of 
many people might also be given this right. In this regard, there are mutual interests 
of cooperation for the decision making authority and the addressees of the admin­
istrative act, since the active participation of the parties gives the chance for the rule 
maker to estimate the possible impact of the various options and it may enhance the 
effectiveness of the normative acts by gathering relevant information, policy alterna­
tives and suggestions. The legislator has, notwithstanding this, a wide range of appre­
ciation to determine the entitled groups or corporate bodies. 
The right to access to the relevant documents is also an indispensable ingredient 
of procedural fairness. This right rests on the assumption that a person is only able 
to protect effectively his or her rights and interests if he/she knows the relevant cir­
cumstances and facts of the case. It embraces access to the documents containing 
information about the matter. Normally, it also extends to the possibility to look into 
and make a copy of them. As with all other procedural rights, it may also be subject to 
certain restrictions imposed by law, such as for reasons of national security. 
The right to use of the assistance of legal counsel should also be included among 
the tools available to citizens whose concern is under investigation by public authori­
ties. In most administrative procedures, this is not necessary for the successful partici­
pation of the clients, whereas in judicial proceedings it may not be required by the 
court. At the same time, it cannot be prohibited, and the parties may not be sanc­
tioned because of the use of a legal representative. So it is really a procedural right, 
rather than an obligation. 
(Voorhis and Co. Law Publishers, New York 1878) 74; Seymour S. Peloubet, A Collection Of Legal Maxims 
in Law and Equity – With English Translations (New York 1880) 20. 






The right to legal aid is another aspect of this privilege. It can be provided for those 
who lack sufficient resources to resort to the assistance of a lawyer. In parallel with the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR,39 legal aid can usually be provided both for legal repre­
sentation or to cover the costs of proceedings. This right, or, conversely, the absence 
of legal aid is closely related to the principle of effective legal protection, because the 
poor financial situation of the potential or real parties of administrative procedures 
or litigation can result in denial of justice for them, preventing rightful claims from 
being submitted to court. 
3.3 Access to administrative justice 
3.3.1 Administrative protection 
The right to the administrative act within a reasonable time is an essential component 
of legal protection of individual rights. The decision is the outcome of the whole 
process, by which the administrative body may resolve the case. No claim by citizens 
can be satisfied without it, because only a formal act may have a legal (and practical) 
effect. Thus, the right of individuals in their own case to an administrative decision is 
a guarantee against the ‘silence’ of the administrative body. 
The silence of the administration means that the competent public authority, for 
whatever reason, fails to resolve the case, that is it does not make any decision on 
its merit within a reasonable time. The basis for legal protection in these cases is 
the legal fiction that the interested party’s application has been virtually rejected or 
refused. One of the major requirements of the rule of law is the transparency of the 
decision making process of public authorities. It is an indispensable condition of the 
accountability of state agencies that they have to make their decisions in compliance 
with the relevant substantive and procedural rules. Otherwise, those who are directly 
affected by these decisions could remain unprotected. 
If there is no administrative act to be challenged, another option for legal remedy 
is the private law claim referring to state liability. But even if this route is open for 
citizens who have been adversely affected by the behaviour of an administrative body, 
it is not an effective form of rights protection for several reasons. First, the civil law 
claim has its own prerequisites, as the claimant has to prove the damage, the unlawful­
ness of the behaviour of the administrative body and the causal relationship between 
the former and the latter. Secondly, civil litigation might be much longer and more 
costly than an administrative trial when the subject of the proceeding is only to ascer­
tain whether the reviewed administrative act is legal or not. Then, the conduct of 
public administration can do non-material harm in individual rights or legitimate 
interests of citizens, so the redress provided by this sort of judicial procedure cannot 
be satisfactory. 
In the absence of the adequate regulation, the court may consider all relevant cir­
cumstances to determine what is the reasonable time in a particular case. Several 
different conditions can be considered, except the lack of capacity (e.g. sufficient 
personnel) of the administrative body – the rights and legitimate interests of the citi­
zens cannot depend on the equipment of administrative organs. In many countries, 
39 Engström (n. 13) 57. 
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during the judicial process, the courts may issue interim rulings in order to eliminate 
or resolve procedural barriers, or to seek alternative ways to resolve the case. The pur­
pose of these provisional judicial injunctions is to preserve the legal position of the 
parties in question without deciding the merit of the case. 
The formal act of the administrative body is a necessary condition, though not suffi­
cient in itself, for the correct and lawful closure of a procedure. The decision making 
authority has a duty to give reasons for its decisions. The objective of this requirement 
to give reasons is, first, that it makes it less likely that an administrative agency will 
act arbitrarily and capriciously, knowing that its decision can be reviewed based on 
these reasons. Secondly, this duty makes the review of the original decision easier for 
the appellate body and, furthermore, it has an additional function of legitimising the 
administrative act. Finally, it is an indispensable prerequisite for the effective legal 
protection of individual rights, because the lack of information about the reasons why 
the particular act has been adopted may make the right to defence impossible, or at 
least much more difficult. Thus, it is a precondition for the appellant to try to show 
that the reasons that have been given are unsatisfactory or mistaken. 
The statement of reasons must be expressed in the decision, and it must include 
the grounds on which the court bases its decision. It would be exaggerated to require 
the administrative body to report on all relevant circumstances of the case, or the 
court to react to every piece of evidence or argument raised by the parties during the 
proceeding. However, the reasoning must be specific enough to enable understand­
ing as to why the decision maker has decided the case in a certain way; the facts that 
have been determined and taken into account, as well as the legal grounds of the 
decision, are indispensable elements of the statement of reasons. If only legal issues 
are examined in the judicial appellate proceedings, the requirement to give reasons 
may be stricter for courts, specifying not only the established facts and legal acts on 
which the decision has been based, but also the evaluation of evidence and the reason 
why the court has not upheld the claims of the complainants. While the failure to give 
notification of the reasons can usually in itself provide grounds enough for the annul­
ment of the administrative act, it is not necessary when the decision is favourable to 
the applicant and no adverse party takes part in the procedure. 
As has already been mentioned, the adoption of the administrative act, that is to say 
the settlement of the issue at hand, may by itself be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s 
claim. When this is not the case, that is the decision is unfavourable to the applicant, 
the formal act becomes the object of all remedial processes. 
In theory, administrative appeal is not necessary for the constitutional right of citi­
zens to appeal against all public acts that adversely affect their rights and interests, 
provided that they may request a judicial review of those acts. Furthermore, it could 
be argued that it is not a real appeal, as the recourse to the same body or to a higher-
level organ keeps the matter within the administrative hierarchy, where the appellate 
body is not really an independent forum, so one of the basic requirements of the right 
to appeal is not met (except when independent administrative tribunals adjudicate 
the recourses). It is easy to see that the original decision maker is the last one from 
whom real legal protection can be expected. As far as the superior body is concerned, 
as the argument may go, it represents and pursues the same interests or policies as the 
first instance authority, and therefore real remedy cannot be expected of it. 
However, administrative remedy itself can be made a constitutional requirement for 
several reasons. First and foremost, it might be posited as a guarantee for the careful 














consideration of the applicant’s claim. Apparently, the pure possibility of reconsidera­
tion of the case can promote the correct and lawful resolving of the matter. So the 
administrative appeal as an ordinary legal remedy available to all persons affected by 
a particular administrative decision can hardly be replaced by the judicial route, as 
administrative bodies use different standards in resolving the day-to-day problems of 
clients from the courts, which may only check the legality of the decision. This mecha­
nism can then be an effective tool for filtering out those cases which – for whatever 
reason – should not go to courts, so it serves also to prevent an excessive caseload for 
the courts. For this purpose, the exhaustion of all available administrative recourse 
should be a precondition for starting a judicial review process. 
It is a sub-principle of legal protection that all those persons who have been parties 
in an administrative procedure have the right to appeal to another body for review. 
Moreover, an administrative appeal cannot cause any irrational delay in the whole 
process, and the applicants must have a reasonable time to lodge a complaint with 
the court. 
3.3.2 Judicial protection 
The principle of effective judicial protection requires that natural and legal per­
sons who have been adversely affected by an administrative decision must be able to 
enforce their rights before a court in a fair trial. Following from the principle of rule 
of law, all administrative acts should be subject to judicial review, including individual 
acts and administrative regulations when they might have direct effects on citizens’ 
rights and interests. The scope of judicial review should extend to all questions of 
legality, so the courts must be able to check any breach of law, including misapplica­
tion of law, procedural errors and abuse of power. Judicial review must inspect not 
only the result of administrative procedures, but also the decision making process 
itself, as public authorities are bound to both substantive and procedural rules of 
law. Access to judicial review must be available without unreasonable burdens (e.g. 
high costs) to all citizens and legal persons whose rights and legitimate interests are 
directly affected. 
Certainly, as with other rights of procedural fairness, access to courts can also be
limited, if this is necessary for other legitimate reasons, and when the limitation is
imposed in a way proportionate with that objective. Despite the basic principle of
the general availability of the judicial route, there may be exceptions, as certain
kinds of administrative acts may be excluded from the scope of judicial review. In
this regard, the ancient legal maxim of exceptio est strictissimae interpretationis should
prevail, so exceptions must be narrowly defined and need strong justification. Typi­
cally, governmental acts of a political nature (policy guidelines, statements), inter­
nal measures (organisational or management instructions) and contractual or other
civil law actions and measures count among the non-reviewable administrative acts.
This does not necessarily mean that these measures are completely exempt from
any external control, but they do not fall within the scope of administrative judicial
review. 
A separate issue is the judicial review of normative rules (statutory instruments, 
administrative regulations, ordinances, etc.) of administrative bodies. Where admin­
istrative regulations are also subject to judicial control, this task is often (but not 
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According to some scholars, the use of special provisions is justified, as the application 
of the same procedural rules that were developed for the judicial review of individual 
acts would be impractical and inappropriate for reviewing normative measures.40 
As for the procedural limitations, the requirement of the exhaustion of all available 
remedies is a rational precondition for the judicial route; however, in this regard, 
only real appeals should be taken into account, when the appealing authority has a 
power to provide redress. Furthermore, the legislator, for the sake of legal certainty, 
may determine a time-limit for access to court. In doing so, different deadlines may 
be set by law for launching an administrative dispute before the court, depending on 
the subject of the claim. The initiation of the judicial process may be subject to rea­
sonable charge determined by law. Court fees have twofold functions; first, to obtain 
financial resources for the judicial proceedings; and secondly, to weed out the appar­
ently unestablished requests or petty cases which could overburden the courts. But 
the payment obligation should not impose an impossible burden on those who seek 
justice against administrative decisions which have an adverse effect on their rights 
and interests. 
In a judicial appeal, the applicant may ask the court to declare an administrative 
act illegal and annul it (partially or completely); to forbid the administrative body 
from carrying out an illegal activity; to recognise or declare a legal relationship, an 
entitlement or a right of the claimant; or to order the administrative agency to pay 
compensation for damages caused by an unlawful action. In fact, the courts may have 
different powers depending on the nature of the matter concerned in the judicial 
review process. In Anglo-Saxon systems, for example, the judicial review and the 
‘merit’ review are often distinguished from one another.41 Another distinction is also 
made in terms of whether the court has full power to change, annul or confirm the 
examined administrative act, or if it may only annul the illegal decision and send 
back the case to the administrative body that made the decision at first instance. The 
return of the case and the repetition of the whole procedure may cause a waste of 
time. However, the logic of this form of legal protection is that it might be better for 
both the related private and public interests if the administrative body, which is clos­
est to the parties and has expertise and local knowledge, conducts the decision mak­
ing process to repair the legal defects of its own first act, too. 
4 The institutions of legal protection 
4.1 Administrative bodies, ombudsmen and tribunals 
Administrative justice needs institutions through which effective legal protection 
can be realised. As we do not simplify legal protection to the judicial protection, 
administrative bodies which have the competence to settle the cases of individuals, 
or to issue administrative regulations, belong to our field of interest. We understand 
40 Türk (n. 3) 126.
 
41 Peter Cane and Leighton Macdonald, Principles of Administrative Law (2nd edn., Oxford University 

Press, Oxford 2012) 209–237; Peter Cane, ’Judicial Review and Merits Review: Comparing Adminis­
trative Adjudication by Courts and Tirbunals’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth (eds.), 
Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 2013) 426–448. 












   
administrative authorities42 as entities or persons entitled to issue administrative acts in 
their own range of responsibility. These bodies are governmental authorities (other 
than legislative bodies or courts), which affect the rights of private parties through 
adjudication, rule-making, investigating and other forms of behaviour.43 Notably, the 
exercise of public power can be conferred by law to private organisations. Since the 
power to take legally enforceable decisions or measures is the prerogative of the pub­
lic authorities (as agencies of the state), such an entitlement must be exceptional and 
requires serious reasons. 
Ombudsmen do not have the power to invalidate administrative acts or to oblige 
administrative authorities to do or to refrain from doing something. Instead, they 
use persuasion, publicity and commitment to fair and transparent public administra­
tion. They usually hold wide-ranging investigatory powers and the right to initiate 
different sorts of procedures (supervisory, disciplinary, civil or criminal) and to make 
recommendations for law-making bodies. However, they may only make non-binding 
suggestions, as the administrative agencies concerned are not bound to accept their 
solution proposals in case of maladministration. On account of the relatively weak 
powers of the ombudsmen, they do not represent the most effective tools for legal 
protection. Moreover, this institution is more suitable for the redress of infringe­
ments of legitimate interests, rather than for the remedy of the violation of rights, 
as the ombudsmen in most countries deal with maladministration and not (or only 
indirectly) with the legality of administrative acts. 
Legal protection is also provided by independent tribunals and other special 
commissions, however they are classified; they may be considered as parts of the 
administration, or as independent (mostly quasi-judicial) bodies. The procedures of 
administrative tribunals are usually cheaper, quicker and more flexible than those of 
the courts, and they may be mandated to adjudicate recourses against administrative 
decisions. Since they specialise in a particular area of administration or public service, 
they have the necessary expertise for the proper judgment of the facts of the case 
before them. They can be efficient and effective enough to manage a high volume of 
similar cases and are thereby able to disencumber the courts. 
4.2 Courts 
As a matter of fact, judicial review is the primary field of legal protection, and in
most countries, the courts are the protagonists of legal protection in administrative
law. They can be organised completely independently from the ordinary courts,
or they can constitute a separate branch of the general judicial system, or admin­
istrative acts may be reviewed by ordinary courts. It does not really matter which
model is followed by a country. The point is the admissibility to the judicial route
(conditions of standing), as access to courts is a fundamental part of the principle
of rule of law. Moreover, the scope of judicial review of administrative acts is much
more important than the organisational system in which these disputes may be
42 The terms ‘administrative authorities/bodies/agencies/organs’ are used interchangeably throughout 
the book acknowledging that the different names might signify distinct legal or administrative status in 
the various countries (see e.g. the special legal standing of the regulatory agencies). 











Conceptualising the principle of protection 25 
settled. Whatever organisational arrangements exist in a country, the guarantees of 
the judiciary (like impartiality or the irremovability of judges) and the accessories of 
judicial processes (like adversarial process, legal expertise) must prevail. 
Traditionally, the administrative procedure and judicial review of administrative 
acts have taken place consecutively, as the subject of the judicial process is the review 
of the final decisions of administrative bodies, having legal force according to admin­
istrative law. It is true that, in frequent cases, when the court annuls the administrative 
act and instructs the competent public authority to take a new (lawful) decision, the 
administrative procedure may begin again, but the administrative and the judicial 
procedures still remain intact and separate from each other. Today, the administra­
tive and judicial phases are often intertwined, as the court may usually issue interim 
actions or injunctions requiring the administrative bodies to take missing decisions 
or to correct a procedural irregularity in order to prevent an apparently illegal final 
decision. 
Similarly to that of the administrative procedure, the judicial process also has a
double function, once its mechanism has been activated. The mission of the courts
in administrative trial cases is to remedy administrative offences against individual
rights as well as to remove the unlawful acts. The role of the courts in the protection
of the objective legal order can be demonstrated by the mechanism of the annul­
ment of an illegal action, as not only the unlawful violation of individual rights, but
also any serious breach of the relevant law can lead to the repeal of the erroneous
administrative acts. 
Courts may adjudicate on not only the requests of the applicants to review an 
administrative act, but the extraordinary appeals as well. These recourses may be sub­
mitted against enforceable judicial decisions. This is not, however, a normal or usual 
form of legal protection; on the contrary, it is exceptional, and it serves primarily for 
the protection of the objective legal order (legality), rather than of individual rights 
and legitimate interests. Thus, it is a device to ensure the uniform application of law 
by courts, or to establish precedents for resolving legal problems of major impor­
tance. Nevertheless, this route might offer legal protection, even if that is not the 
main function of this proceeding. 
4.2.1 The intensity of judicial control of administrative acts 
The courts may be bestowed with reformatory or cassatory powers by law. While the 
former means full power for the administrative judge, including the ability to change 
the administrative act, the latter extends only to the annulment of the unlawful deci­
sion, when the case typically cannot be settled or closed by the court. 
The degree of judicial intervention is a crucial problem of administrative justice. It 
can be formulated as a normative claim that the greater the power that is bestowed on 
public authorities, the more strictly the judicial review of administrative acts should be 
implemented.44 The question is how far the courts may intervene in the merit of the 
case. The answer is not as simple as it seems to be at first glance. When only one pos­
sible solution follows from the statutes, for example, it can be practical to conclude 
44 For a similar claim in European administrative law, see Jürgen Schwarze, ‘Judicial Review of European 
Administrative Procedure’ (2004) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 105. 





the whole proceeding instead of sending it back to the administrative body (which 
could lawfully only make the same decision) for reconsideration. However, according 
to conventional wisdom, the function of the courts is only to guarantee the lawfulness 
of the administrative acts, not to make decisions instead of public authorities. 
One possible extreme option is judicial minimalism45 using a ‘manifest error test’, 
accepted by EU administrative law,46 annulling an administrative act only in the case 
of grave and evident factual mistake or error in law. This kind of judicial behaviour 
can be encouraged by statutes restricting the administrative judge’s jurisdiction to 
the annulment of an illegal decision. This approach is grounded in the principle of 
separation of powers: the assessment of facts might be a matter of judgment guided 
by policy considerations, but the courts have no right to substitute their own policy 
choices for those of the responsible administrative agencies. 
In contrast to the deferential approach, the law may entrust the courts to check 
whether the contested decision of the administrative body is based on reliable and 
accurate proof, and whether the decision maker has evaluated them in a correct man­
ner. But if the court is able to check even the correctness of the exercise of adminis­
trative discretion, in most cases, it can be empowered to settle and close the dispute 
itself, without taking on the role of administration. 
Behind these alternatives are two different philosophies about the true function 
of the (administrative) court;47 whether they are expected to find the right solution
to the underlying legal question, seeking substantive administrative justice, or whether 
the function of judicial review is simply to verify the procedural fairness of the admin­
istrative decision making process while disregarding the merit of the case. 
It is very difficult to determine the limits of legitimate judicial intervention con­
cerning the merits of administrative cases. The separation between administrative 
and judicial functions is particularly difficult in those cases where the administra­
tive authority has a discretionary power. The wider this power is, the more careful 
the judicial encroachment is into the sphere of public administration. It is a wide­
spread view that the court may not review the outcome of the discretionary power 
of the administrative authority. According to this approach, it is the sphere of public 
administration to balance the public and private interests in individual cases. The 
administrative bodies, which promote and implement public policy, are equipped 
with appropriate resources and expertise to consider all relevant circumstances of 
the particular situations and to make decisions that best serve policy goals and the 
common good. However, it is also beyond any doubt that administrative discretionary 
power must be exercised only within the framework of certain substantive principles, 
like proportionality, equal treatment or legitimate expectations. It is nevertheless 
strange to say that the courts should not review the administrative balancing of the 
rival interests of the case, as long as the outcome of such a balance is not contrary, 
for instance, to the proportionality principle. While checking compliance with the 
procedural rules seems to be a purely legal question and does not raise any problems 
of the separation between the administrative activity and judicial authority, a delicate 
45 Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996).
 
46 Craig (n. 1) 409.
 
47 Jean-Marie Whoerling, ‘Judicial Control of Administrative Authorities in Europe. Toward a Common 
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balance between judicial activism and self-restraint is needed for the judicial examina­
tion of the administrative decision regarding whether all relevant facts of the particu­
lar situation have been taken into consideration, the choice of the applied sanctions 
by the administrative body is correct, or the limitation of the legitimate expectations 
of the appellant is proportionate to the public interest under the given conditions. 
Whatever powers are vested in the administrative court, if it finds an administrative 
act unlawful, it must at least be able to redress the situation by repealing it partly or 
fully and, if necessary, to refer the case back to the administrative body for reconsider­
ation and for a new decision that complies with the judicial ruling. The court should 
also have the power to award compensation for damages caused by an illegal act. 
It is to be noted that, in general, the breach of a procedural rule itself may not be 
enough reason to quash an administrative decision; it is also necessary that the irregu­
larity has resulted in a violation of an individual right or legitimate interest whose pro­
tection is the objective of the procedural rules. In other words, the general measure 
of the invalidation of an administrative act is that its content would have been differ­
ent (supposedly, more favourable for the applicant), if the omitted procedural rule 
had been followed. At the same time, there are certain procedural guarantees that 
are considered so substantial that their breach leads in any case to the invalidation of 
the act. For example, the duty to give reasons for an unfavourable decision is strongly 
binding in all cases, so the lack of the statement of reasons represents serious illegality 
and is sanctioned by annulment. 
4.2.2 Basic procedural features of administrative litigation 
Administrative litigation, like any other sort of judicial proceeding, must take place 
under strict procedural conditions. It is not a principal issue, however, whether or 
not these processes have special procedural rules; they may be conducted by applying 
the general (e.g. civil law) rules. Such disputes may be settled in an inquisitorial or 
adversarial process, even though these forms cannot be sharply separated from each 
other. In the first case, the judge oversees the conflict between the parties, seeking 
arguments and establishing the relevant facts of the case. In the alternative model, 
he/she is a neutral arbitrator listening to the evidence and arguments submitted by 
the parties during the process. 
Other procedural principles will also be discussed in this book. The non ultra petita
principle means that the powers of the court are limited to what is conferred upon it 
by the parties, so the court may not go beyond the framework of the plea submitted 
by the plaintiff. Ultra petita means the opposite; the court is not tied to the claim of the 
plaintiff. There is a clear link between the use or non-use of the ultra petita principle 
and the basic functions that are attributed to the courts. Where the defence of public 
interest and objective legal order is just as important as the protection of individual 
rights, ultra petita judgments have a greater chance. But if the judicial review serves 
primarily as a tool of effective legal control in defence of individual rights, the prin­
ciple of non ultra petita is more plausible, since the only objective of the complaint is 
to seek justice. 
For the aim of effective legal protection, the principle of reformatio in peius also has 
implications for both administrative procedures and judicial processes. By this princi­
ple, the second instance administrative body is not bound by the decision of the pub­
lic authority delivered in first instance, in the sense that it may place the complainant 
28 Zoltán Szente 
in a worse position than he or she was in beforehand. This power can be given for a 
more effective provision of public interest, even at the expense of the claimant’s pri­
vate interests. Of course, with regard to the inherent nature of the right to appeal/ 
court, the law-maker may prohibit the appellate administrative organ or the court 
from making a decision which adversely affects the claimant’s position. 
All these definitions and requirements may facilitate the wide-ranging compari­
son that is attempted in the following chapters. However, we must not forget that all 
concepts, institutions and procedures have to be examined in its own context, and 
all comparisons have serious inherent limits. But this should not discourage us: the 
principle of effective legal protection in administrative law is important enough to be 










   
     




2 Effective legal protection in 
the European legal order 
Christoph Görisch 
1 Foundation of the principle of effective legal protection in 
European union law 
The principle of effective legal protection is mentioned explicitly in the primary law 
of the European Union in Art. 19 para 1 subpara 2 TEU (Treaty on European Union): 
‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection 
in the fields covered by Union law.’1 But it follows already from the first subparagraph 
of the same provision, according to which the European Court of Justice has got the 
general obligation to ‘ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Trea­
ties the law is observed’, that the principle not only applies to the Member States 
when they are implementing Union law, but also to the Union itself.2 
More specifically, Art. 47 CFR (Charter of Fundamental Rights) – in conjunction 
with Art. 6 para 1 TEU – as ‘perhaps the most important provision of the Charter’3 
guarantees the right ‘to an effective remedy and to a fair trial’ as a basic right within 
‘the scope of Union law’ according to Art. 51 CFR.4 The explanations to the Charter, 
which were ‘drawn up as a way of providing guidance in [its] interpretation’ and 
1 Cf also the declaratory emphasis of the requirement of ‘necessary provisions on legal safeguards’ in 
the fields of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
according to Arts. 75 para 3 and 215 para 3 TFEU ([Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] 
in connection with Declaration [No 25] on Arts. 75 and 215 TFEU, annexed to the Final Act of the 
Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon); furthermore – with regard to the 
particular field of civil matters and therefore largely without relevance in the field of administrative 
law – Art. 67 para 4 TFEU, according to which the ‘Union shall facilitate access to justice, in particular 
through the principle of mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil matters’, and 
Art. 81 para 2 TFEU, according to which the Union ‘shall adopt measures [for the purpose of develop­
ment of judicial cooperation in civil matters] aimed at [. . .] (e) effective access to justice’. 
2 Failing to take account of the connection between both subparas, A. Arnull, ‘The Principle of Effective 
Judicial Protection in EU Law: An Unruly Horse?’ (2011) 36 EL Rev 51, 53 n. 19 comments that the first 
subpara ‘seems out of place in Art. 19’ and ‘should really have been included at the end of Art. 4 (3) 
TEU’ instead. 
3 D. Shelton in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner and A. Ward (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
(Hart, Oxford and Portland 2014) para 47.42 (from a comparative perspective). 
4 Cf the explanations of the Charter, OJ 2007 C 303, p. 32 with reference to Case 5/88 – Wachauf [1989] 
ECR 2609; Case C-260/89 – ERT [1991] ECR I-2925; Case C-309/96 – Annibaldi [1997] ECR I-7493; 
consenting Shelton (n. 3) para 47.49; disagreeing T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn., 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 456, assuming a more restrictive interpretation of Art. 51 CFR; as 
to this discussion more generally, e.g., M. Borowsky in J. Meyer (ed.), Charta der Grundrechte der Europäis­
chen Union (4th edn., Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014) Art. 51 paras 24–30b (with numerous references). 
















        
  
    
   
      
   
   
  
      
  
‘shall be given due regard by the courts’ (Art. 52 para 7 CFR),5 refer to Arts. 6 and 13 
ECHR (European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights) and to the ECJ 
case law as ‘sources’ of the basic right. It is emphasised that ‘in Union law the protec­
tion is more extensive’ compared to the Convention rights. The Charter guarantees 
in Art. 47 para 1 the right to an effective remedy not only before any ‘authority’ (Art. 
13 ECHR), but ‘before a court’; this corresponds with the inseparable connection 
between legal and judicial protection according to Art. 19 TEU. Furthermore (unlike 
Art. 6 para 1 ECHR), the right to a fair hearing according to Art. 47 para 2 CFR ‘is 
not confined to disputes relating to civil law rights and obligations’, but is generally 
applied. ‘Nevertheless, in all respects other than their scope, the guarantees afforded 
by the ECHR apply in a similar way to the Union.’6 
Even before the Lisbon Treaty with the codification of the principle of effective
legal protection in the aforementioned provisions of primary law came into force on
1 December 2009, specific contents of the principle were ‘widely acknowledged by
secondary law’, i.e. in the fields of consumer law or public procurement legislation
or the right of free movement within the territory of the Union.7 As ‘a general princi­
ple of Union law’, the right to an effective judicial remedy was originally ‘enshrined’
by the case law of the ECJ in 1986.8 The seminal judgment of the ECJ in the Case
Johnston also originated in the application of a secondary law provision. The 1976
directive (76/207/EEC) on equal treatment for men and women as regards access
to employment provides in Art. 6 that all persons who consider themselves wronged
by discrimination must be able to pursue their claims by judicial process. The court
pointed out that the ‘requirement of judicial control stipulated by that article reflects
a general principle of law which underlies the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States’.9 This was a decisive shift of approach from a dogmatic point of
view. The court had already referred to the requirement of effective legal protec­
tion at an earlier date, but from a different perspective.10 In its former judgments in
the Cases REWE-Zentralfinanz and COMET in 1976, the Court mentioned a duty of
5 Cf ECJ Case C-129/14 PPU – Spasic [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:586 paras 54–55; Case C-583/11 P – Inuit
[2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:625 para 97 with further references; see also the opinion of Advocate General 
Kokott in ECJ Case C-17/10 – Toshiba Corporation and others ECLI:EU:C:2011:552 points 41, 54; more 
detailed K. Lenaerts, J. A. Gutiérrez-Fons, To Say What the Law of the EU Is. EUI Working Paper AEL 
2013/9 (European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole 2013) 41–46. 
6 OJ 2007 C 303, pp. 29–30; as to the ECHR-guarantees in particular, cf in detail the report of Marten 
Breuer in this volume. 
7 L. M. Ravo, ‘The Role of the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in the EU and Its Impact on 
National Jurisdictions’ in Edizioni Universitá di Trieste (ed.), Sources of Law and Legal Protection (Edizioni 
Università di Trieste, Trieste 2012) 101, 106, with reference to Directives 93/13/EEC, 89/665/EEC and 
2004/38/EC; more detailed and with further examples A. Arnull, ‘The Principle of Effective Judicial 
Protection in EU Law: An Unruly Horse?’ (2011) 36 EL Rev 51, 63–68; as to the field of environmental 
law in particular, see below, around ns. 40–47. 
8 See the explanations of the Charter, OJ 2007 C 303, p. 29 with reference to ECJ, Case 222/84 –
Johnston [1986] ECR 1651 and further references to ECJ Case 222/86 – Heylens [1987] ECR 4097; Case
C-97/91 – Borelli [1992] ECR I-6313. With regard to Art. 19(1) subpara 2 TEU cf also Arnull (n. 7) 51,
53 with reference to ECJ Case C-50/00 P – Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6677 para 41. 
9 ECJ, Case 222/84 – Johnston [1986] ECR 1651 para 18 (with additional reference to Arts. 6, 13 ECHR). 
10 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between both approaches see S. Prechal and R. Widder­
shoven, ‘Redefining the Relationship Between “Rewe-effectiveness” and Effective Judicial Protection’ 
(2011) 4–2 R.E.A.L. 31–50; Ravo (n. 7) 101, 111–122; cf also, e.g., D. J. Rhee, ‘The Principle of Effective 
 








    
 
      
      
    
      
   
   
  
  
      
Effective legal protection in European order 31 
‘ensuring the legal protection which citizens derive from [. . .] Community law’. But
the court based this duty with regard to the obligations of the Member States on the
‘principle of cooperation’ [now Art. 5 para 3 TEU] in conjunction with the ‘direct
effect of the provisions of Community law’,11 not on the principle of effective legal
protection as a separate requirement as was later acknowledged in Johnston (which
also concerned Member States’ obligations).12 In the end, the general principle of
effective legal protection ‘to which expression is now given by [Art. 47 CFR]’13 is 
rooted in the (even more general) rule of law as a framework principle according to
Art. 2 TEU.14 
2 Institutional system of legal protection 
The explanations of the Charter emphasise that the ‘inclusion of this precedent (sci­
licet the aforementioned case law starting from Johnston) in the Charter has not been 
intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties’.15 This 
system constitutes the institutional framework within which the principle of effective 
legal protection is valid. Instead of providing for the creation of ‘Union courts’ in the 
single Member States,16 Art. 19 para 1 TEU is based on the premise that ‘the guardians 
of [the] legal order and the judicial system of the European Union are the Court of 
Justice and the courts and tribunals of the Member States’. The ECJ assumes that this 
‘system [. . .] is [. . .] a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to 
ensure review of the legality of acts of the institutions’.17 At the ‘core’ of this system, 
the action for annulment provided in Art. 263 TFEU allows the ‘direct review of the 
legality of binding Union measures before the Union courts’, whereas ‘the national 
courts are the bodies to which individuals may turn whenever action or failure to act 
on the part of national authorities or other individuals infringes rights conferred on 
them by Union law’.18 The supremacy of the ECJ over the national courts within the 
Protection’ (2011) 16 JR 440, 443–444; A. Ward in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward (eds.), (n. 3) 
paras 47.247–251. 
11 ECJ, Case 33/76 – Rewe-Zentralfinanz [1976] ECR 1989 para 5; Case 45/76 – Comet [1976] ECR 2043 
para 13. 
12 As to this development cf. e.g. – more or less detailed – K. Lenaerts, I. Marselis and K. Gutman, EU 
Procedural Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014) paras 4.02 (n. 4), 4.05, 4.07; Ravo (n. 7) 101, 
103–108. 
13 ECJ Case C-69/10 – Samba Diouf [2011] ECR I-7151 para 49 with further references. 
14 ECJ Case C-354/04 P – Gestoras Pro Amnistía [2007] ECR I-1579 para 51; C-355/04 P – Segi [2007] ECR 
I-1657 para 51; cf also, e.g., C. Görisch, Demokratische Verwaltung durch Unionsagenturen (Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen 2009) 381–382 with numerous further references to the ECJ case law; furthermore the expla­
nations of the Charter, OJ 2007 C 303, p. 30 with reference to ECJ Case 294/83 – Les Verts [1986] ECR 
1339; consenting Shelton (n. 3) para 47.49. As to the additional competence of the Union to monitor 
compliance with the principle on the national level according to Arts. 7, 49 TEU, which will not be 
examined here, cf more generally European Commission, MEMO/16/2017 (1 June 2016) on the Rule 
of Law Opinion concerning the situation in Poland. 
15 OJ 2007 C 303, p. 29. 
16 Cf the reflection on this issue by Lenaerts, Marselis, Gutman (n. 12) para 2.02. 
17 ECJ opinion 1/09 [2011] ECR I-1137 para 66, 70. 
18 Lenaerts, Marselis, Gutman (n. 12) paras 2.02 (with reference to ECJ Case 26/62 – Van Gend & Loos
[1963] ECR 1, 12), 7.02. As to the complementary function of Arts. 258, 265 TFEU with respect to Art. 
263 TFEU see below, n. 23. 
32 Christoph Görisch 
  
  
    
     
     
   
 





system19 is guaranteed by the procedure of preliminary ruling according to Art. 267 
TFEU. Although this provision contains no explicit obligation to make a reference 
for such a preliminary ruling for those national courts against whose decisions there 
is still a judicial remedy under national law, the ECJ held in Foto Frost that no national 
court has ‘the power to declare acts of the Community institutions invalid’. The Court 
argued from the ‘purpose’ of the preliminary ruling procedure ‘to ensure that Com­
munity law is applied uniformly by national courts’. Additionally, the ECJ refers to 
Art. 263 TFEU and assumes that this provision ‘gives the Court exclusive jurisdiction 
to declare void an act of a Community institution’. Consequently, ‘the coherence of 
the system requires that where the validity of a Community act is challenged before a 
national court the power to declare the act invalid must also be reserved to the Court 
of Justice’.20 
3 Substance of the principle 
On substance, concentrating on the legal protection in a narrow sense (judicial 
protection),21 access to a court has to be regarded as the basic question (concerning 
the question whether judicial proceedings take place at all),22 followed by the deter­
mination of minimum standards of the court procedure as a ‘fair trial’ (concerning 
the question how judicial proceedings take place) and additional procedural aspects 
(including rights under the administrative procedure). 
3.1 Access to a court 
In the compound judicial system of the EU constituted by Art. 19 TEU in conjunction 
with Arts. 263 and 267 TFEU in particular,23 access to a court means access either to 
the Union or to the national courts. In addition to the grant of access in substance 
as described in the following, the ‘realisation of access to justice’24 demands legal aid 
where necessary according to Art. 47 para 3 CFR; this right, which may also apply to 
19 Cf also the formulation in ECJ Case 294/83 – Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339 para 23: ‘the treaty established 
a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the court of Justice to review the 
legality of measures adopted by the institutions’ (emphasis added). 
20 ECJ Case 314/85 – Foto Frost [1987] ECR 4199 paras 15, 17; cf. also Lenaerts, Marselis, Gutman (n. 12) 
para 10.01, more detailed paras 3.59–60. 
21 As to the particular role of judicial protection in the complex system of legal protection see – from
a comparative point of view – M. Kayser, ‘Rechtsschutz und Kontrolle’ in A. V. Bogdandy, S. Cassese
and P. M. Huber (eds.), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum V (C. F. Müller, Heidelberg 2014) § 91
paras 37–39. 
22 Cf the opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in ECJ Case C-509/11 – ÖBB-Personenverkehr ECLI:
EU:C:2013:167 point 76: the ‘right of access to a Court, [. . .] forms the heart of the principles estab­
lished by the Court under the rubric of effective judicial protection’; consenting K. Pabel, ‘Justizgrun­
drechte’ in C. Grabenwarter (ed.), Europäischer Grundrechteschutz (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014) § 19 
para 35. 
23 As to the possibility of individual legal protection by an action for failure to fulfil obligations under Art. 
258 TFEU and as to the action for failure to act under Art. 265 TFEU as a counterpart to the action 
for annulment see, e.g., T. v. Danwitz, ‘Rechtsschutz in der Europäischen Union’ in A. Hatje and P.-C. 
Müller-Graff (eds.), Europäisches Organisations- und Verfassungsrecht (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2014) § 13 
paras 8–9, 
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legal persons, ‘may cover both assistance by a lawyer and dispensation from payment 
of the costs of proceedings’.25 
3.1.1 Union courts 
As already mentioned, at the ‘core’ of the judicial system of the EU the action for
annulment allows direct protection even for individuals against Union measures on the
Union level according to Art. 263 para 4 TFEU.26 On several occasions, the more nar­
rowly formulated predecessors of this provision have been interpreted in a broad sense
by the ECJ to ensure effective judicial protection. The famous seminal case Les Verts
dealt with an action for annulment of a political party against a decision of the Euro­
pean Parliament concerning the allocation of appropriations in the General Budget.
The ECJ recognised the Parliament as a potential defendant due to the ‘complete sys­
tem’ of judicial protection drawn up by the Treaties although the Parliament was not
yet explicitly mentioned in the enumeration of potential defendants against an action
for annulment at that time.27 With reference to this landmark decision the General
Court (resp. in old terms: the Court of First Instance) accepted an action for annul­
ment against detrimental measures of Union agencies (as institutions which are now
mentioned in Art. 263 para 1 clause 2 in conjunction with para 5 TFEU, but have not
been mentioned in the Treaties at all before Lisbon).28 Equally, the ECJ recognised in
Kadi the admissibility of actions for annulment against restrictive Union measures, like
freezing of funds and economic resources, in the area of common foreign and security
policy even before Arts. 24 para 1 subpara 2 clause 6 TEU, 275 para 2 TFEU explicitly
established the respective jurisdiction of the ECJ under particular circumstances.29 
Still, despite numerous requests in the judicial literature and beyond30 for a change 
of evaluation due to the principle of effective legal protection, the ECJ maintains in 
the recent Inuit judgment its strict interpretation of the rules on the admissibility of 
individuals’ actions for annulment as regards the specific classification of the con­
tested act. A number of Inuit seal hunters brought to the European courts an action 
for annulment against a Parliament and Council regulation containing new rules on 
seal hunting which the Inuit considered incompatible with the fundamental freedoms 
25 ECJ Case 279/09 – DEB [2010] ECR I-13849 paras 27–62 (quote: 48). See also n. 40.
 
26 As to the foundations of the concrete Treaty provisions on the judicial system of the Union see also 

below, around n. 34. 
27 ECJ Case 294/83 – Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339 para 23; cf also – in turn – the recognition as a privileged 
applicant in ECJ Case C-70/88 – Parliament/Council [1990] ECR I-2041 paras 13–27. 
28 CFI Case T-411/06 – Sogelma [2008] ECR II-2771 paras 33–57; GC Case T-70/05 – Evropaïki Dynamiki
[2010] ECR II-313 paras 61–75. 
29 ECJ Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P – Kadi and Al Barakaat [2008] ECR I-6351 paras 281–327; 
see however, speaking of more than just marginal irregularities (‘mehr als nur marginale Schönheitsfehler’) 
in the system of judicial legal protection of the EU with regard to Arts. 275 para 1, 276 TFEU Danwitz 
(n. 23) Art 13 paras 21–22; cf also – with regard to the jurisdiction of the ECJ to give preliminary rul­
ings in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Art. 35 TEU in the pre-Lisbon 
version) – ECJ Case C-354/04 P – Gestoras Pro Amnistía [2007] ECR I-1579 paras 49–54; Case C-355/04 
P – Segi [2007] ECR I-1657 paras 49–54. 
30 Cf – with regard to the pre-Lisbon version of the Treaties – the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in 
ECJ Case C-50/00 P – Unión de Pequeños Agricultores ECR [2002] I-6677) point 2 with numerous refer­
ences; consenting CFI Case T-177/01 – Jégo-Quéré [2002] ECR II-2365 paras 22–54. 





    
    
 
   
  
  
of the Treaties. The admissibility of this application has to be examined according to 
Art. 263 para 4 TFEU again. The conventional requirement of an ‘act [. . .] of direct 
and individual concern’ to the applicant (if not addressed to him directly) continues 
to be assessed by the Court on the basis of the Plaumann-test which was established 
already in 1963:31 ‘According to that case law, natural or legal persons satisfy the con­
dition of individual concern only if the contested act affects them by reason of certain 
attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they 
are differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue of these factors distinguishes 
them individually just as in the case of the person addressed’. As usual the abstract 
regulation in Inuit did not meet this requirement. But the Lisbon treaty amended this 
rule on admissibility and now also permits an action for annulment against a ‘regula­
tory act which is of direct concern’ to the applicant ‘and does not entail implement­
ing measures’. Still, despite an individual concern no longer being required under 
this variant, the ECJ understands the term ‘regulatory act’ in a narrow sense as strictly 
opposed to ‘legislative acts’, so that Parliament and Council regulations as acts of the 
Union legislator continue to be excluded from individuals’ actions for annulment. 
This was the case in Inuit, and therefore the application was declared inadmissible by 
the ECJ. A broader interpretation due to the principle of effective legal protection 
was rejected by the court for ‘such an interpretation cannot have the effect of setting 
aside the conditions expressly laid down’ in the Treaties (based on the assumed strict 
distinction between regulatory and legislative acts).32 
3.1.2 National courts 
As regards the involvement of national courts, the principle of effective legal protec­
tion is mixed up partially with the previously established principle of effectiveness 
derived from the (direct or at least binding) effects of Union law in the Member 
States. The distinction between both principles remains elusive in the ECJ case law.33 
In theory, this distinction is quite clear: The principle of effectiveness aims at ensur­
ing the full implementation (or effet utile) of Union law in the Member States, whereas 
the principle of effective legal protection aims at the availability of remedies against 
alleged violations of subjective vested Union rights caused by acts of public authority 
either of the Union or of the Member States.34 In the latter case the more general 
31 Cf ECJ Case 25/62 – Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95, 107.
 
32 ECJ Case C-583/11 P – Inuit [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:625 paras 45–62, 68–77, 89–107 with reference 

to the explanations of the Charter, OJ 2007 C 303, p. 29 which are formulated more or less ambigu­
ously with respect to Art. 47 CFR, stating that the ‘inclusion [of the recognised general principle of 
judicial protection] in the Charter has not been intended to change the system of judicial review laid 
down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to admissibility for direct actions before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. The European Convention has considered the Union’s system 
of judicial review including the rules on admissibility, and confirmed them while amending them as 
to certain aspects, as reflected [. . .] in particular in the fourth paragraph of Art. 263’ TFEU; cf also
P. Craig, European Union Administrative Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) 315–318; 
see furthermore below, around ns. 66–67. 
33 As to a detailed analysis cf the references in n. 10. 
34 Summarising, e.g., J. Berkemann, ‘Der slowakische Braunbär im deutschen Prozessrecht’ (2013) 128 
DVBl 1137, 1146; as to the ancillary nature of the principle of effective legal protection in particular 

























Effective legal protection in European order 35 
principle of effectiveness35 also applies on the basis of the additional ‘principle of 
equivalence’ according to which the national procedural rules governing actions for 
safeguarding an individual’s rights under Union law must be no less favourable than 
those governing similar domestic actions. According to the ‘principle of effectiveness’ 
the national procedural rules must not render practically impossible or excessively 
difficult the exercise of the rights conferred by Union law.36 The requirements of 
equivalence and effectiveness contain limitations of the principle of national proce­
dural autonomy. The national courts are obliged to interpret the national procedural 
law as favourably as possible as regards access to justice in Union law matters. Taking 
into account the principle of effective judicial protection in particular, this may even 
result in an obligation to create new remedies in the national courts praeter legem,37 
even if not contra legem.38 
This obligation was put in concrete terms, for instance, in Unibet concerning a ref­
erence for preliminary ruling by a Swedish court. A British internet betting company
had brought an action against the Swedish State demanding, firstly, a declaration that
the Swedish Law on Lotteries violated its freedom to provide services within the Union
(now Art. 56 TFEU), secondly, a compensation for the damage suffered as a result of
that alleged violation and, thirdly, interim relief. Under Swedish law, only the claim for
damages was fully admissible. The ECJ decided that legal remedies must be available
to ensure effective judicial protection of the rights under Community law. It would
not be sufficient in this context if the party concerned was forced to be subject to
administrative or criminal proceedings and to any penalties that may result as the sole
form of legal remedy for disputing the compatibility of the national provision at issue
with Community law. But the principle of effective judicial protection does not require
the national legal order to provide for a free-standing action for an examination of
47.55, referring to the principle ubi ius ibi remedium with the requirement of ‘another right arising from 
EU Law to be protected before it will become operative’; furthermore, e.g., C. Nowak, ‘Europäisches 
Verwaltungsrecht und Grundrechte’ in J. P. Terhechte (ed.), Verwaltungsrecht der Europäischen Union
(Nomos, Baden-Baden 2011) § 14 para 16. 
35 Cf the opinion of Advocate General Kokott in ECJ Case C-75/08 – Mellor [2009] ECR I-3799 point 28: 
‘A specific expression of the principle of effectiveness is the principle of effective legal protection’; 
disagreeing Arnull (n. 7) 51, 55 n. 30. 
36 Cf, e.g., ECJ Case C-268/06 – Impact [2008] ECR I-2483 para 46 and the case law cited; additionally, 
also with respect to the tension between both requirements, T. v. Danwitz, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht
(Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg 2008) 483–489; Danwitz (n. 23) § 13 paras 49–59, with further references 
to the ECJ case law. 
37 Cf J. Gundel, ‘Judicial and Procedural Fundamental Rights’ in D. Ehlers (ed.), European Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms (De Gruyter, Berlin 2007) § 19 paras 48, 50 with reference to the case law of the 
French Conseil d’Etat; furthermore Hofmann (n. 34) paras 47.56–62; J. Saurer, Der Einzelne im europäis­
chen Verwaltungsrecht (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2014) 371–374. 
38 D. Krawczyk, ‘The Slovak Brown Bear Case’ (2012) 14 Env L Rev 53, 61 (without a proper distinction 
between EU law enforcement praeter and contra legem in relation to the national statutory law; as to this 
distinction cf also ECJ Case C-268/06 – Impact [2008] ECR I-2483 paras 54–55 on the one hand, 100 on 
the other hand; see furthermore below, around n. 64, and, however, the opinion of Advocate General 
Jääskinen in ECJ Joined Cases C-401/12 P, C-402/12 P and C-403/12 P – Council and others/Vereniging 
Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht ECLI:EU:C:2014:310 point 137 with reference 
to ECJ Case C-282/10 – Dominguez [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:33 para 25); additionally, e.g., M. Elianto­
nio, Case Note (2012) 49 CMLR 767, 783; accordingly the judgment of the German Federal Administra­
tive Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), Case 7 C 21/12 (2014) 33 NVwZ 64, 67. 
































    
  
   
  
  
whether national provisions are compatible with Union law. Thus, an indirect pos­
sibility of challenging the compatibility of national law with Union law by a claim for
damages might be sufficient. Nonetheless, the principle of effective legal protection of
individuals’ rights under Union law requires the national courts to grant the interim
relief necessary to ensure that those rights are respected on the national level.39 
Strict and far-reaching requirements for the interpretation of the national procedural
law concerning the access to the national courts have been established by the ECJ in the
context of environmental law in particular.40 In Lesoochranárske zoskupenie (the so-called
‘Slovak Brown Bear Case’) the ECJ had to decide about the general impact of the Con­
vention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters, known as ‘the Aarhus Convention’ (AC), which
was signed on 25 June 1998 and approved on behalf of the European Community by
Council Decision 2005/370/EC, on the Member States’ procedural law. According to
Art. 9 para 3 AC, ‘each Party [of the Convention] shall ensure that, where they meet
the criteria, if any, laid down in its national law, members of the public have access to
administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private per­
sons and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating
to the environment’. A Slovak association concerned with environmental protection
(‘WOLF Forest Protection Movement’, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK) lodged an action
against a ministerial decision granting a hunting association’s application for permis­
sion to derogate from the protective conditions accorded to the brown bear. According
to national law, environmental associations were classed as ‘interested parties’ which
could not directly initiate proceedings to review the legality of decisions. On this basis
the claim had to be declared inadmissible. The Slovak Supreme Court referred the
case for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ to ascertain whether Art. 9 para 3 AC has ‘the
direct applicability or direct effect of Community law’. The ECJ found that ‘the dispute
in the main proceedings concerns whether an environmental protection association
may be a »party« to administrative proceedings concerning, in particular, the grant of
derogations to the system of protection for species such as the brown bear. That species
is mentioned in Annex IV(a) to the Habitats Directive [92/43/EEC], so that, under
Art, 12 thereof, it is subject to a system of strict protection from which derogations may
be granted only under the conditions laid down in Art. 16 of that directive. It follows
that the dispute in the main proceedings falls within the scope of EU law.’ Although
Art. 9 para 3 AC ‘does not have direct effect in EU law’, the ECJ has ruled with refer­
ence to the Unibet judgment that ‘it is for the referring court to interpret, to the fullest
extent possible, the procedural rules relating to the conditions to be met in order to
bring administrative or judicial proceedings in accordance with the objectives of [Art. 9
39 ECJ Case C-432/05 – Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271 paras 36–77; cf, e.g., the analysis of Arnull (n. 7) 51, 
54–56; see also ECJ Case C-268/06 – Impact [2008] ECR I-2483 paras 37–55; furthermore however, refus­
ing a general pari passu status of the legal protection on the primary and secondary level (with regard 
to the field of public procurement law in particular) S. Harms, Unionsrechtliche Vorgaben für den Recht[s] 
schutz im Vergabeverfahren unterhalb der EU-Schwellenwerte (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2013) 230–235. 
40 As to the transferability to other fields of law see, e.g., S. Schlacke, ‘Zur fortschreitenden Europäisierung 
des (Umwelt-) Rechtsschutzes’ (2014) 33 NVwZ 11, 17; disagreeing W. Frenz, ‘Individuelle Klagebe­
fugnis zwischen Bürgerprotest und Umweltverbandsklagen’ (2012) 127 DVBl 811, 813. But see also – with
regard to Art. 47 para 3 CFR (cf above, around ns. 24-5) – the opinion of Advocate General Kokott in 
ECJ C-260/11 – Edwards and Pallikaropoulos ECLI:EU:C:2012:645 point 39: ‘legal protection under the 
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para 3 AC] and the objective of effective judicial protection of the rights conferred by
EU law, so as to enable an environmental protection organisation, such as the zoskupenie, 
to challenge before a court a decision taken following administrative proceedings liable
to be contrary to EU environmental law’.41 Based on this preliminary ruling, the Slovak
Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky) has decided that ‘the judicial power
needed to grant the individual the right of access to justice’ conferred by Art. 9 para 3
AC.42 Correspondingly, the limitation of the judicial enforceability to subjective public
rights, which can ‘only be established by those norms which do not merely serve to
protect the general public, but at least, in some way, intend to protect the individual as
well’43 in German administrative law according to the so-called Schutznormtheorie (‘pro­
tective provision theory’) needed to be modified in the context of environmental law. In
accordance with the legal literature44 the German Federal Administrative Court (Bun­
desverwaltungsgericht) has extended the right of environmental organisations to bring
proceedings before the courts with reference to Lesoochranárske zoskupenie.45 Neverthe­
less, the ECJ demands a further extension of this right, at least in the special context
of Art. 9 para 2 AC. The German administrative procedural law has been respectively
amended in reaction to the Trianel judgment46 already. However, the amendment has
been considered insufficient by the ECJ.47 
3.2 Basic standards of the court procedure 
With regard to the court procedure, basic particular standards can be derived to vary­
ing degrees from the principle of effective legal protection. 
3.2.1 Binding decision 
As regards the binding effects of judgments without which judicial protection would
not be effective,48 the ECJ has the power to annul the contested Union measure as a
41 ECJ Case C-240/09 – Lesoochranárske zoskupenie [2011] ECR I-1255 paras 37–38, 51–52. 
42 D. Krawczyk, ‘The Slovak Brown Bear Case’ (2012) 14 Env L Rev 53, 60 with reference to the judgment 
of the Slovak Supreme Court in Case 5Sžp 41/2009 and analogous judgments. 
43 Summarizing B. Wegener, ‘Subjective Public Rights – Historical Roots Versus European and Demo­
cratic Challenges’ in H. Pünder and C. Waldhoff (eds.), Debates in German Public Law (Hart, Oxford 
and Portland 2014) 219, 220; cf also, e.g., M. Eliantonio, Case Note (2012) 49 CMLR 767, 777; as to a 
comparative overview of the divergent systems throughout the EU Member States see Kayser (n. 21) 
Art 91 paras 42–44, 93–100. 
44 Cf, e.g., J. Berkemann, ‘Der slowakische Braunbär im deutschen Prozessrecht’ (2013) 128 DVBl 1137, 
1141–1148; for further references, also for dissenting voices, see Schlacke (n. 40) 12 n. 27. 
45 Case 7 C 21/12, 33 NVwZ (2014) 64, 65–68 with additional reference to ECJ Case C-237/07 – Janecek
[2008] ECR I- 6221 para 3; cf also above, n. 38 already. 
46 ECJ Case C-115/09 – Trianel [2011] ECR I-3673; for an overview of the other ECJ case law (and the 
national judges’ responses) concerning the special guarantees of legal protection related to the first 
and second pillars of the Convention according to Art. 9 AC and the implementation provisions in 
EU law see L. Lavrysen, Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (UNEP 2014) (available at http://hdl.
handle.net/1854/LU-4426506) 8–13; as to the limited relevance of the general principle in this area 
with respect to the concrete settlement of the secondary law provisions M. Eliantonio, Case Note (2012) 
49 CMLR 767, 790: ‘probably no need [for the ECJ] to mention this [general] principle’. 
47 Cf ECJ Case C-137/14 – Commission/Germany [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:683. 
48 Cf Pabel (n. 22) § 19 para 57 with further reference. As to the obvious reconcilability of the general prin­
ciple of res judicata with the principle of effective legal protection see GC Case T-341/07 – Sison/Council II














    
    
     
  
    
  
consequence of a successful action for annulment. In contrast, the court has no power
to decide the original case as such in the case of a reference for a preliminary ruling;
this final decision continues to be reserved to the referring national court. The dif­
ference is reflected, e.g., in the diverging formulation of the legal consequences: An
unlawful act is declared void in an action for annulment procedure according to Art.
264 TFEU, and, in contrast, invalid – meaning: inapplicable – according to Arts. 267,
277 TFEU in a preliminary ruling procedure. Nevertheless, in both cases the final judg­
ment of the Union Court with regard to the assessment of Union law has a congruent
(factual and legal) binding effect not only inter partes, but erga omnes.49 
As regards the question of different levels of jurisdiction, primary law contains 
binding basic rules for the system of Union courts in Arts. 256–257 TFEU. However, 
the principle of effective legal protection does not absolutely require such different 
levels of jurisdiction.50 
3.2.2 Duration of court procedure 
The principle of effective legal protection includes the ‘right to fair legal process 
within a reasonable period’. The ECJ has held, for example, a duration of proceed­
ings of ‘about five years and six months’ before the General Court as a violation of 
this principle.51 
With regard to the extraordinary complexity of the preliminary rulings procedure, 
certain temporal extensions resulting from this particular mechanism of cooperation 
are accepted in principle.52 Furthermore, a general delay caused by the requirement 
of ‘additional steps [of extrajudicial legal protection] before access to a Court can be 
granted’ is regularly accepted by the ECJ.53 That applies all the more as the possibility 
of interim measures is an important element in the context of duration of proceed­
ings as already mentioned.54 
[2011] ECR II-7915 para 23; see furthermore (dealing with the limitations of the first-mentioned principle),
however, R. Widdershoven, ‘European Administrative Law’ in R. J. G. H. Seerden (ed.), Administrative Law
of the European Union, Its Member States and the United States (3rd edn., Intersentia, Cambridge 2012) 245, 301
with reference to ECJ Case C-2/08 – Fallimento Olimpiclub [2009] ECR I-7501 paras 22–31. 
49 Cf in detail Lenaerts, Marselis, Gutman (n. 12) paras 6.27–32, 7.219–223, 10.18–21. 
50 ECJ Case C-169/14 – Sánchez Morcillo and Abril García [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2099 para 36; cf also 
Pabel (n. 22) § 19 paras 47–48 with further references. 
51 ECJ Case C-185/95 P – Baustahlgewebe/Commission [1998] ECR I-8417 paras 26–49 (with the final limit­
ing conclusion, that ‘in the absence of any indication that the length of the proceedings affected their 
outcome in any way, that plea cannot result in the contested judgment being set aside in its entirety’); cf 
also ECJ Case C-270/99 P – Z/Parliament [2001] ECR I-9197 para 24; Case C-500/10 – Belvedere Costruzioni
[2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:186 paras 23–28. 
52 Cf, e.g., Gundel (n. 37) § 19 para 39 with regard to the respective ECtHR case law. 
53 Hofmann (n. 34) para 47.85 with reference to ECJ Joined Cases C-317/08 to C-320/08 – Alassini and 
others [2010] ECR I-2213 paras 58–66 (62 in particular); as to the requirement of a preliminary admin­
istrative procedure cf with regard to judicial protection against the measures of Union agencies, e.g., 
C. Görisch, ‘Die Agenturen der Europäischen Union’ (2012) 34 Jura 42, 50–51 (also with regard to the 
admissibility of an exclusion of direct appeal against factual or preparing acts). 
54 See above, around n. 39. As to the important harmonising effect of the respective case law according to 
which ‘the suspension of enforcement of administrative measures based on a Community regulation, 
whilst it is governed by national procedural law, in particular as regards the making and examination 
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Finally, whereas time-limits have an accelerating effect on the duration of court 
procedure on the one hand, they must be long enough ‘to ensure that interested par­
ties have sufficient time within which to bring an action against published measures 
and, consequently, to observe the right to effective judicial protection’55 on the other 
hand. Although only with regard to abbreviated procedures as rather exceptional 
cases, the ECJ has decided that even ‘a 15-day time limit for bringing an action does 
not seem, generally, to be insufficient in practical terms to prepare and bring an effec­
tive action and appears reasonable and proportionate in relation to the rights and 
interests involved’.56 
3.2.3 Liability claims 
As regards liability claims, the ECJ has held already in the seminal case Francovich that 
the ‘protection of [conferred] rights [. . .] would be weakened’ without the possibil­
ity of state liability in case of their violation.57 Correspondingly, the principle of state 
liability might be called a ‘necessary extension of the general principle of effective 
judicial protection’.58 Additionally, the principle includes exhaustive Union liability 
beyond Arts. 340 paras 2, 3 TFEU, 41 para 3 CFR (in connection with Art. 268 TFEU). 
Therefore, for example, an action for unjust enrichment brought before the ECJ, 
although not mentioned explicitly in these provisions, has been declared admissible.59 
4 Additional procedural rights 
The basic standards of the court procedure are complemented by additional proce­
dural rights (including rights under the administrative procedure, in particular as 
guaranteed by the right to good administration according to Art. 41 CFR).60 Accord­
ing to explicit primary law provisions, these rights comprise, among others,61 the right 
to access to documents (Arts. 15 TFEU, 41 para 2 lit b, 42 CFR), the right to refer to 
the European Ombudsman cases of maladministration in the activities of the (non­
judicial) institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union (Arts. 24 para 3, 228 
uniform so far as the granting of such relief is concerned and which it [scilicet the ECJ] has defined 
as being the same conditions as those of the application for interim relief brought before the Court’ 
cf Kayser (n. 21) § 91 para 137 with reference to ECJ Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and 
C-194/04 – ABNA [2005] ECR I-10423 para 104. 
55 ECJ Case C-625/11 P – PPG and SNF/ECHA [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:594 para 35. 
56 ECJ Case C-69/10 – Samba Diouf [2011] ECR I-7151 para 67. As to the equally affected principle of res 
judicata see already above, n. 48. 
57 ECJ Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 – Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357 paras 32–33, 42 (concerning 
a breach by the Italian Republic of the obligation to implement the directive on the protection of 
employees in the event of the insolvency of the employer). 
58 See the opinion of Advocate General Léger in ECJ Case C-224/01 – Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239 point 35; 
consenting Nowak (n. 34) § 14 para 18. 
59 ECJ Case C-47/07 P – Masdar/Commission [2008] ECR I-9761 paras 48–50. 
60 As to the close link between the ‘requirements of good administration and [. . .] the principle of effec­
tive legal protection’ see Hofmann (n. 34) para 47.67 with reference to ECJ Case C-362/09 P – Athinaïki 
Techniki/Commission [2010] ECR I-13275 para 70. 
61 As to more exhaustive enumerations and examinations see, e.g., Nowak (n. 34) § 14 paras 19–28; Pabel 
(n. 22) § 19 paras 44–75. 















TFEU, 43 CFR), the right to petition the European Parliament (Arts. 24 para 2, 227 
TFEU, 44 CFR), the right to be heard (Arts. 41 para 2 lit a, 47 para 2 clause 1 CFR) 
resp. to intervene (Art. 40 Protocol [No. 3] on the Statute of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in conjunction with Art. 51 TEU), the right to counsel (Art. 
47 para 2 clause 2 CFR) and the duty to give reasons (Arts. 296 TFEU, 41 para 2 lit 
c CFR) respectively the right to the reasoning of judicial decisions (Art. 36 clause 1 
Protocol [No 3] on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union in con­
junction with Art. 51 TEU).62 
5 Conclusions 
For some time now, legal protection has been one of the central issues of legal doc­
trine in European administrative law.63 Even on the level of European Union law in 
particular, it raises a number of interesting questions. Regarding the complementary 
system of legal protection by Union and national courts, perhaps the most interest­
ing one in the present context is whether the ECJ applies higher standards to the 
national courts’ jurisdiction than to that of the Union courts (i.e. its own). The ECJ, 
as mentioned before, has been heavily criticised for regularly excluding direct access 
of individuals to an action for annulment against legislative acts on the one hand, but 
imposing heavy restrictions on the procedural autonomy of the Member States on the 
other hand. However, a deeper analysis of the case law in Les Verts and its successors 
reveals that the ECJ interprets even Union law contra legem if this is necessary to enable 
access to justice at all.64 The limitation of direct access to the ECJ for individuals in an 
action for annulment procedure mainly rests on the procedural primacy of judicial 
protection in the Member States,65 corresponding to the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 
5 para 3 TEU). Furthermore, it has to be pointed out that even in the highly discussed 
field of environmental law the ECJ would not promote a ‘dual standard’ if it declared
an action for annulment against legislative EU acts inadmissible due to a restrictive 
interpretation of Art. 9 para 3 AC66 as long as it does not require a different interpreta­
tion of the Convention from the national courts.67 
62 Cf also the related explanations to the Charter, OJ 2007 C 303, pp. 28–30.
 
63 Kayser (n. 21) § 91 para 1.
 
64 Explicitly M. Breuer, ‘Die Klagebefugnis von Umweltverbänden unter Anpassungsdruck des Völker- 

und Europarechts’ (2012) 45 Verw 171, 191. 
65 Cf Danwitz (n. 23) § 13 paras 15–16. 
66 Corresponding to the opinions of Advocate General Jääskinen in ECJ Joined Cases C-404/12 P 
and C-405/12 P – Council and Comission/Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe
ECLI:EU:C:2014:309 points 18–66 (left open in the judgment [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:5 para 54), and 
Joined Cases C-401/12 P, C-402/12 P and C-403/12 P – Council and others/Vereniging Milieudefensie and 
Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht ECLI:EU:C:2014:310 points 100–11 (left open in the judgment 
[2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:4 para 62), in the latter cases furthermore promoting an extensive interpreta­
tion of the term ‘administrative act’ [points 123–37] and stressing the uniform standard of interpreta­
tion and application of the Union Law in the context of Arts. 2 para 1 lit. g) 10 Regulation (EC) No 
1367/2006 with reference to Case 104/81 – Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641 para 14 [point 135]; cf also 
M. Breuer, ‘Die Klagebefugnis von Umweltverbänden unter Anpassungsdruck des Völker- und Euro­
parechts’ (2012) 45 Verw 171, 198–199; J. H. Jans, ‘On Inuit and Judicial Protection in a Shared Legal 
Order’ (2012) 21 EEELRev 188, 190–191. 
67 Apparently disagreeing D. Krawczyk, ‘The Slovak Brown Bear Case’ (2012) 14 Env L Rev 53, 64; similarly 
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Additionally, it must be taken into account that an ‘extension of the direct legal 
protection, which at first sight seems to be favourable for the citizens, could also have 
adversarial consequences. If the concerned party does not use the existing possibility 
of an action for annulment against a known [Union] legal act, a subsequent indirect 
review, as for instance in the proceedings of a preliminary ruling, would be denied 
according the ECJ Textilwerke Deggendorf case law’ to avoid a circumvention of the time-
limit set out in Art. 263 para 6 TFEU.68 This shows that even a restriction of access to 
justice sometimes might work for the benefit of effective legal protection – although 
it has to be admitted that this surprising consequence will occur only in rare and 
exceptional cases. 
Finally, as regards the advancement of the principle of effective legal protection, it
is worth noting the observation that ‘[amongst] the issues which might require further
clarification in the future is the question of the intensity of judicial review. So far, the
case law interpreting the right to effective judicial review, while acknowledging that
that right is linked to the intensity of judicial review, has only rarely addressed this
issue. [. . .] To date, the Court of Justice has always held that its own standards of review
of legality, especially under the action for annulment (Art. 263 TFEU), satisfy the
demands of the principle of effective judicial review, without giving further explana­
tions as to why that might be so’.69 However, an explanation for the limited intensity of
review by the ECJ concerning the strict application of the applicants’ burden of proof
and the principle of ne ultra petita can be found in the Romanist legal traditions,70 
whereas the assumed ‘limited judicial review’ with regard to discretionary decisions
of administrative authorities does not exclude the Union judicature from establishing
‘whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent’ as well as
‘whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account
in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the
conclusions drawn from it’,71 i.e. from an intensive review in substance.72 
786–791; cf also, e.g., J. H. Jans, ‘Who Is the Referee?’ (2011) 4–1 R.E.A.L. 85, 96–97. As to the similar 
discussion about a ‘double standard’ of the ECJ in the review of the principle of proportionality, see, 
e.g., F. G. Jacobs, ‘Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in European Community 
Law’ in E. Ellis (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart, Oxford and Portland 
1999) 1, 21. 
68 J Gundel (n. 37) § 19 para 32 (with reference, among others, to ECJ Case C-188/92 – TWD [1994]
ECR I-883): ‘This preclusion rule [. . .] has so far only been important for individual measures, such 
as for decisions of the Commission against Member States ordering the reversed transaction of unlaw­
fully granted national state-aids. [. . .] If the [direct] judicial review [of legislative acts before the ECJ] 
is opened by an extensive interpretation of [Art. 263 para 4 TFEU] the question of whether the cor­
responding ‘Deggendorf-Rule’ should be extended to such cases arises as well.’ 
69 Hofmann (n. 34) para 47.91, with reference to ECJ C-272/09 P – KME Germany and others/Commission
[2011] ECR I-12789 paras 91–94; Case C-386/10 P – Chalkor/Commission [2011] ECR I-13085 paras 
45–57. As to the admissibility of an exclusion of direct appeal against factual or preparing acts cf already 
above, n. 53. 
70 Cf Danwitz (n. 23) § 13 para 42. 
71 CFI Case T-187/06 – Schräder/CPVO [2008] ECR II-3151 paras 59–61. 





























3 Creating a European-wide standard 
of effective legal protection 





1 Historical background 
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
commonly referred to as the ‘European Convention on Human Rights’ (ECHR),1 
has arisen out of the disastrous events of World War II. At a time when the project
of European integration under the auspices of the (then) European Communities
had not even been launched,2 the Convention was a first response of European
states (mainly of the Western hemisphere) to the atrocities of Nazism and Fas­
cism. This necessitated a fundamental change of thinking in public international
law: until the end of World War II, the individual had almost no place in interna­
tional law whatsoever.3 The lesson learned from the Nazi era was that it did not
suffice to leave protection of fundamental rights to national constitutions. What
was needed was a second level of protection, this time being an international one.
As a consequence, the individual became a subject (though only a partial one) of
international law.4 The first step in this direction was made, at UN level, by the Uni­
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 10 December 1948.5 Important as
it undeniably was, the Universal Declaration lacked a legally binding character and
it was no earlier than almost 20 years later, in 1966, when legally binding instru­
ments were set up at the universal level.6 Against this background, one cannot but
praise the Member States of the Council of Europe for having achieved consensus
on a strong human rights catalogue as early as 1950 when the Convention was
opened for ratification. 
1 ETS No 5. 
2 The European Coal and Steel Community was founded in 1952, the European Atomic Energy Commu­
nity and the European Economic Community in 1958 respectively. 
3 cf L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I: Peace (Longmans, Green, and co., London, New York [etc.] 
1905) 346: ‘[The so-called rights of mankind] do not in fact enjoy any guarantee whatever from the Law 
of Nations, and they cannot enjoy such a guarantee, since the Law of Nations is a law between States, and 
since individuals cannot be subjects of this law.’ 
4 cf generally C. Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (3rd edn., 2014). 
5 GA Res 217 (III); for further reading, see G. Alfredsson and A. Eide (eds.), The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement (1999). 
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social 









   
 
   
   










A European-wide standard of legal protection 43 
The Convention entered into force in 1953, and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) was established six years later.7 However, the human rights protection 
of the early days significantly differed from the level of protection guaranteed today: 
First, as for the substance, the Convention contained only the core of (mainly liberal) 
rights. Other guarantees were added in the course of time by means of additional 
(and facultative) protocols, such as the right to property (Art. 1 Protocol No 1)8 or 
the prohibition of death penalty in times of peace (Protocol No 6)9 and war (Protocol 
No 13).10 Secondly, the enforcement machinery significantly differed from the way 
it looks like today: the Court’s jurisdiction was facultative and subject to a separate 
declaration of acceptance.11 In cases where a state had not made such a declaration, 
it was for the Committee of Ministers – i.e. for a political body within the Council 
of Europe – to establish whether or not there had been a violation.12 What is more, 
even the individual complaint procedure was not compulsory but subject to another 
(facultative) declaration of acceptance.13 As a consequence, some Council of Europe 
Member States hid for years in the shadow since no individual could blame them at 
the European level for not complying with their Convention obligations.14 Lastly, even 
in cases where a state had accepted both the Court’s jurisdiction and the individual 
complaint procedure, the potential victim of a human rights violation had no direct 
access to the Court. Instead, complaints were lodged with the then European Com­
mission of Human Rights (EComHR) which decided on the admissibility. If the com­
plaint had been found admissible, the case was brought before the Court (mainly) by 
the Commission which set up a (confidential) report on the merits.15 
The new era began in November 1998 when Protocol No 11 entered into force.16 
This Protocol brought about a number of innovations which are still central to today’s 
design of the Convention machinery. The right to individual complaint which is now­
adays the centrepiece of the Convention17 became obligatory for all states (Art. 34 of 
the Convention), as well as the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. Today, it goes without 
saying that the victim himself or herself has direct access to the Court.18 The for­
mer Commission has been abolished in favour of a Court which is now composed by 
full-time judges (under the old system, the judges met only irregularly on part-time 
basis). The role of the Committee of Ministers has been reduced to the surveillance 
7 J. A. Frowein, ‘Einführung’ in J. A. Frowein and W. Peukert (eds.), Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention: 
EMRK-Kommentar (3rd edn., 2009) MN 2, 4. 
8 ETS No 9. 
9 ETS No 114. 
10 ETS No 177. 
11 Former Art. 46 of the Convention. 
12 Former Art. 32 of the Convention. 
13 Former Art. 25 para 1 of the Convention. 
14 Turkey e.g., being one of the original Parties to the Convention, made the declaration only in 1987. 
15 Former Art. 31 of the Convention. 
16 ETS No 155. 
17 cf C. Tomuschat, ‘Individueller Rechtsschutz: das Herzstück des “ordre public européen” nach der 
Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention’ (2003) 30 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 95. 
18 The direct access to the Court had been introduced by Protocol No 9 (ETS No 140) which was, how­
ever, an optional protocol. Hence, it was only by Protocol No 11 that direct access to the Court became 
obligatory for all Contracting Parties. 
















of the states honouring their obligations after a finding of a violation (Art. 46 para 2 
of the Convention). Protocol No 11 saw the introduction of a new Court formation, 
the Grand Chamber which decides on serious questions affecting the interpreta­
tion or application of the Convention or the protocols thereto, or serious issues of 
general importance (Art. 43 para 2 of the Convention). Although there have been 
subsequent procedural innovations (Protocols No 14,19 which entered into force in 
June 2010, and Protocols No 1520 and 16,21 not yet in force), the fundamental nature 
of the change brought about by Protocol No 11 cannot be overestimated. 
Another factor which had an immense impact on today’s functioning of the system 
was the enlargement of the Council of Europe after the fall of the iron curtain. When 
the Convention was opened for signature in 1950, the Council of Europe consisted of 
thirteen Member States, most of them belonging to the Western hemisphere (except 
for Turkey). Within this part of Europe, there was a large consensus about central 
human values. After the end of the cold war in 1990, the Council of Europe decided 
to open its gates and to let in the newly established democracies.22 This decision, 
understandable as it might have been, had strong repercussions on the Convention 
system. Today, the Council of Europe consists of 47 Member States, some of which are 
facing systemic problems in safeguarding the rule of law. This has led to an immense 
influx of incoming applications up to the number of 160,000 pending cases, a num­
ber which severely endangered the functioning of the system as a whole. Although 
the Court managed to reduce the number of pending cases to just under the mark of 
100,000 by the end of 2013 and even further to 70,000 by the end of 2014, the long­
term functioning of the Convention system is still one of the most pressing – and, one 
might add, still unanswered – questions.23 
2 Rights-based perspective 
It might be rather unusual to cite the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in a contri­
bution dedicated to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, this is 
exactly what shall be done here. The ECJ has held in a long-standing jurisprudence 
that the right to effective judicial protection is ‘one of the general principles of law 
stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States’, a right 
that has also been ‘enshrined in Arts. 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’.24 One aspect is striking: 
The ECJ mentions, in the same breath, both Arts. 6 and 13 of the Convention as if 
there was no difference between them. Indeed, from a Union law perspective, this is 
exactly the case since nowadays, both Convention articles have been merged together 
into what is now Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). From a genuine 
19 CETS No 194. 
20 CETS No 213. 
21 CETS No 214. 
22 cf V. Djerić ‘Admission to Membership of the Council of Europe and Legal Significance of Commit­
ments Entered Into by New Member States’ (2000) 60 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht 605; J. F. Flauss, ‘Les conditions d’admission des pays d’Europe centrale et orientale au sein 
du Conseil de l’Europe’ (1994) 5 European Journal of International Law 401. 
23 Figures according to ECtHR, Annual Report 2013 (2014) 9; Annual Report 2014 (2015) 5. 














   
  
 
   




   
   
  
   
A European-wide standard of legal protection 45 
Convention perspective, however, things are quite different. Arts. 6 and 13 of the 
Convention follow different dogmatic concepts. This has strong repercussions on the 
subject under consideration, namely, the effective legal protection in administrative 
law matters. Therefore, as a first step, it is necessary to address the respective dog­
matic concepts of Art. 6 para 1 and Art. 13 of the Convention. 
2.1 Dogmatic concept of Art. 6 para 1 and Art. 13 of the Convention 
Art. 6 para 1 of the Convention is at the same time both larger and narrower in 
scope, compared to Art. 13.25 It is larger in scope because it does not only apply to 
alleged breaches of other Convention rights, as Art. 13 does. Instead, it applies to 
rights protected under national law alone. However, Art. 6 is narrower in scope in 
that it applies only to disputes concerning ‘civil rights and obligations’ and ‘criminal 
charges’ respectively. This might give rise to the impression that Art. 6 para 1 does not 
apply to administrative law matters at all. This, however, would be misconceived. The 
ECtHR has developed an autonomous concept of what is meant by ‘civil rights and 
obligations’ and by ‘criminal charges’.26 Large parts of the law which at the national 
level are regarded as belonging to the administrative branch of law are covered by 
Art. 6 para 1 as interpreted by the ECtHR.27 E.g., if a person is denied a building 
permission by the relevant authority, this would be regarded under many – if not 
most – national laws as an administrative law matter. In Convention terms, however, 
Art. 6 para 1 of the Convention applies since the right to property is at the heart of 
this dispute and the right to property is regarded a ‘civil right’ by the ECtHR.28 This 
is not to say that Art. 6 para 1 of the Convention applies to all administrative law mat­
ters. Cases concerning the expulsion of aliens, e.g., are not regarded as being ‘civil’ 
in nature.29 Here, Art. 13 steps in.30 
There is yet another difference between Art. 6 para 1 and Art. 13 of the Conven­
tion. Supposed, Art. 6 para 1 applies, the wording of the provision requires that 
the dispute be settled by a ‘tribunal’. This is different for Art. 13, here, the wording 
requires only a ‘national authority’ (in French: ‘une instance national ’). The Court has 
acknowledged that a ‘national authority’ must not necessarily be a court.31 In other 
words, Art. 13 is less strict than Art. 6 para 1 in that it does not require in all cases a 
judicial remedy. From this, it is generally concluded that Art. 6 para 1 is lex specialis
25 cf M. Breuer, ‘Art 13’ in U. Karpenstein and F. C. Mayer (eds.), EMRK: Kommentar (2nd edn., 2015), 
MN 5. Art. 6 para 1, first sentence of the Convention reads: ‘In the determination of his civil rights 
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.’ Art. 13 of the 
Convention reads: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’ 
26 C. Grabenwarter, ‘Art 6’ in idem, European Convention on Human Rights: Commentary (2014), MN 3 et seq. 
27 J. Gundel, ‘Art 146. Verfahrensrechte’ in D. Merten and J. Papier (eds.), Handbuch der Grundrechte in 
Deutschland und Europa (2010) volume VI/1, MN 21 et seq. 
28 Allan Jacobsson v Sweden (No 2), Appl no 16970/90 (ECHR, 19 February 1998), paras 38 et seq. 
29 Maaouia v France [GC], Appl no 39652/98 (ECHR, 5 October 2000), paras 33 et seq. 
30 Infra at n. 66. 
31 Klass and Others v Germany, Appl no 5029/71 (ECHR, 6 September 1978), para 67. 












   
  
  
with regard to Art. 13 of the Convention.32 There is only one exception to this, which 
will be dealt with later, namely the cases of unduly long proceedings.33 Against this 
dogmatic background, one might now deal with the different facets of the principle 
of effective legal protection from a rights-based perspective. 
2.2 Right of access to court 
The right of access to court is at the very heart of any effective legal protection. From 
the Convention perspective, an anomaly comes into play. Whereas Art. 13 expressly 
requires an ‘effective remedy before a national authority’, Art. 6 para 1, surprisingly, 
remains silent on the question of access to court. In fact, Art. 6 para 1 enshrines a 
number of procedural guarantees once a tribunal has been seized, like fair and public 
hearings, that the tribunal be independent and impartial or that it be established by 
law. According to the strict wording of the provision, however, it would not be forbid­
den to deny access to court altogether. Yet, there is a long-standing jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR going back to the Golder judgment in 1975 where the Court convincingly 
held that it: 
would be inconceivable . . . that Article 6 para. 1 should describe in detail the 
procedural guarantees afforded to parties in a pending lawsuit and should not 
first protect that which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit from such guar­
antees, that is, access to a court. The fair, public and expeditious characteristics of 
judicial proceedings are of no value at all if there are no judicial proceedings.34 
From that, the Court concluded that ‘the right of access constitutes an element which 
is inherent in the right stated by Article 6 para. 1’.35 This interpretation was heavily 
criticised, at the time, by judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice.36 Meanwhile, however, it is a 
well-established and, one might add, a well-accepted jurisprudence. 
2.3 Right to appeal 
Art. 6 para 1 enshrines a right of access to court but no more than that. In par­
ticular, it does not recognise a right to appeal as such. To quote from the Court’s 
jurisprudence: 
The Court reiterates that Article 6 of the Convention does not compel the Con­
tracting States to set up courts of appeal. However, where such courts do exist, the 
requirements of Article 6 must be complied with, so as for instance to guarantee 
to litigants an effective right of access to court for the determination of their ‘civil 
rights and obligations’. The ‘right to a court’, of which the right of access is one 
aspect, is not absolute; it is subject to limitations permitted by implication, in 
32 Grabenwarter (n. 26), Art. 13 MN 8.
 
33 Infra at n. 51.
 
34 Golder v United Kingdom, Appl no 4451/70 (ECHR, 21 February 1975), para 35.
 
35 Ibid. para 36.
 
36 Ibid. Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice.
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particular where the conditions of admissibility of an appeal are concerned, since 
by its very nature it calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin 
of appreciation in this regard. However, these limitations must not restrict or 
reduce a person’s access in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence 
of the right is impaired.37 
There is, in fact, a right to appeal under Protocol No 7.38 Art. 2 para 1 of this Proto­
col gives ‘everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal’ the right to have 
‘his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal’. Again, one might con­
clude at first sight that this provision is automatically inapplicable in administrative 
law disputes. However, the concept of autonomous interpretation has lead the Court 
to apply this provision in administrative law cases as well.39 Administrative sanctions, 
therefore, might be regarded a conviction of a ‘criminal offence’ in terms of Protocol 
No 7. If, in such a case, the decision at first instance has been issued by an administra­
tive authority, it follows from the right of appeal under Art. 2 of Protocol No 7 that 
there must be two more levels of jurisdiction by an independent tribunal.40 
2.4 Right to intervention 
With respect to stakeholders’ right to intervene into proceedings, the application of 
Art. 6 para 1 to administrative law disputes becomes highly relevant. This is so because 
Art. 6 para 1 inter alia guarantees a ‘fair hearing’ and the Strasbourg Court has inter­
preted this as encompassing the principles both of equality of arms and of adversarial 
proceedings. The principle of equality of arms implies that each party is given ‘a 
reasonable opportunity to present its case under conditions that do not place it at a 
substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis its opponent’.41 According to the principle of adver­
sarial proceedings, ‘the parties must have the opportunity not only to make known 
any evidence needed for their claims to succeed, but also to have knowledge of, and 
comment on, all evidence adduced or observations filed, with a view to influencing 
the court’s decision’.42 
This concept has put considerable pressure on long-established institutions like 
the ‘commissaire du gouvernement’ under French administrative law. The commissaire du 
gouvernement, who is today called ‘rapporteur public’, is a member of the Conseil d’Etat. 
His or her task is to present concluding observations (les conclusions) at the end of 
the oral proceedings, very much like the Advocate General does before the ECJ. He 
does so in full independence. The problem is that the parties to an administrative law 
dispute have no opportunity to comment on the conclusions. The ECtHR did not see 
a problem of equality of arms, given that the conclusions were presented orally dur­
ing the public hearing and neither party had access to them beforehand.43 Nor did it 
find a violation of the principle of adversarial proceedings, although this aspect was 
37 Anghel v Italy, Appl no 5968/09 (ECHR, 26 June 2013), para 50.
 
38 ETS No 117.
 
39 Grecu v Romania, Appl no 75101/01 (ECHR, 30 November 2011), paras 81 et seq.
 
40 Grabenwarter (n. 26) P7–2, para 2.
 
41 Krčmář and Others v Czech Republic, Appl no 35376/97 (ECHR, 3 March 2000), para 39.
 
42 Ibid. para 40.
 
43 Kress v France [GC], Appl no 39594/98 (ECHR, 7 June 2001), para 73.
 







   
 
 
   
 








   
  
   
 
more delicate. The Court held that the possibility of filing a so-called note en delibéré
in advance to the oral presentation of the conclusions ‘helps to ensure compliance 
with the adversarial principle’.44 What the Court did criticise, however, was the fact 
that the commissaire du gouvernement took part in the private deliberation of the judg­
ment, although without a vote.45 As a consequence, French administrative procedural 
law was amended to the effect that in cases before the Conseil d’Etat, any party, at the 
beginning of the oral proceedings, might object to the commissaire’s taking part in 
the deliberation of the judgment.46 
It was already mentioned that the Advocate General at the ECJ was modelled after 
the French commissaire du gouvernement. Hence, it has been questioned whether the 
Luxembourg proceedings live up to human rights standards. The Luxembourg Court 
itself has found no breach of the fair trial principle, given the possibility of having the 
oral proceedings reopened if it considers that it lacks sufficient information, or that 
the case must be dealt with on the basis of an argument which has not been debated 
between the parties.47 In the subsequent Strasbourg proceedings, the applicant com­
pany failed for formal reasons.48 
2.5 Right to an administrative act within reasonable time 
With respect to legal protection against inactive administrations, there is a remark­
able difference between the Convention and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.49 
The Charter contains, in Art. 41, the right to good administration. This includes that 
a matter be handled, by the administration, within reasonable time (Art. 41 para 1 
CFR). Under the Convention, no such guarantee is expressly acknowledged. This 
does not mean that there is no legal protection whatsoever against an administration 
which remains silent. Such protection, however, can be construed only indirectly, by 
means of an extensive interpretation of Art. 6 para 1 of the Convention. 
What Art. 6 para 1 actually does guarantee is a court trial within reasonable time.
The question remains, however, what is the temporal scope of this guarantee. Does the
‘trial’ begin at the time when the claim is lodged with the administrative court? Or does
Art. 6 para 1 also encompass proceedings before the administrative bodies preceding
the administrative court trial? The Strasbourg Court has decided in the latter sense,
thereby extending the temporal scope of Art. 6 para 1 well beyond the sole court trial.50 
As a consequence, the Convention grants an indirect right that an administrative act
44 Ibid. para 76.
 
45 Ibid. paras 77 et seq.
 
46 Décret n° 2006–964 du 1er août 2006 modifiant la partie réglementaire du code de justice administra­
tive, JORF n°178 du 3 août 2006 page 11570. 
47 Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar [2000] ECR I-665, para 18; see R. Lawson, ‘Case C-17/98, Emesa Sugar 
(Free Zone) NV v Aruba, Order of the Court of Justice of 4 February 2000, nyr. Full Court’ (2000) 
37 Common Market Law Review 983; T. Schilling, ‘Das Recht der Parteien, zu den Schlußanträgen der 
Generalanwälte beim EuGH Stellung zu nehmen’ (2000) 60 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht 
und Völkerrecht 395. 
48 Emesa Sugar NV v the Netherlands, Appl no 62023/00 (ECHR, 13 January 2003); see M. Breuer, ‘Offene 
Fragen im Verhältnis von EGMR und EuGH’ (2005) 32 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 229. 
49 Gundel (n. 27) MN 43. 
50 König v Germany, Appl no 6232/73 (ECtHR, 28 June 1978), para 98; Nowicky v Austria, Appl no 34983/02 
(ECtHR, 24 February 2005), para 47. 
 
 




   
  





   
   
 
  
    
   
 
   
   
  
  
A European-wide standard of legal protection 49 
be issued within reasonable time. This right, it is to be noted, has no standing of its
own. The proceedings before the administrative bodies form part of Art. 6 para 1 only
insofar as they are a precondition for seizing the administrative courts. If no court pro­
ceedings are initiated, Art. 6 para 1 of the Convention is inapplicable. 
Art. 6 para 1 enshrines the right to a court trial within reasonable time as such. 
Another question is whether the Convention also guarantees a national remedy 
against unduly delayed proceedings. The answer to this question is to be found in 
Art. 13 of the Convention. In its famous Kudła judgment, the Court has held that 
there must be a national remedy against unduly long proceedings.51 This has been 
expressly acknowledged in cases of unduly long administrative court proceedings as 
well.52 Here, Art. 13 applies in addition to Art. 6 para 1 of the Convention. It has been 
mentioned above that normally, Art. 6 para 1 is deemed to be lex specialis with regard 
to Art. 13.53 This is not so for length of proceedings cases.54 The Convention does 
not only protect the right to proceedings within a reasonable time, it also requires a 
national remedy against undue delays. 
The Court’s jurisprudence has led to a number of changes in legislation introduc­
ing a national remedy against unduly long court proceedings (be they administra­
tive or otherwise).55 In some states, the internal law was brought in line with the 
Convention requirements by way of a change of jurisprudence, a noticeable example 
being the Magiera judgment of the French Conseil d’Etat.56 The Strasbourg Court has 
acknowledged the effectiveness of this jurisprudential affiliation.57 In Germany where 
the implementation of the Court’s jurisprudence took the form of a legislative enact­
ment, the Supreme Administrative Court at least partly seceded from the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. The Court found that the administrative proceedings preceding the 
administrative court trial should not be considered when calculating the length of 
proceedings.58 This is not in line with the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence which 
held in the opposite direction.59 
2.6 Locus standi of persons no longer affected 
It is in the very nature of police measures that they are typically of only short endur­
ance. The assembly has been dissolved, the house search has been carried out, the sur­
veillance measure has ended well before the person concerned had the chance to go to
court. In those situations, the question comes up whether the potential victim still has
locus standi before the national courts. In the Camenzind case, the Swiss Federal Court
51 Kudła v Poland [GC], Appl no 30210/96 (ECtHR, 26 October 2000).
 
52 Rumpf v Germany, Appl no 46344/06 (ECtHR, 2 September 2010); Vassilios Athanasiou and others v Greece, 

Appl no 50973/08 (ECHR, 21 December 2010). 
53 Supra at n. 33. 
54 cf T Vospernik, ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen Art 13 und Art 6 EMRK – Absorption oder “Apfel und Birne”?’ 
(2001) 56 Österreichische Juristenzeitung 361. 
55 cf Taron v Germany, Appl no 53126/07 (ECHR, 29 May 2012); Techniki Olympiaki AE v Greece, Appl no 
40547/10 (ECtHR, 1 October 2013). 
56 CE Ass, judgment of 28 June 2002, Recueil Lebon p 247; see Calmes-Brunet in this book. 
57 Broca and Texier-Micault v France, Appl nos 27928/02, 31694/02 (ECtHR, 21 October 2003), paras 19 
et seq. 
58 BVerwGE 147, 146 para 24. 
59 Supra n. 50. 





















    
  
   
   
  
   
  
 
   
 
 
denied locus standi on account of the fact that the applicant was no longer affected
by the police measure in question. This was arguable from the national point of view
because under section 28(1) of the Federal Administrative Criminal Law Act, an inves­
tigative measure could be appealed in court by anyone who was affected by it and had
an interest worthy of protection in having it quashed or varied. According to settled
Swiss jurisprudence, the ‘interest’ had to be a present one in the sense that persons had
only locus standi when they were still affected by the impugned measure.60 This result,
however, did not live up to Convention standards. Since neither ‘civil rights and obliga­
tions’ nor ‘criminal charges’ were directly at stake, the application did not come in the
ambit of Art. 6 para 1 of the Convention.61 Instead, Art. 13, taken in conjunction with
Art. 8 of the Convention, was the applicable yardstick. The Court pointed to its long­
standing jurisprudence according to which Art. 13 required for an ‘effective remedy
before a national authority’.62 Since the applicant was denied, by the interpretation of
the national law, any form of judicial remedy, the Court found a violation. 
It is interesting to note that the German Constitutional Court changed its case law 
quite at the same time.63 Although the Strasbourg Court had not yet given judgment, 
it is arguable that the ruling of the German Constitutional Court was at least influ­
enced by the Strasbourg proceedings, given the fact that the (then) Commission had 
already submitted its report and equally found a violation of Art.13.64 
2.7 Suspensive effect 
The effectiveness of legal protection may require that an administrative act not be
executed as long as the court trial is pending. However, this requirement contradicts
states’ interest namely in cases concerning the expulsion of aliens. Typically, national
law used to provide that legal remedies against deportation orders are without suspen­
sive effect. What is more, the European asylum system used to exclude, as a rule, sus­
pensive effect in cases where the asylum seeker was to be deported to another Member
State where he or she had first entered the European Union.65 In the widely-noticed
MSS judgment, the Strasbourg Court found that this was not in line with the Conven­
tion. The Court recalled its established jurisprudence according to which ‘in view of
the importance [of] Article 3 of the Convention and the irreversible nature of the dam­
age which may result if the risk of torture or ill-treatment materialises, the effective­
ness of a remedy within the meaning of Article 13 imperatively requires [. . .] that the
person concerned should have access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect’.66 
60 BGE 103 IV 115.
 
61 BC v Switzerland, Appl no 21353/93 (EComHR 27 February 1995).
 
62 Camenzind v Switzerland, Appl no 21353/93 (ECtHR, 16 December 1997), para 53.
 
63 BVerfGE 96, 27.
 
64 BC v Switzerland, Appl no 21353/93 (EComHR 3 September 1996); see Gundel (n. 27) MN 82, n. 717.
 
65 Art 19 para 2, fourth sentence of the so-called Dublin II Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 

343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national, OJ L 50/1). 
66 MSS v Belgium and Greece [GC], Appl no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011), para 293, citing Čonka v 
Belgium, Appl no 51564/99 (ECtHR, 5 February 2002), paras 81–83 and Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v 







   
 
   












   
A European-wide standard of legal protection 51 
This judgment was echoed by the ECJ in the NS case.67 The ECJ mainly subscribed 
the findings of the Strasbourg Court in MSS as for the deficiencies of the Greek asy­
lum system but avoided to pronounce itself on the question of suspensive effect.68 
Meanwhile, a new regulation has been set up which provides for a differentiated sys­
tem of suspensive effect.69 
2.8 Execution of national judgments 
In administrative law, execution of (national) judgments at first sight seems to pose 
no serious problems: whenever the administrative court decides in favour of the 
claimant and quashes the impugned administrative act, no question of execution 
arises. Things are different, however, in cases where e.g. social security benefits are 
concerned: here, a mere court judgment that the administrative body has to pay a 
certain amount of money does not suffice to settle the claim since the administrative 
authority has to become active. In a functioning Rechtsstaat, it is not worth mention­
ing that binding court decisions must be executed. From the Convention perspective, 
however, non-execution of national court judgments is one of the pressing problems, 
at least in certain (mostly Eastern European) countries.70 
In Convention terms, the first question to be assessed is which right is at stake
when a binding court judgment is not being executed. Given that most of those
cases concern the payment of money, it is arguable to hold that the non-execution
of the court judgment infringes the right to property (Art. 1 Protocol No 1). On
the other hand, the non-enforcement concerns a procedural aspect. Therefore, the
Court in those cases finds a violation not only of Art. 1 Protocol No 1 but also of
Art. 6 para 1 of the Convention.71 This presupposes that Art. 6 para 1 applies even
after the national court has given judgment. This is exactly what the Court found
in Hornsby: 
However, [the right to a court] would be illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic 
legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the 
detriment of one party. It would be inconceivable that Article 6 para. 1 should 
describe in detail procedural guarantees afforded to litigants – proceedings that 
are fair, public and expeditious – without protecting the implementation of judi­
cial decisions; to construe Article 6 as being concerned exclusively with access 
to a court and the conduct of proceedings would be likely to lead to situations 
incompatible with the principle of the rule of law which the Contracting States 
undertook to respect when they ratified the Convention (. . .). Execution of a 
67 Case C-411/10 NS and others [2011] ECR I-13905. 
68 cf K. Hailbronner and D. Thym, ‘Vertrauen im europäischen Asylsystem’ (2012) 31 Neue Zeitschrift für 
Verwaltungsrecht 406, 408 et seq. 
69 Art 26 paras 3 and 4 of the Dublin III Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Par­
liament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one 
of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, OJ L 180/31). 
70 F. Jacobs, R. White and C. Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (6th edn., 2014) 262. 
71 Burdov v Russ (No 2) [GC], Appl no 33509/04 (ECtHR, 15 January 2009), paras 65 et seq. 














   
 




   
  
   
judgment given by any court must therefore be regarded as an integral part of the 
‘trial’ for the purposes of Article 6.72 
It goes without saying that in the administrative law context, Art. 6 para 1 of the 
Convention applies only where the dispute concerns a ‘civil right and obligation’ or 
‘criminal charges’ respectively.73 
2.9 State liability 
Many procedures in administrative law aim at eliminating the unlawful decision of 
the administrative authorities.74 There are situations, however, where the mere quash­
ing of the impugned decision does not suffice because a non-reparable damage has 
been caused. In those circumstances, the issue of state liability is at stake. According 
to the Court’s settled case law, 
where an individual has an arguable claim that he has been ill-treated by agents 
of the State, the notion of an ‘effective remedy’ entails, in addition to the payment 
of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of 
leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible and including 
effective access for the complainant to the investigatory procedure.75 
From that, it might be concluded that Art. 13 of the Convention does not in all cir­
cumstances require a compensatory remedy but only ‘where appropriate’. On the
other hand, the interplay between primary and secondary remedies has become par­
ticularly clear in cases of unduly long proceedings. The Court has held that ‘where
length-of-proceedings violations already exist, a remedy designed to expedite the
proceedings – although desirable for the future – may not be adequate to redress
a situation in which the proceedings have clearly already been excessively long’.76 
In those cases, Art. 13 of the Convention requires for a compensatory remedy at
national level. This has led many states to introduce compensatory mechanisms.77 
3 Institutional perspective 
3.1 The notion of ‘tribunal’ 
It is not necessary for the States Parties to the Convention to set up administrative
courts. The ECtHR has accepted that a full examination of administrative acts
by civil courts is in compliance with the requirements under Art. 6 para 1 of the
Convention.78 In fact, the Court is cognisant of the reluctance with which states
72 Hornsby v Greece, Appl no 18357/91 (ECtHR, 19 March 1997), para 40.
 
73 Supra at n. 25.
 
74 Cf ‘Anfechtungsklage’ in German Law, ‘recours pour excès de pouvoir’ in French Law.
 
75 El-Masri v the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], Appl no 39630/09 (ECtHR, 13 December 

2012), para 255 with further references (emphasis added). 
76 Scordino v Italy (No 1) [GC], Appl no 36813/97 (ECtHR, 29 March 2006), para 185. 
77 cf M. Breuer, Staatshaftung für judikatives Unrecht (2011) 554 et seq, with further references. 
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have reacted to the demand of their administrative authorities being subjected to
any kind of judicial review. To use the words of the Court: 
Admittedly, the very establishment and existence of administrative courts can be 
hailed as one of the most conspicuous achievements of a State based on the rule 
of law, in particular because the jurisdiction of those courts to adjudicate on acts 
of the administrative authorities was not accepted without a struggle. Even today, 
the way in which administrative judges are recruited, their special status, distinct 
from that of the ordinary judiciary, and the special features of the way in which 
the system of administrative justice works [. . .] show how difficult it was for the 
executive to accept that its acts should be subject to review by the courts.79 
Irrespective of this general sympathy and understanding, the Court’s jurisprudence has
brought about some far-reaching changes in the institutional structure of legal protec­
tion in administrative law. Again, this is due to the extensive application of Art. 6 para 1
to administrative law cases. This Article requires that each dispute covered by it be
settled by a ‘tribunal’ showing certain characteristics like impartiality, independence
and establishment by law. In Austria, traditionally the only court having jurisdiction in
administrative law matters used to be the Supreme Administrative Court. The problem,
however, was that its jurisdiction was confined to questions of law, as opposed to ques­
tions of fact. As a consequence, the Austrian legislator created the so-called ‘Independ­
ent Administrative Panels’ (Unabhängige Verwaltungssenate), which are administrative
authorities enjoying independence and having full jurisdiction on questions of fact and
of law.80 The Court has accepted those entities as being ‘tribunals’ for the purposes of
Art. 6 para 1.81 However, the debates about the issue of effective legal protection did not
come to an end in Austria. By the year 2014, Austrian administrative law saw the crea­
tion of fully-fledged administrative courts of first instance.82 This is only one example of
institutional changes induced by Art. 6 para 1 which could be supplemented by others
from the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.83 
3.2 Judicial review of administrative regulations 
According to settled case law, Art. 13 of the Convention does not go so far as to 
guarantee ‘a remedy allowing a Contracting State’s laws as such to be challenged 
before a national authority on the ground of being contrary to the Convention or to 
79 Kress (n. 43) para 69.
 
80 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz-Novelle 1988, Bundesgesetzblatt Nr 685/1988, introducing Art. 129a et seq 

Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (Austrian Constitution); see Ulrike Giera & Konrad Lachmayer in this book. 
81 Baischer v Austria, Appl no 32381/96 (ECtHR, 20 December 2001), para 25. 
82 H. P. Lehofer, ‘ “Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit neu” – die wichtigsten Änderungen im Überblick’ (2013) 
68 Österreichische Juristenzeitung 757, 759. 
83 cf Gundel (n. 27) MN 28; R. Hofmann, ‘Erweiterung des verwaltungsgerichtlichen Rechtsschutzes in 
Schweden’ (1990) 17 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 10; Kley-Struller, Art 6 EMRK als Rechtsschutzga­
rantie gegen die öffentliche Gewalt (1993) 86; A. Knutsson, ‘Some Aspects of the Jurisdiction of the Euro­
pean Court of Human Rights and Its Influence on Swedish Law’ in P. Mahoney et al. (eds.), Protecting 
Human Rights: The European Perspective: Studies in Memory of Rolv Ryssdal (2000) 715 et seq; see also Kari­
anne Albers, Lise Kjellevold & Raymond Schlossels (concerning the Nethelrands) and Felix Uhlmann 
(concerning Switzerland) in this book. 







   
   
  
  
equivalent domestic legal norms.’84 In other cases, the Court formulates that ‘Article 
13 cannot be interpreted as requiring a remedy against the state of domestic law’.85 
This jurisprudence, however, is concerned with acts of Parliament. It reflects the situ­
ation that in many European states, judicial review of acts of Parliament used to be, 
and partly still is, unknown, due to separation of power arguments. With respect to 
administrative regulations, this rationale does not hold true. Therefore, it can gener­
ally be deduced that under Art. 13, there must be some kind of remedy to a national 
‘authority’ against administrative regulations, capable of challenging their conform­
ity with Convention standards.86 
4 Conclusion 
The Convention sets standards for the effective legal protection in administrative 
law matters. This is mainly due to the autonomous understanding of Art. 6 para 1, 
which has lead the Court to apply this guarantee to many administrative law cases in 
a way definitely not anticipated by the Contracting States in 1950. The overview of 
the Court’s jurisprudence has shown a certain preponderance of Art. 6 para 1, com­
pared to Art. 13 of the Convention, which results from the lex specialis character of 
the former. Still, a full picture of the principle of effective legal protection under the 
Convention requires that both Articles be taken into account. 
From a Convention perspective, strengthening of legal protection at national level 
is a demand for at least two reasons: First, it is well in line with the principle of subsidi­
arity, which underlies the whole Convention machinery.87 According to the principle 
of subsidiarity, the State concerned should have the opportunity first to wipe out the 
consequences of a Convention violation. This is so because the national authorities 
are usually better-equipped to do that, compared to the judges in Strasbourg. Hence, 
the principle of subsidiarity serves an effective protection of human rights. 
Secondly, strengthening national remedies is also in the Court’s own interest. 
National systems where the legal protection is deficient lead to hundreds and thou­
sands of applications being lodged with the Court in Strasbourg. It is common knowl­
edge that the long-term functioning of the Court mainly depends on the improvement 
of the legal protection at the national level. Hence, the importance of the issue of 
effective legal protection cannot be overestimated. 
84 James and Others v the United Kingdom, Appl no 8793/79 (ECtHR, 21 February 1986), para 85.
 
85 IG and Others v Slovakia, Appl no 15966/04 (ECtHR, 13 November 2012), para 156.
 
86 Breuer (n. 25), Art 13 MN 16.
 























     
  
 





The idea of effective legal protection in administrative law, while certainly at the heart
of any given legal order and as such not alien to public international law as well, is nev­
ertheless very difficult to grasp in the latter field. The conceptual problems one faces
in attempting to approach the question are manifold, and it is no exaggeration to say
that virtually every single word in the phrase ‘effective legal protection in administra­
tive law’ raises a host of unresolved problems when applied to international law. For
one, assuming for good reason that legal protection in the present context means
protection of the rights of individuals, the problem is that individuals only rarely and
exceptionally have rights directly under international law. While the time-honoured
concept of diplomatic protection admittedly provides for a more or less effective
means of protecting the interests of individuals, most notably in the law concerning
the treatment of foreigners, the rights at issue do not pertain to the individuals but to
their respective home state. The individual merely is the beneficiary of these norms
which are owed to the state of nationality. It follows that this ‘dependency’ of the
individual on his/her state of nationality equally applies procedurally on the level
of judicial enforcement.1 Still today, the law of diplomatic protection generally only
allows for an invocation by the state of nationality in case of breach of the norms on
the treatment of foreigners.2 
1 This was already made clear by the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions, Judgment of 30 August 1924 (Objection to the Jurisdiction of the Court), PCIJ Ser A No 2, 
at 12: 
‘It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when 
injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they have been 
unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects 
and by resorting to diplomatic protection or international judicial proceedings, a State is in reality assert­
ing its own rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international 
law. The question, therefore, whether the present dispute originates in an injury to a private interest, 
which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes, is irrelevant from this standpoint. Once 
a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of 
the latter the State is sole claimant.’ 
2 As the Court stated in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo), Prelimi­
nary Objections, Judgment of 24 May, ICJ Reports 2007, 582, at 615 para 89: ‘The Court, having carefully 
examined State practice and decisions of international courts and tribunals in respect of diplomatic 
protection of associés and shareholders, is of the opinion that these do not reveal – at least at the present 
time – an exception in customary international law allowing for protection by substitution . . .’. The 








To be sure, international law has gone a long way from that situation. Today, there 
is no doubt that in particular areas, such as human rights, investment law, or the 
employment law of international organisations, the individual may well enjoy rights 
directly under international law as will be discussed below. These developments have 
also mitigated the general problem of effectiveness inherent in international law due 
to its decentralised structure. While in general international law, legal protection 
before international courts and tribunals is only possible if and to the extent the par­
ties to the dispute have consented to the jurisdiction of the relevant court or tribunal, 
in those areas where the individual possesses rights directly under international law, 
one frequently finds courts or tribunals having quasi-compulsory jurisdiction. Even 
if one still faces immense difficulties when it comes to enforcing international deci­
sions, these developments have no doubt increased the possibilities of access to legal 
protection of the individual. Before looking at the various meanings of international 
administrative law, I will give a few examples on the increased significance of the indi­
vidual in terms of legal personality. I will not address the most obvious field, namely 
human rights, as this is covered in detail elsewhere in this book.3 
1 The legal protection of the rights of individuals 
In the discussion of problems concerning the legal protection of individuals in inter­
national law the focus usually lies on the relevant substantive rights, and the question 
of enforcement is generally viewed as being merely ancillary or supplemental to the 
existence or not of a specific substantive right. However, the situation is much more 
complex and while it is true that a substantive right exists whether or not it is enforce­
able, enforcement will always be the ultimate test of effectiveness of the given legal 
order. 
For various reasons, international law very often defers the enforcement of inter­
national law by individuals to the domestic level, at least temporarily. The rule on 
the exhaustion of local remedies which applies in both diplomatic and human rights 
protection is the classic example of this. In the field of diplomatic protection where, 
as already noted, the individual does not possess rights on his/her own, the local 
remedies rule is inextricably linked with the substantive obligation of the host state 
not to commit a denial of justice.4 The idea that a person’s individual rights (notably 
under private law) must be enforceable is considered to be a kind of general prin­
ciple of law,5 but while under international law this privilege was formerly confined 
Court, however, left the question open as to ‘whether customary international law contains a more lim­
ited rule of protection by substitution, such as that set out by the ILC in its draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection, which would apply only where a company’s incorporation in the State having committed the 
alleged violation of international law “was required by it as a precondition for doing business there” (Art. 
11, para. (b))’. Ibid., para 91 and 616 para 93. 
3 See the contribution by Breuer in Chapter 3, this volume. 
4 J. Paulsson, Denial of Justice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005) 100–130. 
5 This was e.g. expressed by the European Court of Human Rights in Golder v The United Kingdom, Appl. 
No. 4451/70, ECtHR, Judgment of 21 February 1975: ‘The principle whereby a civil claim must be capa­
ble of being submitted to a judge ranks as one of the universally “recognised” fundamental principles of 
law; the same is true of the principle of international law which forbids the denial of justice. Art. 6 para. 
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to foreigners, human rights law has in many ways extended the scope of that idea 
and turned it into a ‘real’ right of the individual. At least on the European level, the 
human right of access to justice and due process (especially Art. 6 ECHR) has largely 
supplanted the ‘old’ law on the treatment of foreigners. 
But the idea that international law may not only create direct rights of individuals 
but also provide for their enforcement is not as new as one might think. Already in 
1928 the Permanent Court of International Justice addressed this idea in its advisory 
opinion concerning Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig. The case concerned a dispute 
between the Free City of Danzig and Poland on the question whether railway employ­
ees who had passed from the service of the Free City into the Polish railway adminis­
tration were entitled to bring actions against the Polish administration in respect of 
pecuniary claims, even if these claims were based on an international treaty, namely 
the Danzig-Polish Agreement (the so-called Beamtenabkommen). The Beamtenabkom­
men regulated the employment conditions of the Danzig railway employees who were 
now under Polish administration. Poland disputed such a possibility and argued that 
the Agreement, as an international treaty, could only create rights and obligations 
between the parties but not direct rights for the individuals concerned who are to be 
viewed as mere beneficiaries of these rights, the more so as the Agreement was not 
incorporated into Polish legislation. The Court however rejected these arguments 
and held: 
It may be readily admitted that, according to a well established principle of inter­
national law, the Beamtenabkommen, being an international agreement, cannot, 
as such, create direct rights and obligations for private individuals. But it cannot 
be disputed that the very object of an international agreement, according to the 
intention of the contracting Parties, may be the adoption by the Parties of some 
definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable by the 
national courts. That there is such an intention in the present case can be estab­
lished by reference to the terms of the Beamtenabkommen.6 
At the time it was expressed that view was quite progressive and the resemblance with 
the International Court’s decision in LaGrand more than 70 years later is striking. In 
LaGrand the question arose whether the right of a foreigner to consular assistance 
by his/her state of nationality was a direct, individual right of the person concerned. 
The Court closely looked at the wording of the relevant provision of the Vienna Con­
vention on Consular Relations and held: 
‘The Court notes that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), spells out the obligations the 
receiving State has towards the detained person and the sending State. It provides 
that, at the request of the detained person, the receiving State must inform the 
consular post of the sending State of the individual’s detention “without delay”. 
It provides further that any communication by the detained person addressed 
to the consular post of the sending State must be forwarded to it by authorities 
of the receiving State “without delay”. Significantly, this subparagraph ends with 
the following language: “The said authorities shall inform the person concerned 
6 Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion of 3 March 1928, PCIJ Ser. B No. 15, at 17–18. 
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without delay of his rights under this subparagraph”. Moreover, under Article 36, 
paragraph 1 (c), the sending State’s right to provide consular assistance to the 
detained person may not be exercised “if he expressly opposes such action”. The 
clarity of these provisions, viewed in their context, admits of no doubt. . . . Based 
on the text of these provisions, the Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph 1, 
creates individual rights, which, by virtue of Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, 
may be invoked in this Court by the national State of the detained person.’7 
Here again, the Court, after carefully analysing the text and the wording used, reached 
the conclusion that the international treaty included a provision in favour of third 
parties and thus established direct rights of the individual. There are of course sig­
nificant differences between the two examples. Thus while the Jurisdiction of the Courts 
of Danzig opinion was concerned with employment law, particularly the possibility to 
bring legal actions for acts of the administration, the LaGrand case involved consular 
rights towards the host country rather than the state of nationality. Furthermore, in 
terms of enforcement, the Permanent Court allowed for direct enforcement by the 
individual in domestic courts whereas the International Court applied a modified 
concept of diplomatic protection for the violation of consular rights on the inter­
state level. Genuine and progressive as this dictum was, it still upheld the legal fiction 
according to which the individual depends on the state of nationality for protection.8 
2 The many meanings of ‘international administrative law’ 
Even more difficult than to ascertain the idea of (effective) legal protection of the
rights of individuals in general public international law is the task of identifying or
delimiting, let alone defining, what may be understood as international administra­
tive law. Since international law has not (yet) endorsed the idea of a clear separation
of powers and given its continuing decentralisation, accompanied by a lack of institu­
tional differentiation and of a clear assignment of roles and functions, the notion of a
distinct and uniform branch of international administrative law (as part of public inter­
national law and not merely some kind of conflict rules concerning domestic or trans­
national administrative law)9 has not yet developed. However, the term has been in
use for quite some time, albeit by different people with different meanings at different
times in different contexts. But what they all have in common is the idea that adminis­
tration is concerned with regulatory decision making in the general or public interest.
The various understandings, which totally differ from the meaning of administrative
law as understood in national jurisdictions, will be briefly set out in the following. 
A rather unique meaning of international administrative law implies a territorial or
spatial understanding. One may identify two different aspects of this understanding.
The first, more general one, refers to the law governing spaces that are not – or not
7 LaGrand (Germany v United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2001, 466, at 494 para 77. 
8 A. Vermeer-Künzli, The Protection of Individuals by Means of Diplomatic Protection: Diplomatic Protection as a 
Human Rights Instrument, Dissertation (University of Leiden 2007); id., ‘As If: The Legal Fiction in Diplo­
matic Protection’ (2007) 18 EJIL 37. 
9 See, eg, Stephan W. Schill, ‘Transnational Legal Approaches to Administrative Law: Conceptualizing 
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exclusively – under the jurisdiction of specific states. Examples of this very loosely cir­
cumscribed and heterogeneous, even patchy understanding include large parts of the
law of the sea, the norms regulating international or internationalised rivers, canals,
the polar regions, or the outer space. A more palpable and much narrower – yet still
very broad – understanding of the territorial approach to international administra­
tive law describes the law concerning international territorial administration. Again,
this covers a broad variety of understandings ranging from the mandate system under
the League of Nations succeeded by the trusteeship system of the United Nations up
to distinct administrations established on an ad hoc basis, usually in post-conflict situ­
ations.10 Nowadays such administrations are either established and conducted by an
international organisation, notably the United Nations;11 or the international admin­
istration is created by individual states. The latter case is generally covered by the
international law of belligerent occupation, but the applicable law may well be modi­
fied if and to the extent the administration is authorised by the UN Security Council.12 
For present purposes, international territorial administrations raise the question as
to the legal accountability of the administration authority towards the rights of the
inhabitants of the territory. This concerns e.g. the right to freedom or other funda­
mental rights of the person. It is usually up to the given authority to establish review
mechanisms in order to guarantee some form of protection to persons concerned.13 
The attitude by UN-led administrations has been inconsistent and quite reluctant
and the control exercised usually is confined to mere political accountability. Judicial
control, e.g. in the form of claims commissions, is the exception. Access to independ­
ent institutions such as ombudspersons may provide an alternative forum for review
of acts of the international territorial administration.14 
A third understanding of international administrative law denotes the various 
aspects of the internal law of international organisations. Unlike the former notions of 
administrative law, this branch of law is largely unrelated to territory; what it however 
10 See generally D. S. Smyrek, Internationally Administered Territories – International Protectorates? An Analy­
sis of the Internationally Administered Territories with Special Reference to the Legal Status of Post-War Kosovo
(Duncker & Humblot 2006); C. Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: 
Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008); B. Knoll, The Legal Status of 
Territories Subject to Administration by International Organisations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2008); R. Wilde, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never 
Went Away (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008); E. de Brabandere, Post-Conflict Administrations in 
International Law: International Territorial Administration, Transitional Authority and Foreign Occupation in 
Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2009); M. Benzing, ‘International Administration of Terri­
tories’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2012) volume V, at 316. 
11 Examples include the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the UN Administra­
tion Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), or the UN Transitional Authority 
for Cambodia (UNTAC). See H. F. Kiderlen, Von Triest nach Osttimor: Der völkerrechtliche Rahmen für die 
Verwaltung von Krisengebieten durch die Vereinten Nationen (Springer, Heidelberg 2008). 
12 This was for instance the case in Iraq under the administration by the Coalition Provisional Authority 
after March 2003, which was based on the law of occupation as modified by Security Council Resolu­
tion 1483 (2003). See R. Wolfrum, ‘Iraq – from Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi Exercise of Sovereignty: 
Foreign Power Versus International Community Interference’ (2005) 9 MaxPlanckUNYB 1. 
13 See Knoll (n. 10) 339–403. 
14 See in detail Stahn (n. 10) 598–644. 


















   
 
has in common with them is the fact that it is intrinsically linked with international 
organisations as it governs their internal relations and functioning.15 On the one hand 
it consists of the rules dealing with the institutional setting, notably the organisational 
structure, comitology, relations between organs, or law making. On the other hand, 
it regulates the ‘international bureaucracy’ by providing rules and regulations on
employment of the staff of an organisation. This law of the international civil service 
has developed over decades and nowadays constitutes a distinct branch of interna­
tional institutional law usually designated ‘international administrative law’.16 It not 
only lays down the substantive rules governing the employment relations between the 
organisation as employer and its staff as employees, but also contains procedural and 
institutional arrangements, such as tribunals, to ensure legal protection and enforce­
ment of the rights of the organisation’s personnel. Given its high significance in prac­
tice, this understanding will be dealt with in greater detail below (3.1). 
Finally, the most comprehensive and sophisticated understanding of the term
international administrative law is that of Global Administrative Law (GAL) as a form
of transnational law governing the processes of administration by international actors
‘in ways that implicate more than purely intra-State structures of legal and political
authority’.17 The conceptualisation of GAL presumes the existence of global or trans­
national administration.18 GAL is an inclusive concept that views all regulatory activity,
particularly decision making, from a transnational perspective, without distinction as
to the applicable law (international or domestic), the ‘type’ of actor (private or pub­
lic, although states and inter-governmental organisations still are the main ‘admin­
istrative’ actors) or the area of concern. In fact, global regulatory regimes cover a
vast array of different subject-areas, just as in domestic administrative law (e.g. envi­
ronmental protection, financial or commercial activity, telecommunication technol­
ogy, security matters, medical and sanitary standards, or transportation and shipping
facilities). Furthermore, the exact character of the norms at issue is often unclear,19 
with a great number of possible ‘candidates’ for sources (public international law,
15 See e.g. J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Organizations Law (3rd edn., Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2015) 207–263. 
16 For a recent account see O. Elias (ed.), The Development and Effectiveness of International Administra­
tive Law: On the Occasion of the Thirtieth Anniversary of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal (Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden 2012). See also C. F. Amerasinghe, The Law of the International Civil Service (as Applied 
by International Administrative Tribunals) (2nd edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994) 2 volumes; id, ‘The 
Future of International Administrative Law’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 773; id, Principles of the Institutional Law 
of International Organizations (2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005); C. de Cooker 
(ed.), International Administration: Law and Management Practices in International Organisations (Martinus 
Nijhoff, Leiden and Boston 2009). 
17 B. Kingsbury and M. Donaldson, ‘Global Administrative Law’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclope­
dia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) volume IV, at 468–482. 
18 See the seminal article by B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R. B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Admin­
istrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15. The literature on the topic is abounding, 
hence a few references will suffice: Kingsbury and Donaldson (n. 17) and the literature cited there at 
480–482; ‘Symposium on Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal 
Order’ (2006) 17 EJIL 1–278; A. von Bogdandy et al. (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by International 
Institutions: Advancing International Institutional Law (Springer, Heidelberg 2010). 
19 B. Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law’ (2009) 20 EJIL 23; B. Kingsbury
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transnational law, international public law, national administrative or public law, or
‘autonomous systems’ generating internal norms).20 However, the relevant point is
that these regulatory measures on the transnational level have a direct – in the rare
case that the regulatory authority has supranational powers – or, more commonly, an
indirect bearing on individuals through national implementation. 
It is important to note that the focus of GAL is not the specific content of sub­
stantive rules, but the operation of existing or possible principles, procedural rules 
review and other mechanisms relating to accountability, transparency, participation, 
and assurance of legality in global governance. The emerging principles of GAL are 
said to include: procedural participation and transparency, reasoned decisions, the 
possibility of review, and certain basic substantive standards when individual rights 
are the main object of administrative action (proportionality, means-ends rationality, 
avoidance of unnecessarily restrictive means, or legitimate expectations).21 
The parallel here to domestic administrative law is obvious, even though in most 
cases the accountability at issue is merely political and the result of the procedure is 
non-binding and recommendatory only. A good example of the latter is the World 
Bank Inspection Panel which may, as a result of a complaint procedure initiated by 
individuals affected, hold the World Bank accountable for failing to adhere to its own 
policies and procedures in financing projects. 
In the following section, I will look at three selected areas in terms of protection of 
the rights of individuals. These are the system of protection of the rights of employ­
ees of international organisations; the protection of the rights of foreign investors; 
and the protection of the rights of persons subject to sanctions by the UN Security 
Council. Disparate as these three selected examples may appear as to their substan­
tive content, they nevertheless have commonalities for present purposes in that they 
involve legal remedies and other forms of protection against regulatory acts and, 
more generally, may be considered as forming part of GAL. 
3 Selected examples of legal protection in international law – where 
protection works and where it does not 
3.1 Legal protection of employees of international organisations 
International organisations not only have become key players in international relations
but also important employers. The United Nations alone has a workforce of over 40,000
specialised men and women. Each international organisation has its own employ­
ment law (staff regulations and rules) which is distinct from municipal law. What is
more, given their far-reaching immunities under international law, municipal courts
have no jurisdiction over disputes between an international organisation and their
staff. To avoid a gap in the legal protection, organisations provide for their own judi­
cial systems, or at least accept the jurisdiction of an existing tribunal, to decide such
employment disputes. The jurisdiction, procedure, available remedies and many other
features of such dispute settlement vary from tribunal to tribunal, and the law is very
heterogeneous in this regard. Apart from these quasi-judicial bodies there are also
20 Kingsbury and Donaldson (n. 17) 468. 
21 Kingsbury et al. (n. 18) 37–41. 













more informal systems of conflict resolution. The United Nations, for instance, have 
created a single integrated and decentralised Office of the Ombudsman for the 
Secretariat as well as a Mediation Division within the Office of the Ombudsman.22 
While the Ombudsmen provide confidential and impartial assistance through good 
offices, the Mediation Division shall act as facilitator making proposals for negotiated 
settlements. 
Administrative tribunals are competent to hear and decide disputes between a cur­
rent or former staff member and the organisation. International organisations gener­
ally exercise their powers vis-à-vis their staff through administrative decisions. When 
a staff member disputes an act or omission of the administration, he/she usually 
questions a decision taken by the administrative authority. These decisions must be 
taken in the exercise of the powers of the organisation which vary from organisa­
tion to organisation. Likewise, the jurisdiction ratione materiae of administrative tri­
bunals varies, depending on their statutes. Therefore the picture is very fragmented 
and resists generalisation. Generally, however, the review by tribunals concerns cases 
where it appears that the decision was based on a mistake of fact or law (breach of 
the employment contract or of the staff regulations and rules), on abuse of discre­
tion, on discrimination and inequality of treatment or on procedural irregularity.23 
As to the remedies available, where a tribunal considers a complaint well-founded in 
fact and law, it may annul the contested decision, remand the case back to the origi­
nal decision maker, or order the specific performance of the obligation which may 
also include reinstatement. Furthermore, administrative tribunals have the power to 
award financial compensation if the injury cannot be made good otherwise. 
The two most important administrative tribunals are the International Labour 
Organization Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT) and United Nations Dispute Tribunal
(UNDT).24 The ILOAT dates back to the Administrative Tribunal of the League of 
Nations which was transferred to the ILO in 1946.25 In 1949, the Statute of the ILOAT 
was amended so as to permit other organisations to recognise the jurisdiction of the 
ILOAT. The ILOAT may be considered the most important of the existing adminis­
trative tribunals, as currently more than 60 international organisations have accepted 
the jurisdiction of ILOAT for their own staff disputes.26 The UNDT was established in 
2007 and replaced the previous United Nations Administrative Tribunal (UNAT).27 
In contrast to the ILOAT whose judgments are final and without appeal,28 the UN
22 UNGA Res A/RES/62/228 of 22 December 2007 (‘Administration of justice at the United Nations’), 
paras 25–30. 
23 See in detail Amerasinghe (n. 16), volume 1, at 277–401. See also A. Riddel, ‘Administrative Boards, 
Commissions, and Tribunals in International Organizations’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclope­
dia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012), volume I, 66, at 69. 
24 Mention must also be made of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal, established in 1980. 
25 F Gutteridge, ‘The ILO Administrative Tribunal’ in Cooker (n. 16) 655. 
26 For the list of organisations see http://www.ilo.org/tribunal/membership/lang—en/index.htm. 
27 GA Res 62/228 (n. 22). See A. Reinisch and C. Knahr, ‘From the United Nations Administrative Tribu­
nal to the United Nations Appeals Tribunal- Reform of the Administration of Justice System Within the 
United Nations’ (2008) 12 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 447; M. Struyvenberg, ‘The New 
United Nations System of Administration of Justice’ in Elias (n. 16) 243. 
28 Art. VI(1) ILOAT Statute. Note, however, that Art. XII ILOAT Statute provides that in any case in which 
the Governing Body of the ILO or the Administrative Board of the Pensions Fund challenges a decision 
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decided to establish a two-tier formal system of administration of justice. It consists of 
the first instance, the UNDT, and an appellate instance, the United Nations Appeals 
Tribunal.29 Grounds for appeal are that the UNDT has exceeded its jurisdiction 
or competence, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, erred on a question of 
law, committed an error in procedure, such as to affect the decision, or erred on 
a question of fact, resulting in a manifestly unreasonable decision.30 The Appeals 
Tribunal may affirm, reverse, modify or remand the judgment of the Dispute Tribu­
nal.31 Also part of the UN justice system which is of great practical importance is the 
Office of Staff Legal Assistance whose main task is to provide professional legal assis­
tance for staff in their relations to the UN as employer.32 With the establishment of
the two-tiered system and the numerous other improvements, the United Nations 
have accommodated most of the criticism voiced against the previous system,33 and 
the current internal justice system of the UN can readily be described as an example 
of effective legal protection of the rights of individuals in a limited, yet important 
field of international law. 
3.2 Investment protection 
Apart from human rights protection, international investment protection is the sin­
gle most important area of international law where individuals not only are benefi­
ciaries of significant substantive rights but also have an array of remedies available to 
enforce these rights in case of alleged violation.34 Investment law comprises the legal 
norms on the treatment of foreign direct investments by the host country. These 
standards are regularly contained in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between the 
state of nationality of the investor and the host country and include protection from 
unlawful expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, or full protection and security.35 
A distinctive feature of BITs is that in case of breach the investor may bring a claim 
against the host country before an international arbitral tribunal.36 The tribunal 
may be established under various institutions or regimes, such as the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Permanent Court of 
which shall be binding. To date only two such advisory opinions were given by the International Court, 
and the Court appears to be very critical towards such an odd review procedure, see J. A. Frowein and 
K. Oellers-Frahm, ‘Art. 65’ in A. Zimmermann et al. (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: 
A Commentary (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) 1623 MN 49. 
29 GA Res 62/228 (n. 22) paras 39–45. 
30 Art. 2(1) UN Appeals Tribunal Statute. 
31 Art. 2(3) UN Appeals Tribunal Statute. 
32 GA Res 62/228 (n. 22) paras 12–21. 
33 See Report of the Redesign Panel on the United Nations System of Administration of Justice, Doc 
A/61/205, 28 July 2006. 
34 See generally R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn., Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2012). 
35 M. Jacob, ‘Investments, Bilateral Treaties’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Inter­
national Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012), volume VI, at 317; A. Reinisch (ed.), Standards of 
Investment Protection (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008). 
36 C. Schreuer, ‘Investment Disputes’ in R Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) volume VI, at 309. 




   







Arbitration (PCA), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or the United 
Nations Commission on Trade Law (UNCITRAL).37 
International investment arbitration has become a very prominent example of 
effective legal protection of individuals against sovereign regulatory acts in interna­
tional law. Conceptually, investment law is a hybrid branch of law in various respects.38 
First of all, it consists of several layers of legal norms pertaining to different legal 
systems. The applicable law in a given investment dispute may include public inter­
national law (the BIT, other treaties, customary international law), international 
contracts between the investor and the host country, and domestic law of the latter. 
Furthermore, these layers belong to different areas of law. In fact investment law uses 
concepts from both public and private, notably commercial, law. This is also evident 
on the enforcement level39 since investment arbitration shows features that are more 
akin to commercial arbitration than to arbitration between states or states and inter­
national organisations because it governs claims of private individuals. Procedurally 
it is fashioned along the rules of commercial arbitration, and the enforcement of 
investment arbitration awards operates in a manner almost identical to that in com­
mercial arbitration. And yet, investment law is part of the broader picture of public 
international law and, more importantly, investment law and arbitration invariably 
involve the host country’s regulatory powers, such as public services of general inter­
est, infrastructure facilities, energy supply, labour standards, considerations of envi­
ronmental protection, or medical and sanitary regulations. 
All these considerations have prompted a distinct strand in the doctrine arguing 
that international investment law, particularly investment arbitration, is predomi­
nantly public law40 and as such part of GAL.41 Although investment law is largely 
based on bilateral treaties and enforced through arbitration, the effect of its applica­
tion, interpretation, and operation in practice (notably by strong reliance on de facto
precedent) has led to a ‘multilateralisation’ of international investment law.42 Given 
that investment protection affects important common or public interests over which 
37 Ibid. 315–316 MN 45–50.
 
38 See generally Z. Douglas, ‘The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2003) 74 BYIL 151.
 
39 C. Knahr, C. Koller, W. Rechberger and A. Reinisch (eds.), Investment and Commercial Arbitration –
 
Similarities and Divergences (Eleven, Utrecht 2010); G. Cordero Moss, ‘Commercial Arbitration and 
Investment Arbitration: Fertile Soil for False Friends?’ in C Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch and
S Wittich (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st Century (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) 
782. See also the separate opinion of Thomas Wälde in International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v 
The United Mexican States, 1 December 2005, notably at para 13. 
40 G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007). 
41 G. Van Harten and M Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL 121. 
42 S. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2009). This de facto application of precedent was nicely described by the tribunal in Saipem v Bangladesh, 
ICSID Case No. ARAB/05/7, Award of 20 June 2009, para 90 as follows (footnotes omitted): 
‘The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, it is of the 
opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals. It believes 
that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of 
consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances 
of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment 
law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors towards 
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the host state has sovereign powers of regulation, these have to be taken into consid­
eration in adjudicating investment claims.43 
Therefore, investment arbitration is viewed as an administrative review mechanism 
against regulatory interference with private rights and as such has ‘transplant[ed] the 
procedural framework and enforcement structure of commercial arbitration into the 
public realm’.44 This public law approach towards investment law that is so common 
nowadays45 is also recognised in arbitral practice. Thus the tribunal in Wintershall v 
Argentina stated that the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes ‘com­
bines a public law system of State liability with private arbitration’.46 
All these considerations show that investment arbitration is a very effective means of
protecting interests against regulatory measures interfering with the rights an inves­
tor enjoys towards the host country. The level of protection is further increased by the
fact that awards of investment tribunals may in general be challenged or reviewed.
While awards are final and not subject to any appeals procedures, it is possible that
an award is challenged if it suffers from a serious deficiency. In non-ICSID arbitration
review of awards is carried out by national courts pursuant to domestic law. The result
of a successful challenge is that the award is set aside and not subject to enforcement.
Setting aside may be requested in the country in which, or under the law of which,
the award was made. Essentially the same result may be achieved if recognition and
enforcement of the award is sought from a competent domestic authority, and the
other party requests the refusal of recognition and enforcement. The most important
source for such a procedure is laid down in Art. V of the 1958 New York Convention.47 
Awards made under the ICSID Convention are not subject to annulment or any other
form of review by domestic courts.48 The ICSID Convention provides for its own sys­
tem of annulment which is triggered upon the request of a party to the arbitration.
The exhaustive list of grounds for annulment is contained in Art. 52(1): 
• the tribunal was not properly constituted; 
• the tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
• there was corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal; 
• there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or 
• the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based. 
If the ad hoc annulment committee finds in favour of the request, the award is set 
aside. The committee cannot replace the tribunal’s award by its own decision on the 
43 See T. Treves, F. Seatzu and S. Trevisanut (eds.), Foreign Investment, International Law and Common Con­
cerns (Routledge, London and New York 2014). 
44 Van Harten and Loughlin (n. 41) 147. 
45 See S. W. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2010). 
46 Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award of 8 Decem­
ber 2008, para 160. See also Glamis Gold Ltd v US, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award of 8 June 2009, para 5, 
stating that ‘Chapter 11 of the [North American Free Trade Association] contains a significant public 
system of private investment protection. 
47 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 10 June 1958. 
See also UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985, Arts. 34 and 36. 
48 Art. 53(1) ICSID Convention. 
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merits of the dispute.49 This makes it clear that there is no room for appeal even if the 
award is erroneous or incorrect in points of law. 
Furthermore, awards may be enforced on the initiative of the investor. How this is 
to be achieved again depends on the institution under whose rules the arbitral pro­
ceedings were conducted. In non-ICSID arbitration, enforcement must be sought in 
domestic courts. This again is governed by domestic law, and the parties to the New 
York Convention are under an obligation to grant recognition and enforcement. As 
mentioned, Art. V of the Convention lists a number of grounds on the basis of which 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign (including non-national) arbitral award 
may be refused at the request of a party to the arbitration. In ICSID proceedings, Art. 
54 of the ICSID Convention obliges parties to ‘recognize an award rendered pursuant 
to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that 
award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State’. This 
makes it clear that the domestic court where enforcement is sought is not entitled to 
examine or review the award. It may not even scrutinise whether the award is in con­
formity with the forum state’s ordre public. 
Finally, unlike in other arbitral proceedings, the ICSID Convention also provides 
for the possibility of revision that is a regular remedy to standing courts.50 The party 
requesting revision of the award must furnish the discovery of some fact of such a 
nature as decisively to affect the award, provided that when the award was rendered 
that fact was unknown to the tribunal and to the applicant and that the applicant’s 
ignorance of that fact was not due to negligence (nova reperta). 
In sum, therefore, international investment law provides for an overall highly effec­
tive system of legal protection of the rights of individuals against administrative, that is 
regulatory, acts by states. Even though the system of investment law is overwhelmingly 
based on bilateral treaties and contracts, it has assumed a public law-like character 
through the process of multilateralisation particularly in the framework of investor-
state arbitration. 
3.3 Legal protection against targeted sanctions 
The increasing imposition by the United Nations Security Council (SC) of targeted 
sanctions against individuals in the fight against transnational terrorism has raised 
issues of legal protection that were unknown 20 years or so ago.51 Targeted sanc­
tions are measures taken by the SC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which are 
directly aimed at designated individuals. The sanctions employed are mainly freezing 
of assets and funds as well as travel bans. As is well-known, in particular cases these 
sanctions are a severe interference with individual rights of the persons or entities 
concerned leaving them without any remedy to have the particular sanction reviewed. 
49 C. Schreuer, L. Malintoppi, A. Sinclair and A. Reinisch, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edn., 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009) 890–1095; R. D. Bishop and S. M. Marchili, Annulment 
Under the ICSID Convention (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012). 
50 Art. 51 ICSID Convention. 
51 See generally A. Pellet and A. Miron, ‘Sanctions’ in R Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
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This disregard of fundamental norms of due process resulted in a complete lack of 
protection of the individuals concerned.52 
The administration of these sanctions is regularly conferred to a special ‘Sanc­
tions Committee’ as a subsidiary organ of the SC, which monitors the observance and 
implementation of the sanctions regime. It is in charge of registering individuals and 
entities in an updated list, the so-called ‘Consolidated List’.53 The most prominent of 
these sanctions committees is the 1267 Sanctions Committee concerning Al-Qaida 
and associated individuals and entities.54 Each state is entitled to propose individuals 
or entities to be included on the Consolidated List, but it is the Committee which 
decides whether a name is to be put on the list or not. Initially, the 1267 sanctions 
regime did not offer a delisting procedure; rather, any delisting process had to be 
started by the person or entity concerned who had to ask the state of residence or 
citizenship to request a review before the Sanctions Committee. This situation, which 
left the petitioner completely dependent on its own state and without any remedy to 
have his situation reviewed, met with strong criticism from various sides. Therefore, 
the SC established a ‘Focal Point’ which should provide a clear procedure for delist­
ing. However, the Focal Point only operates as a facilitator; its main task is to receive 
requests for delisting and to forward the requests to the relevant governments.55 But 
neither can it carry out an independent review, nor can it even forward the delisting 
request to the Sanctions Committee. 
It was only after continuing criticism that the SC established formal delisting 
criteria,56 and that it subsequently set up an independent and impartial Office of the 
Ombudsperson to assist the petitioner in the delisting process. The procedure for 
requests for delisting that are submitted to the Office of the Ombudsperson has been 
improved and enhanced since the establishment of the Office and consists of three 
phases.57 Phase one deals with information gathering and lasts over four months 
with a possible extension to six months.58 The Ombudsperson forwards the delisting 
petition to the Committee, relevant states and UN bodies (including the Monitor­
ing Team),59 requests information from these entities and gathers any relevant infor­
mation obtained from these entities and through own research. Furthermore, the 
Ombudsperson informs the petitioner of the steps involved in the procedure. Phase 
two is concerned with dialogue lasting for two months with a possible extension to four
months. Here the Ombudsperson informs the petitioner of the gathered infor­
mation and engages in a dialogue with him/her. The petitioner has an opportunity
52 Criticism in the doctrine was accordingly very fierce, and literature on the topic is abundant. For fur­
ther references see A. J. Kirschner, ‘Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009): A Significant Step in the 
Evolution of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Regime?’ (2010) 70 ZaöRV 585 and the literature cited 
there at 586 in n. 2. 
53 An overview of the existing sanctions committees may be found at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/. 
54 See e.g. SC Res 1267 (1999), subsequently extended and modified by numerous SC resolutions. 
55 SC Res 1730 (2006), Annex. 
56 See e.g. SC Res 1735 (2006) para 14. 
57 SC Res 1904 (2009), Annex II, as amended by SC Res 1989 (2011) and most recently by SC Res 2083 
(2012). See Kirschner (n. 52) 597–599. 
58 SC Res 2083 (2012), Annex II, paras 1–4. 
59 The Monitoring Team consists of eight experts appointed by the Secretary General to support the Com­
mittee, see SC Res 1526 (2004) para 7. 
68 Stephan Wittich 
  
















to be heard, to address the information gathered and to answer relevant questions. 
At the end of phase two, the Ombudsperson drafts and submits a ‘Comprehensive 
Report’ to the Sanctions Committee with a summary of the relevant information gath­
ered and, most importantly, with a recommendation on the delisting request.60 The 
third phase includes the discussion in the Committee and its decision.61 The Commit­
tee has thirty days to review the report and the Ombudsperson will then present the 
report to the Committee in person and answer any questions the Committee might 
have regarding the request. If the Ombudsperson recommends retaining the list­
ing, the petitioner remains on the list; if however the Ombudsperson recommends 
delisting, the petitioner is removed from the list unless the Committee decides by 
consensus to retain the listing, or the matter is referred to the SC for a vote. The deci­
sion must be taken 60 days after the Committee completes consideration of the Com­
prehensive Report. The Committee shall convey the decision to the Ombudsperson, 
setting out its reasons and including relevant information. If the Committee rejects 
a delisting request, the Ombudsperson shall inform the petitioner accordingly and 
provide him/her with all relevant and publicly releasable information. 
There is no doubt that the appointment of an Ombudsperson as an independent 
and impartial authority constituted a great improvement in relation to the situation 
existing earlier – which was somehow comparable to the procedure under the Span­
ish Inquisition. However, as can readily be seen from the above presentation, the 
procedure hardly meets reasonable criteria of effective legal protection. As was stated 
in its recommendations prior to the establishment of the Ombudsperson, the Wat­
son Report considered such an institution as having only ‘[l]imited ability to provide 
[an] effective remedy, since although recommendations [of the Ombudsperson] may 
be made public, they are non-binding’ and that they ‘therefore may not fully satisfy 
court concerns’.62 Likewise, in 2008 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe found that ‘the procedural and substantive standards currently applied by 
the UNSC . . ., despite some recent improvements, in no way fulfil the minimum 
standards laid down above and violate the fundamental principles of human rights 
and the rule of law’.63 
The procedural changes that have been made since the creation of the Ombud­
sperson have certainly improved the process and supplemented it with aspects of due
process required by the rule of law. This concerns for instance aspects of fair hearing
of the petitioner or rudiments of an effective remedy by providing a review mecha­
nism with power to grant de facto effective relief. And indeed, under the enhanced
procedure, the Ombudsperson’s recommendations have to date prevailed in every
case. No recommendations to delist have been overturned by the Committee nor
referred to the SC, although there have been several contentious cases.64 This is
viewed by some, including the Ombudsperson, that the Ombudsperson’s current
60 SC Res 2083 (2012), Annex II, paras 5–7.
 
61 Ibid. paras 8–17.
 
62 T. J. Bieersteker and S. E. Eckert, ‘Addressing Challenges to Targeted Sanctions: An Update of the 

“Watson Report” ’, October 2009, at 28 (available at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/2009_10_
targeted_sanctions.pdf). 
63 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1597 (2008), United Nations Security Council 
and European Union blacklists, 23 January 2008, point 6. 
64 S. E. Eckert and T. J. Biersteker, ‘Due Process and Targeted Sanctions: An Update of the “Watson 
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mandate adequately safeguards the rights of listed persons to a fair, independent,
and effective process.65 To be sure, the Ombudsperson is not a judicial authority
and the process is no judicial review of acts of the SC (and its subsidiary organs). It
is true that not even European courts have required a fully-fletched judicial review
in the formal sense of listing decisions but have demanded that the review process
meet standards of effective judicial protection (in the sense of protection equivalent
to judicial processes);66 however, it is difficult to see how the current procedure meet
these standards. Thus, in his 2012 report, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promo­
tion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering
terrorism ‘acknowledges and welcomes the significant due process improvements
brought about by resolution 1989 (2011), but nevertheless concludes that the Al-
Qaida sanctions regime continues to fall short of international minimum standards
of due process’.67 This view was, unsurprisingly, also shared recently by the European
Court of Human Rights in Al-Dulimi v Switzerland.68 
It will have to be seen whether the SC is willing in the future to further improve the 
delisting procedure in favour of strengthening the due process rights of the individu­
als concerned. As it stands at present, one can certainly not speak of an example of 
effective legal protection in a context that involves interference with fundamental 
human rights. 
4 By way of conclusion 
This brief and rather selective analysis leaves a fragmented picture. There is no over­
arching legal framework in international law that would provide for and guarantee
the effective legal protection of individuals against regulatory acts and decisions,
whoever the acting sovereign (states, international organisations or other). Given
the generally decentralised structure of international law that is furthermore based
on consensualism, the situation in general international law will hardly change in
the near future. However, there are branches or areas of international law where the
decision makers involved have agreed on some sectorial system of legal protection
that may meet minimum standards of due process and thus result in relatively effec­
tive legal protection. The internal justice system of international organisations and
65 See the references ibid. 22–23. 
66 This is e.g. the constant case law of the European Court of Human Rights, see Case of Bosphorus
Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland, Application no. 45036/98, Judgment of 30
June 2005, paras 108, 155–156; Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and
Norway, Applications no. 71412/01 and 78166/01, Grand Chamber, Decision of 2 May 2007, paras
80 and 145. In its notorious decision in the Kadi case, the ECJ followed the approach of the ECtHR,
see Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and
Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, at para 256; Kadi v
Commission, Case T-85/09, Judgment of the General Court, 30 September 2010, at para 90; European
Commission and others v Kadi,C-584/10P, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 18 July 2013, at
paras 97–134. The first Kadi decision was among the reasons for the SC to establish the Office of
the Ombudsperson. 
67 Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, 
annual report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, 26 September 2012, UN Doc. A/67/396, at para 59. 
68	 Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v Switzerland, Application no 5809/08, Judgment of 26 November
2013, para 119. 






investment protection are such examples of effective legal protection. The situation
of individuals affected by targeted sanctions of the UN SC, on the other hand, shows
that in areas that are politically highly sensitive, the key players are not willing to
concede too much Rechtsstaatlichkeit. The invocation of the rule of law then becomes
pure lip service and policy needs prevail over legitimate interests of effective legal
protection. 
Part II 
The principle of effective 















    
  5 The principle of effective 
legal protection in Austrian 
administrative law 
Ulrike Giera and Konrad Lachmayer 
1 Historical development: from the monarchy towards Europe 
1.1 The beginnings in the nineteenth century 
The Austrian idea of effective legal protection has its roots in the political liberalism 
of the nineteenth century. In the time of absolute monarchy, the administration was 
not bound by law and there was subsequently no legal possibility to appeal before a 
court in administrative matters. In the second half of the nineteenth century, this 
situation underwent significant change. The individual was not longer regarded as an 
object of governmental action, but as a legal subject with (subjective) rights against 
the state to protect his or her legally protected interests.1 
This concept was promoted by the Revolution of 1848 that initiated constitution­
alism in the Habsburg Empire and finally led to the adoption of a constitution con­
sisting of five State Basic Laws (Staatsgrundgesetze) in 1867.2 Most importantly with
regard to our topic, these developments then resulted in the establishment of the
(High) Administrative Court in 1876. The new Administrative Court introduced a
new system of judicial control of the administration. The Court was competent to
declare an administrative ruling void if the decision was unlawful and infringed the
rights of the person concerned and thus initiated legal protection against adminis­
trative acts. 
Due to the fact that the administrative procedure was not codified by the parlia­
ment, the progressive case law of the Administrative Court became very important. 
The Court developed several substantive rule of law principles that an administrative 
procedure had to be in accordance with and that administrative bodies had to follow 
if they did not want to risk their decision being declared unlawful by the Administra­
tive Court.3 Nevertheless, the margin of appreciation for the government and the 
administration remained very great. 
1 R. Thienel and E. Schulev-Steindl, Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht (5th edn., Verlag Österreich, Wien 2009) 43. 
2 The so-called ‘Constitution of December’ consisted of five separate acts. The Act on General Rights of 
the Citizens contained a catalogue of fundamental rights which is still in force today (StGG über die allge­
meinen Rechte der Staatsbürger, RGBl 1867/142). 
3 See R. Walter, D. Kolonovits, G. Muzak and K. Stöger, Grundriss des österreichischen Verwaltungsverfahrensrechts
(9th edn., Manz 2011) para. 22. 











1.2 From the Austrian constitution 1920 to the abolishment of any rule of law 
After World War I, the Austrian state was created as a democratic republic (the so-
called 1st Republic). The Austrian Constitution, which in its core is still in force, was 
enacted in the 1920. With regard to administrative procedure, the intentions for a 
consistent codification were realised as a result of the international pressure regard­
ing the dramatic economic situation in the country, which led to the adoption of 
several procedural acts in 1925, including the General Administrative Procedure Act 
(GAPA) and the Administrative Penal Act (APA). These administrative procedural 
acts are still in force today, although they have been amended several times over the 
years. 
Since the enactment of the Austrian Constitution in 1920, the Austrian system 
of judicial protection has been based on three supreme courts: the Constitutional 
Court, the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court. There is no formal hierar­
chy between these three courts and each of them is competent for a different substan­
tive area of law. 
The Austrian rule of law was abolished in 1933 with the introduction of an Austro­
fascist regime, when the democratic constitution lost its force. This situation finally 
led to Austria’s participation in the NS regime, which perverted any form of rule 
of law, rights and legal protection. After World War II, the so-called 2nd Republic 
was proclaimed and re-established the Austrian Constitution from the year 1920 as 
amended in 1929. The official government position on the NS regime, however, was 
based on the ‘first-victim’ thesis (Opferthese), ignoring the context of Austria’s acces­
sion to Nazi Germany.4 This position goes along with a reluctance on the part of 
the Austrian government to grant transitional justice to the victims of the NS regime. 
Effective legal protection was not guaranteed; restitutions were quite limited. It actu­
ally took until the late 1990s for certain forms of restitutions to be offered. 
1.3 Enfolding the rule of law: From the ECHR to EU law 
After World War II, judicial protection in administrative law was still the domain of 
the Administrative Court and Constitutional Court.5 An appeal against an adminis­
trative body had to be filed before another – in the hierarchy, ‘higher’ – administra­
tive authority before the Administrative Court decided in the final instance. Austria’s 
accession to the European Convention of Human Rights in 1958 had an important 
impact on the organisation of legal protection and the conceptualisation of rights. 
The ECHR made significant changes to the Austrian system of legal protection over 
the next decades. 
The Austrian system of non-independent administrative authorities and of having 
only a ‘reviewing control’ of the Administrative Court did not comply with the Euro­
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).6 The case law of the European Com­
4 In 1945, however, an anti-NS principle was integrated into the Austrian Constitution, and this does not 
allow any political party or political movement or even an individual to express National Socialist ideas. 
5 See K Lachmayer and H Eberhard, ‘Rule of Law in Austria’ (2011) Understandings of the Rule of Law 
in various Legal Orders of the World, Rule of Law Wiki (available at http://wikis.fu-berlin.de/display/SB
projectrol/Austria) accessed 1 October 2015. 
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mission/Court of Human Rights made clear that Art. 6 ECHR requires a decision by 
an independent and impartial tribunal in matters concerning civil rights and obliga­
tions as well as criminal charges. The Austrian system of legal protection adopted the 
standards of the ECHR step by step. The acknowledgment of the ECHR as Austrian 
Constitutional Law in 1964 was an important move towards giving authority to the 
ECHR in the Austrian legal system. The application of Art. 6 ECHR furthermore 
strengthened the role of the Constitutional Court in deciding on procedural ques­
tions in administrative matters. 
In 1989, Austria established so-called Independent Administrative Tribunals (Unab­
hängige Verwaltungssenate), which represented a major amendment of the Austrian 
Constitution. The Independent Administrative Tribunals met the requirements of 
the ECHR. Although they were classified as administrative bodies, they were inde­
pendent and could be classified as tribunals with regard to Art. 6 ECHR.7 The inten­
sity of (quasi-)judicial control was therefore significantly enforced. 
With the accession to the European Union in 1995, several other independent 
tribunals were established in order to comply with the standards and requirements 
of legal protection of European law.8 EU law furthermore demanded the creation of 
legal protection, even in cases in which the legal system of the Member State did not 
thus far provide any legal protection. The effectiveness of EU law required a certain 
legal protection. The Constitutional Court, in particular, created new concepts to 
enable the enforcement of these principles of EU law.9 
1.4 The fundamental reform of administrative justice in 2014 
The Austrian legal system’s adoption of European standards finally led to the intro­
duction of administrative courts of first instance in 2014,10 which is a decisive change
to the overall constitutional system of judicial protection in Austria. The concept
was obviously inspired by the German model of legal protection in administrative
law. This new system changes the understanding of the Administrative Court, in
so far as the control of the administration is primarily the duty of the administra­
tive courts of first instance, and no longer that of the Administrative Court. The
function of the Administrative Court is now to ensure the objective legality and a
uniform case law of the administrative courts of first instance.11 Although the new
system of administrative courts of first instance has brought and will continue to
bring an improvement to judicial protection, the Austrian legal system still does not
provide fully effective legal protection in administrative law, which will be discussed
in this paper. 
7 Theo Öhlinger, Verfassungsrecht (6th edn., Facultas WUV 2005) para 653.
 
8 E.g. in the context of telecommunications or energy liberalisation and regulation.
 
9 See Konrad Lachmayer, ‘Country Report: Austria’ in Anneli Albi (ed.), The Role of National Constitutions
 
(T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague 2016 [forthcoming]). 
10 See the Administrative Justice Amendment 2012 (Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeits-Novelle 2012); Adminis­
trative Justice – Implementation Act 2013. 
11 See Rudolf Thienel, ‘Die Kontrolle der Verwaltungsgerichte erster Instanz durch den Verwaltungsger­
ichtshof’ in Michael Holoubek and Michael Lang (eds.), Die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit erster Instanz
(Linde Verlag 2013) 331–379. 












2 Constitutional framework 
2.1 The constitutional foundation of effective legal protection 
The core document of the Austrian Constitution does not explicitly mention the prin­
ciple of effective judicial protection. This is only contained in Art. 13 ECHR, which 
is part of Austrian constitutional law. It provides an effective remedy in case of the 
violation of rights and freedoms of the ECHR. Nevertheless, the Constitution guar­
antees effective judicial protection through several other legal institutions. Effective 
legal protection is, for example, constitutionally ensured by the principle of legality, 
various fundamental rights, the separation of power principle and the system of inde­
pendent judicial review. Effective judicial protection constitutes an implicit constitu­
tional principle as part of the rule of law principle.12 In this context the jurisdiction 
of the Constitutional Court was and is very important. The Court has determined 
different aspects of the principle of effective legal protection. 
2.2 The case law of the constitutional court 
First of all, the Constitutional Court developed according to and relies on the rule 
of law principle. Since the 1980s, the Constitutional Court has increasingly based its 
constitutional reasoning on the rule of law principle and promoted the principle of 
effective legal protection.13 The Court understands the principle of effective legal 
protection as an essential aspect of the rule of law principle.14 Based on the rule of law 
principle, the Court has derived the more specific principle that the legal order must 
provide sufficient and efficient legal protection.15 
Based on its landmark case, in which the Constitutional Court qualified the rule 
of law principle for the first time as a fundamental principle of the Austrian Consti­
tution in the 1950s, the Court developed its settled case law according to which the 
sense of the rule of law principle is that all governmental acts must be based on law 
and indirectly on the constitution (principle of legality in Art. 18 Austrian Constitu­
tion). The Court claims that a system of institutions for legal protection must be 
provided. This, however, only means that administrative acts adopted in accordance 
with laws higher in legal hierarchy (Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung) are legally binding.16 
Nowadays, settled case law dictates that legal protection requires a minimum of 
‘factual efficiency’ for the person concerned. ‘Factual efficiency’ means not only the 
enforcement of an administrative decision by legal means, but also the actual imple­
mentation of this decision in social reality. The word ‘protection’ – as part of the term 
12 Martin Hiesel, ‘Die Rechtsstaatsjudikatur des Verfassungsgerichtshofes’ (1999) 53 Österreichische Juris­
tenzeitung 522; Martin Hiesel‚ ‘Die Entfaltung der Rechtsstaatsjudikatur des Verfassungsgerichtshofs’ 
(2009) 63 Österreichische Juristenzeitung 111. 
13 See Konrad Lachmayer, ‘Constitutional Reasoning in the Austrian Constitutional Court’ in András 
Jakab, Arthur Dyevre and Giulio Itzcovich (eds.), Constitutional Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2016 [forthcoming]). 
14 VfSlg 17.340/2004. 
15 VfSlg 14.702/1996. 
16 VfSlg 2455/1952; 2929/1955, 8.279/1978; 11.196/1986; 13.003/1992, 13.182/1992, 13.223/1992, 
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‘legal protection’ – also refers, in its constitutional sense, to the timely guarantee of a 
factual position. Therefore, the purpose to actually implement the right is inherent 
in institutions for legal protection.17 Furthermore, the Court stated that the purpose 
of institutions for legal protection is to ensure a (certain) minimum of efficiency for 
the person seeking legal protection.18 
According to the principle of effective judicial protection, the Constitutional Court 
declared several statutes unconstitutional.19 Some conclusions of the Court can be 
listed as follows: 
•	 A general elimination of suspensive effect of an appeal is unconstitutional. 
•	 Burdening a person seeking legal protection generally and exclusively with the 
negative effects of a potentially illegal administrative decision should be avoided 
until his or her request for legal protection is taken care of. 
•	 Not only the person’s positions have to be taken into account, but also the pur­
pose and the content of a regulation, the interests of any third person and the 
public interest. The legislative authority must find a balance between those cir­
cumstances, but the principle of factual efficiency of a legal remedy does take 
priority and it is only possible to limit that principle if objectively necessary and 
important grounds exist.20 
•	 The general exclusion of a legal remedy is illegal in a court procedure.21 
•	 A time limit for a legal remedy must be adequate in relation to the content of a 
decision and to the procedure and must guarantee an appropriate possibility to 
appeal against the decision.22 A time limit of two days to file an appeal is therefore 
contradictory to the rule of law principle in an asylum proceeding because effec­
tive legal protection is not ensured for an asylum seeker, who normally does not 
speak German.23 
•	 The possibility to gain knowledge about judgments of the Supreme Court is a 
requirement for the efficiency of legal protection.24 
•	 An excessive time limit for an administrative ruling can contradict the princi­
ple of effective legal protection. In the concrete case, the Constitutional Court 
declared a time limit that was four times longer than the normal time limit to be 
unconstitutional.25 
•	 If a legal remedy necessitates high fees, it can also contravene the principle of 
effective legal protection.26 
In conclusion, the Constitutional Court identifies in a case-to-case strategy several ele­
ments of effective legal protection, such as the balance of interests when eliminating 
17 VfSlg 11.196/1986.
 
18 VfSlg 11.196/1986, 15.218/1998, 15.369/1998.
 

































   
  
  
suspensive effect of a legal remedy, the possibility to appeal against a decision, time 
constraints or appropriate fees. A legal remedy must not only exist in theory, but 
also has to fulfil effectively its purpose. Based on an overall idea of a rule of law and 
a certain understanding of access to justice, the Court expands its understanding of 
effective legal protection step by step. 
2.3 Specific constitutional challenges 
2.3.1 The constitutional concept of administrative acts 
Although the new system of administrative courts of first instance brought and will 
bring an improvement to judicial protection, the Austrian legal system still does not 
provide full effective legal protection in administrative law. One of the most obvious 
deficits is the restriction of legal protection to certain forms of administrative action. 
The scholarly debate hypothesises that the Constitution is based on an exclusive enu­
meration of sources of law that existed when the Constitution was adopted in 1920 
(‘Relative Geschlossenheit des Rechtsquellenssystems’). The ordinary legislator must not cre­
ate new sources of law because effective legal protection is ensured only against legal 
acts provided by the Constitution.27 Judicial protection in Austrian administrative law 
is bound to a certain number of forms of action. Thus, an administrative authority 
that wants to adopt a legally binding act is limited to the forms of action the Con­
stitution provides. However, in the scholarly debate, it has been demonstrated that 
the exclusive enumeration of sources of law is merely relative because there are also 
forms of action, that are implicitly accepted by the Austrian Constitution, although 
they are not mentioned in the text of the constitution.28 
Due to the rule of law principle, administrative acts that have an extensive legal
effect on an individual person must be legally defendable. Otherwise, the constitu­
tionally guaranteed system of legal protection would be suspended.29 In the under­
lying case, a statute, qualified as an administrative act, did not grant financial aid,
as a non-binding expertise and not as a binding administrative issue. As already
mentioned, in the Austrian constitutional framework, effective judicial protection
is only possible against those forms of administrative action which are provided by
the Constitution. Ordinary federal and state legislation must not create new sources
of law because otherwise effective legal protection would not be ensured. Every
administrative act that potentially infringes an individual person’s rights must be
enacted in a form of action that provides effective legal protection. However, the
examination of the Constitutional Court stops at that point. It seems the Constitu­
tional Court implies that every action is in accordance with the constitutional system
of forms of action. But what happens if the system of forms of action provided by
the Austrian Constitution is too narrow and some acts adopted by an administrative
authority do not fit in? In such a case, the Austrian Constitution does not provide
legal protection at all. 
27 Heinz Schäffer, Rechtsquellen und Rechtsanwendung (Manz 1973) p. 34.
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2.3.2 EU law’s challenges and potential for the constitution 
Due to the influences of EU law, the link between certain forms of action and judi­
cial protection becomes more and more difficult.30 Within the scope of Union law, 
the strong constitutional link between effective legal protection and certain forms of 
action become problematic, because not all regulations provided by EU law fit into 
the Austrian system of administrative forms of action. In this case, the Austrian legal 
order does not provide effective judicial protection.31 
An example from environmental law regarding air quality plans clearly shows the 
deficits of this system. Such air quality plans are implemented in the form of ordi­
nances by administrative authorities. According to the case law of the ECJ, a per­
son directly affected by air pollution is entitled to require the competent national 
authorities to draw up an action plan.32 In general, a subjective right to an ordinance 
does not exist in the Austrian legal system. If a person who is concerned by air pollu­
tion exceeding permitted values requests the competent administrative authority to 
release an air quality plan and if the authority does not react to the application, the 
right to an air quality plan cannot be enforced effectively.33 The right to an adminis­
trative decision within a reasonable timescale is only enforceable concerning adminis­
trative issues. The Austrian legal system does not provide legal remedies to challenge 
inactivity regarding ordinances. 
EU law, however, also creates new potential for the effective legal protection in the 
Austrian constitutional system. The Constitutional Court declared in its leading case 
on the EU-CFR in 201234 that ‘it follows from the equivalence principle [as a general 
principle of the EU]35 that the rights guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights may also be invoked as constitutionally guaranteed rights’. The Court thus 
strengthened the possibilities for invoking the rights of the Charter before the Consti­
tutional Court. The Court opened the possibilities for legal protection in other cases 
too, by arguing with EU law.36 
2.3.3 The principle of reasonableness 
According to the established case law of the Constitutional Court, which is based on 
a mere interpretation of the wording, the Austrian Constitution does not contain any 
provision37 that recognises parties’ rights in an administrative procedure at all or to a 
30 See Harald Eberhard, ‘Altes und Neues zur “Geschlossenheit des Rechtsquellensystems’ (2007) 61 
Österreichische Juristenzeitung 679. 
31 See Ulrike Giera, ‘Individualrechte aus Unionsrecht’ in S. Schmid, V. Tiefenthaler, K. Wallnöfer and
A. Wimmer (eds.), Auf dem Weg zum hypermodernen Rechtsstaat? ( Jan Sramek 2011) 183–213. 
32 Case C-237/07 Dieter Janecek v Freistaat Bayern [2008] ECR I-6221. 
33 See Giera (n. 31) 183–213. 
34 VfSlg 19.632/2012; see also Konrad Lachmayer, ‘The Austrian Approach Towards European Human 
Rights, VfGH 14 March 2012, U 466/11 et al.’ (2013) 7 ICL-Journal 105–107. 
35 See Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 
424. 
36 Konrad Lachmayer, ‘Country Report: Austria’ in Anneli Albi (ed.), The Role of National Constitutions
(T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague 2016 [forthcoming]). 
37 An exception is of course Art. 119a para 9 Austrian Constitution that provides parties’ rights to munici­
palities in a supervisory procedure initiated by the federal or state authority. 















certain extent. It lies within the scope of the statute to provide parties’ rights. Thereby 
the legislator is bound by the principle of legality and the principle of equality.38 
The Court explicitly stated that the rule of law principle does not require granting 
of locus standing.39 Only in rare cases does the Constitutional Court derive from the 
rule of law principle the obligation to grant parties’ rights to a person concerned.40 
Instead, the Constitutional Court usually relies on the principle of equality (Art. 7 
Austrian Constitution), which the Court tends to interpret loosely.41 Thus, the Court 
has derived from the principle of equality a general principle of reasonableness.42 
In some cases the Court uses this principle of reasonableness to determine whether 
a statute grants locus standing or not. The statute from which individual rights are 
derived is bound to the general principle of objectivity. In general, granting subjective 
rights requires at the same time granting locus standing. Depending on the purpose 
of the procedure and on the peculiarity and the importance of the rights concerned, 
the exclusion of parties’ rights can be appropriate, if the procedure will primarily 
guarantee the interests of another person.43 The Constitutional Court examines case 
by case whether a differentiation concerning parties’ rights is on the one hand essen­
tial in relation to the regulation and on the other hand founded on actual differences 
regarding the interests considered in the procedure.44 
The reference to the principle of equality has to be viewed critically.45 In licensing 
procedures concerning industrial facilities, for example, neighbours have subjective 
rights granted by the particular statute (Industrial Act) and are thus parties to the 
procedure. They can claim that they are adversely affected in their life, health or 
property by the facility. Due to deregulation a simplified procedure was introduced, 
in which neighbours – although their substantive rights are the same – are no longer 
parties to the administrative procedure. The Constitutional Court, however, did not 
classify this provision as a violation of the principle of equality. The purpose of speed­
ing up procedures is legitimate. In the case of licensing an industrial facility for which 
granting permission is the rule, neighbours can be excluded from the procedure. 
The administrative authority is obliged to take care of the public interest – which also 
lies in the neighbours’ interest and therefore the rights protected under the Indus­
trial Law Act are not violated.46 
In general, the non-reference to the rule of law principle in the context of estab­
lishing rights is surprising considering the fact that effective legal protection in 
administrative law depends on the participation in an administrative procedure 
which requires locus standing. Individual rights are only effectively protected if the 
beneficiary participates in the procedure. 




40 For example VfSlg 13.646/1993.
 
41 Lachmayer (n. 13).
 
42 Manfred Stelzer, The Constitution of the Republic of Austria (Hart Publishing 2011) 242–243.
 
43 VfSlg 11.934/1988; 19.617/2012.
 
44 VfSlg 15.545/1999, 17.389/2004.
 
45 See Bernhard Raschauer, ‘Anlagenrecht und Nachbarschutz aus verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht’ (1999) 

13 Zeitschrift für Verwaltung 506–520, see also Rudolf Thienel, ‘Verfassungsrechtliche Grenzen für das 
vereinfachte Genehmigungsverfahren nach Art 359b GewO’ (2001) 15 Zeitschrift für Verwaltung 718. 
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3 Rights-based perspective 
3.1 Constitutional rights 
The Austrian Constitution contains several fundamental procedural rights that are
linked to the principle of effective legal protection: the right to a lawful judge (Art. 83
para. 2 Austrian Constitution), the right to a fair trial (Art. 6 ECHR) or the right to an
effective remedy (Art. 13 ECHR and Art. 47 CFR).47,48 The scope of the right to a lawful
judge is quite broad. Every governmental authority that makes legally-binding decisions
is regarded as a lawful judge. Hence Art. 83 para. 2 Austrian Constitution also comprises
administrative bodies. The right to proceed before the lawful judge is infringed if an
authority exercises a power it does not have or if it wrongly rejects its competence and
thus refuses to decide on the merits,49 if an improperly constituted tribunal deals with the
case50 or if a court does not request a preliminary ruling of the ECJ although it is obliged
to.51 The right to a fair trial (Art. 6 ECHR) is usually applied in accordance with the
ECtHR case law as well as Art. 13 ECHR, which guarantees an effective remedy before
a national authority if someone alleges the violation of rights and freedoms of ECHR. 
3.2 Individual and procedural rights 
3.2.1 Individual rights as structural precondition to effective legal protection 
In Austrian administrative law, access to justice and effective legal protection crucially 
depends on individual rights (subjektives Recht). Without an individual or subjective 
right, a person does not enjoy legal protection. The right to access administrative 
authorities, the right to appeal to an administrative court or the right to a decision 
within a reasonable timescale requires a subjective right. The most common and 
accepted doctrine defines subjective rights as the legal power that an individual per­
son derives from a regulation of public law to claim his/her interests against the 
state.52 The difficult and still not fully answered question is when and how a subjective 
right can be derived from administrative law. There is a scholarly consensus that not 
every statute provides subjective rights for individuals. On the contrary, administra­
tive statutes regularly contain objective duties for authorities and do not grant rights 
to an individual. If an interest concerned is recognised as a legally protected inter­
est by law, a subjective right can be derived and subsequently enforced. Economic 
or environmental interests are usually not regarded as legal interests, but as factual 
interests that the administrative authorities have to consider ex officio without granting 
legal protection in an administrative procedure. Moreover, legal interests are usually 
narrowly defined. 
47 See, regarding the application of the CFR, Chapter 2.3.2.
 
48 See, regarding the overall situation of fundamental rights in Austria, Anna Gamper, ‘A “Bill of Rights” 

for Austria: Still Unfinished Business’ (2010) III Percorsi costituzionali. Quadrimestrale di diritti e libertà 211. 
49 VfSlg 12.889/1991. 
50 VfSlg 10.022/1984. 
51 VfSlg 14.390/1995. 
52 VwSlg 14.750 A/1997; see W. Antoniolli and F. Koja, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (3rd edn., Manz
1996) 283. 


































3.2.2 How are individual rights determined? 
Some statutes explicitly grant subjective rights to individuals, but other laws have to be
interpreted. According to the case law of the Administrative Court and the so-called
‘impairment of rights doctrine’ (Schutznormtheorie) a person has a subjective right if a
statute protects not only public interests, but also interests of a specific person. The
specific interest of a person must be distinguishable from the interests of the general
public.53 Whether a statute grants a subjective right or not depends on the purpose
and objectives of the statute.54 The interests that are protected under the ‘impairment
of rights doctrine’ are traditionally limited to the subjective interests and concerns of
a person, for example life or property.55 Various cases have dealt with these disputed
questions. However, the case law of the courts does not fully resolve the question. The
result of the interpretation of the statute also tends to be part of a free decision on
the part of the relevant administrative authorities and courts. The distinction between
legal and factual interests is very contingent and to a certain extent arbitrary. It is
often unclear or disputed, whether a statute grants a subjective right or not. Due to
the narrow interpretation of subjective rights, access to justice in administrative law
is more limited than open. In the light of effective legal protection, the uncertainty
about whether an individual right exists or not is unsatisfactory, and the negative
result that no individual right exists is – at least in certain cases – highly problematic. 
3.2.3 Locus standing of parties 
Granting locus standing to parties makes subjective rights enforceable. According to
the General Administrative Procedural Act (GAPA), a person who is involved in an
activity of an authority by a legal title or legal interest is party to a procedure. In other
words, the party to the administrative procedure is a person whose rights are affected
by the procedure. The GAPA does not constitute a subjective right for the parties
itself, but refers to the substantive administrative law. Substantive statutes must again
be interpreted in order to deduce subjective rights (regarding the theories described
above). If a person is granted a subjective right in an administrative statute, he or
she normally has locus standing in an administrative procedure to defend his or her
rights. Some laws explicitly specify persons whose legal interests are recognised by
law and are therefore considered as ‘parties’ in administrative procedure. 
Subjective rights and locus standing in an administrative procedure are closely 
linked, but the two terms are not equal. On the one hand, some statutes grant locus 
standing without a corresponding subjective right (several environmental statutes for 
example grant locus standing to governmental organs or NGOs), on the other hand, 
as already mentioned, in some cases statutes do not grant locus standing although 
53 J. Hengstschläger and D. Leeb, Kommentar zum Allgemeinen Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz I (Manz 2004) Sec. 
8 GAPA para 6. 
54 C. Grabenwarter and M. Fister, Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit (4th edn., Verlag 
Österreich, Wien 2014) 24. 
55 Eva Schulev-Steindl, ‘Vom Wesen und Wert der Parteistellung’ in C. Jabloner, G. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, 
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a subjective right is affected (neighbours for example do not have locus standing 
in procedures regarding certain industrial facilities that have minor effects on the 
neighbourhood).56 
3.2.4 Procedural rights 
Once someone is recognised as a party in an administrative procedure according to 
the GAPA, he or she has various rights, such as the right to access the files, the right 
to be heard, the right to remedies, the right to service of process or the right to an 
administrative decision within due time. These rights ensure an effective participa­
tion in the procedure and enforcement of the subjective rights. 
If the administrative procedure ends with a negative administrative ruling, a person 
who alleges infringement of his or her rights has the right to file an appeal before the 
competent administrative court.57 The right to appeal requires the anterior position 
as party to the administrative procedure. If a party does not have a subjective right, he 
or she can neither participate in the administrative procedure nor in the procedure 
before the court. Subsequently, an appeal against a decision of the administrative 
courts before the Administrative or the Constitutional Court can be filed by the par­
ties to the procedure. Once again, only the parties to a procedure are entitled to file 
an appeal before the two supreme courts. While before the Administrative Court the 
allegation of the violation of an individual right granted by an ordinary statute is suf­
ficient, the appeal before the Constitutional Court requires the alleged violation of a 
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right. 
3.2.5 Individual rights which cannot be enforced in an administrative  
procedure under the GAPA 
As already mentioned, effective judicial protection in Austrian administrative law is 
focused on subjective rights and the participation in an administrative procedure 
according to GAPA and the obtaining of an administrative ruling. If a person is party 
to an administrative procedure and therefore gains an administrative ruling, his or 
her rights are effectively protected – first, by participating in the procedure, and sec­
ond, by filing an appeal before the competent administrative court. 
The reality is different when it comes to subjective rights which are not the sub­
ject of an administrative procedure to which the GAPA applies. In this case, effective 
judicial protection is not ensured, due to the fact that the right to appeal requires 
the participation in the preceding administrative procedure. If a person requests the 
application of an ordinance or a so-called ‘factual act’ like for example, the submis­
sion of information or the conducting of inspections, then neither the GAPA, nor the 
ACPA nor any other general procedure act is applicable. 
56 Bernhard Raschauer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (4th edn., Verlag Österreich, Wien 2013) para 
1105–1109. 
57 Art. 132 para. 1(1) Austrian Constitution. 
















   
  
• Ordinances 
Ordinances are adopted in an internal procedure where the persons concerned or
interested do not have locus standing.58 In order to ensure effective judicial protec­
tion it is necessary to obtain an administrative ruling which opens access to justice
for the parties of the procedure. If the GAPA cannot be applied because a person
files an application for an ordinance or a factual act, effective judicial protection
is not guaranteed in Austrian administrative law, which constitutes a breach of Art.
47 CFR.59 
• Acts of law enforcement 
Against acts of law enforcement and police powers – although the administrative 
authority does not issue an administrative ruling, due to the fact that it does not 
conduct a formal procedure – effective judicial protection is ensured. A person who 
claims infringement of his or her rights because of the exercise of law enforcement 
has the right to appeal before the administrative courts of first instance.60 The aim 
of an appeal against the exercise of direct administrative power is to declare the act 
unlawful and, should it still be taking place, to terminate it. Acts of direct administra­
tive power or compulsion include the arrest of a person, towing away of cars or seizure 
of goods. 
• Further (factual) acts 
The administrative courts of first instance can still only review those forms of actions 
the Constitution provides. However, the limitation to certain legal acts was softened 
by the constitutional amendment establishing the administrative courts of first 
instance.61 The Constitution opens up the possibility of introducing new forms of 
legal protection regarding other (factual) acts of administrative authorities, includ­
ing the submission of information or the conducting of inspections. Federal or state 
laws can provide complaints for illegality of the ‘conduct of an administrative author­
ity in executing the law’ (‘Verhalten einer Verwaltungsbehörde in Vollziehung der Gesetze’).62 
It remains to be seen whether and how the ordinary federal or state legislator will 
make use of this option. 
3.3 Rights of administrative authorities or groups to intervene 
The right to intervention exists in some limited cases. It may be granted to administra­
tive authorities which are then formal parties in an administrative procedure. Accord­
ing to Art.132 para. 1(2) Austrian Constitution, the competent Federal Minister has 
58 Raschauer (n. 56) para. 789.
 
59 See Bernhard Raschauer, ‘Realakte, schlicht hoheitliches Handeln und Säumnisschutz’ in Michael Hol­
oubek and Michael Lang (eds.), Rechtsschutz gegen staatliche Untätigkeit (2011) 265. 
60 Art. 130 para. 1(2) Austrian Constitution. 
61 See Chapter 4.1. 
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the right to appeal before an administrative court of first instance against an admin­
istrative ruling in certain matters that are regulated by federal law, but executed by 
the states, for example matters concerning citizenship or environmental impact 
assessment. With this right, the federal state supervises the execution and perfor­
mance of the states.63 Furthermore, federal and state laws can grant the right to appeal 
against administrative rulings to certain persons64 or organs.65 The Ombudsman for 
the environment, for example, is entitled to appeal against administrative rulings of 
certain environmental or nature protection proceedings. Several statutes grant locus 
standing to environmental organisations. Locus standing is explicitly granted to such 
organs or groups. 
Such ‘administrative parties’ do not have their own subjective rights that they are 
defending. They participate in the procedure without being directly and personally 
affected. Their task is to observe and ensure objective legality in administrative or 
court procedures. The Ombudsman for the Environment, for example, is entitled 
to represent the concerns and interests of the environment as a public interest. He 
can challenge compliance with environmental laws and regulations in an administra­
tive procedure. For the purpose of ensuring objective legality, ‘administrative parties’ 
have procedural rights, but no substantive rights. They can only file an appeal in the 
case of an alleged infringement of procedural rights. 
3.4 Right to challenge inactivity as an essential aspect 
of effective judicial protection 
Judicial protection is only efficient if the legal system provides the right to an admin­
istrative act within a reasonable time. An administrative authority is obligated to issue 
a ruling on submissions of a party without undue delay, within six months at the lat­
est. If the competent administrative authority does not issue a ruling within the term 
allowed for the decision, the party has the right to file a complaint to the administra­
tive court to claim a breach of the duty to reach a timely decision (Säumnisbeschwerde). 
Only parties of the corresponding administrative procedure who are entitled to get a 
decision have the right to file a complaint. According to the Federal Administrative 
Court Procedure Act (FAPA, Verwaltungsgerichtshofsgesetz), the court itself has to decide 
on the case within six months. In case the judgment is not issued within this term, 
the party can file a motion to set a deadline for violation of the duty to decide by an 
administrative court of first instance (Fristsetzungsantrag) to the Administrative Court. 
The responding court is instructed to issue the judgment within a maximum term of 
three months and to submit a copy of the judgment to the Administrative Court or to 
explain why it did not violate its duty to reach a decision. This term can be extended 
one more time if the court can submit evidence for reasons regarding the merits of 
the case which made it impossible to issue a judgment in due time. 
The Austrian legal order provides a remedy against unlawful delay, but it is ques­
tionable whether the right to an administrative act within a reasonable time is effec­
tive. First, it takes a long time to enforce an administrative act, and secondly, if the 
63 T. Öhlinger and H. Eberhard, Verfassungsrecht (10th edn., Facultas.wuv 2014) para. 661.
 
64 E.g. citizens´ initiatives.
 
65 Art. 132 para. 5 Austrian Constitution.
 








Figure 5.1 Separation of powers and court system 
administrative court of first instance does not issue a decision after the Administrative 
Court has extended the term, the administrative act cannot be enforced.66 Another 
problem is the general focus on administrative rulings. Only administrative rulings 
can be enforced by a complaint to the administrative court of first instance and/or 
to the Administrative Court. The complaints apply only to an administrative request. 
If an applicant requests a factual act, such as the submission of information or the 
conducting of inspections or an ordinance, neither the GAPA nor the Administra­
tive Court Act is applicable and the applicant cannot claim a violation of the duty to 
decide.67 
4 Institutional perspective 
4.1 Separation of powers 
The introduction of the new system of administrative courts of first instance68 started 
to make significant changes to the concept of separation of powers between the 
administration and the judiciary. Before 2014, the constitutional concept provided 
different instances and possibilities to appeal within the administration and only after 
the exhausting of the chain of appeals was it possible to apply either to the Consti­
tutional Court or to the Administrative Court. Since 2014, the role of administrative 
authorities has been significantly limited and all appeals now have to be addressed to 
the newly introduced administrative courts of first instance.69 Moreover, from a separa­
tion of powers perspective, the link between administrative decisions and judgments 
by administrative courts became imminent. 
66 Ulrike Giera, Individualrechte im europäischen Umweltrecht und ihre Durchsetzung im nationalen Recht
(Facultas-Nomos 2015) 228–247. 
67 See Raschauer (n. 59) 265; Michael Potacs‚ ‘Subjektives Recht gegen Feinstaubbildung?’ (2009) 33 
Zeitschrift für Verwaltung 874. 
68 Most of the Courts were transformed from the existing independent administrative authorities. 
69 An exception is a municipality’s own sphere of competence where an administrative two-stage appeal 
still exists that can, however, be excluded by law. See Art. 118 para. 4 Austrian Constitution. 
 
  










Effective legal protection in Austrian law 87 
The same constitutional amendment also opened up new possibilities of legal pro­
tection from administrative authorities to ordinary courts.70 Federal or state legisla­
tion may provide in specific matters an appeal from the administrative authority to a 
court of justice instead of an appeal to the administrative court. The quite strict sepa­
ration of powers between administration and ordinary judiciary71 was significantly 
weakened. The legislator can thus change the institutional and procedural concepts 
of appeal; it will, however, always result in a judicial review of the administrative 
decision. 
4.2 The new system of legal protection in administrative law 
In 2014, Austria introduced – as mentioned above – a completely new system of 
administrative courts of first instance (the so-called 9+2 model): one federal admin­
istrative court of first instance, a federal fiscal court of first instance and nine state 
administrative courts of first instance. With this reform, all stages of administrative 
appeal were abolished: the appellant can only file a complaint against an adminis­
trative ruling before the competent administrative court of first instance and, sub­
sequently, the appellant can appeal against the decision of the administrative court 
to the Constitutional Court and/or to the Administrative Court. The access to the 
Administrative Court was limited due to the introduction of the administrative courts 
of first instance. Revision is only admissible if the solution depends on a legal ques­
tion of essential importance. This is the case if the decision of the administrative 
court of first instance deviates from the established case law of the Administrative 
Court, such established case law does not exist or the legal question to be solved has 
not been answered in a uniform manner by the previously established case law (Art. 
133 para 4 Austrian Constitution). This new system changes the understanding of the 
Administrative Court, in so far as the control of the administration is primarily the 
duty of the administrative courts of first instance, and no longer that of the Adminis­
trative Court. The function of the Administrative Court is now to ensure the objective 
legality and a uniform case law of the administrative courts of first instance.72 
Along with the establishment of administrative courts of first instance, a so-called 
Administrative Courts Procedure Act (ACPA)73 was adopted, which regulates the pro­
cedure before the administrative courts of first instance. This new procedural statute 
for the administrative courts of first instance does not provide a solution for the afore­
mentioned problem regarding legal protection. 
Another point that has to be regarded critically is the subsidiary application of the
General Administrative Procedure Act. The underlying constellation is different in
administrative and judicial procedures: While in an administrative procedure, the
70 Art. 94 para. 2 Austrian Constitution. 
71 Art. 94 para. 1 Austrian Constitution. 
72 See Rudolf Thienel, ‘Die Kontrolle der Verwaltungsgerichte erster Instanz durch den Verwaltungsger­
ichtshof’ in Michael Holoubek and Michael Lang (eds.), Die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit erster Instanz
(Linde Verlag 2013) 331–379. 
73 The Administrative Courts Procedure Act (ACPA) (Verwaltungsgerichtsverfahrensgesetz) regulates the pro­
cedure before the administrative courts of first instance, while the (Federal) Administrative Court Pro­
cedure (FAPA, Verwaltungsgerichtshofsgesetz) applies to the procedure before the Federal Administrative 
Court which is, apart from the Constitutional Court, the last instance in administrative law. 












relation between administrative authority and applicant74 is hierarchical, in a judicial
procedure, both the administrative authority and the appellant are equal parties to the
procedure. Furthermore, administrative and judicial procedures are governed by dif­
ferent principles and standards; a subsidiary application involves the danger of a trans­
fer of administrative standards to the court procedure. Thus, the new enacted ACPA
not only solves problems but creates new ones regarding effective legal protection. 
4.3 The concept of three supreme courts 
Since the enactment of the Austrian Constitution in 1920, the Austrian system of judi­
cial protection has been based on three supreme courts: the Constitutional Court, the 
Administrative Court and the Supreme Court. There is no formal hierarchy between 
these three courts and each of them is competent for a different substantive area of 
law: The Constitutional Court deals with constitutional questions, for example with 
the infringement of fundamental rights or federal issues;75 the Administrative Court 
is competent to decide on violations of administrative law as last instance, if there is 
no violation of constitutional law at the same time; and finally the Supreme Court has 
to rule on civil law cases and criminal charges.76 The relationship between the three 
courts is characterised by equality, although the position of the Constitutional Court 
is somehow distinguished because of its exclusive competence to review laws and ordi­
nances and to repeal them in case they violate the constitution.77 
The Austrian legal system lacks a constitutional complaint to appeal against deci­
sions of civil or criminal courts to the Constitutional Court. Therefore, it is up to the 
Supreme Court to rule on violations of fundamental rights. While judges argue that 
there is no need for a constitutional complaint,78 scholars demand it due to existing 
deficits in the case law of civil and criminal courts.79 The Austrian Constitution estab­
lished the Constitutional Court as a specialised court for constitutional questions. 
Thus, the Constitutional Court is the ‘guardian’ of constitutional fundamental rights 
and not the Supreme Court. The case law differs to some extent from the case law of 
the Constitutional Court, which involves the danger of having two different standards 
in the protection of fundamental rights.80 
74 The accused person in an administrative penal law procedure.
 
75 See, regarding the Austrian Constitutional Court, Christoph Bezemek ‘A Kelsenian Model of Consti­
tutional Adjudication. The Austrian Constitutional Court’ (2012) 66 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 115; 
A. Gamper and F. Palermo ‘The Constitutional Court of Austria: Modern Profiles of an Archetype of 
Constitutional Review’ (2008) 3 Journal of Comparative Law 64. 
76 Criminal law must be distinguished from administrative penal law which applies in case of a violation 
of administrative law. In first instance administrative authorities are competent to decide over breaches 
of administrative law. An appeal against their decision can be filed before an administrative court of 
first instance. Another peculiarity of administrative penal law is that administrative bodies are not only 
competent to impose fines, but also imprisonment. 
77 Art. 139, Art. 140 Austrian Constitution. 
78 See for example Eckhardt Ratz, ‘Grundrechte in der Strafjudikatur des OGH’ (2006) 60 Österreichische 
Juristenzeitung 318. 
79 See for example A. Stufer and R. Soyer, ‘Kritik des Grundrechtsschutzes in der Strafjudikatur des OGH’ 
(2007) 61 Österreichische Juristenzeitung 139–148. 
80 See Christoph Grabenwarter, ‘Die österreichischen Höchstgerichte und deren Verhältnis zueinander’ 























Effective legal protection in Austrian law 89 
This problem was addressed by another constitutional amendment of 2013,
which came into force in 2015. Although there is still no constitutional complaint
against judgments of the Supreme Court, a new appeal was introduced with regard
to the judgments of the ordinary (!) courts of first instance. After a judgment of
an ordinary court of first instance, the complainant can not only appeal to the
ordinary court of second instance, but also file a complaint at the Constitutional
Court that the provisions of the statutes, on which the judgment is based in the
concrete case, contradict the constitution.81 The new form of constitutional review
enables a certain control of constitutionality in the proceedings of the ordinary
courts. It is, however, still not a full constitutional complaint against the judgment
of the ordinary court of first instance, and not at all a constitutional complaint
against the judgment of the Supreme Court. Thus, the deficits of legal protection
regarding a constitutional complaint against ordinary court judgments have not
really been solved, although it is fair to say that the structural problems have been
reduced. 
4.4 Ombudsman board and mediation 
From a constitutional perspective, the Austrian Ombudsman system (Volksanwaltschaft) 
is a politically important but legally very weak institution. People can, after exhausting 
the possibilities of legal protection, file a complaint against maladministration.82 The 
Ombudsman board can investigate and make recommendations, but the administra­
tive authorities only have to justify their decisions. In the end, the Ombudsman board 
cannot effectively protect the rights of individuals. The role of the Ombudsman 
Board was, however, developed in 2012. The powers of the Ombudsman Board were 
strengthened with regard to checking human rights in the administration, following 
a development of ombudsman institutions around the world in the last 20 years.83 
These new competences regarding human rights violation of the administration, 
however, refer only to parts of law enforcement, including prisons, policing and insti­
tutions for handicapped persons. 
In certain cases, administrative law also provides possibilities for mediation and 
alternative dispute resolution, e.g. in the context of energy regulation between con­
sumer and energy companies or in environmental law. The mediation procedures 
are, however, always provided before a formal legal procedure is started. It might be a 
possibility for weak legal protection with low access barriers, but legal protection will 
finally be granted by the courts. 
5 Conclusion 
An overall evaluation of the principle of effective legal protection would be quite 
positive. A strong concept of administrative procedures, a new system of administra­
tive court and dynamic case law of the Constitutional Court are constantly improving 
81 Thomas Ziniel, ‘Strengthening the Judicial Review System in Austria’ (2014) 8 ICL-Journal 437.
 
82 See Art. 148a-j Austrian Constitution.
 
83 See Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Europäische Ombudsmann-Institutionen: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersu­
chung zur vielfältigen Umsetzung einer Idee (Springer 2008). 






the legal protection against different administrative acts. The huge impact of ECHR 
and EU Law is also contributing to an overall stable system. 
The positive evaluation does not, however, mask various severe structural problems 
in the Austrian system of effective legal protection: 
•	 The impact of the European Union not only provides new possibilities for domes­
tic legal protection, but also affects the Austrian concepts of legal protection. The 
consequence might not only be deficits in legal protection, but also the necessity 
to reform the whole constitutional structure to create conformity with Union law. 
The introduction of the administrative courts of first instance can serve as such 
an example, with it being possible after 20 years to find a proper solution to such 
problems. 
•	 While the new administrative courts signify a huge improvement to legal protec­
tion in Austria, the implementation of the new system goes hand-in-hand with 
manifold procedural problems in detail. This kind of transitional challenge will 
hopefully be resolved by the legislative adaption of the new procedural law and 
by the case law of the administrative courts. 
•	 The concept of individual rights in administrative law remains quite restrictive 
and limits the possibilities of individuals to participate in administrative pro­
cedures. While such concepts help to accelerate administrative proceedings, 
especially in commercial administrative law, they limit the effectiveness of legal 
protection. 
•	 The rather strict typology of administrative action also limits the possibilities of 
legal protection. The constitutional reform created new possibilities on the part 
of the legislator to open up the system regarding any kind of administrative acts. 
If the legislation is exploiting this new potential, significant deficits in legal pro­
tection could be resolved. 
In conclusion, the principle of effective legal protection remains an important pro­
ject of Austrian constitutional and administrative law. There is still plenty of room for 


















    
      
  
6 The principle of effective  




1 Historical developments 
There is no legally binding principle of effective legal protection in Danish law. It 
is of course a concern for legislators to take effective legal protection into account 
when making laws – and the legislation does provide effective legal protection – and 
it may be of relevance to take into account in judgments where the relevant rules are 
not clear. But no general legal principle exists regulating the matter – the administra­
tion and the courts are only bound by the laws that the legislator has decided should 
provide legal protection. The Constitution ensures only a minimum level of legal 
protection. 
Danish citizens do however have a high degree of effective legal protection whether 
speaking of procedural guarantees (e.g. the right to be heard or administrative 
authorities’ duty to give reasons for their decisions) or access to remedies (the courts 
and the Ombudsman as well as rights to administrative recourse). This is not based on 
a general principle of effective legal protection, but on specific rules. A great deal of 
these rules is part of the general administrative law which applies to all administrative 
decisions unless an exception is made by law. In certain administrative areas (e.g. tax 
administration) there are rules that give the citizen further specific rights.1 I shall 
not go into such special rules. The following thus concerns only the general rules 
which – normally – are the minimum standards for citizens’ rights. 
Many of the rules that give citizens procedural guarantees have been developed
by either the courts or the Ombudsman. Several of the most important rights have
since been codified and expanded in two laws of general administrative law: the
Public Information Act (PIA, first adopted in 1964) and the Public Administra­
tion Act (PAA, first adopted in 1985).2 Both acts have been amended since – PIA
was generally revised in 2013. It must be said that before 1964 the right of access
to information was relatively limited, though the Ombudsman since 1964 has had
influence on the application of the law concerning the interpretation, includ­
ing the application of the principle of ‘more publicity’, i.e. the duty to consider
whether to give citizens access to information that the law does not entitle them to
demand.3 
1 Cf. Consolidation Act No. 175 of 23 February 2011.
 
2 Act No. 606 of 6 June 2013 and Consolidation Act No. 433 of 22 April 2014 respectively.
 
3 See s 14 of the Public Information Act and s 10 of the Public Administration Act.
 













    
  
 
The influence of Danish administrative legal theory should also be considered.
Danish administrative law was more or less ‘founded’ by Poul Andersen in 1924
when he published his doctoral thesis on the invalid administrative acts.4 Before
1924 there was very little literature, no general laws, and only a few court rulings
established the general rules of administrative law. Poul Andersen went on to write
Danish administrative law in five editions from 1936 to 1965 and had great influence
on the courts and the Ombudsman’s (established in 1955) application of adminis­
trative law.5 
2 Constitutional framework 
The Danish Constitution ‘Grundloven’ sets forth only a few rights for citizens as to 
effective legal protection. Art. 63 of Grundloven grants the right to bring administra­
tive decisions before the courts. A few provisions give further rights in this regard. 
Thus Art. 73 of the Constitution states, for example, that both the question of the 
legality of an expropriation as well as the question of what comprises ‘complete com­
pensation’ can be tried by the courts. The Constitution also declares that it is possible 
for the legislator to set up administrative courts, but there must be access to appeal to 
the Supreme Court. The legislator has not set up administrative courts; therefore all 
administrative matters can be brought before the ordinary courts. 
According to Art. 55 of Grundloven, the Parliament (Folketinget) elects one or two 
Ombudsmen to scrutinise the state administration. The provision only means that 
the institution of the Ombudsman once created cannot be abolished. However, it is 
up to the legislator to establish the extent of control. For instance, the Ombudsman’s 
jurisdiction includes the local municipalities – which comprise a substantial part of 
the administration – according to the Ombudsman Act but the Constitution does not 
prevent the legislator from changing this.6 
The Danish Constitution therefore has relatively little importance when determin­
ing rights of citizens in relation to effective legal protection. The constitutional frame­
work is just that: A frame that leaves it open to the legislator to decide what rights to 
legal protection citizens should have, besides the right to bring matters before the 
courts. 
It is relatively rare that provisions of the Constitution are invoked in cases concern­
ing administrative law apart from the principle of legality which is deduced from 
Grundloven and there are no cases where a violation of Grundloven has been found in 
relation to the general matter of effective legal protection. It may help to understand 
the lack of rules in the Constitution on effective legal protection that most of the 
rules were written in 1848–1849, i.e. before there was anything called administrative 
law in Danish law, and it has only been amended four times, the last time being in 
1953. One reason for this is the fact that Grundloven is very difficult to change: first, 
4 Poul Andersen, Om Ugyldige Forvaltningsakter (Arnold Busck, Cph. 1924). 
5 Poul Andersen, Dansk Forvaltningsret (Nyt Nordisk Forlag – Arnold Busck, Cph. 1936, Gyldendalske 
Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, Cph. 1946, Gyldendal, Cph. 1956, Gyldendal, Cph. 1963 and Gyldendal, 
Cph. 1965). 
6 Cf. Helle Bødker Madsen, Jens Garde et al., Forvaltningsret: Almindelige emner (5th edn., Jurist- og Økonom­
forbundets Forlag, Cph. 2009) 449–450, Kaj Larsen, Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen et al., Forvaltningsret (2nd 








   
 
    
   
 
  
Effective legal protection in Danish law 93 
a constitutional bill must be passed in Parliament. Then the government must – if it 
wishes to (it is not obligated) – call for a general election. Then the proposal must 
be passed once more in the newly elected parliament. Then it must be subjected to a 
referendum where more than 40% of the all the persons that may vote in parliamen­
tary elections must vote yes in order for the law to pass. Finally, the government must 
confirm the law.7 It is also a major concern that there is really no need for provisions 
in the constitutions securing citizens rights in as much as the ordinary legislation 
provides such rights.8 
3 Rights-based perspective 
There are a number of possible legal remedies for citizens. As a starting point it must 
be said that an administrative authority which is aware that it has made an illegal 
decision is obligated to re-open the case in order to assess whether the decision is 
invalid.9 The duty to reassess ends if or when it is or becomes clear that the decision 
is not invalid (and perhaps also if it is or becomes clear that the illegality is of very 
little importance). So if it is obvious from the beginning that the decision is legal, the 
authority does not actually have to re-open the case, but can reply that there aren’t 
sufficient grounds for re-opening the case. Frequently, the problem is that there is a 
disagreement on whether the decision is illegal, or that there is a disagreement on the 
use of discretion by the administration rather than the legality of a decision. In that 
case other remedies become relevant to consider. 
As mentioned above, all administrative decisions can be brought before the ordi­
nary courts. The courts can also try claims for damages as well as assess the legal­
ity of the use of force. The conditions for bringing a case before the courts will be 
described below. As also mentioned in chapter 2, Folketinget elects an Ombudsman to 
scrutinise the administration. Besides these two forms of remedies there are in many 
cases other remedies available. 
In many cases administrative recourse is possible, i.e. the citizen has a right to have 
a case reviewed by another administrative authority. Many administrative authorities 
are also subject to supervision by another administrative authority. This does not give 
the citizen a right to review, but the supervising authority may be obligated to review 
a case (though this is in principle not an obligation towards the citizen). 
Since it is a general rule of Danish administrative law it should be noted that even
though a remedy is available, it does not mean that the citizen is not obliged to com­
ply with an administrative decision until it is perhaps changed or quashed. However,
normally the authority that has made a decision may suspend the effects of that deci­
sion until a complaint has been decided.10 Also both administrative recourse authori­
7 Cf. Jens Peter Christensen, Jens Peter Christensen et al, Dansk statsret (Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 
Cph. 2012) 394–396.
8 Cf. Jens Peter Christensen, ‘Er grundloven god nok?’ Jyllandsposten (Viby J 5 June 2013) on the day of 
the 60th anniversary of the latest revision of the constitution. 
9 Cf. Karsten Revsbech, Jens Garde et al, Forvaltningsret: Almindelige emner (5th edn., Jurist- og Økonom­
forbundets Forlag, Cph. 2009) 493–494, Karsten Loiborg, Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen et al., Forvaltningsret
(2nd edn., Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, Cph. 2002) 921–927. 
10 Cf. Revsbech (n. 9) 323–327, Loiborg (n. 9) 985–987. 
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ties11 and the courts may do the same12 and the Ombudsman – who has no powers to
make or change decisions – may ask that the administration does so (and in practice
the administration will comply).13 
It should perhaps be pointed out that there is no requirement of violation of a 
so-called subjective right for a citizen to be entitled to make a complaint or file a law­
suit against an authority. Instead the citizen must have an interest in the matter – for 
instance that he is in some way affected by an administrative decision. 
In some cases a local authority (a kommune or a region) is entitled to bring a higher 
authority’s decision before the courts. This situation is in practice the same if the 
Ombudsman asks that the administration re-evaluate a decision. If the administra­
tion chooses not to comply – which does not happen very often – the Ombudsman 
can recommend that the state pays the cost of bringing the case before the courts if 
the citizen wishes to do so. Such a recommendation will always be followed. Once the 
case has been decided by the courts, there is no doubt that the authorities will act 
in accordance with the verdict by their own accord. There have however been a few 
cases where it was unclear what the result of a court case actually was (because the 
verdict was ambiguous) and this can lead to a new court case so that the ambiguity 
may be resolved. 
3.1 Administrative recourse 
3.1.1 The administrative recourse system 
Administrative decisions are in the first instance for the most part made either by 
locally elected municipal authorities (kommuner) or government (state) authori­
ties. An important exception to the rule that most first instance decisions are made 
by either kommuner or state authorities is hospitals which are governed by elected 
regional authorities (regioner). Other exceptions include independent tribunals or 
council (nævn and råd respectively). For example, compensation for expropriation is 
decided by an independent tribunal when the expropriating authority and the citizen 
cannot reach an agreement by themselves.14 
If there is no law stating otherwise the decision made by a kommune, a region, a nævn, 
a råd or by a ministry is not subject to administrative recourse. Decisions made by state 
authorities other than ministries are normally subject to recourse unless the law states 
otherwise. For example, a decision made by Naturstyrelsen (‘the Nature Board’) would 
normally be subject to recourse to the ministry for the environment.15 
However, in many – probably most – cases the law provides the right to administra­
tive recourse to another authority. Most decisions made by a kommune are subject to 
recourse either to a state authority or an independent tribunal depending on the law. 
Also in many cases the right to recourse to a ministry from another state authority is 
11 Cf. the aforementioned literature.
 
12 Cf. Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 1994, pp. 823–827 H, Revsbech (n. 9) 382–385.
 
13 Cf. Madsen (n. 6) 471, Larsen (n. 6) 885.
 
14 An overview of the organisation of the Danish administration cf. Jørgen Albæk Jensen, Jens Garde et al., 

Forvaltningsret: Almindelige emner (5th edn., Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, Cph. 2009) 37–69. 







Effective legal protection in Danish law 95 
replaced by a right to recourse to an independent tribunal (e.g. Naturstyrelsen’s deci­
sions can in some cases be appealed to Natur- og Miljøklagenævnet (Nature- and Envi­
ronment Appeal Tribunal) instead of the ministry). And where decisions are made 
in the first instance by a tribunal there is often recourse to another tribunal (e.g. the 
decision to limit the owner’s use of his fields or to grant access to the public made by 
a Nature Conservancy Board (fredningsnævn) may be appealed to Natur- og Miljøkla­
genævnet). Thus in most cases there will be access to administrative recourse to at least 
one other administrative authority and in a few cases even two levels of administra­
tive recourse. This goes perhaps some way to explain why there generally has been 
little support for establishing administrative courts: since there are a large number of 
specialised and quasi-judicial tribunals, the need for actual administrative courts does 
not seem very pressing. 
3.1.2 Requirement for access to administrative recourse 
Administrative recourse is normally only available once an administrative decision 
has been made. One cannot therefore complain until a case has been decided. If one 
for instance wishes to make a complaint over the procedure, one must wait till the 
authority has made its decision before making a complaint. If the authority neglects 
or refuses to make a decision, this may however in itself be considered a decision and 
it is thus possible to make a complaint also in that situation.16 A citizen has the right to 
a decision within ‘reasonable time’. The problem for the citizen is that it is generally a 
matter or resources and thus a political matter, what a reasonable time is.17 
Administrative appeal is normally only available to citizens who have a significant 
and individual interest in a decision.18 The citizens who are specified subjects to a 
decision will always be considered to have a significant and individual interest, e.g. 
the subject of a prohibition according to an individual administrative act or an appli­
cant may, for example, file a complaint. The requirement that the interest must be 
individual means it is usually not possible to complain about general provisions since 
no one has an individual interest. However, a citizen will have an individual interest if 
a decision is made regarding him in accordance with the provisions and the recourse 
authority may then decide on the legality of the provisions. The requirement that the 
interest must be both significant and individual means that it is not enough to be indi­
vidually effected, the citizen must also have a significant interest. This can be deter­
mined only case-by-case. Thus, a number of neighbours may be affected by a building 
permit, but only those that are affected significantly may complain. So a neighbour 
who loses his perfect view of the sea because of a building permit may be affected 
significantly, whereas another neighbour who has no special view (e.g. the only view is 
of some other houses beyond the land where the new building is to be erected) may 
not be significantly affected. Or, if a great number is affected equally, e.g. 100 people 
16 Cf. Revsbech (n. 9) 305–307.
 
17 Cf. Jens Olsen, Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen et al, Forvaltningsret (2nd edn., Jurist- og Økonomforbundets 

Forlag, Cph. 2002) 923–925. If a decision is not made within reasonable time, the citizen may be enti­
tled to damages cf. Orla Friis, Jens Garde et al, Forvaltningsret: Almindelige emner (5th edn., Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag, Cph. 2009) 566. 
18 Revsbech (n. 9) 307–313, Loiborg (n. 9) 963–968. 








are affected significantly, then no one will be affected individually and none of them 
may complain. Sometimes the access to recourse is subject to regulation by law. Thus 
environmental laws often give access to recourse for specific associations. And the 
law regulating local planning provisions provides access to recourse to anyone with a 
legal interest. 
If a written decision is subject to administrative recourse, it must include infor­
mation about the relevant recourse authority and how to file a complaint including 
information about a possible time limit (if this information is not given the time limits 
are suspended). This does not apply if the decision is entirely in favour of the citizen 
and the citizen therefore has no reason to complain. 
Unless the law states otherwise, there are no formal requirements and no time lim­
its.19 Thus it is sufficient for a citizen to just phone or send an e-mail to the authority 
and say that he wishes to file a complaint. It is of course for practical purposes neces­
sary to make clear who is complaining and what the complaint is about – if this is not 
clear the authority must enquire by itself. If a complaint is made to a wrong authority 
that authority must forward the complaint to the correct authority. As can be seen it 
is usually very easy to file a complaint. Only if the law provides must the citizen pay a 
(usually relatively small) fee, typically 50–100 Euro. On the other hand, if the citizen 
has expenses in regard to, for example, legal counsel he must normally pay that him­
self. This must be seen in relation to the recourse authority’s obligation to review the 
case by itself (cf. chapter 4.1). 
Often there are in fact time limits and in some cases other requirements, e.g. that a 
complaint should be written, but as stated the administration must inform about such 
requirements and must often assist the citizen. 
3.2 The courts 
Grundloven grants the right to bring administrative decisions before the courts. It 
must be said that there – in spite of the words of the Constitution – is an exception to 
this rule. According to a verdict by the Supreme Court the legislator may limit access 
to courts. Today, two important examples of this remain: the Refugee Tribunal and 
the Foreigners Tribunal (which resemble a court, e.g. the chairman must be a high 
or supreme court justice). If a complaint concerns the ‘discretionary’ decision as to 
the correct application of the law the case will be thrown out of court. Other matters 
can be tried, e.g. the correct abstract interpretation of the law, procedural errors and 
breach of general legal principles. What may at first seem a very problematic excep­
tion is in practice not quite so problematic. The reason for the rule is that court cases 
can take years which would mean foreigners without legal grounds for staying could 
stay for years.20 
Unless the law states otherwise there are no time limits (in fact the law very often 
sets time limits; if so the administration must inform about the time limit) and nor 
is it a requirement that the means of administrative recourse have been exhausted 
(in fact the law also in many cases alters this).21 Only citizens with a legal interest in 
19 Cf. Revsbech (n. 9)314–322, Loiborg (n. 9) 968–982.
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a decision may challenge it at the courts. This includes anyone with a significant and 
individual interest in a decision. 
The proceedings in most cases follow the general rules of civil court cases. If a 
criminal case concerns an administrative decision, e.g. the refusal to comply with 
an order or prohibition, the administrative decision may be challenged during the 
criminal proceedings. 
As a general rule a verdict may be appealed once. So a district court verdict may be
brought before a high court. Cases that concern ‘matters of principle’ may be referred
by a district court to a high court and in that case the high court verdict can be appealed
to the Supreme Court. Also if a case has been tried at both a district and a high court a
party may apply for permission to bring the case before the Supreme Court. 
It is possible for other parties to intervene, but it is rather seldom used by private 
parties. In principle at least a verdict is only binding for the parties to the case. It has 
been seen that other private parties than the recipient of a permit e.g. neighbours 
have sued the authority who has issued the permit – without the recipient being party 
to the case. In my view this can perhaps pose a problem as to the right to a fair trial. In 
one case the Supreme Court decided that a warehouse was illegally built.22 The owner 
was not party to the case. Eventually the warehouse was made legal by way of a new 
local plan. This too was contested by other private parties, this time without success.23 
If the Supreme Court had decided that the warehouse could not be given a permit 
it would have had to be demolished. If the owner in such a situation tried to contest 
such a decision by the administration – one could ask if the owner would have access 
to a fair trial. 
3.3 The Ombudsman 
Anyone may make a complaint to the Ombudsman (Folketingets Ombudsmand) as 
long as the complaint is not anonymous. On the other hand, the Ombudsman is not 
obliged to review the complaint – he may refuse entirely or just review aspects of the 
complaint.24 
The Ombudsman’s competence does not include all parts of the public administra­
tion: certain tribunals fall outside his competence, some because they decide conflicts
between citizens (e.g. rent tribunals) or are similar to courts (e.g. tribunals deciding
compensation for expropriation). However, the majority of the public administra­
tion fall within the Ombudsman’s competence.25 Since the Ombudsman’s compe­
tence does not include the courts, he will not review cases that are or are about to be
brought before the courts. Also since he is a parliamentary Ombudsman he will not
review cases where Folketinget or a parliamentary committee has expressed an opinion. 
The Ombudsman will normally refuse to review a case if the complaint is filed more 
than a year after the administration made its decision. Also he will refuse cases where 
the citizen has access to administrative recourse.26 If a case concerns a commune or 
22 Cf. Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 2004, pp. 1849–1856. 
23 Cf. Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 2011, pp. 1712–1719. 
24 Cf. Madsen (n. 6) 468–471, Larsen (n. 6) 879–884. 
25 Cf. Madsen (n. 6) 454–464, Larsen (n. 6) 867–879. 
26 Cf. Madsen (n. 6) 469–470, Larsen (n. 6) 880–882. 
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region he will usually send the case to Statsforvaltningen before reviewing the case 
himself. 
The Ombudsman cannot make or change decisions. He may express his opinion 
and can appeal to the administration, e.g. that it reconsiders changing its decision. 
He may also criticise the administration. Almost always the administration follows an 
appeal from the Ombudsman. If not he may appeal to the ‘free process’ authorities 
to give free process, i.e. the state pays the legal expenses of a court case if the citizen 
wishes to pursue the matter at the courts. Such an appeal has hitherto always been 
complied with and it is very hard to imagine this will change.27 
3.4 Procedural rights – an overview 
The citizens’ procedural rights are mainly governed by the Public Administration Act
(PAA). It is supplemented by unwritten law that in some respects provides further
rights especially as to the extent the citizen must be heard on the authorities’ initiative. 
A citizen has the right to use representatives, but the use of counsel or representatives
must be paid for by the citizen himself. In some select areas of the law e.g. concerning
taxes and expropriation the law provides for total or partial reimbursement. 
The PAA provides a citizen with a significant and individual interest in a decision (cf.
para 3.1.2.) and a right to access the documents of the case. The general rule is that a
citizen may access all the documents of the case. The most important exception (prob­
ably) is that the right to access does not include internal documents i.e. documents that
have not been made available to anyone outside the authority (except for certain legal
reasons). Also certain external documents are exempted from access. If there is factual
information of importance in such documents, this information must however normally
be made available. There are also other exceptions to the right to access. For instance,
there is generally no access to criminal cases under the PAA (this is governed by the
Administration of Justice Act, i.e. the procedural law of the courts). Also information may
be exempted due to significant public or private interests but the right to access must be
given considerable weight in balancing these interests. A decision whether to give access
or not to the documents of a case is a decision in itself meaning that it gives rise to the
same rights regarding complaint, reasoning, etc. as any other decision. Even if the citizen
does not have an actual legal right to access a certain document or piece of information
the authority is obliged – on its own initiative – to consider if it should give access anyway
(unless it would be a breach of the rules of confidentiality or the rules on processing of
personal data). This includes giving reasons if such voluntary access is refused. 
According to the PAA, citizens must be heard before a decision is made in the fol­
lowing situation: if a citizen with a significant and individual interest is unaware of 
information relating to facts or external professional assessments the authority must 
make the information or the assessments available to the citizen for comment before 
a decision is made. This however only applies if the information or the assessments 
are unfavourable to the citizen and of substantial importance for the decision in ques­
tion. There are a number of specific exceptions to this rule, for instance if the citizen 
does not have the right to access to the information. According to unwritten prin­
ciples of contradiction in some cases the right to be heard is more comprehensive, 
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but as a general rule the obligation to take steps to hear the citizen does not include 
opinions about how a case should be decided or legal matters, e.g. the interpretation 
of the law, only matters relating to the facts of the case. However, the citizen may at 
his own initiative make a statement which may relate to facts, the law or just state his 
opinion. The administration is normally obliged to postpone making a decision until 
the citizen has had time to make a statement (the administration may set a time limit 
and in some cases refuse to postpone the decision making, for instance if the law has 
set a time limit for the administration to make the decision). 
The right to access documents and to make a statement should be seen in connec­
tion with the right to demand a decision be postponed until access to the documents 
of the case has been given (decided). 
According to the PAA, a written decision must be accompanied by reasons, unless it 
is entirely in favour of the citizen. If the citizen is informed orally of such a decision, 
the citizen may within 14 days’ demand reasons be given. The reasoning must include 
the legal grounds for the decision (e.g. the relevant paragraphs and sections of the 
law according to which the decision is made) and if necessary also a brief account 
of the facts of the case of substantial importance. If the decision is discretionary the 
main considerations must also be made clear. 
As stated above, information must also in some situations be given about adminis­
trative recourse and the access to the courts. 
4 Institutional perspective 
4.1 Administrative recourse 
As it was discussed above, administrative recourse institutions include both govern­
mental (state) administrative authorities and tribunals. This varies from law to law 
and there is no general rule. There has however been a tendency towards a system 
where appeals can be made to one level of administrative recourse in the form of 
an independent tribunal (nævn). There are many different nævn and thus nævn are 
generally speaking specialised and usually more so than compared to a ministry. Also 
nævn are normally free of political influence (as opposed to a ministry) though there 
are political members of some nævn and the members are appointed by politicians. 
It must be noted that political motives often are not legal and abuse of power in 
terms of making decisions based on political views rather than the law is quite rare. 
In many cases the chairman must be a judge or at least a lawyer in order to ensure 
the legality of the decisions made by the tribunal, whereas other members provide 
other kinds of expertise depending on what matters are decided by the board. For 
example, Taksationsmyndigheden (Valuation Board), which has as its sole task to decide 
on damages claimed by neighbours to windmills, consists of a lawyer who fulfils the 
conditions for being appointed a judge and a real estate agent, the lawyer acting as 
chairman. In every kommune there is a committee on children and young people (Børn 
og unge-udvalg) which amongst other things decides on the forced removal of children 
from their home. The committee consists of a municipal judge (as chairman), two 
members from the council of the kommune, and two members who have knowledge of 
a pedagogical-psychological nature. 
Common to all recourse institutions is that they are part of the administration and 
therefore subject to the rules of general administrative law including the PIA and 
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the PAA. It is a general principle of Danish administrative law that the administra­
tive authority must examine all aspects of a case on its own initiative before making 
a decision. This means that a recourse authority by itself must examine the law, the 
facts and the relevant considerations of a case regardless of the issues mentioned in 
a complaint.28 
Unless the law states otherwise the review includes discretionary matters. Often 
the law reduces the review to legal matters (which includes review of the facts of the 
case). Where application of the law relies on discretion in the sense that the law leaves 
it open to the administration whether a certain decision should be made only mat­
ters of law can be reviewed – if no rule is broken, then the decision must stand, and 
if a rule is broken, usually the decision can only be quashed and if relevant referred 
back to the administration, not changed by the recourse authority. However, if the 
application of the law relies on discretion in the sense that the law uses vague terms, 
e.g. whether a building project is ‘large’, this is considered a legal matter and can be 
reviewed. Sometimes the recourse authority may give the administration a margin of 
appreciation in such instances, especially if knowledge of the local situation is better 
determined by the local administration.29 
Review always includes determining what the facts of a case are.30 It also includes 
the interpretation of the law and the application of the law in the specific case (cf. 
above). The law is not only the written law but also general principles of administra­
tive law: the principles of equality, proportionality, legitimate expectations and the 
duty to make a decision based on discretion in each case where the law gives the 
administration discretion to name the most important principles that are not related 
to procedure. As to procedural rules both the decision’s compliance with written and 
unwritten rules are reviewed. 
Generally speaking, the recourse authority can react in the following ways: if the 
complaint does not meet formal requirements, it may dismiss the complaint. It may 
uphold the decision. It may quash a decision – and if relevant can refer it back to the 
administration, if deemed necessary with guidelines. It may also change a decision, 
but as stated above there may be limitations as to discretionary decisions.31 
It should be noted, that often the recourse authority may change the decision to 
what it considers to be the right decision, even if it is unfavourable to the citizen who 
has complained. Sometimes the law specifies that the citizen should be heard first in 
such cases – perhaps it is a general rule – and in some cases the citizen can actually 
revoke his complaint.32 
4.2 The courts 
As stated previously, there are no administrative courts, but only a few specialised
courts in Denmark. The Danish Courts include the Supreme Court, two high courts,
and 24 district courts as well as courts of the Faroe Islands and Greenland. These
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courts handle both criminal cases and civil cases, including both cases where citi­
zens contest administrative decisions and/or claim damages from the administra­
tion. Also there is a Maritime and Commercial Court, a Land Registration Court,
and the Special Court of Indictment and Revision. The Maritime and Commercial
Court has only a few administrative law cases. The Land Registration Court actually
is a special form of administration (that traditionally has been performed at the
courts). The Special Court of Indictment and Revision has administrative law cases
since a judge normally can only be fired by this court, but otherwise it has little to
do with administrative law. The Appeals Permission Board has to be also mentioned,
which is neither part of the administration, nor is it a court. This board is a special
organ to which only some rules of administrative law are not applied. Its chairman
is a Supreme Court judge. The board decides mainly on allowing certain types of
court appeals which are not available without permission, e.g. the right to appeal to
the Supreme Court as a third instance, and as an appeal board regarding decisions
concerning legal aid made by The Department of Civil Affairs under the Ministry
of Justice. 
According to Grundloven, ‘the courts are entitled to review any question regarding 
the boundaries of the administration’. What those boundaries are, the Constitution 
does not say. It was left for the courts to determine this. From 1849 to 1922, review 
developed from just deciding whether a matter was for the courts or the public admin­
istration to decide to examine the legality of administrative acts. However, there was 
no judicial review of the use of discretion, and only a little case law concerning pro­
cedural requirements. From the 1920s the courts developed a new approach that 
the use of discretion should respect the principles of lawful considerations/interest, 
equality and proportionality.33 
Today, judicial review of administrative acts goes as far as to check whether the
relevant considerations or interests have been taken into account, but normally not
to review the balancing of the lawful considerations or interests as long as the out­
come is within the limits of the principle of proportionality and not contrary to the
principles of equality and legitimate expectations. For instance, the courts will not
decide how to balance the conflicting interest of the environment against the inter­
est of a land owner when the administration has decided to issue or not to issue a
permit to build a house outside the city zones. This is a matter for discretion. But the
courts will check that all relevant considerations have been made. If a permission is
not granted, and this is contrary to previous similar cases, the courts may (and will
normally) decide that the owner is entitled to a permit. Also if a permit has been
given and the administrative authority wishes to change that decision the courts
will decide if the owner has legitimate expectations and if so whether revocation is
possible. 
Judicial review may possibly extend to the investigation whether the outcome is mani­
festly unreasonable or unfair. The courts will also review whether there is an obligation
to use discretion in each case (as opposed to the administration setting up and follow­
ing strict rules by its own accord), i.e. whether fettering discretion is prohibited (which
33 Cf. Jørgen Mathiassen, Jens Garde et al, Forvaltningsret: Almindelige emner (2nd edn., Jurist- og Økonom­
forbundets Forlag, Cph. 1989) 321–327. 
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varies from area to area). Finally, judicial review examines the compliance with proce­
dural rules and the correct determination of the facts of the case.34 
Of course, the outcome of a judicial case depends on the claims made before the 
court. A court may always quash an illegal decision and – if relevant and claims to that 
effect have been made – refer it back to the decision making administrative body. If a 
case concerns a decision that does not rely on discretion, the courts can change the 
decision in favour of either party depending on their claim. For instance, in a case 
concerning the right to a tax deduction that a citizen has been denied, the court may 
conclude that the relevant administrative organ must acknowledge that the citizen is 
entitled to the deduction (and it therefore must change its tax decision). If a decision 
relies on the use of discretion as a general rule the courts will not balance the involved 
interests – this is left to the discretion of the administrative body. Thus with regard to 
a discretionary decision where some error has been made – e.g. the citizen was not 
heard or an illegal interest has been taken into account – or the administrative body 
has misunderstood the facts of the case – the decision may be quashed and if relevant 
be referred back to it, but the courts will not change it. However, there are exceptions 
to this. If the competent administrative body has replaced its discretion with rules of 
its own (by way of a circular or an administrative practice) whereby it decides cases of 
the involved type, the courts may decide the case by applying those rules.35 
4.3 The Ombudsman 
As stated in para 3.3 above the Ombudsman is not obliged to review the complaint
and may choose just to review aspects of the complaint. The Ombudsman’s compe­
tence is as a general rule limited to legal matters, see para 4.1 above for an expla­
nation of what this includes. However, he may also as an exception to the general
rule – and this is a special ground for review that (normally) is only available to the
Ombudsman – review accordance with ‘good administrative practise’. This is a spe­
cial set of norms that includes making decisions within a reasonable time (though
in a lawsuit for damages this may also be the basis for a case at the courts), speak­
ing politely to citizens, giving reasons even though it is not required by law, making
notes, etc.36 
In regards to the kommunerne (communes), it is stressed in the Ombudsman Act 
that he should respect the conditions of local government, i.e. refrain from reviewing 
discretionary decisions, even though he cannot review discretionary decisions anyway. 
Even though the Ombudsman is not part of the administration, he generally follows 
rules similar to those that apply to the administrative bodies.37 
The Ombudsman cannot change a decision, only express his opinion, appeal to 
the administration, e.g. to reconsider its decision, and criticise the administration. In 
practise this is just as effective as being able to change a decision.38 As stated above 
34 Cf. Revsbech (n. 9) 385–423, Jon Andersen, Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen et al, Forvaltningsret (2nd edn., 
Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, Cph. 2002) 819–847. 
35 Cf. Revsbech (n. 9) 423–448, Andersen (n. 34) 847–862. 
36 Cf. Madsen (n. 6) 475–488, Larsen (n. 6) 892–905. 
37 Cf. Madsen (n. 6) 473–475, Larsen (n. 6) 885–892. 
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the administration in almost all cases follows the Ombudsman – even if perhaps the 
administration might not actually agree. 
5 European perspectives 
European Union law and the European Convention of Human Rights have so far had
almost no influence on effective legal protection in administrative law in general.
Nevertheless, in specific areas both EU law and international law prescribe specific
provisions that influence the rights of citizens but it only pertains to those specific
areas.39 An exception is the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. This has influ­
enced administrative procedures in general. However as to actually improving the
effective legal protection of citizens I think it has mattered relatively little. Mostly it
does not hinder authorities from handling data the way they would otherwise be able
to, and it does not in most cases give rights to access to information that the citizen
was not entitled to according to national rules on access to information. It does how­
ever mean that citizens are informed of administrative proceedings that they perhaps
otherwise would not be aware of. In many cases citizens are noticed on the proceed­
ing before an unfavourable decision is made, as various rules require their hearing,
for instance. 
This does not mean that Danish administrative law has not been influenced by 
foreign or international law. However, owing to the current, high level effective legal 
protection in Denmark, there is no strong need for borrowing new principles or 
mechanisms from outside. 
6 Conclusion 
In my view – as I stated in the opening chapter – citizens are afforded a high degree
of effective legal protection in administrative law in Denmark which exceeds the
level of protection required by international law. It explains the fact that the general
rules of Danish administrative law have not been influenced much by European
Union Law and the European Convention of Human Rights. 
It is in fact hard to see that there is a great need for further effective legal protec­
tion for citizens. I believe that perhaps the biggest problem is related to the time 
administrative proceedings take. This is however a matter of allocation of resources 
and thus in the end a political matter: how much taxes should be paid by citizens and 
how should they be spent. This is of course also the case in relation to (further) finan­
cial support of citizens’ expenditure on representatives (e.g. lawyers). Other areas 
where rights might be bettered, e.g. expanding the right to be heard on the authori­
ties’ initiative, include hearing a citizen who may be the subject of an administrative 
39 The influence of EU-law on Danish Administrative Law was the subject of Niels Fengers doctoral thesis 
Forvaltning & Fællesskab (Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, Cph. 2004). The thesis spans more than 
1000 pages and thoroughly examines the subject. An overview of the current influence of EU law on 
Danish Administrative Law is found in Niels Fenger, EU-rettens påvirkning af dansk forvaltningsret (2nd 
edn., Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, Cph. 2013) (which is only about 70 pages). 
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act about legal opinions and proposals (as opposed to merely the facts of the case) in 
all cases – this would not only demand more resources but more importantly could 
prolong administrative proceedings. This would especially cause a problem where 
there is more than one private party. The same can be said of establishing more levels 
of appeal bodies. 
The level of effective legal protection for citizens must be balanced against other 
considerations. Rights cost money and the public sector in Denmark is not likely to 
expand nor is it likely that any government will find it viable to raise the tax level. 
The demographic development and, e.g., growing healthcare expenses mean that 
the level of effective legal protection may come under pressure. There is an ongoing 
discussion of spending on ‘cold’ vs. ‘warm’ hands (i.e. administrative employees vs. 
teachers, day caretakers, doctors and nurses) and it is obvious that cold hands aren’t 
popular when prioritising and budget making in the public sector. There is a lack of 
understanding that legal protection is generally a prerequisite of getting the citizen 
the care of the ‘warm’ hands that the citizen is entitled to. Thus I think the issue today 
is not if the level of effective legal protection should be raised overall but to maintain 
the level that has been achieved over the last century. 




   















7 The principle of effective 




The principle of the rule of law, which subjects the government to the law ‘is intended 
to protect individuals against arbitrary governmental acts by constraints of substantive 
law, as well as by the introduction of regulated procedures’.1 In particular, the prin­
ciple of legality – that is to say abiding by the law – protects citizens’ freedom from 
the abuse of power of administrative bodies, providing procedural guarantees for this 
purpose. 
The term ‘effective legal protection’ is part of ‘Eurospeak’ and its inherent rights
are explicitly recognised in European administrative law. Though French law does
not explicitly enshrine the principle of ‘effective legal protection’ as such, it refers
to some tenets and mechanisms that obey its logic, most particularly in administra­
tive law. French administrative law – primarily geared towards achieving efficient
administration – is traditionally based on objective notions such as ‘public interest’
(intérêt général), ‘public service’ (service public), ‘government authorities’ (puissance
publique) or the principle of legality (principe de légalité). 
However, today it also protects individuals’ rights and interests, especially in the 
context of court proceedings. That means that the ‘applicant-citizen’ (administré­
requérant) is better protected than the ‘administered-citizen’ (administré-citoyen).2 
While for a long time the judge was confined to the role of regulating the adminis­
tration’s operations, with power to invalidate decisions taken unlawfully, he became 
a full judge – who may finally and concretely settle the disputes he is presented for 
arbitration, in a more subjective sense that trivialises public policy and the law gov­
erning it. This is a more egalitarian view of the relationship between government and 
citizens, which encourages the latter to stand up for their rights and interests. 
More generally, the concept of ‘legal protection’ refers to the subjects and objects
of this guarantee and to those who warrant them. On one hand, one has to deal with
the protection of the recipients of administrative actions.3 French law calls them
‘administered people’ (administrés), ‘users’ (usagers) or, during the court proceed­
ings, ‘litigants’ (justiciables). It may also be a matter of protection of third parties of
the case. In fact, it embraces the procedural protection of the individual rights and
1 Jürgen Schwarze, Droit administratif européen (2nd edn., Bruyland 2009) I–10. 
2 Bertrand Faure, ‘Les deux conceptions de la démocratie administrative’ (2013) 4 Revue Française de Droit 
Administratif (RFDA) 709. 
3 Cf. more particularly: Rozen Noguellou, ‘La décision administrative et son destinataire’ (2013) 4 RFDA 732. 

















      
    




interests of all affected people. On the other hand, this protection is primarily pro­
vided by judges, including administrative judges, since the French judicial system
has two branches of the ordinary courts: civil courts (juridictions judiciaires, where
private law cases are judged)4 and administrative courts (juridictions administratives
for administrative law cases).5 However, legislators remain the guarantors of free­
dom under the control of the constitutional court (Conseil constitutionnel). 
French law does not guarantee procedural rights always in an explicit or precise 
manner. The reason for this is that in the French approach, law is seen as an objective 
order aiming at effective administration. Due to the conceptual vagueness of indi­
vidual rights it is not always easy to identify and classify the relevant guarantees in a 
systemic set of standards. Nonetheless, the principles of effective remedy and fair trial 
are recognised and they include the following requirements: 
•	 the equal right of access to the administration and administrative documents; 
•	 the principle of sound administration and administrative transparency; 
•	 the right to the reasoning of the judgment and the obligation of administrative 
bodies to justify their decisions; 
•	 the principle of equality of arms between parties in the adversarial administrative 
proceeding; 
•	 the right to defence; 
•	 the right to be heard; 
•	 the right to remedy, and the access to courts, where independent and impartial 
judges decide the case in reasonable time. 
1 Historical developments 
The intention to remove public acts from courts – called ‘parliaments’ in the ancien 
régime –6 dates back to 1641 and 1661 when the Edicts of Saint-Germain and of Fon­
tainebleau were adopted, long before Montesquieu and his theory of the separation 
of powers. Later, courts opposed any reform at the end of the ancien régime, and so 
the Judicature Act of 1790 (loi d’organisation judiciaire) prohibited any intervention 
by courts in the cases before the public administration. The Conseil d’État (Council of 
State) was created in 1799 as a government advisory body7 to decide on administra­
tive appeals. The statute of 24 May 1872 and a judgment of 18898 established general 
jurisdiction for administrative judges to annul administrative acts. However, not this 
ruling of the Conseil d’État but a decision of the Court of Disputes (Tribunal des conflits)
4 Title VIII of the Constitution uses the expression ‘judicial authority’ (autorité judiciaire), because the 
1958 constituent didn’t want to give much power to the judges. The Cour de cassation is the Supreme 
Civil Court. 
5 The Council of State – Conseil d’État (CE) – is the Supreme Administrative Court. The administrative 
tribunals – Tribunaux administratifs (TA) – are the first instance courts and the administrative courts of 
appeal – Cours administratives d’appel (CAA) – the courts of appeal. 
6 In France the so-called ‘parliaments’ (parlements) were the superior judicial courts before the 1789 
French Revolution. 
7 Cf. for example Arlette Lebigre, La justice du Roi, la vie judiciaire dans l’ancienne France (Albin Michel 
1995) 48 et seq. 
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led to the creation of an independent administrative law. This was the Blanco case in 
1873.9 The Tribunal des conflits stated that the liability of the state must be assessed 
according to ‘special rules that vary according to the needs of the [public] service 
and the requirement to balance state’s rights with private rights’, rather than to the 
principles of the Civil Code (Code civil). On this basis, the Conseil d’État has developed 
special rules of administrative law. Most importantly, it has created the ‘general prin­
ciples of law’ (principes généraux du droit) for protecting citizens’ rights, such as the 
rights of the defense, the right to be heard by the administrative bodies and the courts 
or the principle of sound administration. 
French administrative law is thus essentially based on case law which creates some 
problems for accessibility to the law. That is why France has just undertaken to leg­
islate and codify for the past 40 years.10 Concerning citizens’ procedural protection, 
the statutes on the protection of personal data,11 the right to access to administrative 
documents,12 on public and private archives,13 the law requiring the administrative 
bodies to duly justify their acts (particularly those that restrict the exercise of freedom, 
impose a sanction or refuse a permit),14 the decree concerning relations between the 
public administration and users,15 the statute on citizens’ rights in their relations with 
public administration (droits des citoyens dans leurs relations avec les administrations),16 
and the statute on the simplification of these relations17 can be mentioned. Now, even 
if France is not yet provided with a general statute on administrative procedures, the 
procedural rights are granted to citizens who are considered as ‘users’ of the adminis­
tration. They can enjoy these rights before the courts, particularly the administrative 
ones. The Code of Administrative Justice (Code de justice administrative, CJA), which 
replaced on 1 January 200118 the former regulation,19 comprises the bulk of written 
judicial administrative procedure provisions. 
2 Constitutional framework 
The constitutional court (Conseil constitutionnel) was created by the 4 October 1958 
Constitution to ensure the smooth functioning of the streamlined parliamentary sys­
tem, keeping the legislature in its own jurisdiction. But the Conseil constitutionnel went 
beyond this framework in the 1970s. The 1971 decision n° 71–44 DC on freedom of 
9 Marceau Long, Prosper Weil, Guy Braibant, Pierre Delvolvé and Bruno Genevois, Les grands arrêts de la 
jurisprudence administrative (GAJA) (19th edn., Dalloz 2013) n°1. 
10 It is worth mentioning besides the principle of the secret correspondence between lawyers and their 
clients was instituted by a statute n° 71–1130 of 31 December 1971. 
11 N° 78–17 of 1978. 
12 N° 78–753 of 1978. 
13 N° 79–18 of 1979. 
14 N° 79–587 of 1979. 
15 N° 83–1025 of 1983. 
16 N° 2000–321 of 2000, including the adversarial principle and administrative transparency. 
17 N° 2013–1005 of 2013. Particularly, silence kept for two months by the Administration on request 
meant so far implied rejection of the request. From now on, this silence is worth acceptance decision. 
From now on as well, for example, an electronic referral to the Administration is possible. 
18 Ordinance n° 2000–387 and decree n° 2000–389 of 2000. 
19 Code of Administrative Tribunals and Administrative Courts of Appeal (Code des Tribunaux administratifs 
et des Cours administratives d’appel) statute n° 87–1127 of 1987. 
















association (liberté d’association) turned its role as the guardian of the Executive into 
the defender of individual rights and freedoms, whose scope of reference is now 
extended to the whole body of constitutional rules (bloc de constitutionnalité).20 For this 
purpose, it was necessary to open the referral (saisine) and allow the political opposi­
tion to apply to the Conseil constitutionnel, which was achieved by the 29 October 1974 
constitutional revision.21 
The 23 July 2008 constitutional revision marks a decisive new procedural step with 
the introduction of the ‘question prioritaire de constitutionnalité’, which means ‘prior­
ity ruling on constitutionality’. The traditional constitutionality review established in 
1958 in Art. 61 para 2 is an a priori control (déclaration de conformité) by the Conseil 
constitutionnel, i.e. before the enactment of statutes. However, since the 2008 reform, 
in force since 1 March 2010, the procedure for the priority ruling on constitutionality 
(QPC decisions) allows for an already enacted legislative provision to be challenged, 
whether it ‘infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution’ (Art. 
61–1). This new procedure is clearly intended to secure citizens’ rights and freedoms. 
The Constitution of 1958 contains some basic principles like the equality before 
the law, and states that the civil courts are guardians of individual liberty (Art. 66). 
The Constitution refers to some other constitutional rules which include the Declara­
tion of human and civil rights (Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, DDHC) of 
1789, the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946 and the 2004 Charter for the Environ­
ment. Furthermore, they include the ‘fundamental principles recognized by the stat­
utes of the Republic’ (principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République) prior 
to 1946, including the rights to defence,22 the independence of the administrative 
court,23 and the competences (bloc de compétences) of administrative courts (namely the 
control of the legality of administrative decisions).24 The relevant constitutional rules 
refer also to the objectives of constitutional value (objectifs de valeur constitutionnelle)25 
such as the respect of others’ freedom,26 the accessibility and intelligibility of the law,27 
or the sound administration of justice.28 In particular, the principles of independence 
and impartiality of courts, which derive from Art. 16 of the DDHC 1789, are insepa­
rable from the exercise of judicial office. In addition, the right to effective judicial 
remedy before a court, a corollary of the right of access to a judge, is reinforced as the 
procedural safeguard of all other rights. ‘No substantial violations of the concerned 
20 Louis Favoreu, ‘Le principe de constitutionnalité, essai de définition d’après la jurisprudence du Conseil
constitutionnel’ in Marcel Waline (ed.), Recueil d’études en hommage à Charles Eisenmann (Cujas 1975) 33. 
21 Art. 61 al.2: ‘Statutes approved by Parliament may be referred to the Conseil constitutionnel, before their 
promulgation, by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National 
Assembly, the President of the Senate, [1974 revision] sixty Members of the National Assembly or sixty 
Senators.’ 
22 [1976] Conseil constitutionnel (CC) n° 76–70 DC. 
23 [1980] CC n° 80–119 DC. 
24 [1987] CC n° 86–224 DC. 
25 These ‘objectives’ are merely guidelines given for constitutional standards. 
26 [1989] CC n° 88–248 DC. 
27 [1999] CC n° 99–421 DC; [2005] CC n° 2005–514 DC. 
28 [2009] CC n° 2009–595 DC. The requirements of the reasonable time of administrative procedures can 
be attached to the principle of the sound administration of justice: Jacques Arrighi de Casanova, ‘Liti­
gants must be able to easily find a judge who must have, as much as possible, full jurisdiction’ (2014) 13 
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person’s right to exercise effective remedy before a court’ will be allowed:29 it is 
unconstitutional to deprive litigants of any opportunity to challenge through effec­
tive judicial remedy a measure infringing their rights – for example a decision on the 
request for extension of a European arrest warrant to other offenses.30 
While this ‘body of constitutional rules’ is the main source of rights and freedoms, 
the other levels of protection should not be overlooked. The Conseil constitutionnel
states that the substantial protection of rights is provided by legislative actions.31 The 
parliamentary legislation as the ‘expression of the general will’32 has long been the 
main source of law, particularly under the Third and Fourth Republics. Legislative 
power was understood as the defender of freedom (freedom of the press in 1881, 
trade union freedom in 1884, freedom of association in 1901). The current Fifth 
Republic has limited the scope of the statutory law and established the Conseil constitu­
tionnel. The development of jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel has challenged 
the omnipotence of the legislative power. Nevertheless, under Art. 34 of the Constitu­
tion, the general statutory law still sets the rules regarding ‘fundamental guarantees 
granted to citizens for the exercise of civil liberties’. 
3 Rights-based perspective 
Interested citizens must be able to make themselves heard by a judge, but also at the 
stage of the administrative procedure. However, various formal rights that protect 
private rights and interests are guaranteed more or less effectively, depending on the 
stages of administrative and judicial proceedings. 
3.1 Administrative procedures 
While the administrative bodies have ‘first privilege’ (privilège du préalable) which 
means that they may take binding decisions, and an appeal does not have suspensive 
effect to the execution of their actions, citizens must be able to defend themselves 
against them, according to the principle of sound administration including the right 
to be heard. The Conseil d’État has set a general principle of law that all administrative 
measures of some seriousness (withdrawal of an authorisation for example) must be 
taken in the context of ‘adversarial procedures’;33 that means that the applicants may 
access their files and can air their opinions prior to decisions. If the administrative 
body refuses to disclose the file, the applicant may refer to a special commission (Com­
mission d’accès aux documents administratifs), which is an independent administrative 
authority. 
The obligation to give reasons for adverse individual administrative acts – and these 
only – is required by law.34 Clear and specific reasons must be given in writing and 
contain the essential grounds relating to the situation of fact and law. The absence 
29 [1996] CC n° 96–373 DC; [2012] CC n° 2012–283 QPC.
 
30 [2013] CC n° 2013–314 QPC.
 
31 [1969] CC n° 69–66 L.
 
32 Art. 6 of the DDHC 1789.
 
33 Dame Trompier Gravier [1944] CE Section du contentieux (Sect.) n° 69751.
 
34 Statute n° 79–587 of 1979. The obligation to state reasons has been required, since the statute n° 

2012–1460 of 2012, also to normative decisions having an impact on the environment. 








or lack of motivation may be adjusted. If this is not the case, the administrative act is 
unlawful and must be annulled. 
There are two kinds of administrative appeal (recours administratif ) to protect rights 
and freedoms by requesting the public administration to reconsider the case.35 On 
the one hand, an internal appeal (recours administratif gracieux) may be addressed to 
the administrative authority that took the decision. On the other hand, a hierarchical 
appeal (recours administratif hiérarchique) may be addressed to a superior body. Internal 
or hierarchical appeals are possible within two months, provided that there is a pre­
ceding administrative decision (décision préalable). These appeals are in principle not 
mandatory before requesting a judge.36 They provide a two-month time extension for 
the applicant to apply to the courts.37 These administrative appeals enable dialogue 
between public administration and individuals. However, this dialogue is based on 
the will of the former. If the administrative body refuses to enforce statutes imposing 
procedural safeguards (access to documents, adversarial principle, etc.), individuals 
may appeal to the judge (annulment proceeding or state liability proceeding). 
3.2 Access to court 
‘The French administrative trial is primarily used to control the objective legality of 
the administration, while at the same time it also aims to actually guarantee citizens’ 
individual rights. This justifies that the appeal against an administrative decision does 
not, in principle, have suspensive effect. This also explains why the conditions of 
bringing an action are not particularly stringent and why it is possible to address nor­
mative regulations that do not affect the individual as such.38 
According to the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel, the right to access to 
the court follows from Art. 16 of the DDHC 1789.39 
The effectiveness of judicial action is largely due to the temporary preservation of 
the litigants’ interests, for as long as it is required to make a decision on the merits of 
their dispute with an administrative body. For this aim, the administrative court in the 
so-called ‘interim’ or ‘urgent’ (référé) proceedings may, since the Statute n° 2000–597 
of 2000, take special temporary measures. The major innovation of this reform is the 
petition for protection of fundamental liberties (référé-liberté): the court may order all 
measures required to safeguard a freedom that has been seriously infringed by the 
administrative body in a manner that is clearly illegal. 
According to the jurisprudence of the Conseil d’État and to the CJA, ‘annulment 
proceedings’ (contentieux de l’annulation) of illegal unilateral administrative acts − 
whether individual or normative − are to be distinguished from ‘full jurisdiction pro­
ceedings’ (contentieux de pleine juridiction). 
35 Statute n° 2000–321 of 2000. 
36 Except when a ‘mandatory preliminary administrative request’ (recours administratif préalable obligatoire:
RAPO) is required (in tax matters for example). Cf. Gweltaz Eveillard, ‘Nouvelles précisions sur le 
recours administratif préalable obligatoire’ (2013) 12 Droit administratif (DA) 52. 
37 Bansais [1881] CE, Rec. 430 (hierarchical appeal); Marchelli [1917] CE, Rec. 42 (internal appeal); M. 
Ouahrirou [2009] CE n° 322581 (both appeals). 
38 Cf. Schwarze (n. 1) 127. 
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The judicial review of administrative acts is exercised in a so-called ultra vires
action (recours pour excès de pouvoir, REP),40 where litigants request the judge to can­
cel (retroactively and erga omnes) a unilateral administrative decision for its illegality.
The original administrative decision (décision préalable) can be appealed within two
months from the ‘publication’ (of normative acts) or ‘notification’ (of individual
decisions). 
The REP is acknowledged as a ‘public interest’ action. That means that this review 
is wide open, even in the silence of the statutes, against any administrative decision.41 
But the ‘acts of government’ (actes de gouvernement) on the relationship between pub­
lic bodies or the international relations of the state and some internal measures of 
various public authorities are exempt from judicial review. 
As experience shows, the principle of legality leads the courts to monitor the com­
pliance of administrative acts with a comprehensive set of standards, including gen­
eral principles of law that can effectively protect individuals (for example, the right 
to lead a normal family life). 
Furthermore, the Conseil d’État admits the possibility of limiting the effects of ret­
roactive cancellation to avoid their ‘manifestly excessive consequences’, particularly 
with regard to ‘situations that might have occurred’.42 Henceforth, the courts may 
decide – and it is a revolution in French public law – the effects of the illegal act43 will 
be final or that cancellation will take effect at a later date. 
The administrative court may not only annul the objected administrative act, but 
may, in the ‘full jurisdiction’ (plein contentieux) litigation, substitute it with its own 
decision. In certain cases this power allows the judges to modify or replace the admin­
istrative act, whereas in cases of state’s liability or contractual litigation, the court 
may grant compensation to the applicants, may change its amount, or may restore 
the contractual situation that the administrative body has improperly terminated.44 
Since the judicial review (REP) cannot be applied against administrative contracts, 
the Conseil d’État established in a judgment of 200745 a remedy allowing unsuccessful 
competitors to obtain cancellation of the contract they have not been awarded and, 
in a judgment of 2014,46 the same remedy for third parties to a contract liable to see 
their interests harmed. 
The condition of the applicant’s locus standi (intérêt à agir) is understood in its
broadest sense by the judge.47 The judicial proceedings contain original parties (par­
ties originaires), but some other interested natural or legal persons may intervene
in the ongoing procedure. Their intervention may be voluntary or induced. Some
40 ‘A trial against an administrative act’ (un procès fait à un acte): Edouard Laferrière, Traité de la juridiction 
administrative et des recours contentieux (t. 2, 2nd edn., Berger-Levrault et Cie 1896) 560. 
41 Dame Lamotte [1950] CE Assemblée (Ass. i.e. full Court), GAJA n° 61. 
42 Association AC! et autres [2004] CE Ass, Rec. 197, GAJA n° 112. 
43 Regulatory or individual act: Sire, Vignard [2007] CE (2008) Actualité Juridique de Droit Administratif 
(AJDA) 5 638. 
44 Commune de Béziers [2011] CE, Rec. 117. 
45 Société Tropic Travaux Signalisation [2007] CE Ass., Rec. 360. 
46 Département du Tarn-et-Garonne [2014] CE Ass. n° 358994. 
47 Real injury (or at least potential injury), legitimate and sufficiently direct injury. For example, the qual­
ity of living in the local community may be deemed sufficient to have interest in bringing proceedings 
against an act of this community: Vedel et Jannot [1995] CE Ass. (1996) 3 RFDA 313. 
















third parties involved may be condemned (mise en cause) or may be obliged to guar­
antee the defendant (appel en garantie), and others who are likely to be harmed by
the upcoming judgment may enforce their rights (appel en déclaration de jugement
commun). 
The court can be seized by a simple letter, whether or not the applicant is repre­
sented by a lawyer, and electronic referral to the court is possible.48 Now, appealing 
has been subject to a registration fee as of October 2011: €35 in first instance and 
€150 on appeal.49 However, this fee may seem to thwart the right to access justice and 
the right to effective judicial remedy. Yet, the Conseil constitutionnel, in a decision n° 
2012–231/234 QPC of 2012, has ruled that there was no disproportionate interfer­
ence with the right to exercise effective remedy before a court or with rights of the 
defense. For all that, this fee was abolished in 2014, because the Minister of Justice 
deemed it unfair.50 
The court leads the judicial inquiry (instruction), but the procedure is adversarial, 
according to a general principle of law.51 Specifically, this general principle prohibits 
ruling in a case if parties have been unable to consult the various submitted pleadings 
and documents that the judge relied on. The ECtHR held that the legal opinions 
(conclusions) by the ‘consultant judge’ (commissaire du gouvernement, called rapporteur 
public since 2009, who is similar to the Advocate General before the ECJ) are to be 
included in the scope of the adversarial principle.52 The CJA was thus amended by 
the decree n° 2009–14 of 2009: ‘If the case is to be judged after the consultant judge 
has delivered his or her legal opinion, the parties or their agents are informed of the 
importance of this opinion for the case concerned, before the hearing’; according 
to the same logic, since a decree n° 2011–1950 of 2011, the parties may, after the 
consultant judge has delivered his or her legal opinion, ‘make oral observations in 
support of their written submissions’. 
The parties must adduce evidence of the facts they argue. However, the unequal 
power relationship between parties to the administrative proceedings leads to some 
relief, or even a reversal of the burden of proof. In ultra vires proceedings, the judge 
may not require the applicant to provide evidence for the facts: the judge must take 
all useful measures able to help him or her to form an own opinion, including by 
requiring the administrative body to produce any documents which allow the verifica­
tion of the applicant’s allegations.53 
The judgments of the administrative courts are normally made collectively – at least 
by three judges – but there has been a growing number of exceptions allowing a sin­
gle judge since 199554 for faster treatment of simple or minor cases. 
The composition of the court must meet the principle of impartiality, which is a 
general principle of law.55 A mere risk of bias is sufficient to consider that the prin­
48 Decree n° 2012–1437 of 2012 and order of 2013.
 
49 Decree n° 2011–1202 of 2011. Persons enjoying legal aid are exonerated from it (more than a million 

recipients in 2012). 
50 Decree n° 2013–1280 of 2013. 
51 Gate [1976] CE, Rec. 40. 
52 Kress v France (n° 39594/98) (2001), (2001) 32 Dalloz 2619. 
53 Cordière [2012] CE n° 354108. 
54 Statute n° 95–125 of 1995. 
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ciple has been violated.56 The Conseil d’État’s dualism (both counselor and judge of 
public administration) has been a problem. The Conseil d’État, and the regulatory 
authority have thus followed the ECtHR:57 a judge that has given his or her opinion 
as a counselor must withdraw (that is to say abstain from sitting) at the trial stage.58 
When the impartiality of one member of the court is at issue, parties may request his 
or her disqualification. 
Then, parties must be regularly summoned to the hearing in order to attend and 
make comments. As a principle, these hearings are open to the public (audience 
publique), although it was not held as a ‘general principle of law’ for administrative 
courts.59 
The secrecy of judicial deliberation is a guarantee of judicial independence. The 
ECtHR considered that the mere presence, even passive, of the consultant judge (com­
missaire du gouvernement) during deliberations violated the impartiality of the judg­
ment.60 Consequently, a decree of 2006 excludes the commissaire du gouvernement from 
the deliberations before administrative tribunals and administrative courts of appeal, 
but the consultant judge is maintained without taking part, before the Conseil d’État, 
unless parties request his or her exclusion, which is in line with European case law.61 
On one hand, the administrative judges’ powers are limited: in principle, they must 
decide neither infra nor ultra petita, i.e. they rule upon the totality of the request, but 
not beyond, except, for example, in all contractual matters where the courts may have 
general ultra petita powers.62 But, on the other hand, the judge and the legislature 
have created incentives and coercive measures to strengthen the judgments’ bind­
ing force, like penalty payments (statute n° 80–539 of 1980) and judicial injunctions 
(statute n° 95–125 of 1995). 
3.3 Judicial appeal 
In the Canal, Robin et Godo judgment on 1962, the Conseil d’État ruled that although 
exceptional circumstances did justify the creation of a special court (juridiction 
d’exception), they did not allow the exclusion of any judicial remedy against the court’s 
judgments. 
3.3.1 Withdrawal 
There are remedies against judgments brought before the same court (but other 
judges) for withdrawal (rétractation). Some routes of withdrawal are open to the par­
ties who were present at the proceedings: ‘application for review of sentence’ (recours 
en révision) and ‘request for rectification of factual error’ (recours en rectification d’erreur 
matérielle). Other options for withdrawal can be exercised by parties who were not 
56 Syvanise [2009] CE (2010) 1 Gazette du Palais.
 
57 Sacilor-Lormines v France (n° 65411/01) (2006), (2007) 3 RFDA 342.
 
58 What the ECtHR Admitted (UFC ‘Que Choisir?’ de Côte-d’Or v France (2009), (2009) 4 RFDA 885).
 
59 Debout [1978] CE Sect, Rec. 395.
 
60 Kress v/ France (2001), op. cit.; Martinie v/ France (2006), (2006) 4 AJDA 986.
 
61 Etienne v France (2009), (2010) 2 Droit Administratif (DA) comment 9.
 
62 Commune de Béziers [2009] CE Ass.n° 304802; Ministre de l’Intérieur [2011] CE n° 348647; Société Ophrys
 
[2011] CE n° 337349. 














present at the proceedings but whose rights are affected by the judgment and who 
are seen ‘third parties’ (tierce opposition) in the particular case. In the latter, the point 
is to ensure compliance with the adversarial principle, allowing absent parties to get 
the case re-judged by the same court. 
3.3.2 Appeal and cassation 
Appeal is the most classic remedy which allows the interested parties, in principle 
within two months of receiving notification of the first judgment, to obtain a second 
trial of the case, in law and in fact, by a higher court. The ‘devolutionary effect’ (effet 
dévolutif ) of appeal allows a complete retrial of the case.63 The appeal does not have a 
suspensive effect, but the appellant may obtain a ‘stay of execution’ (sursis à exécution) 
of the first instance judgment. However, the right to appeal is neither a constitutional 
principle, nor even a general principle of law. In practice, a number of TA judgments 
are rendered in the first and last instance and are subject only to appeal in cassa­
tion before the Conseil d’État (typically in social cases, local taxes, driving licences, 
pensions). 
Cassation is an extraordinary remedy. It is not a complete review of the case but is 
intended only to check the legal correctness of the decision of the court of first or 
second instance. This appeal may be filed (within two months) by the parties with an 
interest before the Conseil d’État against any judicial decision of last resort made by 
a general or special administrative court, even in the silence of the texts,64 but after 
filtering. It must in principle be brought by a lawyer who is authorised to appear 
before the Conseil d’État and the Cour de cassation. The cassation does not have any 
suspensive effect, but the appellant may request the court to suspend the execution of 
the objected judgment. In case of cancellation of the judgment, the Conseil d’État may 
refer the case to the trial court for a retrial, or may itself give final judgment on the 
merits, ‘when the interest of the proper administration of justice requires to do so’.65 
4 Institutional perspective 
4.1 Independent public authorities 
Currently, there are 40 public authorities66 which are independent both from the
public administration and the courts and which have different types and names.
They can be considered to be quasi-courts.67 These authorities are relatively close
63 However, the appeal court cannot worsen the appellant’s situation, in the absence of application by 
another party. 
64 D’Aillières [1947] CE Ass., GAJA. 
65 Statute n° 87–1127 of 1987. 
66 Cf. list of authorities and special statutory law for each authority, available at http://www.legifrance. 
gouv.fr/Sites/Autorites-independantes, accessed 12 July 2015. Cf. also: Sébastien Martin, ‘Les autorités 
publiques indépendantes: réflexions autour d’une nouvelle personne publique’ (2013) 1 Revue du droit 
public et de la science politique en France et à l’étranger (RDP) 53; Commission des lois du Sénat, Autorités admin­
istratives indépendantes – 2006–2014: un bilan (Patrice Gélard, Rapport d’information n° 616, 2014). 
67 Cf. in particular: Conseil d’État, Réflexions sur les autorités administratives indépendantes (Rapport public 
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to the Executive and may wield great influence in sectors sensitive to the exer­
cise of rights and freedoms, for example the public television and radio, the data
protection, or the access to administrative documents. They take individual or
even regulatory decisions. But this power is limited by the different statutes and
controlled by the Conseil constitutionnel,68 and their decisions are subject to appeal
before the Conseil d’État. Furthermore, some of these authorities may have sanction­
ing power, but they also must respect the rights of defense and the right to a fair
trial.69 Indeed, an independent authority can be described as a ‘tribunal’ within the
meaning of Art. 6–1 of the ECHR (but not in the French sense). Therefore, the
Conseil d’État requires the principle of impartiality.70 Similarly, the Conseil constitu­
tionnel confirms rampant judicialisation of these authorities,71 by subjecting them
to the principles of independence and impartiality of judges arising from Art. 16
of the DDHC 1789.72 
Independent authorities exist in various fields having different powers. The most
recent example is the establishment of the ‘High Authority for the transparency of
public life’ (Haute Autorité pour la transparence de la vie publique).73 Another recently
created institution is the ‘Defender of Rights’ (Défenseur des droits), who is the
only ‘independent constitutional authority’ (autorité constitutionnelle indépendante). 
The 2008 constitutional reform and the statute n° 2011–333 of 2011 have cre­
ated this new authority, which replaces several previous ‘independent administra­
tive authorities’.74 The Defender of Rights is appointed by the President of the
Republic75 for a six-year, non-renewable term.76 The Defender shall ensure the due
respect of individual’s rights and freedoms by the state’s administration, territo­
rial communities, public legal entities, and by bodies carrying out a public service
mission. Free referral may be made to the Defender by every person who consid­
ers any rights to have been infringed by the operation of a public service. But the
Defender may also act without referral. He or she may intervene in several fields
(public services, children’s protection, fight against discrimination, security eth­
ics), and can be assisted by third parties (collèges). The Defender has wide-ranging
powers (investigation, recommendation, injunction, mediation, referral to the
68 [1986] CC n° 86–217 DC, [1989] CC n° 88–248 DC. 
69 The full jurisdiction proceeding has applied in administrative sanctions since 2009, under the influ­
ence of the ECtHR (Gradinger v/Austria (n° 15963/90) (1995), DA 1996 n° 116): Société ATOM [2009] 
CE Ass., Rec. 26. 
70 Société Profil France [2008] CE Interim order n° 311974. 
71 Including the ‘Competition Authority’ (Autorité de la concurrence), which does not have judicial function, 
however. 
72 [2012] CC n° 2012–280 QPC (2013) 1 RFDA 144. 
73 Statutes relating to the transparency of public life n° 2013–906 and 2013–907 of 2013. 
74 The ‘Ombudsman’ (Médiateur de la République, created in 1973), the ‘Children’s Defender’ (Défenseur 
des enfants), the ‘High Authority against Discrimination and for Equality’ (Haute Autorité de lutte contre les 
discriminations et pour l’égalité) and the ‘National Commission on Security Ethics’ (Commission nationale 
de déontologie de la sécurité). 
75 After public consultation with the relevant standing committee in each assembly (National Assem­
bly and Senat). The President of the Republic may not make the appointment when the sum of
the negative votes in each committee represents at least three fifths of the votes cast by the two
committees. 
76 Dominique Baudis was the Defender of rights in principle until 2017, but he died on 10 April 2014. He 
was succeeded by Jacques Toubon on 17 July 2014. 









Conseil constitutionnel (constitutional court) 
QPC QPC 
Cour de cassation (supreme civil court) Conseil d’État (supreme 
administrative court) 
courts), and is accountable for his or her actions to the President of the Repub­
lic and to Parliament. The Defender received more than 100,000 applications in
2014.77 
4.2 National courts 
The legal protection of individuals’ rights and interests is primarily judicial. Judges 
are involved in developing standards and make it effective that rights and freedoms, 
if requested by individual application, are indeed exercised. Progress in the protec­
tion of rights is therefore largely due to the growth, expansion and deepening of the 
judge’s controls. There is real ‘judicial power’, and the principle of ‘separation of 
powers’ as well as the ‘guarantee of rights’ under Art. 16 of the DDHC 1789 prevent 
the legislator from violating the force of res judicata decisions.78 
4.2.1 The constitutional court (Conseil constitutionnel) 
The Conseil constitutionnel, which is vested with the power of constitutional review of 
statutes, uses a number of control techniques for protecting rights and freedoms. For 
example, the Court may issue ‘interpretation reservations’ (réserves d’interprétation) 
stating that the examined legislation conforms to the Constitution, but only if it is 
interpreted in a certain way. In addition, the Conseil constitutionnel uses a tool called 
the ‘threshold’ or ‘floor’ effect. This jurisprudence assumes that the legislature does 
not totally deprive ‘legislative protection’ of ‘constitutional requirements’.79 Finally, 
Art. 61–1 of the Constitution allows the repeal (abrogation) of any legislative provision, 
should it violate the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. For this rea­
son, litigants may, in all ordinary courts, invoke in their favour the unconstitutionality 
of a current statute: the matter may be referred by the Conseil d’État or by the Cour de 
cassation to the constitutional court. 
Figure 7.1	  The procedure for the priority ruling on constitutionality ( question prioritaire de 
constitutionnalité: QPC) 
77 Le Défenseur des droits, Bilan annuel d’activité 2014 (Jacques Toubon 2015). 
78 [2005] CC n° 2005–531 DC. The legislature may, however, adopt a (retrospective) ‘validating statute’ 
(loi de validation) of administrative acts yet canceled or voidable. The Conseil constitutionnel and the Con­
seil d’État, under the pressure of the ECtHR, strengthened the conditions in which this method may be 
used; in particular, the right to effective judicial remedy must be respected. 
79 Cf. [2003] CC n° 2003–485 DC and, for example, [2012] CC n° 2012–235 QPC. 
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4.2.2 The court of disputes (Tribunal des conflits) 
The Court of Disputes, created by the 1848 Constitution and an 1872 Statute, is tasked 
with resolving conflicts of jurisdiction between the two orders of ordinary courts. 
In fact, the requirement of an effective guarantee of individual rights can some­
times be met both by the administrative judge and the civil court, as stated by the 
Conseil constitutionnel in its decision n° 89–261 DC of 1989. However, the Court of 
Disputes tries to rationalise the distribution of powers between the administrative 
and civil courts. For example, the SCEA du Chéneau decision of 2011 extends the 
jurisdiction of civil courts by reducing the circumstances in which a question must 
be asked to the administrative judge (question préjudicielle). The objective of this and 
some other recent decisions is to facilitate litigants and their counsel’s task by waiv­
ing over-subtle jurisdiction distribution and driving through solutions based on the 
concept of ‘scope of competence’ (bloc de competences), more in line with the need for 
sound administration of justice and respect for European requirements about the 
time it took to hand down a judgment. 
civil courts Tribunal des conflits (disputes court) administrative courts 
Figure 7.2 The dispute-resolution procedure 
4.2.3 Administrative courts (Juridictions administratives) 
‘Resorting to the administrative judge has become common, since citizens no longer 
feel deference to an administrative body because they require of it impeccable behav­
iour and respect of fundamental rights, placed at the top of the order of social val­
ues’.80 The number of referrals to the administrative courts is thus steadily increasing, 
which has justified increasing the number of judges, which is still insufficient to cope 
with the demand for judgment within a reasonable time. In 2012, 190,000 cases were 
dealt with by first instance administrative tribunals and 29,000 by administrative courts 
of appeal (as against 117,500 and 16,000 respectively in 1999). All contentious pro­
ceedings increase, on average, by 6% yearly since 40 years.81 Now, litigants may incur
the liability of the state for negligence (faute simple) when the duration of the proce­






Figure 7.3 The system of administrative courts 
80 David Bailleul, Le procès administratif (LGDJ 2014) 15.
 
81 Jean-Marc Sauvé, ‘De nouveaux défis pour la Justice administrative de demain’ (2015) 1 Les Annonces 

De La Seine 9. 
82 Magiera [2002] CE Ass. n° 239575, Rec. 248. 










     
first instance, appeal or cassation, this delay is less than one year since 2011 (nine and 
a half months for the TA – it was 20 months in 2000).83 
Besides these administrative courts of general jurisdiction, there are also some 30 
‘specialised administrative courts’ (juridictions administratives spécialisées). These are 
independent and impartial judicial tribunals which are established by various stat­
utes. For example, the last one, the Commission for paid parking’s disputes (Commis­
sion du contentieux du stationnement payant), was created by the ordinance n° 2015–45 
of 2015, which reformed the General Local Authorities Code (Code général des collec­
tivités territoriales). 
These courts are ‘special’ because their composition is unusual (their members 
are not only professional judges, but also civil servants, elected representatives and 
experts) and their jurisdiction is limited to a special field of public sphere. They may 
have three different types of competence. Some tribunals rule on remedies again 
administrative decisions, at first and last instance (like the National Court of Asylum). 
Others may impose disciplinary sanctions (like the Budget and Finance Disciplinary 
Court), while lastly some of them may have a non-judicial function (for example, the 
Court of Auditors checks the regularity of all public accountants’ accounts). 
Even if these are special courts, they are bound by the administrative proceedings’ 
principles and are supervised by the Conseil d’État. The number of referrals to these 
specialised courts is also steadily increasing, even though almost all these courts have 
remained only little known. For example, the National Court of Asylum took more 
than 38,500 decisions in 2013,84 1,200 more than in 2012. 
4.3 Alternative dispute resolution schemes 
Mediation is an undeveloped concept in French public law,85 but the idea is spreading 
steadily. In the CJA there are only two procedures used in the powers of the admin­
istrative judge in terms of mediation: the reconciliation (conciliation) and mediation 
(médiation) in the specific case of cross-border disputes. A report prepared in 2007 
by the Ministry of Justice on Arbitration and legal persons of public law86 states that, as 
an exception, several ‘public bodies with industrial and commercial functions’ like 
the French post office or railways have the ability to resolve disputes through arbitra­
tion. In specific areas (archaeological digs or cross-border contracts for example), the 
arbitration is also authorised by the statute n° 75–596 of 1975.87 A mediator and an 
arbitrator may have similar roles in the amicable resolution of a dispute. However, the 
difference is that the former cannot impose a solution but only accompany parties 
to reach a negotiated settlement, while the second is the guarantor of a sentence or 
a compromise that parties undertake to respect. Moreover, the administrative bod­
ies are now encouraged to make greater use of transactions, for example for public 
83 Sauvé (n. 81) 9.
 
84 Cour Nationale du droit d’Asile, Rapport d’activité (2013).
 
85 The study of the Conseil d’État in 2010, entitled Developing mediation within the framework of the European 

Union (Développer la médiation dans le cadre de l’Union européenne), following the publication of the 2008 
EU Directive, aims to reflect primarily on civil and commercial litigation. 
86 Groupe de travail sur l’arbitrage, Ministère de la justice (Daniel Labetoulle 2007). 
87 Official Journal of 10 July 1975 7076. Cf. Bernard Dreyfus, ‘La médiation en droit public – Des textes à 
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works or contracts.88 Many commissions for mediation and reconciliation also exist in 
tax matters, particularly in the French districts. Or then again, the National Commis­
sion for Public Debate (Commission nationale du débat public) allows each party to share 
all of the arguments, and thus helps prevent conflicts. As for the Defender of rights, 
he or she is also meant to achieve mediation, as do government mediators and their 
local representatives, where they exist. The development of this spirit of mediation 
and dialogue can be found in many public or public interest enterprises (like French 
railways or the subway in Paris). 
5 European perspectives 
While there are reciprocal influences of European law and French administrative law, 
some of which have already been mentioned, we cannot really claim rules and princi­
ples have been harmonised. 
5.1 ECHR law 
Procedural rights are best protected by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, and the 
ECHR is the largest international source of French administrative litigation law. It 
guarantees several rights, which individuals may rely on before the French admin­
istrative court, even if the former receives those rights rather as, mostly, guarantees 
for the quality of justice itself. This is particularly the case of the right to a fair trial 
if punitive measures have been decided (Art. 6–1) and the right to effective remedy 
before a national authority (Art. 13). 
Several examples show that France yielded when it was condemned, by amending 
its legislation (for example about wiretapping89 and police custody)90 or its juris­
prudence (for example about transsexuals’ rights).91 Even the Conseil constitutionnel
operates reversal of jurisprudence, following ECtHR judgments, for example con­
cerning which civil judge is competent to impose a custodial sentence or a pretrial 
detention.92 
However, differences remain. Indeed, for the ECtHR, a ‘tribunal’ is, in the mate­
rial sense, characterised by its judicial function.93 But the Conseil d’État applies Art.6–1 
ECHR to French authorities even if they have no judicial function. For example, the 
‘Financial Markets Council’, which is an independent public authority, is not a ‘court’ 
under domestic law, but the principle of impartiality of Art. 6–1 may be a ground for 
an appeal to the Conseil d’État again the disciplinary sanctions adopted by this pub­
lic authority, because of this authority’s ‘nature, composition and competences’.94 In 
addition, solutions are sometimes contrary to each other. For example, the suspensive 
88 Prime Minister circular of 6 April 2011.
 
89 Statute n° 91–646 of 10 July 1991.
 
90 Statute n° 2011–392 of 14 April 2011.
 
91 [1992] Cour de cassation Ass n° 91–11.900.
 
92 Decision n° 2011–135/140 QPC of 2011 reversed the n° 93–326 DC decision of 1993, considering that 

only the ‘sitting judge’ (juge du siège), not the judge of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (juge du parquet or 
ministère public) can bring sufficient guarantees for the protection of individual freedoms. 
93 Demicoli v Malte (n° 13057/87) (1991). 
94 Didier [1999] CE Ass. n° 207434. 






   
   
 
   
   





appeal against refusal to accept foreigners’ political asylum is only possible within a 
very short period (48 hours), and this is in practice not compliant with the principle 
of effective remedy of Art. 13 ECHR. The Conseil d’État considers however that this 
appeal is effective.95 
5.2 EU law 
In some areas, the French administrative law and its objective nature have influenced 
the procedure of EU law. Indeed, the French ultra vires action (REP) is the model for 
action for annulment under Art. 263 TFEU. Furthermore, the EU Treaty established 
a European Ombudsman (Art. 228 TFEU), which is close to the model of the French 
Médiateur de la République (now défenseur des droits); as a matter of fact, among the six 
founding members of the European Union, France was the first to establish in 1973 
its own Ombudsman. The French consultant judge (commissaire du gouvernement, now 
rapporteur public) was also the model for the Advocate General before the ECJ96. 
There has been some resistance on the French side, however, outside the scope 
of EU law, because of the principle of the primacy of national statutory law, which 
has long prevailed. It is only from the time of the Conseil d’État Nicolo judgment of 
198997 that one can speak of a Europeanisation movement of French administrative 
law. Through European influence,98 the Conseil d’État Gardedieu judgment of 200799 
provides that if a statute infringes international commitment (treaty or agreement), 
the French State is, by that fact alone, bound to repair all damages arising from the 
breach. In the same logic, and again under external pressure,100 the Conseil d’État
admitted in 2008101 that, if the content of a judicial decision that has become final is 
vitiated by a manifest infringement of EU law conferring rights on individuals, then 
the state’s liability is engaged. 
It could also be mentioned the Conseil constitutionnel decision n° 2013–314P QPC 
of 2013 about the European arrest warrant, in which the French constitutional judge 
accepts for the first time to stay proceedings and to refer to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling concerning the transposition by French law of the 2002 Framework Decision. 
The ECJ considers that the statutory law, which precludes any suspensive remedy 
against a decision to extend a European arrest warrant to another offence,102 is not a 
necessary consequence of the European Framework Decision.103 Therefore, the statute
95 ‘Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE) [2013] CE n° 357848’ 
(2013) 29 AJDA 1696. 
96 Cf. particularly Ami Barav, ‘Le commissaire du gouvernement près le Conseil d’État français et l’avocat 
général près la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes’ (1974) 26 no4 Revue internationale de 
droit comparé (RIDC) 811.
97 Nicolo [1989] CE Ass. n° 108243, Rec. 190. 
98 Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich v Italie [1991] ECR I-05357. 
99 Gardedieu [2007] CE Ass. n° 279522 (2007) 3 AJDA 585. 
100 Case C-224/01 Köbler v Autriche [2003] ECR I-10239. 
101 Gestas [2008] CE Sect. n° 295831. 
102 It was a case of an English teacher who had come to France with one of his female pupils aged 15 
(arrest warrant for ‘child abduction’); he was extradited and then accused of ‘sexual assault on a 
minor’. 
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does not enjoy constitutional coverage of Art. 88–2 of the French Constitution104 and 
the Conseil constitutionnel considers in the decision n° 2013–314 QPC of 2013 that the 
statute was an unjustified infringement of the right to effective judicial remedy that 
derives from Art.16 of the DDHC 1789. 
Thus, the French court’s and the ECJ’s steps and the dialogue between the judges 
show a common desire to organise a complementary guarantee of rights. 
6 Conclusion 
On the whole, current French administrative law protects individuals’ procedural
rights, especially in the context of court proceedings. The courts rely on the case law
‘general principles’ and on the CJA, which governs general and special administrative
law, even if courts and specific statutes may provide some procedural differences for
special law (public procurement, urban planning, enter and stay of foreigners, tax law). 
Concerning contentious proceedings, several significant developments furthering 
individual rights’ protection can be highlighted, like the clarification of the role of 
the ‘consultant judge’ (rapporteur public) since 2006, the easy and free access to the 
courts for ultra vires action, the increased concrete powers of the courts in annulment 
litigation, the interim proceedings (particularly the référé-liberté) since 2000, and third-
parties’ protection (access to the judge, appellation again contracts since 2007). 
Concerning the non-contentious administrative procedure, the statute on citizens’ 
rights in their relations with public administration of 2000 changed the nature of rela­
tionship between administrative bodies and individuals towards partnership rather 
than a strict hierarchical relation, and the statute n° 2013–1005 of 2013 intends to 
simplify this relation and to improve the protection of the rights and interests of the 
private parties. 
However, protections for individual rights should be more increased in non­
judicial proceedings, through the adoption of a written general statute on administra­
tive procedures,105 and through reinforced alternative dispute resolution schemes in 
administrative law. Moreover, French administrative law basically has remained too 
complicated, due to the distribution of competences between civil and administrative 
courts, and to the various ‘specialised administrative courts’ and ‘independent public 
authorities’. The distinction between the use of annulment proceedings and full juris­
diction proceedings has also become less clear for litigants and their lawyers, so that 
the question arises if they should not be merged in the future.106 
104 ‘Statutes shall determine the rules relating to the European arrest warrant pursuant to acts adopted by 
the institutions on the European Union.’ 
105 The statute n°2013–1005 of 2013 authorises the Executive to adopt a ‘Code concerning the relations 
between the public and administrative bodies’ (Code des relations entre le public et les administrations). 
106 Cf. Fabrice Melleray, ‘La distinction des contentieux est-elle un archaïsme?’ (2005) 30 La Semaine 





















8 The principle of effective 
legal protection in German 
administrative law 
Diana zu Hohenlohe -Oehringen 
1 Historical developments 
The idea that public power should be limited and that the individual who is subject
to that power should have the possibility to defend himself against unjust measures
in a procedure before a court had been addressed very early in German history.
Already the Imperial Chamber Court (Reichskammergericht), founded in 1495, and
the Aulic Council (Reichshofrat), which was established in 1501, can be regarded as
institutions providing for a certain legal protection against the administration.1 Sub­
jects could sue the ruler by claiming that they were violated in one of their acquired
private rights (jura quaesita).2 Particularly, the way to the imperial courts was open in
cases of high-handed distraint and imprisonment and in cases of delay or refusal of
jurisdiction.3 
However, the imperial courts came to an end with the fall of the Holy Roman 
Empire of German Nation in 1806. In the aftermath, the general dynamic to change 
or at least to modify the existing order in the German territories, which at that time 
had not yet been unified, led to various attempts regarding the installation of a sys­
tem to review the administration.4 These attempts were influenced by two competing 
concepts. On the one hand, there was the French model of administrative justice 
according to which the best supervisor of the administration was the administration 
itself.5 On the other hand, there was the claim that there should be a clear separation 
between the administration and the supervision of the administration; the 
1 E. Schmidt-Aßmann and W. Schenk in F. Schoch, J.-P. Schneider and W. Bier (eds.), Verwaltungsgericht­
sordnung. Kommentar (C. H. Beck, loose-leaf book, state Munich April 2013) Einleitung at 71–72, 49–50. 
2 S. Schlacke, Überindividueller Rechtsschutz (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2008) 30; cf. M. Bullinger, Vertrag und 
Verwaltungsakt (Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1962) 204–219; W. Rüfner, Verwaltungsrechtsschutz in Preußen von 
1749 bis 1842 (Ludwig Röhrscheid, Bonn 1962) 23–44; idem, ‘Verwaltungsrechtsschutz im 19. Jahrhun­
dert vor Einführung der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’ (1963) 16 Die öffentliche Verwaltung 719–726, 719. 
3 A. Laufs, Die Reichskammergerichtsordnung von 1555 (Boehlau, Cologne and Vienna 1976); M. Stolleis, 
Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts (2nd edn., C. H. Beck, Munich 2013) volume 1, 135; T. Würtenberger, 
Verwaltungsprozessrecht (3rd edn., C. H. Beck, Munich 2011) 17–18. 
4 See the various contributions in H. R. Külz and R. Naumann (eds.), Staatsbürger und Staatsgewalt: Verwal­
tungsrecht und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in Geschichte und Gegenwart (C. F. Müller, Karlsruhe 1962) volume 1. 
5 H. de Pansey, De l‘autorité judiciaire en France (Théophile Barrois Père, Paris 1818) 458–460; cf. J. Poppitz,
‘Die Anfänge der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’ (1941) N. S. 33 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 158–221, 159–160
and 192–194; K.-P. Sommermann, Die deutsche Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit(2nd edn., Forschungsinstitut für 
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administration should be controlled by an independent jurisdiction. This view was 
prominently expressed in Art. X para 182 of the Constitution of St. Paul’s Church 
(Paulskirchenverfassung) of 1849, which stated that ‘[t]he administrative justice stops; 
the courts decide about all violations of the law’.6 Although the Constitution of 
St. Paul’s Church never came into effect, this provision was an important stimulus to 
turn away from exclusive inner-administrative review mechanisms and to take a path 
leading to an independent administrative jurisdiction.7 
The first (higher) administrative court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof ) was established in 
the Grand Duchy of Baden in 1863,8 which is commonly regarded as the starting 
point of administrative jurisdiction in Germany.9 After the foundation of the Ger­
man Empire in 1871, further (higher) administrative courts came into being, namely 
the Prussian Higher Administrative Court (Preußisches Oberverwaltungsgericht) in 1875. 
Besides, institutions for the self-supervision of the administration continued as first 
instance for the legal protection of the individual, particularly in the form of cham­
bers, advisory boards or committees which were organisationally and often also with 
regard to their personnel integrated into the administration.10 
The foundation of the (higher) administrative courts was accompanied by an 
intensive scholarly discussion about the function the supervision of the administra­
tion should have. According to one opinion, the supervision should serve the protec­
tion of the objective legal order. In contrast to private law, administrative law was the 
epitome of normative provisions for the execution of state authority. The correct 
application of these norms was ‘obligation and right of the authorities themselves’. 
Therefore, administration was ‘actually already jurisdiction’.11 
Administrative law was ‘an objective legal order which, even independently of
applications of parties, must be applied for the sake of the public law and well-being.
Consequently, all kind of supervision over the state administration is directed at the
same time at the protection of the general public and of the individual’. It was an
error and a civilistic petitio principii to think about each jurisdiction primarily as a
protection of subjective rights.12 The ‘German basic tendency which always loves and
works up enthusiasm for “own rights”,13 misjudges that the person involved particu­
6 Cf. J. Gliss, Die Entwicklung der deutschen Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit bis zur Bundesverwaltungsgerichtsordnung
(PhD thesis University of Frankfurt/Main 1962) 9; Schlacke (n. 2) 32; M. Sellmann, ‘Der Weg zur 
neuzeitlichen Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit – ihre Vorstufen und dogmatischen Grundlagen’ in Külz and 
Naumann (n. 4) 25–96, 80; M. Stolleis, Geschichte des öffentlichen Rechts (C. H. Beck, Munich 1992) vol­
ume 2, 117. 
7 F. Hufen, Verwaltungsprozessrecht (9th edn., C. H. Beck, Munich 2013) 26; G. Sydow, ‘Die Revolution von 
1848/49: Ursprung der modernen Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’ (2001) 92 Verwaltungsarchiv 389–404, 
397–404. 
8 Cf. M. Montag, Die Entwicklung der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit in Baden und Württemberg von 1945 bis 1960
(Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2001) 22. 
9 Cf. M. Stolleis, ‘Hundertundfünfzig Jahre Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’ (2013) 128 Deutsches Verwaltungs­
blatt 1274–1280, 1276. 
10 Hufen (n. 7) 28. 
11 R. von Gneist, ‘Ueber die rechtliche Natur, die Zuständigkeit und die Verhandlungsform der Verwal­
tungsjurisdiction’ in Ständige Deputation des Deutschen Juristentages (ed.), Verhandlungen des 12: 
Deutschen Juristentages (Comissions-Verlag, Berlin 1875) volume 3, 221–241, 232. 
12 R. von Gneist, Der Rechtsstaat und die Verwaltungsgerichte in Deutschland (2nd edn., Julius Springer, Berlin 
1879) 270–271. 
13 R. von Gneist (n. 11) 231. 
















larly supervises the administration in the public interest and was thus ‘authorised to
an imploratio officii judicis or extrajudicial appeal in the canonistic sense’.14 
In contrast, other scholars argued that the function of administrative jurisdiction 
should be the protection of subjective public rights.15 The jurisdiction had the task 
of determining whether the administrative measures violate a subjective public right 
of the individual.16 Public law could be divided into subjective and objective legal 
norms. The latter contained the order directed to the state organs to look after the 
public interest as well as provisions concerning the means and ways to reach this tar­
get. Conversely, the subjective legal norms were provisions which served the protec­
tion of the legal sphere of the individual, which have to be respected ‘as absolutely 
inviolable even vis-à-vis conflicting demands of the public interest’ and which insofar 
determined and limited the will of the public authority and of the individuals in the 
same way as private norms.17 
The southern German states, like Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria and Thuringia, fol­
lowed the model of the protection of subjective rights.18 For instance, Württemberg 
in 1876 allowed the so-called legal complaint (Rechtsbeschwerde) ‘against decisions or 
orders of the administrative authorities’, when ‘somebody, be it a single person, an 
association or a cooperation, claims that the decision or order based on considera­
tions of public law was not legally well-founded and that he [she or it] thereby was 
violated in one of his [her or its] lawful rights or was burdened with an obligation 
which he [she or it] did not owe’.19 On the other side, the northern German states 
under the practical leadership of Prussia as the biggest German state chose a solu­
tion which combined elements of an objective supervision of the administration, 
especially by allowing lawsuits of authorities and popular actions, with such of the 
protection of subjective public rights.20 However, some ‘milestone decisions’21 of the 
Prussian Higher Administrative Court22 firmly established the function of the admin­
istrative jurisdiction to protect the individual.23 For example, the Court in the so-
called Kreuzberg judgment of 1882 overruled a police ordinance generously regulating 
the construction of buildings in the neighbourhood of a certain national monument. 
It held that the discretion of the police was limited by the right of the property owners 
to erect buildings on their land and soil. The principle of the inviolability of prop­
erty had to be respected, and conflicts between the property rights of the individuals 
and the public interests had to be solved in a considerate manner.24 The judgment 
14 Ibid. 233.
 
15 O. von Sarwey, Das öffentliche Recht und die Verwaltungsrechtspflege (Verlag der H. Laupp’schen Buchhand­
lung, Tübingen 1880) 73 and 405–419. 
16 Ibid. 73. 
17 Ibid. 65. 
18 Sommermann (n. 5) 4–5. 
19 W. Kohl, Das Reichsverwaltungsgericht (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1991) 31. 
20 Schlacke (n. 2) 39. 
21 H.-C. Jasch, ‘Das Ringen um die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit. Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit als Instrument 
der Rechtsvereinheitlichung im Dritten Reich’ (2005) 38 Die Verwaltung 546–576, 546. 
22 Cf. L. Frege, ‘Der Status des Preußischen Oberverwaltungsgerichtes und die Standhaftigkeit seiner 
Rechtsprechung auf politischem Gebiet’ in Külz and Naumann (n. 4) 140–155. 
23 Cf. C. H. Ule, ‘Das Preußische Oberverwaltungsgericht in der Weimarer Republik’ (1981) 96 Deutsches 
Verwaltungsblatt 709–719. 
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revealed an aspect which moulded the development of administrative jurisdiction in 
the next decades. That was the linkage between legal protection against the adminis­
tration and material administrative law. Access to the administrative courts was given 
when a person could claim that the administration violated one of his subjective 
rights by a wrong application or non-application of legal norms which also served his 
or her individual interests.25 
In the Weimar Republic the system of individual protection by (higher) administra­
tive courts on the basis of state law continued.26 The Constitution of 1919 in its Art. 
107 simply ordered that ‘[t]here shall be administrative courts in the Reich and in 
the states, as provided by law, for the protection of individuals against ordinances and 
decrees of the administrative authorities.’ However, due to the traditional enumera­
tive principle governing the competences of the (higher) administrative courts, many 
fields of administrative action stayed outside their jurisdiction.27 In such cases, the 
individual could only claim damages with regard to the violation of an official liability 
before the civil courts.28 
In the time of National Socialism, which destroyed the validity of the constitution­
ally bound rule of law,29 it was popularly argued in literature that administrative juris­
diction had lost its justification because it was based on a liberalistic ideology and 
served the protection of subjective rights, which was not compatible with the new 
state model.30 Although the administrative courts were not abolished institutionally, 
they were de facto made functionless.31 
Particularly, the admissibility of the procedure before the administrative courts was 
subject to the disposition of the administrative authorities. Instead of contesting an 
ordinance in an administrative court procedure, the affected person had to lodge a 
complaint with the superior authority or supervisory authority. That authority could 
then, with regard to the fundamental importance or the special circumstances of the 
individual case, admit the administrative court procedure instead of the bureaucratic 
complaint procedure.32 The decision about the admissibility or inadmissibility itself 
was a discretionary decision which could not be impugned.33 
After the end of World War II, the administrative courts provisionally had to stop 
their activities.34 However, the creation of administrative courts of first instance
25 Cf. O. Bühler, Die subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte und ihr Schutz in der deutschen Verwaltungsrechtsprechung
(Kohlhammer, Berlin et al. 1914) 43–47. 
26 R. Grawert, ‘Verwaltungsrechtsschutz in der Weimarer Republik’ in H.-U. Erichsen, W. Hoppe and
A. von Mutius (eds.), Festschrift für Christian Friedrich Menger (Carl Heymanns, Cologne et al. 1985) 35–55, 46. 
27 Grawert (n. 26) 36–37. 
28 Montag (n. 8) 26; Schlacke (n. 2) 43. 
29 See M. Stolleis, ‘Die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit im Nationalsozialismus’ in Erichsen, Hoppe and von 
Mutius (n. 26) 57–80. 
30 T. Maunz, ‘Das Ende des subjektiven öffentlichen Rechts’ (1936) 96 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissen­
schaft 71–111; R. Höhn, ‘Das subjektive öffentliche Recht und der neue Staat’ (1936) 1 Deutsches Recht, 
Wochenausgabe 49–72, particularly 57. 
31 Cf. J. Muth, ‘Die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit und der Krieg’ (1939) 9 Deutsches Recht 1874–1877, 1874; 
Jasch (n. 21) 554–556; Kohl (n. 19) 440–450. 
32 J. Poppitz, Die Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit im Kriege (Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg 1941) 12; Gliss 
(n. 6) 25. 
33 Schlacke (n. 2) 47; Schmidt-Aßmann et al. (n. 1) Einleitung at 81, 54. 
34 Schmidt-Aßmann et al. (n. 1) Einleitung at 82, 55. 



















   
  
  
(Verwaltungsgerichte), which had not existed before, and the re-establishment of higher 
administrative courts (Verwaltungsgerichtshöfe/Oberverwaltungsgerichte) in the western 
occupation zones in 1945 and 1946 were among the first steps to (re)found the lib­
eral order in Germany.35 At that time, also the enumerative principle governing the 
competences of the administrative courts was abolished.36 
To reinstall the rule of law at least in the western parts of Germany, it was
regarded as an elementary precondition to grant each citizen rights which he or
she could claim before courts in case of a violation.37 Therefore, with the Basic
Law (Grundgesetz) of 1949 as the German post-war Constitution, a clear decision
was made that there should be an effective legal protection by independent courts
even against measures of the administration. The idea was, without forerunner in
the Weimar Constitution,38 particularly formulated as a basic right in Art. 19 para
4 of the Basic Law.39 
In 1952, the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) was founded.40 
The protection of subjective rights of the individual was laid down in Art. 19 of the 
Federal Administrative Court Act (Gesetz über das Bundesverwaltungsgericht),41 which 
stipulated that a lawsuit directed against an administrative act was only admissible if 
the plaintiff claims to be violated by this act in his (or her) rights.42 Furthermore, the 
Federal Administrative Court Act assigned the new Court the function of an appeal 
court. Besides, the procedural laws of the federal states remained unchanged.43 These 
laws, together with judge-made law, continued to rule the legal protection of the 
individual before the administrative courts and higher administrative courts.44 How­
ever, the various procedural laws of the federal states, which considerably differed 
from each other, were regarded as an obstacle for the effective legal enforcement of 
the subjective rights of the citizens vis-à-vis the administrative authorities. Thus, the 
demand was raised that there should be a uniform procedural law for all administra­
tive courts in the Federation.45 This demand was fulfilled by passing the Administra­
tive Court Code (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, hereinafter ACC) in 1960.46 The Code, 
which is federal law, rules the constitution of the administrative courts, the compe­
tences of and procedures before the administrative courts, the means of legal redress, 
35 Cf. Montag (n. 8) 40–74; C.-F. Menger, System des verwaltungsgerichtlichen Rechtsschutzes (Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen 1954) 3–13. 
36 Hufen (n. 7) 33. 
37 Cf. Menger (n. 35) 3–13; O. Bühler, ‘Altes und Neues über Begriff und Bedeutung der subjektiven 
öffentlichen Rechte’ in O. Bachof, M. Drath, O. Gönnenwein and E. Walz (eds.), Gedächtnisschrift für 
Walter Jellinek (Isar, Munich 1955) 269–286, 269. 
38 Montag (n. 8) 25; Schlacke (n. 2) 43. 
39 Cf. Schlacke (n. 2) 48; H. Schulze-Fielitz, in H. Dreier (ed.), Grundgesetz (3rd edn., Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen 2013) volume 1, Art. 19 IV at 1, 1793. 
40 Cf. C. H. Ule, ‘Die geschichtliche Entwicklung des verwaltungsgerichtlichen Rechtsschutzes in der 
Nachkriegszeit’ in Erichsen, Hoppe and von Mutius (eds.), (n. 26) 81–103, 92–93. 
41 Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 1952 I, 625. 
42 Cf. Bühler (n. 37) 269. 
43 Schlacke (n. 2) 48. 
44 Cf. Schmidt-Aßmann et al. (n. 1), Einleitung at 84, 55–56. 
45 Cf. C. H. Ule, ‘Für eine einheitliche Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung!’ (1950) 3 Deutsche Verwaltung 1–5, 
2–5; idem, ‘Für eine einheitliche Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung!’ (1950) 3 Deutsche Verwaltung 41–44. 
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the resumption of procedures, the costs and the enforcement of court decisions. For 
instance, Art. 42 para 2 of the ACC, similarly to Art. 19 of the Federal Administra­
tive Court Act, stipulates that, unless otherwise provided by law, the action for the 
rescission of an administrative act (Anfechtungsklage) and the action for the issue of 
an administrative act (Verpflichtungsklage) are only admissible if the plaintiff claims 
that his (or her) rights have been violated by the administrative act or its refusal or 
omission.47 
Correspondingly, Art. 113 para 1 of the ACC determines that, insofar as the admin­
istrative act is unlawful and the plaintiff’s rights have been violated thereby, the court 
rescinds the administrative act and any ruling on an objection. Art. 113 para 5 of 
the Code reads that, insofar as the rejection or omission of the administrative act 
is unlawful and the plaintiff’s rights are violated thereby, the court announces the 
obligation incumbent on the administrative authority to effect the requested act if 
the case is mature for decision. Otherwise, it hands down the obligation to notify the 
plaintiff, taking the legal view of the court into consideration. Furthermore, the ACC 
contains a series of rules concerning the procedure before the administrative courts 
which guarantee the effective legal protection of the plaintiff’s rights. Particularly, 
there are various provisions dealing with the hearing of the plaintiff in a broader 
sense. Since 2004, there is even a special legal remedy against the violation of the 
right to hearing in the administrative court procedure, the so-called hearing repri­
mand (Anhörungsrüge).48 Finally, it has to be noted that the provisions concerning 
the administrative procedure before the administrative authorities have been codi­
fied in the Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) of the Federa­
tion of 197649 and in the subsequent administrative procedure acts of the federal 
states, which followed a model draft and are even today to a large extent identical in 
their wording. The administrative procedure acts supported the development of the 
administrative procedure law from an essentially judge-made law and from a basically 
‘internal law of the administration’ to a law having external effects, with subjective 
procedural rights like the right to hearing, participation of affected persons, inspec­
tion of the files or defense against biased officials.50 
The Administrative Court Code and the administrative procedure acts are linked 
with each other.51 For instance, the objection procedure (Widerspruchsverfahren), 
which is an independent administrative procedure, is with its central aspects stipu­
lated as mere preliminary proceedings in the ACC, whereas the legal consequences of 
procedural defects are only rudimentary ruled in the administrative procedure acts. 
After all, the principle of the effective legal protection of the individual against
measures of the administrative authorities is in Germany predominantly discussed on
47 See about the drafting history W. Skouris, Verletztenklagen und Interessenklagen im Verwaltungsprozeß (Carl 
Heymanns, Cologne et al. 1979) 28–30. 
48 Cf. W. Ewer, ‘Aktuelle Neuregelungen im Verwaltungsprozessrecht’ (2007) 60 Neue Juristische Wochen­
schrift 3171–3176, 3172–3174; A. Guckelberger, ‘Die Anhörungsrüge nach § 152a VwGO n. F.’ (2005) 24 
Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 11–15; Hufen (n. 7) 36 and 622–624; W.-R. Schenke, ‘Außerordent­
liche Rechtsbehelfe im Verwaltungsprozessrecht nach Erlass des Anhörungsrügengesetzes’ (2005) 24 
Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 729–739. 
49 Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 1976 I, 1253. 
50 Hufen (n. 7) 34. 
51 Cf. H. Jochum, Verwaltungsrecht und Verwaltungsprozessrecht (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2004). 


















the level of constitutional law. On the level of statutory law, there exist a set of special
rules which concretise this principle. Thus, effective legal protection is generally a
question of the correct interpretation and application of the existing legal norms in
the ACC and in the administrative procedure acts of the Federation and of the federal
states. Problems which might result from any opinion held in jurisprudence or legal
literature that certain provisions of statutory law are deficit have to be solved in accord­
ance with the provisions of the Constitution. Furthermore, supranational provisions
and jurisprudence can sometimes require amendments in national statutory law. 
2 Constitutional framework 
Art. 19 para 4 of the Basic Law reads that should any person be violated in his (or 
her) rights by public authority, he (or she) may have recourse to the courts. This 
provision does not only mean that the individual has a general right to sue before a 
court in case of a possible violation of his (or her) subjective rights by administrative 
measures. Rather, it also contains requirements with regard to the way in which the 
access to the courts is to be granted.52 
According to the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas­
sungsgericht), this access must be effective (effektiv).53 In other words, the individual 
has a right to an actually effective (wirksam; having considerable effects), quick and 
comprehensive supervision.54 However, this stipulation should not be understood as 
a guarantee for a maximum amount of legal protection.55 Instead, it predominantly 
focuses on the target to secure that a violation of subjective rights can be cancelled or 
at least identified as such on time.56 
The principle of effective legal protection guarantees that procedural requirements 
and their practical application do not constitute inadequately high obstacles for the 
access to the courts.57 Such obstacles might, for example, be linked with obligatory 
preliminary proceedings or they might consist in preclusion norms,58 although the 
52 Schlacke (n. 2) 59; Schulze-Fielitz (n. 39), Art. 19 IV at 80, 1831.
 
53 H. D. Jarass, in H. D. Jarass and B. Pieroth, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (13th edn., 

C. H. Beck, Munich 2014), Art. 19 at 50, 487. 
54 See Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 35, 263–280, 274; 37, 
150–154, 153; 46, 166–185, 178; 49, 329–343, 341; 53, 115,127–128; 65, 1–71, 70; 77, 275–287, 284; 101, 
106–132, 122–123; 101, 397–410, 407; 104, 220–238, 231; 107, 299–339, 337; P. Wilfinger, Das Gebot effek­
tiven Rechtsschutzes in Grundgesetz und Europäischer Menschenrechtskonvention (Peter Lang, Frankfurt am 
Main et al. 1995) 8–14. Critical with regard to the notion of effectiveness in this context M. Kaufmann, 
Untersuchungsgrundsatz und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2002) 244–253. 
55 Schulze-Fielitz (n. 39), Art. 19 IV at 81, 1831. 
56 M. Sachs, in idem (ed.), Grundgesetz (7th edn., C. H. Beck, Munich 2014), Art. 19 at 143, 792–793; 
Schlacke (n. 2) 59; Sommermann (n. 5) 16–17. 
57 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 53, 115,127–128; 60, 253–305, 
269; 77, 275–287, 284; 85, 337–353, 345–350; 88, 118, 124–125; 118, 1–28, 23; Federal Constitutional 
Court (Chamber) (2007) 60 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3117–3118, 3118; (2008) 27 Neue Zeitschrift für 
Verwaltungsrecht 772–775, 773; Sachs (n. 56), Art. 19 at 140, 792 and Art. 20 at 162, 855; E. Schmidt-
Jortzig, ‘Effektiver Rechtsschutz als Kernstück des Rechtsstaatsprinzips nach dem Grundgesetz’ (1994) 
47 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2569–2573, 2572–2573. 
58 Schlacke (n. 2) 59; Schulze-Fielitz (n. 39), Art. 19 IV at 99, 1840–1841; cf. H.-J. Papier, ‘Einwendun­
gen Dritter in Verwaltungsverfahren’ (1980) 33 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 313–321, 318–320; R.
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Federal Constitutional Court and the Federal Administrative Court in several deci­
sions held that it is in principle in accordance with the Constitution when certain 
objections which could have been made, but had not been made in the administra­
tive procedure, are likewise not taken into consideration in the court procedure.59 
Against this background, the principle of effective legal protection can have advance 
effects on the administrative procedure which precedes the control by the adminis­
trative courts.60 Besides, it can have advance effects on the administrative procedure 
with regard to securing the effectiveness of the judicial review. For instance, it can be 
necessary that reasons are given for the measure which is to be controlled61 or that 
the (course of) action of the administrative authority is documented.62 Furthermore, 
the principle of effective legal protection orders that there must be a legal protec­
tion within reasonable time.63 The administrative court procedures must not take 
inappropriately long; a legal protection which comes too late does not adequately 
take into account the protected interests of the bearer of the subjective rights which 
are affected by the administrative measure.64 Correspondingly, the individual has the 
Verwaltungsrechtsschutz’ (1979) 32 Die öffentliche Verwaltung 497–502, 499–502; C. H. Ule, ‘Zur rech­
tlichen Bedeutung von Ausschlußfristen im Verwaltungsverfahren für den Verwaltungsprozeß’ (1979)
34 Betriebs-Berater 1009–1013, 1011–1013; W. Erbguth, ‘Zur verfassungsrechtlichen (Un-)Zulässigkeit
der materiellen Einwenderpräklusion im Planfeststellungsrecht’ in W. Erbguth, F. Müller and V. Neu­
mann (eds.), Gedächtnisschrift für Bernd Jeand’Heur (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1999) 391–402; M.
Niedzwicki, Präklusionsvorschriften des öffentlichen Rechts im Spannungsfeld zwischen Verfahrensbeschleunigung,
Einzelfallgerechtigkeit und Rechtsstaatlichkeit (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2007) 152–166 and 176–211;
M. Kaltenborn, Streitvermeidung und Streitbeilegung im Verwaltungsrecht (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2007) 306–315. 
59 See Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 61, 82–118, 109–118; Fed­
eral Constitutional Court (Chamber) (2000) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 546–548, 547; Federal 
Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 104, 337–347, 341. 
60 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 61, 82–118, 110; 101, 106–132, 
123; 109, 279–382, 364; 116, 135–163, 156; 118, 168–211, 207; 128, 282–322, 313; D. Lorenz, Der Rechts­
schutz des Bürgers und die Rechtsweggarantie (C. H. Beck, Munich 1973) 178–182; Jarass and Pieroth (n. 53),
Art. 19 at 72, 494–495; Kaltenborn (n. 58) 295–315; Schulze-Fielitz (n. 39), Art. 19 IV at 87, 1834. 
61 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 6, 32–45, 44–45; 40, 276–286, 
286; 103, 142–164, 160–161; 118, 168–211, 208; cf. U. Kischel, Die Begründung (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 
2003) 87–88; Kaltenborn (n. 58) 298–306. 
62 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 65, 1–71, 70; 103, 142–164, 159–160;
109, 279–382, 333; 118, 168–211, 208; 128, 282–322, 313–315; Jarass and Pieroth (n. 53), Art. 19 at 74–75,
495–496; Sachs (n. 56), Art. 19 at 143a, 793; Schulze-Fielitz (n. 39), Art. 19 IV at 88, 1834–1835. 
63 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 55, 349–370, 369; U. Ramsauer, 
in E. Denninger, W. Hoffmann-Riem, H.-P. Schneider and E. Stein (eds.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz für 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (3rd edn., Luchterhand, loose-leaf book, Neuwied and Kriftel 2002), Art. 
19 Abs. 4 at 76, 46 and 119, 71–72; Schmidt-Aßmann et al. (n. 1), Einleitung at 157, 106; Schulze-Fielitz 
(n. 39), Art. 19 IV at 111, 1845. 
64 Federal Constitutional Court, 	Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 40, 237–259, 256–257; 93, 
1–25, 13–14; Federal Constitutional Court (2014) 33 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 211–233, 217; 
Federal Constitutional Court (Chamber) (2004) 23 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 471–472; (2005) 
58 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3488–3489; Sachs (n. 56), Art. 19 at 144, 793; E. Schmidt-Aßmann, in
T. Maunz and G. Dürig, Grundgesetz (C. H. Beck, loose-leaf book, state, Munich July 2014), Art. 19 
para 4 at 262–263, 195–197; V. Schlette, Der Anspruch auf gerichtliche Entscheidung in angemessener Frist
(Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1999); K. Redeker, ‘Kann eine Untätigkeitsbeschwerde helfen?’ (2003) 
56 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 488–489; Sommermann (n. 5) 16–17; G. Britz and D. Pfeifer, ‘Rechtsbe­
helf gegen unangemessene Verfahrensdauer im Verwaltungsprozeß’ (2004) 57 Die öffentliche Verwaltung
245–250; C. Steinbeiß-Winkelmann, ‘Überlange Gerichtsverfahren – der Ruf nach dem Gesetzgeber’ 
(2007) 40 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 177–180. 
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right that he (or she) can so timely take action against possible violations of his (or 
her) rights that serious and irreparable damages are excluded as far as possible.65 
Thus, the Constitution demands that there must be a provisional legal protection 
in addition66 to the legal protection in the main proceedings in cases where with­
out such a protection serious and by other means not avoidable disadvantages would 
occur which cannot be disposed of any more later by the decision in the main pro­
ceedings.67 However, with regard to the uncertainty about the legal situation which 
still is to be clarified, decisions about an application for interim measures can be 
based on a summary examination of the prospects of success in the main proceedings 
or on a balancing of the consequences of granting or denying the applied measure.68 
The last explanation leads to a second aspect of the principle of effective legal 
protection beside the guarantee of effective access to legal protection by the courts. 
That is the guarantee of an effective judicial supervisory activity with regard to viola­
tions of subjective rights by administrative authorities. Thus, the potentially violated 
person has in principle a right to a comprehensive, which means the grounds for the 
assessment including examination of the contested measure under legal and factual 
regards.69 Conversely, the court, which decides upon its own responsibility,70 is in 
principle not bound to the factual ascertainments of the administrative authority.71 
However, the constitutionally guaranteed comprehensive legal protection does not 
exclude from the outset administrative scopes for arrangement, discretion and assess­
ment which are provided by the law.72 It is argued in literature that insofar the objec­
tive commitment of the public authority to material law and in the consequence also 
the range of the affected subjective rights of the individual experience a limitation.73 
65 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 46, 166–185, 179; 79, 69–79, 
74; Schlacke (n. 2) 60. 
66 Cf. Sachs (n. 56), Art. 19 at 146a, 795; K. Windthorst, Der verwaltungsgerichtliche einstweilige Rechtsschutz
(Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2009) 20. 
67 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 35, 263–280, 274–275; 93, 
1–25, 13–14; 94, 166–223, 216; Federal Constitutional Court (Chamber) (2001) Neue Juristische Wochen­
schrift 3770–3771; (2002) 3691–3692; (2008) 1369–1371, 1371. 
68 Cf. Federal Constitutional Court (Chamber) (2005) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 927–929, 928; 
(2004) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2297–2299, 2298–2299. 
69 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 15, 275–283, 282; 54, 277–300, 
291; 84, 366–372, 369; 85, 337–353, 345; 101, 106–132, 123; 101, 275–297, 294–295; 101, 397–410, 407; 
103, 142–164, 156; Sachs (n. 56), Art. 19 at 145, 794; Schlacke (n. 2) 60. 
70 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 96, 44–56, 51; Federal Consti­
tutional Court (Chamber) (2002) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1333–1334, 1333. 
71 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 15, 275–283, 282; 88, 40–63, 
56; Sachs (n. 56), Art. 19 at 145, 794. 
72 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 61, 82–118, 111; 84, 34–58, 
49–50; 88, 40–63, 56; 103, 142–164, 157; 113, 273–319, 310; Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidun­
gen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 120, 227–239, 231–232; Jarass and Pieroth (n. 53), Art. 19 at 69, 493; 
W.-R. Schenke, in W. Kahl, C. Waldhoff and C. Walter (eds.), Bonner Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (C. F. 
Müller, loose-leaf book, state, Heidelberg, December 2014), Art. 19 paragraph 4 at 491–590, 353–416. 
73 Sachs (n. 56), Art. 19 at 146, 795; cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas­
sungsgerichts 88, 40–63, 56 and 61; 103, 142–164, 156–157; 113, 273–319, 312–313; Federal Administra­
tive Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 120, 227–239, 231–232; (2008) Neue Zeitschrift 
für Verwaltungsrecht 220–224, 223; F. Schoch, ‘Außerrechtliche Standards des Verwaltungshandelns als 
gerichtliche Kontrollmaßstäbe’ in H.-H. Trute, T. Groß, H. C. Röhl and C. Möllers (eds.), Allgemeines 
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In any way, the criterion for judicial control is the law and particularly the subjec­
tive rights granted by the law. The dogma of the complete judicial review of the lawful
activity of the administrative authorities is restricted by the subjective public right. The
examination whether state measures are illegal does not take place in its full range
but only to the extent to which the plaintiff is possibly violated in his (or her) rights.74 
The control of the interpretation and application of objective law in the framework 
of the legal protection procedure focusing on subjective rights is thus an additional 
purpose of the controlling task of the courts. It contributes to both the protection of 
the (objective) legal order and the constitutionality and legality of the administration 
as such.75 
Finally, the principle of effective legal protection requires that the courts have suf­
ficient power with regard to their decision. A successful court procedure must in prin­
ciple be finished with a decision which is able to reach a binding nature by becoming 
final76 and which is enforceable so that the material law can be imposed or realised 
reliably.77 
It is discussed in jurisdiction and literature whether the principle of effective legal 
protection includes an obligation of the courts to give reasons for their decisions78 
and to follow maxims like the oral trial and the publicity of the proceedings.79 Fur­
thermore, the Federal Constitutional Court holds that the Constitution does not 
guarantee several instances of appeal.80 But if an appeal is provided for, the access to 
that legal means must be given consistently, as far as this is possible, and it must not 
be hindered due to irrelevant considerations.81 
3 Rights-based perspective 
Against the background of these constitutional requirements, the stipulations of the 
Administrative Court Code are almost necessarily detailed. The basic provision for 
74 E. Schmidt-Aßmann, ‘Funktionen der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’ in Erichsen, Hoppe and von Mutius 
(n. 26) 107–123, 109. 
75 Schlacke (n. 2) 61; Schmidt-Aßmann (n. 74) 109. 
76 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 60, 253–305, 269–270; 113, 
273–319, 310; Jarass and Pieroth (n. 53), Art. 19 at 50, 487. 
77 Sachs (n. 56), Art. 19 at 147, 795; H. Bauer, Gerichtsschutz als Verfassungsgarantie (Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin 1973) 102–103; E. Fechner, ‘Kostenrisiko und Rechtswegsperre – Steht der Rechtsweg offen?’ 
(1969) 24 Juristenzeitung 349–354, 350; Ramsauer (n. 63), Art. 19 Abs. 4 at 76, 47–48. 
78 Cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 40, 276–286, 286; 71,
122–137, 135–136; Federal Constitutional Court (Chamber) (2/1999) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungs­
recht, Supplement I 10–12, 11; against an obligation to give reasons in cases of decisions which cannot be 
challenged in court instances see Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsger­
ichts 50, 287–290, 289–290; 94, 166–223, 210; Federal Constitutional Court (Chamber) (2004) Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 1371–1373, 1372. 
79 Cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 103, 44–71, 63–71. 
80 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 4, 74–96, 74; 49, 329–343, 341; 
83, 24–36, 31; 87, 48–68, 61; 89, 381–398, 390; 118, 212–244, 239–240; 122, 248–281, 271; Federal 
Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 94, 279–288, 280; 120, 87–105, 93; 
131, 274–315, 285; Sachs (n. 56), Art. 19 at 120, 784; Schulze-Fielitz (n. 39), Art. 19 IV at 94, 1838. 
81 Federal Constitutional Court, 	Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 54, 277–300, 291–293; 74, 
228–236, 234; 104, 220–238, 232; 125, 104–141, 137; 122, 248–281, 271; Federal Constitutional Court 
(Chamber) (2007) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2241–2242; 3118–3120, 3119. 








    
  
the opening of recourse to legal action to the administrative courts is formulated as 
a general clause. According to the ACC, recourse to the administrative courts is avail­
able in all public law disputes of a non-constitutional nature insofar as the disputes 
are not explicitly allocated to another court by a federal statute. Public law disputes in 
the field of federal state law may also be assigned to another court by a federal state 
statute. Thus, the competencies of the administrative courts are comprehensive. Con­
sequently, there is no numerus clausus of types of lawsuits. Rather, ‘[f]or any action of 
the authorities which infringes rights of a citizen there must be an admissible type of 
lawsuit’.82 This already indicates that a possible violation of rights is essential for the 
individual standing before the administrative courts. However, the ACC does not con­
tain a universal provision for the access to the administrative courts but rules require­
ments concerning admissibility alongside the various types of lawsuits. 
3.1 Action for the rescission of an administrative act 
The prototype of lawsuit before the administrative courts is the action for the rescis­
sion of a burdensome administrative act (Anfechtungsklage), ruled in the ACC. This 
action aims at changing the law by disposing of the legal effects of the contested 
administrative act which violates the plaintiff in his (or her) rights.83 It requires the 
existence of an administrative act.84 
The administrative act (Verwaltungsakt) is legally defined in Art. 35 of the APA as an 
order, decision or other sovereign measure taken by an authority to regulate an indi­
vidual case and intended to have direct external legal effect. Moreover, the provision 
clarifies that an administrative act can also take the form of a general order (Allgemein­
verfügung) directed at a group of people defined or definable on the basis of general 
characteristics or relating to the public law aspect of an object or its use by the public 
at large. A prominent example for the second aspect is the road sign which contains 
a commandment or prohibition, particularly the no-parking sign.85 
According to the ACC, the plaintiff is allowed to bring an action for the rescission 
of the administrative act if he (or she) claims to be violated by the administrative 
act in his (or her) rights (so-called right or authorisation to sue; Klagebefugnis). This 
provision, which connects the standing with material law, has the function to exclude 
popular actions with which the plaintiff makes himself (or herself) a representative of 
public interests or of legally protected interests of third parties.86 However, the mere 
assertion of a violation of subjective rights is not sufficient. Instead, the violation must 
appear to be possible. The plaintiff is primarily authorised to sue when he (or she) 
is the direct addressee of a burdensome administrative act since such an act at least 
touches his (or her) general freedom of action, which is guaranteed in Art. 2 para 1 
of the Basic Law, if there is no special basic right applicable.87 When the plaintiff is 
not the addressee of the contested administrative act but a third party, the situation 
82 Hufen (n. 7) 200.
 
83 Cf. Ibid. 205.
 
84 Cf. W.-R. Schenke, Verwaltungsprozessrecht (13th edn., C. F. Müller, Heidelberg 2012) 62–64.
 
85 Schenke (n. 84) 70.
 
86 Hufen (n. 7) 233–234; Schenke (n. 84) 152.
 
87 N. Achterberg, ‘Die Klagebefugnis – eine entbehrliche Sachurteilsvoraussetzung?’ (1981) 96 Deutsches 
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is more complicated. The plaintiff must at first be able to claim a right in contrast 
to mere (in)conveniences, chances for purchase, economic, political or ideological 
interests or situation-related advantages of geographical or infrastructural nature.88 
Additionally, the right must be attributable as a subjective right to the plaintiff.89 
The subjectification can take place by means of a statutory protection norm 
(Schutznorm), which does not exclusively serve the public interest but contains rules 
with regard to a clearly enclosable group of beneficiaries90 and, thereby, at least also 
aims at serving the protection of the interests of the plaintiff.91 For instance, some 
provisions of building and planning law, emission protection law, nuclear energy 
law and waste disposal law also protect the interests of neighbours.92 Furthermore, 
the subjectification can result from judge-made law, like the rule of consideration 
(Rücksichtnahmegebot),93 or basic rights.94 The rule of consideration was developed 
in planning law before its provisions were interpreted as protection norms95 and it is 
in recent times extended to other fields of law, especially water law96 and historical 
monument protection law.97 
Finally, there must be, as in the case of the addressee, the possibility that the subjec­
tive right is violated by the contested administrative act.98 However, the ACC, apart 
from the general rule, allows to provide by federal law or federal state law that in 
certain cases an action is admissible although the plaintiff cannot claim that he (or 
she) himself (herself) is violated in his (or her) own rights. Such statutory exceptions, 
which provide for an objective supervision procedure, exist, for instance, in favour of 
recognised nature conservation associations and in favour of chambers of handicraft 
and of commerce.99 
Anyway, according to the ACC, a further requirement of the admissibility of the 
action for the rescission of an administrative act is in principle that the plaintiff has 
Ausbildung (Jura) 90–98, 92–93; Schenke (n. 84) 167; K. Stern and H.-J. Blanke, Verwaltungsprozessrecht in 
der Klausur (9th edn., C. H. Beck, Munich 2008) 132. 
88 Cf. Hufen (n. 7) 237–240. 
89 Ibid. 235 and 243. 
90 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 52, 122–131, 129. 
91 Schenke (n. 84) 155; cf. C. D. Classen, Die Europäisierung der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit (Mohr Siebeck,
Tübingen 1996) 40–55; J. Pietzcker, ‘Die Schutznormlehre’ in O. Depenheuer, M. Heintzen, M. Jestaedt
and P. Axer (eds.), Festschrift für Josef Isensee (C. F. Müller, Heidelberg 2007) 577–595. 
92 Cf. Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 7, 354–358, 355–356; 
Hufen (n. 7) 244–249; D. Mampel, Nachbarschutz im öffentlichen Baurecht (Verlag für die Rechts- und 
Anwaltspraxis, Herne and Berlin 1994) 50–55; M. Ruffert, Subjektive Rechte im Umweltrecht der Europäis­
chen Gemeinschaften (von Decker, Heidelberg 1996) 90–101; F. Schoch, ‘Nachbarschutz im öffentlichen 
Baurecht’ (2004) 26 Juristische Ausbildung (Jura) 317–325. 
93 See A. Decker, ‘Die Grundzüge des (bauplanungsrechtlichen) Gebots der Rücksichtnahme’ (2003) 35 
Juristische Arbeitsblätter 246–252; A. Voßkuhle/A.-K. Kaufhold, ‘Das baurechtliche Rücksichtnahmege­
bot’ (2010) 50 Juristische Schulung 497–499; U. Ramsauer, ‘Die Dogmatik der subjektiven öffentlichen 
Rechte’ (2012) 52 Juristische Schulung 769–777, 775–776. 
94 Hufen (n. 7) 243. 
95 Cf. Ibid. 249–250. 
96 Cf. M. Reinhardt, ‘Drittschutz im Wasserrecht’ (2011) 64 Die öffentliche Verwaltung 135–142. 
97 Cf. Higher Administrative Court of Hesse (Hessischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof ) (2010) 63 Die öffentliche Ver­
waltung 661. 
98 Hufen (n. 7) 235. 
99 Schenke (n. 84) 181; F. O. Kopp and W.-R. Schenke, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung: Kommentar (20th edn., 
C. H. Beck, Munich 2014), Section 42 at 180–181, 391–393. 

















unsuccessfully passed an objection procedure before the administrative authority. 
The provision reads that prior to lodging a rescissory action, the lawfulness and expe­
diency of the administrative act must be reviewed in preliminary proceedings. How­
ever, such a review is not necessary if a statute so determines, or if the administrative 
act has been handed down by a supreme federal authority or by a supreme federal 
state authority, unless a statute prescribes the review, or the remedial notice or the 
ruling on the objection contains a grievance for the first time. Thus, the plaintiff must 
initially have filed an objection against the administrative act. According to the ACC, 
the objection is to be lodged within one month after the administrative act had been 
announced to the aggrieved party, in writing or for the record of the authority which 
has carried out the administrative act. 
If the authority considers the objection to be well-founded, it remedies it and rules 
on the costs. If it does not remedy the objection, a ruling on the objection (Wider­
spruchsbescheid) is to be handed down. That ruling is issued by the next higher author­
ity unless another higher authority is determined by law, if the next higher authority 
is a federal or supreme federal state authority, the authority which has issued the 
administrative act, or in matters of self-administration the self-administration author­
ity unless otherwise determined by law. 
The rescissory action must be lodged within one month of service of the ruling on
the objection. If a ruling on an objection is not required, the action must be lodged
within one month of announcement of the administrative act. For a third party
which is not the addressee of the administrative act this period only starts running
when the ruling on the objection was also served him (or her).100 However, if he
(or she) learns about the ruling on the objection in a different way, the right to sue
can be forfeited after one year.101 If the period has expired, there is the possibility
of a restitutio in integrum on request if the plaintiff had been unable to adhere to the
deadline without fault. The action should be lodged with the administrative court
in writing but it can also be lodged at the court for the record of the clerk of the
registry. 
The action must designate the plaintiff, the defendant and the subject-matter of
what is at stake in the action. It should contain a specific motion. The facts and the evi­
dence serving as reasoning should be stated; the original or duplicate of the impugned
order and, as far as necessary, the ruling on the objection should be enclosed. 
The plaintiff may himself (herself) pursue the dispute before the administrative 
court. A legal representation is only necessary before the higher administrative court 
and the Federal Administrative Court, apart from legal aid proceedings. 
3.2 Action for the issue of an administrative act 
Similarly ruled to the admissibility of the rescissory action is that of the action for the 
issue of a favourable administrative act (Verpflichtungsklage). This action is a special 
performance action whose target is to condemn the administrative authority to pass 
a rejected or omitted administrative act. Thus, the court itself with its judgment does 
not change the law but it orders the administrative authority to do so by issuing the 
100 Federal Administrative Court (2010) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1686–1688, 1687–1688. 
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administrative act and thereby influencing the material legal situation, as far as the 
action is well-founded.102 
For the admissibility of the action for the issue of an administrative act the plaintiff
must claim that the refusal or omission of the administrative act violates his (or her)
rights. Thus, the right or authorisation to sue is not linked to the (positive) claim to the
administrative act but, as in the case of the rescissory action, to the possibility of
the violation of subjective rights.103 Accordingly, there must be a right attributable to
the plaintiff and the possibility of a violation of this right by the refusal or omission
of the administrative act. For the stage of admissibility, these requirements must not
be interpreted too narrowly and strictly. The attribution of the right to the plaintiff
must not obviously and clearly be excluded.104 The right or authorisation to sue is
easily given when the plaintiff can refer to a statutory provision which establishes a
claim right and identifies the plaintiff as a possible beneficiary.105 Furthermore, the
right or authorisation to sue can result from a basic right, particularly in its function
as an objective duty to protect (for instance life and health in Art. 2 para 2 of the Basic
Law).106 The action for the issue of an administrative act is always admissible if the
plaintiff holds a basic right which he (or she) can only make use of when the applied
permission is granted (preventive prohibition with the proviso of permission).107 In 
the case of the repressive prohibition with the proviso of dispensation the plaintiff has
at least a right to an examination whether there are the preconditions for granting
an exceptional permission.108 However, if the action for the issue of an administrative
act is not only directed at a release from a statutory prohibition but at an additional
performance, the reference to a liberal freedom is not sufficient. Rather, the possibly
violated right lies either in a statutory concretisation of such a claim right or in a
basic right position in conjunction with the equality clause (derivative participation
right).109 If the plaintiff, by means of the action for the issue of an administrative act,
in fact does not want to reach a favouring of himself (or herself) but a burden for a
third party, for example the stopping of construction works, the making of protective
conditions for activities of this person or the withdrawal of a favouring granted to this
person, this is so to speak a mirror image situation of the protection of neighbours.
Insofar, the prerequisites of the right or authorisation to sue follow the relevant rules
elaborated in the context of the rescissory action, like the protection norm theory
and the rule of consideration. Hence, the statutory basis which comes into considera­
tion for the intervention into the rights of the third party must at least also serve the
protection of the plaintiff.110 
102 Ibid. 279. 
103 Ibid. 286. 
104 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 44, 1–11, 3; (1995) Neue 
Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 478–481, 478. 
105 Hufen (n. 7) 287. 
106 Cf. D. Couzinet, ‘Die Schutznormtheorie in Zeiten des Feinstaubs’ (2008) 123 Deutsches Verwaltungs­
blatt 754–762, 760. 
107 Cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 20, 150–162, 154–155. 
108 Cf. Hufen (n. 7) 287–288; H. Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (18th edn., C. H. Beck, Munich 
2011) 227–231. 
109 Hufen (n. 7) 288. 
110 Cf. Federal Administrative Court (1998) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 395. 
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Regarding the possibility of a violation of the plaintiff’s rights, there must not be 
prerequisites which are too demanding since otherwise aspects which belong to the 
merits would be anticipated. Again at that point the evidence clause finds application 
saying that the right or authorisation to sue is only excluded when the violation of a 
right is obviously and clearly impossible according to any way of looking at the legal 
situation.111 If the plaintiff has plausibly presented his (or her) subjective claim to the 
administrative act, its refusal or omission always implies the possibility of a violation 
of his (or her) rights.112 
Before lodging the action for the issue of an administrative act, as in the case of the 
rescissory action, in principle an objection procedure must have been passed accord­
ing to a provision of the ACC, if the motion to carry out the administrative act has 
been rejected. Thus, the objection procedure is a precondition for the admissibility 
of the action directed against the refusal of an administrative act (Versagungsgegen­
klage). This is even true when the administrative authority has only partly complied 
with the application or has granted a permission whose content is modified vis-à-vis
the application.113 
The most important exception of the requirement to having passed an objection 
procedure is that of the action concerning the inactivity of the administrative author­
ity (Untätigkeitsklage). According to the ACC, the action is admissible if, with regard 
to an objection or an application to carry out an administrative act, it has not been 
decided on the merits within a suitable period without sufficient reason. 
A standard for what is a suitable period is laid down in the ACC reading that the 
action may not be lodged prior to the expiry of three months after the lodging of 
the objection or since the filing of the application to carry out the administrative act, 
unless a shorter period is required because of special circumstances of the case. After 
the period of three months has expired the action is admissible without preliminary 
proceedings. The court must decide unless the administrative authority does not itself 
claim adequate reasons why the objection has not yet been ruled on or the requested 
administrative act has not yet been carried out. However, if the administrative author­
ity can name an adequate reason for the delay, the action is not inadmissible because 
of this circumstance. Instead, the court has to suspend the proceedings until the 
expiry of a deadline set by it, which can be extended. If the objection is admitted 
within the deadline set by the court or the administrative act carried out within this 
deadline, there is no further need to legal protection (Rechtsschutzbedürfnis). There­
fore, the court must declare the main case to have been settled. 
If the application is rejected after the action has been lodged, the plaintiff can 
proceed with his (or her) action by including the negative administrative decision in 
it and forming the action to a normal action for the issue of an administrative act.114 
Entering into an objection procedure is only necessary if there had been adequate 
reasons for the delay in the sense of the ACC and if the administrative act was issued 
111 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 18, 154–157, 157; 36,
192–218, 199–200; 44, 1–11, 3. 
112 Hufen (n. 7) 289. 
113 Ibid. 290. 
114 P. Weides and R. Bertrams, ‘Die nachträgliche Verwaltungsentscheidung im Verfahren der Untätig­
keitsklage’ (1988) 7 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 673–679, 676–677; Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), 
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before the expiry of the deadline set by the court.115 In such a case the court must 
not decide before the ruling on the objection is issued or the time has expired which 
the competent authority has at its disposal to decide about the objection. Instead, the 
court again has to suspend the proceedings.116 
The period for filing the action directed against the refusal of an administrative act 
is one month starting with the announcement of the administrative act which rejects 
carrying out the administrative act applied for or with the service of the ruling on the 
objection. The action concerning the inactivity of the administrative authority can be 
lodged after the period of three months has been expired, unless there are special 
reasons for the decisiveness of a shorter period of time. Before, it is inadmissible 
because of the missing preliminary procedure, not because of a period for lodging 
the action had not been kept.117 There is no fixed time-limit for the action concerning 
the inactivity of the administrative authority but it is possible that the procedural right 
to sue becomes forfeited according to the general rules.118 
As in any case of action, the general need to legal protection is missing if the plain­
tiff could reach the wished result in an easier way, if the action is a misuse of legal 
procedures or if the right to sue is forfeited. Particularly, the action concerning the 
inactivity of the administrative authority requires that the plaintiff has applied at all 
for the favourable administrative act.119 
If the plaintiff cannot be successful with his (or her) action for the issue of an 
administrative act because a favourable good, service or so which exists only uniquely 
is already irrevocably awarded to someone else, the general need to legal protection is 
also not accepted.120 However, the former main case which was the competition com­
plaint concerning a civil servant position is meanwhile decided otherwise. The Fed­
eral Administrative Court after an advice given by the Federal Constitutional Court121 
held that also after the appointment of the competitor an action directed to a new 
administrative act regarding the allocation of the position must be admissible and the 
selection decision must be open for review.122 
3.3 General performance action 
The third type of action before the administrative courts is the general performance 
action (allgemeine Leistungsklage), which is not explicitly ruled but assumed in the 
ACC.123 The general performance action is directed to sentencing the administrative 
authority, another administrative authority or even a private person, if the plaintiff 
115 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 42, 108–115, 112; 66,
342–346, 344; (1992) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 290–295, 291; Weides and Bertrams (n. 114) 677. 
116 Schenke (n. 84) 246; Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 75 at 23, 909–910. 
117 Hufen (n. 7) 291–292. 
118 Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 76 at 2, 911–912. 
119 Federal Administrative Court (1996) Die öffentliche Verwaltung 331–333, 331. 
120 Hufen (n. 7) 292. 
121 See Federal Constitutional Court (Chamber) (2008) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 70–71. 
122 Federal Administrative Court (2011) 64 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 695–700; see also Higher Admin­
istrative Court of Lower Saxony (Niedersächsisches Oberverwaltungsgericht) (2011) 30 Neue Zeitschrift für 
Verwaltungsrecht 891–893; W.-R. Schenke, ‘Neues zur Konkurrentenklage’ (2011) 30 Neue Zeitschrift für 
Verwaltungsrecht 321–327. 
123 Schenke (n. 84) 113. 















is itself an administrative authority, to any behaviour (action, omission or tolera­
tion) which does not consist in an administrative act.124 Against this background, the 
general performance action has been called a ‘kind of “procedural multipurpose 
weapon” ’.125 
The plaintiff has the right or is authorised to lodge the general performance action 
if he (or she) can claim that he (or she) is violated in his (or her) rights by the refusal 
or omission of the behaviour. The relevant rule of the ACC is analogously applicable 
to the general performance action.126 However, as in the case of the action for the 
issue of an administrative act, there must not be placed too strict demands on the 
existence of a subjective right. Rather, the right or authorisation to sue only has to be 
denied if, according to any legal view, either the right to the performance obviously 
and clearly cannot exist or the plaintiff cannot be entitled to that right.127 
Apart from special cases ruled in civil service law,128 an objection procedure need 
not be passed and a period need not be observed. The general need to legal protec­
tion in principle follows from the plaintiff claiming to be owner of the material legal 
position in question.129 Whether the plaintiff must have filed an application at the 
administrative authority is disputed. On the one hand, it is pointed to the relation­
ship between court and administration; the latter must have had the chance to act 
before there could be any judicial review.130 On the other hand, it is argued that an 
application is only required for the action for the issue of an administrative act.131 The 
provision stipulates that in the case that the defendant has not given rise to the lodg­
ing of the action by means of his (or her) conduct, the legal costs shall be imposed 
on the plaintiff if the defendant immediately acknowledges the claim. This shows that 
the fact that the defendant has not given rise to the lodging of the action does not 
exclude the general need to legal protection. Instead, the only disadvantage which 
occurs is that the plaintiff has to bear the costs if the defendant immediately acknowl­
edges the claim.132 The general performance action, like the other actions, can be 
forfeited due to the passing of time133 or it can qualify as a misuse of legal procedures. 
3.4 General action for a declaratory judgment 
Another type of action is the general action for a declaratory judgment (allgemeine 
Feststellungsklage). The target of the general action for a declaratory judgment is the 
establishment of the existence or non-existence of a legal relationship. In this con­
text, a legal relationship is understood as the legal relations of one person toward 
124 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 31, 301–307, 303. 
125 U. Steiner, ‘Die allgemeine Leistungsklage im Verwaltungsprozeß’ (1984) 24 Juristische Schulung
853–859, 853. 
126 Hufen (n. 7) 306. 
127 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 36, 192–218, 199–200; 44, 
1–11, 3. 
128 Cf. Schenke (n. 84) 119. 
129 Federal Administrative Court (1989) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 718–722, 719. 
130 Cf. Federal Administrative Court (1978) Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 607–608, 608; Hufen (n. 7) 306;
J. Pietzcker, in Schoch, Schneider and Bier (eds.), (n. 1), Section 42 paragraph 1 at 156, 90–91. 
131 Cf. Federal Administrative Court (2002) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 97–99, 98. 
132 Schenke (n. 84) 119. 
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another person or toward an object, which result from concrete facts on the basis of 
a legal norm (of public law).134 
Since this notion is far-reaching and can catch even single claim rights or obliga­
tions, it actually includes rights and duties enshrined in an administrative act as well 
as claims to a performance or omission; in fact, any public-law dispute could be solved 
by means of a general action for a declaratory judgment. Therefore, the ACC states 
that the establishment cannot be requested insofar as the plaintiff may pursue or 
could have pursued his (or her) rights by reformatory action or performance action. 
Regardless of this subsidiarity, the general action for a declaratory judgment in prac­
tice has become a means of an incident, ‘secret supervision of statutory law’.135 The 
general action for a declaratory judgment can be used for making the claim that no 
rights and duties arise from a certain legal provision. However, the general action for 
a declaratory judgment cannot refer to the declaration of the nullity or ineffective­
ness of the provision as such but only to that of the existence or non-existence of 
rights and duties of the plaintiff in the concrete case which result from this provision.136 
The establishment of the existence or non-existence of a legal relationship can only 
be requested if the plaintiff has a justified interest in the establishment being made 
soon (Feststellungsinteresse). Thus, the binding declaration of the legal relationship 
can only be claimed under certain preconditions which have a subjective component 
and a temporal component. The reason for this stipulation is that the courts should 
not, against their function, become general information and report offices in legal 
questions.137 
The notion of the justified interest appears to be unclear and changeable. On the 
one hand, it is broader than that of the subjective right in the ACC. On the other 
hand, any interest is not sufficient. Rather, it must be an interest protected by the 
legal order. Whether such an interest is given has to be decided with regard to the 
individual case. It is important to notice that even economic, personal, cultural and 
ideal interests can be referred to if they are adequately attributable to the plaintiff 
and protected by the legal order.138 
The legally protected interest must just exist vis-à-vis the defendant139 and it must
be secured or promoted by the declaration of the court. In this context not any uncer­
tainty with regard to the legal good is sufficient. Instead, there must be a concrete
need to a clarification, for example because there is a difference of opinion between
the plaintiff and the administrative authority concerning a question which is impor­
tant for the plaintiff because he (or she) has to adjust his (or her) behaviour or his (or
her) economic dispositions to the legal situation or because he (or she) wants to avoid
134 F.-J. Peine, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (10th edn., C. F. Müller, Heidelberg 2011) 64–65; Schenke (n. 84)
123–124; W. Selb, Die verwaltungsgerichtliche Feststellungsklage (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1998) 20–45;
cf. Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 40, 323–331, 325–326. 
135 F. Hufen, ‘Von der “heimlichen Normenkontrolle” zur umfassenden Gerichtskontrolle exekutiver 
Normsetzung’ in P. Baumeister, W. Roth and J. Ruthig (eds.), Festschrift für Wolf-Rüdiger Schenke
(Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2011) 803–811, 803; Hufen (n. 7) 311. 
136 Würtenberger (n. 3) 196–197; W. Peters, ‘Zur Zulässigkeit der Feststellungsklage (§ 43 VwGO) bei 
untergesetzlichen Normen’ (1999) 18 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 506–507. 
137 Hufen (n. 7) 315. 
138 Schenke (n. 84) 191. 
139 Federal Administrative Court (1997) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3257–3259, 3257. 













approaching or threatened sanctions, particularly criminal proceedings or a penalty
notice. Furthermore, the legitimate interest is given if the administrative authority
claims that a certain behaviour was illegal but would be tolerated for a time being.140 
The temporal component requires that the legitimate interest just exists in the 
moment of the judgment and that the declaration brooks no delay. If the question is 
presently open and needs clarification, or if a deterioration or repetition is threaten­
ing in the immediate future,141 there are regularly no problems with regard to time.142 
When the concreteness of the legal relationship and the qualified need for legal 
protection with regard to the declaration have been confirmed, there is normally 
no reason to additionally refer to the right or authorisation to sue.143 The tendency 
in jurisdiction to extend the right or authorisation to sue to the general action for a 
declaratory judgment by an analogous application of Art. 42 para 2 of the ACC144 is 
problematic in its generality. There is no loophole in the law which should be closed 
by analogy, because the popular action can reliably be excluded by a consistent appli­
cation of the characteristic of the concrete legal situation and by the requirement of 
the justified interest in the establishment of the existence or non-existence of that 
situation.145 
Apart from special cases of civil service law, an objection procedure need not be 
passed before lodging a general action for a declaratory judgment. Furthermore, 
there is no period which must be observed. The action can be forfeited if the plaintiff 
inadequately delays the lodging. However, this aspect should, as a rule, have already 
been examined in the context of the interest that the establishment is made soon 
and, if necessary, been denied there.146 
3.5 Application for a review of statutory law 
The last type of action147 which should be mentioned is the application for a review 
of statutory law (Normenkontrolle). According to the ACC, the Higher Administrative 
Court adjudicates on application within the bounds of its jurisdiction on the valid­
ity of by-laws (Satzungen) issued under the provisions of the Federal Building Code 
(Baugesetzbuch) and of statutory instruments (Rechtsverordnungen) issued on the basis 
of the Federal Building Code as well as on that of other legal provisions ranking below 
the statutes of the federal state (Landesgesetz[e]), to the extent that this is provided in 
federal state law. 
The review of statutory law is the only procedure laid down in the ACC which is 
directed to an objective supervision of state activity, but, nevertheless, it at least equally 
140 Hufen (n. 7) 315–316.
 
141 Cf. Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 80, 355–373, 365.
 




144 Cf. Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 99, 64–69, 66.
 
145 F. Knöpfle, ‘Feststellungsinteresse und Klagebefugnis bei verwaltungsprozessualen Feststellungskla­
gen’ in P. Badura and R. Scholz (eds.), Festschrift für Peter Lerche (C. H. Beck, Munich 1993) 771–784; 
H.-W. Laubinger, ‘Feststellungsklage und Klagebefugnis (§ 42 Abs. 2 VwGO)’ (1991) 82 Verwaltungs­
archiv 459–495, 491–495; Schenke (n. 84) 131. 
146 Hufen (n. 7) 318. 
147 Cf. Ibid. 339. 
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in weight serves the protection of subjective rights of the applicant, if the applicant 
is not itself a public authority.148 The subjective element is particularly stressed in the 
requirement that there must be a right or authorisation to sue. Art. 47 para 2 of the 
ACC reads that applications can be made by any natural or juristic person claiming 
to have been violated by the legal provision or its application, or that he (or she/ 
it) will be violated within the foreseeable future, in his (or her/its) rights or by any 
public authority. This requirement orientates itself toward Art. 42 para 2 of the ACC, 
although for the application being successful in the merits it is, unlike in the case of 
the rescissory action or the action for the issue of an administrative act, not decisive 
whether there is in fact a violation of subjective rights of the applicant.149 Thus, it is 
necessary and sufficient that there is a legal position attributable to the applicant and 
that its violation by the legal provision or its application is possible now or within the 
foreseeable future. 
Particularly, in the case of by-laws issued under the provisions of the Federal Build­
ing Code the property owners but also the tenants and leaseholders and, because of 
their expected restriction as future owners the buyers of plots of land can be consid­
ered as applicants.150 Private concerns which ground subjective rights are any interests 
of the applicant which are worthy of protection and which are not only insignificantly 
affected. However, the ACC stipulates that the application by a natural or juristic 
person relating to a development plan or to statutes according to the Federal Build­
ing Code is inadmissible if the person lodging the application only makes objections 
which he (or she/it) did not make when the plan or the statutes were publicly avail­
able for inspection or in the consultation of the interested public or made them too 
late, but could have made them (in time), and if notice has been drawn to this legal 
consequence in the consultation. This is an important preclusion norm in the field of 
planning.151 Furthermore, the application must be lodged within one year of announce­
ment of the legal provision. This relatively short period is not unproblematic since 
in the case of legal norms defects often only become obvious a long time after their 
coming into force.152 Finally, there must be again a general need for legal protection. 
This need is missing if there is an easier way to reach the target strived for, if the law­
suit obviously cannot have success or if the application must be regarded as misuse, 
if it is forfeited or contrary to the previous activities of the applicant.153 However, the 
applicant lodging an application according to the ACC cannot be referred to the 
rescissory action against a building permission which realises the development plan, 
although the judge in that procedure incidentally examines the plan. This already 
follows the circumstance that the judgment upon the rescissory action has effects only 
inter partes, whereas the judgment in the procedure to review statutory law has effects 
erga omnes.154 
148 Cf. Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 68, 12–16, 14; 107,
215–223, 217–218. 
149 Schenke (n. 84) 306 and 315. 
150 Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 47 at 70, 533. 
151 Cf. Ibid. Section 47 at 75a, 540. 
152 J. Hüttenbrink, ‘Das Recht auf fehlerfreie Abwägung als subjektiv-öffentliches Recht i. S. der Antrags­
befugnis gemäß § 47 Abs. 2 VwGO n. F.’ (1997) 112 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1253–1258, 1253. 
153 Hufen (n. 7) 355. 
154 Cf. Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 68, 12–16, 13. 




After all, the statutory provisions of administrative court procedure allow access 
to the administrative courts if the plaintiff or applicant can claim a violation of his 
(or her) rights by the behaviour of the administration, be it an administrative act, 
another formal measure or an action, an omission or a toleration, or, in the case of 
the general action for a declaratory judgment, if the plaintiff has a justified interest 
in the establishment of the existence or non-existence of a legal relationship. Thus, 
the procedural law aims at providing a way to the administrative courts, unless special 
courts have been declared competent, in any situation where there is a possibility that 
the administration has violated the rights of a person. This corresponds with the con­
stitutional guarantee that any person who is violated in his (or her) rights by public 
authority can have recourse to a court. 
The access to the administrative courts is connected with the procedural or mate­
rial law which is decisive for the merits. The violation of the plaintiff’s or applicant’s 
rights must not appear to be excluded from the outset. Stipulations concerning peri­
ods and the necessity of an objection procedure limit the access to the administra­
tive courts under the aspects of time and preliminary supervision by administrative 
authorities themselves. 
The stipulations concerning periods serve the legal security, the legal peace and 
the efficiency of the public administration.155 Administrative measures shall become 
incontestable after a certain period of time so that they can be executed or can form 
the basis for further measures and that the beneficiaries can trust in their validity and 
make dispositions accordingly. The objection procedure has the function of a filter. 
It gives the administration the chance to review and, if it thereby finds some defects 
regarding lawfulness or expediency, to reverse or amend the decision by itself. This 
shall lighten the workload of the courts. 
The objection procedure is formed to a certain extent parallel to the possible later 
court procedure. It has no higher requirements regarding admissibility than the lat­
ter. When it is not successful, it at least prepares the factual and legal material for 
the administrative courts. Thus, it in principle supports the effective legal protection 
of the individual, if it is executed properly and brought to an end within reasonable 
time, so that the affected person can, if necessary, proceed with his (or her) lawsuit 
before the courts. 
3.6 Appeal and complaint 
Judgments of the administrative courts can be controlled by means of an appeal on 
points of fact and law (Berufung), judgments and orders of the higher administrative 
courts can be revised by means of an appeal on points of law (Revision). In individual 
cases there is the possibility of a direct appeal on points of law from the administrative 
courts to the Federal Administrative Court. Rulings of the administrative courts or of 
its members can be controlled by recourse to a complaint (Beschwerde). 
The two forms of appeal hinder the entering into formal legal force of the impugned 
court decision (suspending effect). The appeal and the complaint found in principle 
155 Cf. Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 60, 253–305, 269–270; 
State Court of Hesse (Hessischer Staatsgerichtshof ) (1982) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1381–1385, 1382; 
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the decision making power of the higher instance (devolutive effect).156 The appel­
lant or complainant must be authorised to lodge the appeal or complaint (Rechtsmit­
telberechtigung), which is the case if he (or she) took part in the court proceedings on 
the basis of which the impugned decision was made. 
An unwritten requirement for the means of legal redress is the existence of a bur­
den (Beschwer). Conversely to Art. 42 para 2 of the ACC, which requires a material 
burden, for lodging an appeal or complaint a formal burden is sufficient. The formal 
burden is already given when the appellant or complainant was refused something in 
the previous instance which he (or she) had applied for.157 The three means of legal 
redress must be lodged within a fixed time, which is a month in case of appeals and 
two weeks in case of complaints against rulings. Furthermore, the appeal on points 
of fact and law needs to be admitted by the administrative court or by the higher 
administrative court. According to the ACC, the appeal shall only be admitted under 
certain, explicitly mentioned preconditions: if serious doubts exist as to the correct­
ness of the judgment; if the case has special factual or legal difficulties; if the case is 
of fundamental significance; if the judgment derogates from a decision of the higher 
administrative court, of the Federal Administrative Court, of the Joint Panel of the 
supreme courts of the Federation or of the Federal Constitutional Court, and is based 
on this derogation; or if a procedural shortcoming subject to the judgment of the 
court of appeal on points of fact and law is claimed and applies on which the decision 
can be based. 
The admission requirement was introduced in 1996.158 Before, the appeal on
points of fact and law was generally allowed, except from petty affairs and some spe­
cial cases ruled in statutory law. With the amendment of the procedural rules, the
legislator wanted to relieve the appellate courts.159 It held that one factual instance
was regularly sufficient and that a second factual instance should only be provided
for in such procedures where a review of the decision of the first instance was nec­
essary with regard to the matter.160 As far as the principle of equality is maintained,
the limitation of the appeal on points of fact and law is regarded as constitutional
since Art. 19 para 4 of the Basic Law, as mentioned,161 does not guarantee a second
instance; even a complete exclusion of an appeal would be in accordance with the
Constitution.162 
The appeal on points of law allows bringing the case before the Federal Admin­
istrative Court. Against the judgment of a higher administrative court and against 
decisions about applications for a review of statutory law according to the ACC the 
persons who took place in the previous court proceedings can have recourse to an 
156 Schenke (n. 84) 386.
 
157 Cf. Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 17, 352–353.
 
158 Sechstes Gesetz zur Änderung der Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law 

Gazette) 1996 I, 1626. 
159 Deutscher Bundestag, Gesetzentwurf des Bundesrates: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung der Ver­
waltungsgerichtsordnung, Bundestags-Drucksache 13/1433, 13. 
160 Deutscher Bundestag, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Sechsten Gesetzes zur 
Änderung der Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung und anderer Gesetze, Bundestags-Drucksache 13/3993, 13; 
cf. Bundestags-Drucksache 13/1433 (n. 159) 13–14. 
161 See above n. 80. 
162 Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 124 at 2, 1608. 




   






appeal on points of law to the Federal Administrative Court, if the higher administra­
tive court, or the Federal Administrative Court in response to a complaint against 
non-admission, has admitted it. Thus, as the appeal on points of fact and law the 
appeal on points of law requires an admission. The admission-free appeal on points 
of law in cases of essential procedural defects was abolished in 1990.163 An appeal on 
points of law which is lodged without admission is inadmissible. In such a case, the 
Federal Administrative Court cannot ex officio make up leeway for the admission or to 
ignore the missing of the admission and to deal with the appeal as if it was admissible, 
when the preconditions for the admission were actually given and the admission was 
omitted erroneously.164 
According to the ACC, the appeal on points of law shall only be admitted if the 
legal case is of fundamental significance, if the judgment deviates from a ruling of the 
Federal Administrative Court, of the Joint Panel of the supreme courts of the Federa­
tion or of the Federal Constitutional Court and is based on this deviation, or if a pro­
cedural shortcoming is asserted and applies on which the decision can be based. As 
the first two aspects reveal, the function of the appeal on points of law is particularly 
the safeguarding of the unity of jurisdiction and the development of the law.165 Con­
versely, the third aspect focuses on the one side on the safeguarding of procedural 
law, not least with regard to the importance of ‘due process’ for the protection of the 
rights of the citizen and the enforcement of public and private interests enshrined 
in the law,166 and on the other side on the ‘education’ of the courts to pay tribute to 
the procedural rules.167 Besides, the appeal on points of law can only be based on the 
impugned judgment resulting from a violation of federal law or of a provision of the 
administrative procedure act of a federal state the wording of which concurs with 
the Administrative Procedure Act of the Federation. Thus, federal state law is, apart 
from the latter exception, not a suitable basis for review. A review of federal state law 
is only insofar possible as that law must be in accordance with federal law.168 
A judgment always must be regarded as being based on the violation of federal 
law if there are absolute reasons for the appeal on points of law. That is the case if 
the court of decision was not composed according to the regulations, if a judge was 
involved in the decision who had been excluded from the exercise of judicial office 
by force of law or had been successfully rejected for concern about partiality, if a party 
concerned had been refused a legal hearing, if a party concerned in the proceedings 
was not represented in accordance with the provisions of the law, unless he (or she) 
explicitly or tacitly consented to the pursuance of the proceedings, if the judgment 
163 Gesetz zur Neuregelung des verwaltungsgerichtlichen Verfahrens (Viertes Gesetz zur Änderung der 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung), Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 1990 I, 2809. 
164 Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 132 at 4, 1688. 
165 Schenke (n. 84) 391–392; Ibid. Section 132 at 1, 1687. 
166 Cf. F. Kopp, ‘Individueller Rechtsschutz und öffentliches Interesse in der Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’ 
(1980) 26 Bayerische Verwaltungsblätter 263–272. 
167 K. A. Bettermann, ‘Die Revision wegen wesentlicher Verfahrensmängel insbesondere nach dem BVer­
wGG’ (1954) 7 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1305–1310, 1308; Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 132 
at 1, 1687. 
168 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 11, 95–101, 96; 45, 51–65, 
55; 51, 104–111, 110; 56, 308–315, 310; 85, 348–368, 353–354; (1987) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht
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was handed down on the basis of an oral hearing in which the provisions on the pub­
lic nature of the proceedings were violated or if the decision is not reasoned. 
Finally, the complaint is particularly provided for as a legal means against rulings of 
the administrative courts which are not passed in the form of a judgment, whereas rul­
ings of the higher administrative courts are regularly not contestable. Furthermore, 
procedural directions, elucidation orders, orders regarding the postponement of the 
setting of a deadline, orders for the taking of evidence, orders regarding the rejection 
of motions for the taking of evidence, on joindering and separation of proceedings 
and claims and on the rejection of court officials, as well as orders on the rejection 
of legal aid applications if the court exclusively states that the personal or economic 
preconditions for legal aid do not apply, cannot be impugned with a complaint. 
After all, there is no general right to a means of legal redress against judgments and 
other kinds of decisions of the administrative courts and higher administrative courts. 
Instead, appeals against judgments need an admission, and complaints against rulings 
other than judgments have a limited field of application. However, a second instance 
and even a third instance for review exist in certain matters and under certain pre­
conditions. Thus, at least cases in which the rights of the appellant or complainant 
have been violated due to serious ignorance, misapplication or misinterpretation of 
the law can be filtered out. 
3.7 Intervention 
The intervention of third parties into the proceedings before the administrative 
courts in practice takes place only on a small scale. Concentrating on the protec­
tion of the individual is from the outset not combined with the matter to give other 
persons than the plaintiff a share in the proceedings. Particularly, the amicus curiae is 
not known to German procedural law. The contributions of interest groups, NGOs or 
citizens’ groups do not play a settled formal role in the proceedings. At most, in the 
field of environmental law there are possibilities of influence for recognised nature 
conservation associations due to the provisions of European law.169 However, third 
parties can be included in the proceedings by means of a subpoena (Beiladung; liter­
ally: co-summoning) according to ACC.170 The subpoena serves not least the protection 
of the interests of the included person, a comprehensive explanation of the facts and, 
since the subpoena leads to an extension of the legal force of the later judgment on the 
included person, the procedural economy.171 
The simple or optional subpoena is a relatively flexible instrument. As long as the 
proceedings have not yet been finally concluded or are pending at a higher instance, 
the court can subpoena others ex officio or on request whose legal interests are affected 
by the decision. Thus, the filter criterion are the legal interests which are affected by 
the decision. The losing of the case by the plaintiff or the defendant must be able to 
169 See Schlacke (n. 2) 161–332.
 
170 See A. Guckelberger, ‘Die Beiladung im Verwaltungsprozess’ (2007) 47 Juristische Schulung 436–441; 

A. von Mutius, ‘Die Beiladung im Verwaltungsprozeß’ (1988) 10 Juristische Ausbildung (Jura) 273–276; 
C. Nottbusch, Die Beiladung im Verwaltungsprozess (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1995); R. Stober, ‘Beila­
dung im Verwaltungsprozeß’ in Erichsen, Hoppe and von Mutius (n. 26) 401–421. 
171 Schenke (n. 84) 146; Stober (n. 170) 406–408. 








    
  
   
  
    
 
   
  
improve or to worse the legal situation of the subpoenaed person172 but he (or she) 
need not be authorised to sue by himself (or herself) or to be actually or possibly 
violated in his (or her) rights.173 
The necessary or obligatory subpoena has a different legal quality. If third parties
are involved in the contentious legal relationship in such a way that the decision can
also only be imposed on them uniformly, they have to be subpoenaed. This means
that the subpoena is necessary if the court decision the plaintiff has applied for can­
not effectively be made without thereby at the same time immediately and inevita­
bly affecting (i.e. forming, confirming or declaring, amending or abolishing) the
rights of the subpoenaed person, so that the decision due to legal reasons can only
be imposed uniformly on the main parties in the proceedings and the subpoenaed
person.174 
Regarding the consequences of a subpoena and of its omission, it must be distin­
guished between a simple and a necessary subpoena. In case of a simple subpoena the 
subpoenaed person can independently assert means of attack and defense and imple­
ment procedural acts effectively only within the requests of a person concerned. 
Conversely, he (or she) can lodge derogating factual motions if a necessary subpoena
exists. The omission of a necessary subpoena is in principle a serious procedural short­
coming which leads to an annulment of the judgment and to a back reference of the 
lawsuit in the appeal procedure.175 After all, the subpoena is an instrument to prevent 
the rights of a third party from being violated or at least not sufficiently considered 
in lawsuits of others. 
Finally, the German administrative procedure law knows the institution of the 
Representative of the Public Interest (Vertreter des öffentlichen Interesses) and the Rep­
resentative of the Interests of the Federation (Vertreter des Bundesinteresses). These rep­
resentatives can be concerned by the proceedings if they avail themselves of their 
empowerment to participate. They have all rights of a party in the proceedings; 
particularly they can lodge motions and means of appeal according to the general 
conditions.176 The Representative of the Public Interest may be appointed at the 
administrative court and at the higher administrative court by the federal state gov­
ernment. The Representative of the Interests of the Federation has to be appointed 
at the Federal Administrative Court by the Federal Government. 
The Representative of the Interests of the Federation has the function to support 
the Federal Administrative Court in finding the law and to collaborate in the interest 
of the Federation, which is part of the public interest, on its realisation.177 Thereby, 
the interest of the Federation has to be understood in a comprehensive and impartial 
way. It covers the interests of the Federation as a whole, including the concerns of 
172 Federal Administrative Court (1999) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht – Rechtsprechungsreport 276–277, 
276; Higher Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht) of North Rhine-Westphalia (1991) Neue 
Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht – Rechtsprechungsreport 486–487. 
173 Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 65 at 9, 770. 
174 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 51, 268–277, 275; 55, 8–17, 
11; 74, 19–28, 23. 
175 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 51, 6–15, 11; Schenke (n. 84)
148; Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 65 at 42, 786; von Mutius (n. 170) 276. 
176 Cf. Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 63 at 5, 757. 
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the federal states and of the municipalities as well as those of the individual citizen.178 
Thus, the Representative of the Interests of the Federation can mediate the interests 
of private persons.179 
3.8 Aspects and effects of the inquisition maxim 
Beside provisions which directly entitle the affected person to defend his (or her) 
rights before the administrative courts and to ward off their violation by measures of 
the administrative authorities, procedural rules should be mentioned which stand in 
the context of the inquisition maxim and have an immense practical relevance. For 
instance, a provision of the ACC reads that if the action does not meet the require­
ments with regard to its content, the presiding judge or the reporting judge shall 
call on the plaintiff to provide the necessary supplement within a specific period. 
Thus, the plaintiff is given the opportunity to revise and to complete his (or her) 
application. 
According to the ACC, the court investigates the facts ex officio; the parties and the 
other concerned persons have to be consulted in doing so. The court is not bound to 
the submissions and to the motions for the taking of evidence of those concerned. It 
can find out the facts by itself, assess the facts and hear other type of evidence than 
the concerned persons have presented.180 That rule follows the idea that there is a 
public interest in the factual correctness of the decision.181 Furthermore, the ACC 
contains a general obligation of the presiding judge to give advice to the parties and 
to the other concerned persons. The presiding judge shall endeavour to ensure that 
formal errors are remedied, unclear requests explained, proper motions made, inad­
equate factual information supplemented, as well as all declarations submitted which 
are material to the establishment and judgment of the facts. This obligation is valid 
for the whole procedure, not only for the oral hearing or its preparation. It is an 
expression of the inquisition maxim and also an aspect of the principle of legal hear­
ing and of procedural justice. It exists vis-à-vis any person concerned, but in practice 
it particularly serves the compensation of the information lead of the administration 
toward the citizen.182 Moreover, in the proceedings it has the function to prevent sur­
prising orders and decisions.183 
Finally, the presiding judge shall discuss the dispute with those concerned in fac­
tual and legal terms.184 This shall secure that no essential factual or legal aspects are 
178 Deutscher Bundestag, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Innenausschusses zu dem Gesetzent­
wurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuordnung des Bundesdisziplinarrechts, 
Bundestags-Drucksache 14/5529, 65; cf. W. Rzepka, ‘Öffentliches Interesse im Sinne der §§ 35 ff. VwGO’ 
(1992) 38 Bayerische Verwaltungsblätter 295–300. 
179 Cf. Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 35 at 1, 90. 
180 Hufen (n. 7) 551. 
181 Ibid. 536; Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 86 at 1, 1080. 
182 Hufen (n. 7) 549. 
183 Federal Constitutional Court (1991) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2823–2824; Federal Constitutional 
Court (Chamber) (1996) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 45–46; Federal Administrative Court (1986) Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 445; (2000) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht – Rechtsprechungsreport 396–397; 
(2008) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1025–1027, 1027; (2010) 845–847, 847; (2011) 372–375, 373. 
184 Cf. K.-M. Ortloff, ‘Rechtspsychologie und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit: Das Rechtsgespräch in der 
mündlichen Verhandlung’ (1995) 14 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 28–31. 






   
   
  
   
 
   
   
   
  
  
overlooked and that the parties and the other persons concerned get the chance to 
adjust to the questions which are relevant for the judgment of the case and, if neces­
sary, consider them in their statements and motions.185 
To conclude, there are a series of provisions in administrative procedure law which 
prevent the realisation of the formal procedural rights and of the material rights of a 
party from failing due to his (or her) lack of experience, clumsiness or lack of legal 
knowledge.186 At the end, such provisions contribute to a right, law-corresponding, 
just and, as regards the persons concerned, acceptable decision of the court.187 
4 Institutional perspective 
Pursuant to the Administrative Court Code, administrative jurisdiction shall be exer­
cised by independent courts separated from the administrative authorities. This 
excludes any administrative jurisdiction by administrative authorities or by commit­
tees which do not have the quality of courts.188 
Among the minimal requirements for an institution to qualify as a court are the 
decision making by uninvolved third persons,189 the freedom from instructions and 
the institutionally guaranteed independence.190 Hence, the administrative courts are 
independent and organisationally separated from both the legislation and the execu­
tive.191 Likewise, the administrative judges must be personally and materially inde­
pendent. The judges are in principle not allowed to exercise at the same time judicial 
and legislative or executive tasks.192 Furthermore, the judges are in their judicative 
activities only bound by the law (Art. 20 paras 3 and 97 of the Basic Law). However, the 
notion of administrative jurisdiction in the ACC, despite its broad wording, only cov­
ers the jurisdiction according to Art. 40 para 1 of the Code. This provision, as already 
mentioned, reads that recourse to the administrative courts, which are specialised 
courts, is available in all public-law disputes of a non-constitutional nature insofar as 
the disputes are not explicitly allocated to another court by a federal statute. Public-
law disputes in the field of federal state law may also be assigned to another court 
by a federal state statute. Therefore, the fiscal courts (Finanzgerichte) and the social 
welfare courts (Sozialgerichte), although being special administrative courts, do not 
fall under the application of the ACC.193 They are ruled by the Fiscal Court Code 
(Finanzgerichtsordnung)194 and by the Social Welfare Court Act (Sozialgerichtsgesetz).195 
185 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 51, 111–115, 113; Kopp and 
Schenke (n. 99), Section 104 at 1, 1258. 
186 Cf. Federal Administrative Court (1985) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 36–37, 37. 
187 Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 86 at 22, 1102. 
188 Ibid., Section 1 at 1, 5. 
189 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 21, 139–148, 145–146; 54, 
159–172, 166. 
190 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 60, 175–215, 214; 87, 68–90, 
85; Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 78, 216–223, 219; Kopp 
and Schenke (n. 99), Section 1 at 4, 6; cf. Kaufmann (n. 54) 203–227. 
191 Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 1 at 5, 6. 
192 Ibid. Section 1 at 6, 7. 
193 Ibid. Section 1 at 3, 5. 
194 Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 2001 I, 442 and 2262. 
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This concerns disputes in the fields of taxes as well as of national insurance and, 
according to a recent amendment of the Social Welfare Court Act,196 also of income 
support.197 Furthermore, there exist special disciplinary courts for public servants and 
professional courts, like the professional courts for the pharmacists.198 
As regards the relationship between the administrative courts and the ordinary 
courts, particularly the civil courts, Art. 14 para 3 of the Basic Law stipulates that in the 
case of dispute concerning the amount of compensation for expropriation, recourse 
may be had to the ordinary courts. This is an allocation of a matter of public law to 
the civil courts. The provision has a forerunner in Art. 153 of the Weimar Constitu­
tion. That it was maintained under the Basic Law may have to do on the one side with 
an existing uncertainty about the performance of the administrative courts in 1949. 
On the other side, aspects of compensation and problems of causality and calculation 
related thereto belong to the daily work of the civil courts.199 Moreover, the ACC rules 
that recourse is available to the ordinary courts for property claims from sacrifice for 
the public good and from public-law deposit, as well as compensation claims from the 
violation of public-law obligations which are not based on a public-law contract; this 
shall not apply to disputes regarding the existence and the amount of a compensation 
claim in the context of Art. 14 para 1 of the Basic Law, which mentions the regula­
tion of the content and limitations of property. The special provisions of civil service 
law, as well as those on legal recourse to compensate for property disadvantages for 
withdrawal of unlawful administrative acts, shall remain unaffected. This stipulation 
has also partly a constitutional background. Art. 34 of the Basic Law determines in the 
context of the liability for the violation of official duties that the way to the ordinary 
courts shall not be closed to claims for compensation or indemnity. The attribution 
of these claims to the civil courts may be not least explained with their similarity or 
affinity to typical claims concerning the relationship of one citizen to the other.200 
Anyway, the governmental draft of the Administrative Court Code had provided for 
a comprehensive decision making power of the administrative courts in all matters 
of public law. The realisation of that plan was simply prevented by ‘massive lobbying 
by leading representatives of civil jurisprudence’.201 The result is a juxtaposition of 
administrative courts and civil courts in the field of state liability, which bears compli­
cations and leads in general to an unclearness of the legal area.202 This is problematic 
against the background of the principle of effective legal protection. 
The administrative jurisdiction is separated from the constitutional jurisdiction by 
the competence of the administrative courts to decide in ‘all public-law disputes of 
196 Siebentes Gesetz zur Änderung des Sozialgerichtsgesetzes, Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 
2004 I, 3302. 
197 Hufen (n. 7) 173; critical (and in favour of maintaining the competence of the administrative courts) 
H. Geiger, ‘Verlagerung der Sozialhilfestreitigkeiten auf die Sozialgerichte’ (2004) 57 Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1850–1852; A. Decker, ‘Ist die Rechtswegänderung für Sozialhilfestreitigkeiten zum 
1.1.2005 (formell) verfassungswidrig?’ (2004) 23 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 826–828. 
198 Cf. Federal Administrative Court (1992) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1579–1580.
 
199 Maurer (n. 108) 691.
 
200 Cf. Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 40 at 69–73, 209–212.
 
201 F. Schoch, ‘Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, quo vadis?’ in Verwaltungsgerichtshof Baden-Württemberg 

(ed.), Festschrift 150 Jahre Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit (Boorberg, Stuttgart et al. 2014) 215–240, 217. 
202 Maurer (n. 108) 691. 
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a non-constitutional nature’ (Art. 40 para 1 of the ACC). Relevant for the constitu­
tional nature of a dispute is according to the common opinion a twofold constitu­
tional immediateness. This means that the dispute must concern persons who are 
directly participating in constitutional life and it must additionally relate to rights and 
duties which are directly ruled in the Constitution.203 
Besides, the competencies of the Federal Constitutional Court are listed in Art. 93 
of the Basic Law. The Federal Constitutional Court in its steady jurisdiction insists 
that it was no super appeal instance also vis-à-vis the administrative courts and that its 
task was limited to protect specific constitutional law.204 However, the administrative 
courts deal to a large amount with constitutional law since they control administrative 
measures on the basis of legislative acts and of the Constitution. The basic rights and 
the rule of law play a particularly important role in administrative jurisdiction. Con­
sequently, the Federal Constitutional Court de facto has the function of a last instance, 
when citizens lodge a constitutional complaint according to Art. 93 para 1 point 4a 
of the Basic Law against the original administrative measure and the administrative 
court decision(s) which confirm(s) the legality (and constitutionality) of this meas­
ure. Therefore, the Federal Constitutional Court in the past made a series of deci­
sions which stressed and clarified aspects of the principle of effective legal protection. 
The administrative courts have the power to review an administrative measure 
under any aspect of statutory and constitutional law, and they are even allowed to 
incidentally control the constitutionality of the parliamentary act which served as 
the legal basis for the administrative measure. However, the administrative courts 
do not have the power to reject the parliamentary act if they hold that it was uncon­
stitutional. Rather, in such a case the administrative courts, like all other courts, are 
obliged to adjourn the procedure and to present the parliamentary act to the Federal 
Constitutional Court according to Art. 100 para 1 of the Basic Law (so-called concrete 
supervision of a norm; konkrete Normenkontrolle). The Federal Constitutional Court has 
the monopoly to declare legislative acts unconstitutional and, thus, invalid.205 Con­
versely, the higher administrative courts, as already mentioned, have the competence 
to review stipulations ranking below the level of legislative acts according to the ACC 
since such stipulations are not acts of the parliament but abstract and general norms 
of the executive. However, the existing limitations of the review of material provisions 
are problematic. 
The principle of effective legal protections requires that the citizen has the pos­
sibility to go to court in any case where a material provision directly affects his (or 
her) rights. This is not only true for by-laws issued under the provisions of the Fed­
eral Building Code, statutory instruments issued on the basis of the Federal Building 
Code and other legal provisions ranking below the statutes of the federal state to the 
extent that this is provided in federal state law. Instead, it can be argued that federal 
state law has to provide for a review of legal provisions ranking below the statutes of 
the federal state. Furthermore, there is no argument against the introduction of the 
possibility of a principal review of federal legal provisions ranking below the statutes 
203 Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 40 at 32, 169–170.
 
204 Federal Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 7, 198–230, 207; 18, 85–97, 
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of the Federation by the Federal Administrative Court. In any way, the ‘secret supervi­
sion of statutory law’ by means of the general action for a declaratory judgment is not 
an adequate compensation for the existing deficits of legal protection in this regard.206 
The administrative courts must refer to the general principles of international law, 
which are part of federal law according to Art. 25 of the Basic Law. The international 
treaty law which is implemented in the German legal area has the same rank as legisla­
tive acts of the Federation so that must also be considered. Furthermore, the primary 
and secondary law of the European Union belongs to the standard of review of the 
administrative courts. From the perspective of European law the national judge has to 
control, particularly due to a complaint by a private person, whether a state measure 
is compatible with the applicable Union law, and from the German perspective the 
national judge is even obliged to determine and apply Union law ex officio.207 Thereby, 
the primacy of the application of European law can be decisive, when the national 
law is in contrast with European law. A prominent case of the European Court
of Justice which can be mentioned in this context is Alcan, where a company against 
the withdrawal of subventions which were incompatible with European law claimed 
the protection of legitimate expectations due to the course of time on the basis of the 
German Administrative Procedure Act, which was from the first sight not congruent 
with primary European law.208 
The judicial review is limited to the examination of the legality of the administra­
tive measure, which means that the administrative court’s interpretation and applica­
tion of the law is decisive and prevails over a divergent dealing with the law by the 
administrative authority. However, there are certain cases where the density of judicial 
review is limited. 
On the side of the factual area of application (Tatbestand) of legal provisions, the 
courts in principle apply a comprehensive supervision of undetermined legal notions 
(unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe), but there is case law where the administrative courts accept 
that the administration has a scope of assessment (Beurteilungsspielraum) which can 
only be reviewed under certain aspects. Examples are examinations (in schools and 
universities), assessments of the performance of public servants, prognostic decisions 
and risk assessments. In such cases the courts only control whether there are deficits 
in the assessment, for instance procedural shortcomings, the assumption of wrong 
facts, violations of recognised principles for the assessment, irrelevant considerations 
or in other way arbitrary decisions.209 
As to the legal consequence (Rechtsfolge) of legal provisions, the aspect of discretion 
(Ermessen) has to be mentioned. The ACC stipulates that insofar as the administra­
tive authority is empowered to act in its discretion, the court also examines whether 
the administrative act or the refusal or omission of the administrative act is unlawful 
because the statutory limits of discretion have been overstepped or the discretion 
has been used in a manner not corresponding to the purpose of the empowerment. 
206 Ibid. 338; cf. M.-E. Geis, ‘Die Feststellungsklage als Normenkontrolle zwischen suchender Dialektik 
und dogmatischer Konsistenz’ in Baumeister, Roth and Ruthig (n. 135) 709–719. 
207 O. Dörr, ‘Grundstrukturen eines europäischen Verwaltungsprozessrechts’ (2008) 123 Deutsches Verwal­
tungsblatt 1401–1407, 1405–1506. 
208 ECJ, Case 24/95, ECR 1997, I-1607–1625, I-1619. 
209 Cf. E. Schmidt-Aßmann and T. Groß, ‘Zur verwaltungsgerichtlichen Kontrolldichte nach der
Privatschul-Entscheidung des BVerfG’ (1993) 12 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 617–625, 624. 











   
Thus, the administrative court reviews discretionary decisions of the administrative 
authority only under certain legal aspects; it is not allowed to put its own discretion on 
the place of that of the administration. Relevant shortcomings with regard to discre­
tion are that the administration did not make use of its discretion (Ermessensausfall), 
that it either considered irrelevant aspects or incorrectly giving the wrong weight to 
one of the aspects before putting it on Justitia’s scales of justice (Ermessensfehlgebrauch) 
or that it chose an alternative to which it was not authorised and thereby overstepped 
the limits of discretion which were laid down in the authorising norm (Ermessensüb 
erschreitung).210 However, the administration has the possibility to ‘cure’ defects con­
cerning discretion according to the ACC. The provision reads that the administrative 
authority may supplement its discretionary considerations as to the administrative act 
in the proceedings before the administrative courts. 
If the administrative court finds out that there is a discretion defect and if this 
defect is not ‘healed’ in the proceedings, the administrative decision is unlawful. In 
the case of the action for the rescission of an administrative act this leads to the aboli­
tion of the act as far as the plaintiff is violated in his (or her) right. It is not decisive 
whether the administrative authority could have come to the same order or prohibi­
tion without discretion defects, because at least the contested administrative act is 
unlawful and must be abolished under the conditions of the ACC.211 
After all, the administrative courts have far-reaching powers to control the adminis­
trative authorities. There are only few scopes of the administration where the judicial 
supervision is limited. Furthermore, the administrative courts are the principal actors 
to control the activities of the administration. 
Besides, there are informal legal remedies which the citizen can make use of, like 
the counter argumentation (Gegenvorstellung) directed to the administrative body 
which has passed or omitted the decision, the complaint to the supervisory official 
or authority ([Dienst-]Aufsichtsbeschwerde) or the petition to the parliament or to any 
other competent authority, which is constitutionally guaranteed in Art. 17 of the Basic 
Law. A system of citizens’ representatives (Bürgerbeauftragte) supports the work of the 
petition committees on the administrative level and helps the citizens with their little 
and big problems vis-à-vis the administration.212 Special ombudsmen exist in certain 
fields, for instance the data protection representatives of the Federation and of the 
federal states and the university ombudsmen to hear reproaches concerning scientific 
misbehaviour.213 
Finally, in complex planning procedures sometimes mediation takes place.214 The
federal legislator has passed the Act on the Promotion of Mediation and of Other
Procedures of Extrajudicial Dispute-Settlement (Gesetz zur Förderung der Mediation und
210 Hufen (n. 7) 420–421; Schenke (n. 84) 253–255.
 
211 Hufen (n. 7) 421; Kopp and Schenke (n. 99), Section 113 at 20, 1333.
 
212 Hufen (n. 7) 19–20.
 
213 Cf. S. Muckel, ‘Der Ombudsmann zur Anhörung von Vorwürfen wissenschaftlichen Fehlverhaltens’ 

in P. Hanau, D. Leuze, W. Löwer and H. Schiedermair (eds.), Gedächtnisschrift für Hartmut Krüger
(Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2001) 275–297. 
214 Cf. H. Pünder, ‘Kooperation statt Konfrontation’ (2005) 38 Die Verwaltung 1–34; T. Mehler, ‘Verknüp­
fung des Ergebnisses einer Mediation mit der fachplanerischen Abwägung’ (2012) 31 Neue Zeitschrift 
für Verwaltungsrecht 1288–1291. 
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anderer Verfahren der außergerichtlichen Konfliktbeilegung) in 2012.215 This Act contains,
among other rules, a legal basis for an intrajudicial mediation also before the admin­
istrative courts,216 the admissibility of which was disputed beforehand.217 Since the Act
is obviously geared to civil procedure, it must be remain to be seen whether the pro­
visions adequately fit the needs of mediation in the administrative court procedure.218 
5 European perspective 
The European law, which comprehensively penetrates the national legal orders, has 
an important influence on the jurisdiction of the administrative courts in Germany. 
Moreover, the Europeanisation of material administrative law leads to the Europeani­
sation of administrative procedure law219 and in the end also of administrative court 
procedure law.220 The change concerns the principle of effective legal protection vis-
à-vis the administrative authorities particularly in the context of provisional legal pro­
tection221 as well as under aspects of the right or authorisation to sue and the extent of 
the supervisory powers of the administrative courts.222 
As regards the constitutional situation, Art. 19 para 4 of the Basic Law guaran­
tees in the framework of European integration that there is an effective legal protec­
tion of the individual before German courts to claim subjective rights which are laid 
down in Community law. At the same time, the provision guarantees an effective legal 
215	 Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 2012 I, 1577; see M. Ahrens, ‘Mediationsgesetz und Güterichter –
Neue gesetzliche Regelungen der gerichtlichen und außergerichtlichen Mediation’ (2012) 65 Neue Juris­
tische Wochenschrift 2465–2471. 
216 See K.-M. Ortloff, ‘Vom Gerichtsmediator zum Güterichter im Verwaltungsprozess’ (2012) 31 Neue 
Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1057–1061; Hufen (n. 7) 44–45. 
217 Deutscher Bundestag, Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Förder­
ung der Mediation und anderer Verfahren der außergerichtlichen Konfliktbeilegung, Bundestags-
Drucksache 17/5335, 19. 
218 Hufen (n. 7) 43–44; sceptical A. Guckelberger, ‘Einheitliches Mediationsgesetz auch für verwaltung­
srechtliche Konflikte?’ (2011) 30 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 390–396. 
219 C. D. Classen, ‘Das nationale Verwaltungsverfahren im Kraftfeld des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsre­
chts’ (1998) 31 Die Verwaltung 307–334, 333; C. Ohler, ‘Europäisches und nationales Verwaltungsrecht’ 
in J. P. Terhechte (ed.), Verwaltungsrecht der Europäischen Union (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2011) 331–351, 
341; E. Hofmann, ‘Das Verwaltungsverfahren unter dem Einfluss des Europarechts’ in W. Ewer, U. 
Ramsauer, M. Reese and R. Rubel (eds.), Methodik – Ordnung – Umwelt: Festschrift für Hans-Joachim Koch
(Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2014) 211–228. 
220 See D. Ehlers, Die Europäisierung des Verwaltungsprozeßrechts (Carl Heymanns, Cologne et al. 1999);
M. Burgi, Verwaltungsprozessrecht und Europarecht: Eine systematische Darstellung (Franz Vahlen, Munich
1996), particularly 64–73; S. Kadelbach, ‘Gemeinschaftsrecht und (vorläufiger) verwaltungsger­
ichtlicher Rechtsschutz’ (1999) 82 Kritische Vierteljahresschrift 378–401; J. Kokott, ‘Europäisierung
des Verwaltungsprozessrechts’ (1998) 31 Die Verwaltung 335–370; F. Schoch, ‘Die Europäisierung
des Verwaltungsprozessrechts’ in E. Schmidt-Aßmann, D. Sellner, G. Hirsch, G.-H. Kemper and
H. Lehmann-Grube (eds.), Festgabe 50 Jahre Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Carl Heymanns, Cologne et al.
2003) 507–533. 
221 Cf. ECJ, Case C-217/88, ERC 1990, I-2899–I-2909 – Table Wine; Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, 
ERC 1991, I-534–I-554 – Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen; Case C-465/93, ERC 1895, I-3781–I-3797 – 
Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft I; Burgi (n. 220) 66–70; Kadelbach (n. 220) 396–398; C. Steinbeiß-
Winkelmann, ‘Europäisierung des Verwaltungsrechtsschutzes’ (2010) 63 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
1233–1238, 1234. 
222 Cf. Schlacke (n. 2) 505–506. 










    
protection directed at imposing the limits of the claim of European law to find appli­
cation in the national legal sphere.223 
Concerning the right or authorisation to sue, the administrative courts dealt with 
the European demands in the way that they interpreted certain stipulations as protect­
ing third persons. Furthermore, the legislator created new subjective rights in favour 
of the citizen and construed individual rights required by Community law instead 
of mere internal administrative regulations (Verwaltungsvorschriften) as external legal 
provisions which obviously authorise the individual to claim them even before the 
courts.224 
This development is not without problems for the German administrative court 
system. This has to do with the functional relationship between the right or authori­
sation to sue and the density of judicial review.225 If the individual can claim a viola­
tion of his (or her) subjective rights, there is in principle a complete review of the 
contested measure by the administrative court on points of fact and law. The right or 
authorisation to sue has the function of a filter to protect the courts against overload­
ing. If more and more persons are allowed to sue, the question arises whether the 
full program of judicial supervision is still justifiable or at least tenable (in all groups 
of cases).226 In addition to this, the influence of European law leads to a revision of 
the national regime of the legal consequences of shortcomings in the administrative 
procedure.227 Currently, for instance, Art. 46 of the APA stipulates that the application 
for annulment of an administrative act which is not invalid under Art. 44 of this law, 
listing certain severe violations of formal provisions, cannot be made solely on the 
ground that the act came into being through the infringement of regulations govern­
ing procedure, form or local competence, where it is evident that the infringement 
has not influenced the decision on the matter. 
In the European context, the principle of effective legal protection requires a con­
sideration of the procedure not only in its serving function228 but also in its legitimis­
ing function for the correctness of the material outcome.229 The European law forces 
a more intensive judicial review of procedural shortcomings than required by the 
national rules.230 Against this background, it can be argued that the European princi­
ple of effective legal protection charges or improves its national counterpart. 
223 See O. Dörr, Der europäisierte Schutzauftrag deutscher Gerichte (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2003) 277–279. 
224 See S. Neidhardt, Nationale Rechtsinstitute als Bausteine europäischen Verwaltungsrechts (Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen 2008) 76–79; also B. W. Wegener, Rechte des Einzelnen (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1998) 274–298. 
225 Cf. R. Herzog, ‘Verfassung und Verwaltungsgerichte – zurück zu mehr Kontrolldichte?’ (1992) 45 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2601–2605, 2601–2602. 
226 Cf. Neidhardt (n. 224) 86–87; Steinbeiß-Winkelmann (n. 221) 1237. 
227 Schlacke (n. 2) 506; cf. J. Ziekow, ‘Von der Reanimation des Verfahrensrechts’ (2005) 24 Neue Zeitschrift 
für Verwaltungsrecht 263–267, 266; R. Wahl, ‘Das Verhältnis von Verwaltungsverfahren und Verwaltung­
sprozessrecht in europäischer Sicht’ (2003) 118 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1285–1293, 1291. 
228 Cf. K.-P. Dolde, ‘Verwaltungsverfahren und Deregulierung’ (2006) 25 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsre­
cht 857–865, 858 and 864; Ziekow (n. 227) 264. 
229 Cf. W. Erbguth, ‘Rechtsschutzfragen und Fragen der §§ 214 und 215 BauGB im neuen Städtebau­
recht’ (2004) 119 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 802–810, 802–803; T. von Danwitz, ‘Aarhus-Konvention: 
Umweltinformation, Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung, Zugang zu den Gerichten’ (2004) 23 Neue Zeitschrift 
für Verwaltungsrecht 272–282, 279–282; Wahl (n. 227) 1290–1293. 
230 Cf. ECJ, Case C-201/02, ECR 2004, I-748–I-771 – Wells; Schlacke (n. 2) 506; Wahl (n. 227) 1290–1291. 
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A case where this can be demonstrated quite well is Orfanopoulos,231 which con­
cerned the expulsion of aliens having the nationality of other Member States of the 
European Union on the basis of reasons of the public order, security and health. The 
European Court of Justice held that there should be a deviation from the national 
procedural norms on the one side with regard to the point of time which is relevant 
for considering the individual case and on the other side with regard to the necessity 
to control not only the lawfulness but also the expediency of an expulsion. The Court 
stressed that the preconditions for the existence of a present threat must in principle 
be given at the time at which the expulsion really takes place. The Court explained 
this view by referring to the standard argument in the context of the European princi­
ple of effective protection: while the development of the procedural rules governing 
actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law was an 
affair of the Member States, ‘the fact remains that those rules must not be such as to 
render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by 
Community law’.232 
The Court’s view contradicts the German legal position. With regard to the provi­
sions of the ACC, in case of an action for the rescission of an administrative act, the 
time of the last administrative decision is decisive, which is regularly the ruling on the 
objection, irrespective of how much time has passed until the decision of the admin­
istrative court.233 
Against the background of the judgment in Orfanopoulos, the Federal Administra­
tive Court modified its jurisdiction. It argued that the Senate followed the interpreta­
tion of material Community by the European Court of Justice and ‘insofar gives up its 
previous opposite jurisdiction about the decisive point of time. Thus, for the judicial 
review of the lawfulness of the expulsions of citizens of the European Union, who 
bear the freedom of movement, on points of fact and law, now the point of time of the 
last oral hearing of the court of facts is decisive. [. . .] The courts of facts are [. . .] in 
the future not only authorised but in the framework of their clarification obligation 
according to Section 86 paragraph 1 of the Administrative Court Code also obliged 
to examine whether the official threat prognosis and the discretionary decision with 
regard to the point of time of the judicial decision are ultimately founded on a correct 
factual basis [. . .]. If there are new facts which can have effects on the preconditions 
of the expulsion and the discretionary decision about the expulsion, the court on the 
basis of an interpretation of Section 114 sentence 2 of the Administrative Court Code 
in accordance with Community law has to give the aliens’ registration service the 
opportunity to adapt its decision and to particularly also make current discretionary 
considerations. Insofar, the aliens’ registration services have a duty to steadily control, 
in accompanying the court proceedings, the lawfulness of their expulsion order.’234 
231 ECJ, Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/03, ECR 2004, I-5257–I-5336 – Orfanopoulos and Oliveri; see 
for Turkish nationals in the area of application of Association law ECJ, Case C-467/02, ECR 2004, 
I-10924–I-10944, I-10943 (at 47) – Cetinkaya v Baden-Württemberg. 
232 ECJ, ECR 2004, I-5321 (at 80), referring to ECJ, Case 33/76, ECR 1976, 1989–1999, 1997–1998
(at 5) – Rewe; Case C-129/00, ECR 2003, I-14672–I-14691, I-14684 (at 25) – Commission v Italy. 
233 See Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 34, 155–159, 158; 60, 
133–140, 135; 65, 1–8, 1 and 2–4. 
234 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 121, 297–315, 308–310; see 
with regard to persons having rights on the basis of the Association Agreement between the European 
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After the European Court of Human Rights had confirmed the position of the 
European Court of Justice,235 the Federal Administrative Court expanded its jurisdic­
tion to all foreigners.236 Furthermore, the European Court of Justice in Orfanopoulos
limited with regard to certain constellations the scope to decide whether there should 
be an objection procedure prior to the court procedure. According to the German 
law, prior to lodging a rescissory action, the lawfulness and expediency of the admin­
istrative act must in principle be reviewed in preliminary proceedings. However, the 
ACC allows making a different ruling by federal state law. In Baden-Württemberg, 
where Orfanopoulos had its starting point, the legislator has made use of this possibility 
and has excluded the preliminary proceedings in cases of administrative acts passed 
by the regional authorities (Regierungspräsidien).237 
The European Court of Justice stated that in such a case there was no reliable guar­
antee for an exhaustive examination of the expediency of the intended expulsion and 
did not meet the requirements of sufficiently effective protection.238 It would be likely 
to deprive Art. 9 para. 1 of Council Directive 64/221/EEC on the coordination of 
special measures concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which 
are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health of its practi­
cal effect.239 Art. 9 para 1 of Directive 64/221/EEC ‘precludes a provision of a Mem­
ber State which provides neither a complaints procedure nor an appeal, comprising 
also an examination of expediency, against a decision to expel a national of another 
Member State taken by an administrative authority, where no authority independent 
of that administration has been put in place. It is for the national court to establish 
whether courts such as the Verwaltungsgerichte are able to examine the expediency 
of expulsion orders.’240 Consequently, the administrative courts in Germany, which 
due to the concept of the separation of powers and functions cannot examine the 
expediency of administrative measures, in any case where an objection procedure did 
not take place, had to sentence the administration at least to carry out an objection 
procedure with another examination of expediency. Meanwhile, the legal situation 
has changed since Directive 64/221/EEC was repealed by Art. 31 of the Citizenship 
Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, which does 
not prescribe that ‘another authority’ examines all facts and circumstances including 
the expediency of the intended measure. Therefore, the legal situation could main­
tain that there is no objection procedure for citizens of the European Union.241 
Economic Community and Turkey Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwal­
tungsgerichts 121, 315–324. 
235 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Application No. 1638/03, Judgment of 23 June 2008 – Maslov v Austria. 
236 Federal Administrative Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts 130, 20–28, 20 and 23–26; 
cf. I. Kraft, ‘Vom Konflikt zur Konvergenz. Zur Rezeption der ausländerrechtlichen Rechtsprechung 
des EGMR durch die deutschen Verwaltungsgerichte’ (2014) 33 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht
969–976, 973. 
237 See Art. 15 para 1 of the Act on the Performance of the Administrative Court Code (Gesetz zur Aus­
führung zur Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung) of Baden-Württemberg (Gesetzblatt für Baden-Württemberg 2008, 
343). 
238 Cf. ECJ, Case 222/84, ECR 1986, 1663–1694, 1682 (at 17) – Johnston; Case 222/86, ECR 1987, 4112–4119,
4117 (at 14 and 15) – Heylens and Others. 
239 ECJ, ECR 2004, I-5332 (at 110). 
240 ECJ, ECR 2004, I-5333 (at 116). 
241 See Bavarian Higher Administrative Court (Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof ), Judgment of 17 
July 2012–19 B 12.417, particularly at 56. 
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In sum, the case illustrates not only the entanglement of European Union law, Con­
vention law and national procedural law but also the extent and the ruling density 
with which the provisions of European law and international law affect the national 
law of administrative procedure and administrative court procedure. Thus, it can be 
expected that particularly European law will make changes necessary in the national 
system of the protection of rights of the individual against measures of the administra­
tive authorities. 
6 Conclusion 
In Germany, the principle of effective protection of the individual vis-à-vis the admin­
istrative authorities is primarily regarded as a constitutional principle, which addresses 
on the one side the legislator and on the other side the courts and the administration 
itself. In the latter cases it governs the application and interpretation of the proce­
dural norms laid down in the Administrative Court Code and in the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 
In a series of cases, impulses to change existing procedural norms or to introduce 
new provisions came from the Federal Constitutional Court. Consequently, the fields 
of activities and the scopes of decision making of the administration which were 
exempted from judicial review have steadily been reduced. Furthermore, rules had 
been elaborated to deal with assessments of the factual situation, with prognoses and 
with discretion of administrative authorities. 
The protection of the individual is traditionally connected with the notion of the 
subjective right. If the plaintiff can claim a violation of his (or her) subjective rights, 
this opens far-reaching powers of the administrative courts to review the contested 
administrative measure. Conversely, for persons or associations claiming the violation 
of rights of others or of objective law the way to the administrative courts is regularly 
closed completely. There is only a gradual chance due to the influence of European 
law242 in favour of nature conservation associations.243 
Concerning the future development, it can be foreseen that in light of the princi­
ple of effective protection the administrative justice will have to face at least four huge 
challenges: these are the growing complexity of the division of litigations between 
civil and administrative courts, the legal protection in cases of third persons, the cop­
ing with the increasing demands of European law and, finally, the internationalisa­
tion of the legal protection against the administration.244 
242 Cf. ECJ, Case C-115/09, ECR 2011, I-3701–I-3726 – Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen; see B. W. Wegener, 
‘Die europäische Umweltverbandsklage’ (2011) 22 Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht 363–367. 
243 Cf. Ruffert (n. 92) 107–110; W. Porsch, ‘Die Zulässigkeit und Begründetheit von Umweltverbandskla­
gen’ (2013) 32 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1062–1065, 1063–1064. 
244 Schoch (n. 201) 216. 
  






9 The principle of effective 
legal protection in Hungarian 
administrative law 
Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz and István Temesi
 
1 Historical developments 
The roots of the principle of legal protection can be traced back to the second half 
of the nineteenth century in Hungary, during the dual monarchy with Austria. The 
country has followed various patterns and traditions of Western Europe, like the 
principle of legality which was borrowed from the German concept of Rechtsstaat.
The legality became a general requirement in public administration emphasising 
that public authorities are bound by the law. Another fundamental principle, the 
separation of powers, inspired the law which separated the Judiciary from the execu­
tive power.1 As a next step, the Hungarian legislature, after the Austrian model, 
established financial courts which were entitled to change administrative decisions 
made by administrative authorities in certain financial subjects.2 Due to the positive 
experiences of these special courts, the Act No. XXVI of 1896 established specialised 
administrative courts.3 These judicial tribunals existed separately from the organisa­
tion of ordinary courts and were divided into two sections, one for general adminis­
tration and another for financial matters. 
In the very beginning of the twentieth century, the first elements of administrative 
procedures emerged also in statutory law, when, for example, the Parliament enacted 
a law on the legal remedies against administrative decisions. However, as the country 
had an unwritten, historical constitution, according to the widely shared view of that 
time, some legal guarantees of personal freedom were guided by legal customs and 
constitutional conventions. 
The establishment of the Communist rule after World War II brought about sub­
stantial changes both in theory and practice. The system of administrative courts 
was abolished arguing that the public authorities in the ‘people’s democracy’ act on 
behalf of the whole people. Only certain administrative decisions (e.g. in cases of 
retirement, health insurance, election, nationality) remained subjected to judicial 
review by ordinary courts. Some decisions in taxation matters could be controlled by a 
commission belonging to the Ministry of Finances. Disputes of competences between 
administrative authorities were resolved by the Commission of Competencies before 
1 Act No IV of 1869 [stating that ‘judges and administrative authorities are not allowed to encroach on the 
scope of authority of each-other’]. 
2 Act No XLIII of 1883. 
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1954. The adoption of the Act No IV of 1957 on the General Rules of the Administra­
tive Procedure could have been a turning point, as this law allowed the judicial review 
of administrative decisions in special cases enumerated in legislative acts, statutory 
decrees or decrees of the Government. But it had only little practical significance, as 
judicial review has remained exceptional, limited to some special cases, while admin­
istrative decisions concerning fundamental rights were excluded from any judicial 
control. 
As a matter of fact, the Constitution of 1949 (the first written basic law in the national 
history) contained only a short list of rights, focusing on the ‘social, economic and 
cultural rights’, while neglecting or minimising the classical rights and liberties. The 
first administrative code emerged only in 1957 when the National Assembly adopted 
the Act No. IV of 1957 on the General Rules of the Administrative Procedure. Some 
other laws established special procedures for taxation, electoral, infraction, etc. pro­
cedures, to which the general procedural rules could only be applied in the absence 
of any specific provisions, or in which they were not used at all. The general adminis­
trative code entered into force on 1 October 1957 and was applied until 2005 when a 
new code became applicable. 
Fundamental change arrived only with the democratic transition of 1989, when 
the system of the protection of fundamental rights was established by a general con­
stitutional revision of that year4 and the emergence of some new institutions like 
the Constitutional Court.5 The new constitutional provisions not only recognised 
the inviolable and inalienable human rights, but declared also that ‘the respect and 
protection of these rights became a primary obligation of the state’.6 The judicial 
review of administrative decisions became also a general rule as the revised Constitu­
tion stated that ‘legality of administrative decisions are controlled by the court’ (Art. 
50). However, the judicial review of administrative acts was established only by the 
Act No. XXVI of 1991 on the extension of judicial review over administrative deci­
sion. The new provision was born as a consequence of a Constitutional Court deci­
sion which declared that the Parliament had not adopted the appropriate measures 
to comply with the relevant constitutional provision, and thereby has committed an 
unconstitutional omission.7 Subsequently, the legislature empowered the ordinary 
courts to review the legality of administrative acts. For this purpose, as a result of an 
internal specialisation, administrative councils (colleges) have been set up in county-
level court houses and within the Supreme Court. More recently, the Act No. CLXI 
of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of Courts established new courts 
4 Act No. XXXI of 1989.
 
5 For a general description of the Hungarian administrative law after the democratic transition, see
 
Herbert Küpper, ‘Hungarian Administrative Law 1985–2005: The Organization of the Administra­
tion’ in András Jakab, Péter Takács and Allan F. Tatham (eds.), The Transformation of Hungarian Legal
Order 1985–2005: Transition to Rule of Law and Accession to the European Union (Wolters Kluwer, Buda­
pest 2007) 109–122., and Zoltán Szente, ‘Grundzüge des Verwaltungsrechts in gemeineuropäischer
Perspektive: Ungarn’ in Armin von Bogdandy, Sabino Cassese and Peter M. Huber (eds.), Handbuch
Ius Publicum Europeaum: Band V. Verwaltungsrecht in Europa: Grundzüge (C. F. Müller, Heidelberg 2014)
803–860. 
6 Art. 8 para 2. 
7 32/1990. (XII. 22.) CC decision. 






















   
  
    
for administrative and labour matters in the counties. In fact, these courts are not 
separated from the county courts in organisational term, but are only remote units 
of them.8 
2 Constitutional and legal frameworks 
Although the Fundamental Law of 2011 does not refer explicitly to the principle
of effective legal protection, it contains its most important guarantees and com­
ponents. The crucial one is the right to fair procedures assuring that every per­
son has ‘the right to have his or her affairs administered by the authorities in an
impartial, fair and reasonably timely manner’. This right includes the obligation
of public authorities to justify their decisions as determined by law (Art. XXIV
para 1). Furthermore, every person has also the right to submit a written application,
complaint or proposal, whether individual or joint, to any organ which exercises
public power (Art. XXV). Another constitutional provision guarantees everybody’s
right to seek legal remedy against any court, administrative or other official deci­
sion which violates his or her rights or lawful interests. This right to appeal means
that the rights and obligations of any person must be ‘adjudicated by a legally estab­
lished independent and impartial court in a fair public trial within a reasonable
period of time’ (Art. XXVIII para 1). Public authorities are obliged to justify their
decisions. This means that administrative authorities and courts have to provide the
reasons for their decisions that can serve as basis for legal remedy. Also the lack of a
measure that is not to be taken should be reasoned in the decisions (the Art. XXIV
para 1). The Fundamental Law comprises also a general entitlement to ‘statutory
state compensation’ for those who suffered ‘any unlawful damage caused by the
authorities while performing their duties’ (Art. XXIV para 2). The legal equality
is one of the requirements that serve as a basis for the effective legal protection in
law and jurisprudence after the democratic transition of Hungary. According to
this legal tenet, all people are equal before the law, and, consequently, ‘law binds
everyone [in the same way] including individuals and organs of public authority’
(Art. XV para 1). 
The first commentary on the Fundamental Law published in English claims that 
Art. XXIV para 1 guaranteeing the right to fair administration ʽfills a lacuna’ that has 
been uncovered by the practice of the Constitutional Court.9 This provision can be 
regarded as a due process clause specialised in administrative law, while the similar 
provision of the former constitution was mainly developed only for civil and criminal 
law procedures. The right to fair trial was not mentioned in the Constitution before 
2012, but the Constitutional Court deduced certain elements of it from the concept 
of the fair and impartial court hearing, and from the procedural guarantees ema­
nating from the principle of rule of law. In a recent ruling the Constitutional Court 
stated that Art. XXVIII means that ‘[t]he rule of law requirement of material justice 
8 Rozsnyai Krisztina, ʽA közigazgatási bíráskodás megteremtésének sarokkövei’ in Varga Zs. András
and Fröhlich Johanna (eds.), Közérdekvédelem: A közigazgatási bíráskodás múltja és jövője (PPKE JÁK-KIM
2011) 95. 
9 Loránt Csink, Balázs Schanda and András Zs. Varga (eds.), The Basic Law of Hungary: A First Commentary
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can be achieved by respecting the institutions serving legal certainty and guarantees. 
The Fundamental Law grants a right to a procedure which is necessary and in most 
cases appropriate to the realisation of material justice’.10 
In statutory law, beyond the general code of procedural rules, the Act CXL of
2004 on the General Rules of Administrative Procedures and Services (herein­
after: GRAPS), there are some special types of administrative process (for the
proceedings of tax authorities, public procurement, nuclear energy, election and
referendum procedures etc.) regulated by further legislative acts and government
decrees. 
Before the enactment of the Fundamental Law of 2011, the Constitutional Court
established a robust jurisprudence of the rule of law and determined the exact
requirements of the principle of fair trial. Although the fourth amendment of the
Fundamental Law in 2013 repealed all Constitutional Court rulings that had been
taken prior to the entry into force of the new Fundamental Law, significantly weak­
ening the level of constitutional protection of rights by this way, the former deci­
sions, the standards remained to be points of reference in the jurisprudence of
the Constitutional Court.11 Therefore it is worth invoking the major achievements
of the constitutional adjudication in the topic since the democratic transition of
1989–1990. 
The concept of legal certainty as a pillar of the principle of rule of law appeared 
already in the practice of the Court in the early 1990s. In the next years, the Constitu­
tional Court explained step-by-step the basic requirements of these principles which 
have had implications also in the administrative proceedings. Thus, public authorities 
must exist in the operational order determined by law, and in a way predictable for 
the citizens.12 In another landmark decision, the Court expressed that the princi­
ple of legal certainty requires the whole legal system to be clear, unambiguous and 
predictable.13 All these have been associated with the requirements that procedural 
guarantees have to be established for the stability of the existing legal relationships, 
the full compliance of the procedural rules and that public authorities must operate 
in a foreseeable and effective way.14,15 
As to the principle of fair trial used in administrative cases, the Court declared 
in 1997 that during the judicial disputes, all procedural safeguards ensured by the 
former Constitution (i.e. every person’s right that his or her rights and duties must 
be judged in a just, public trial by an independent and impartial court established by 
law) must be realised. Furthermore, all regulations which limit the judicial control of 
the public administrative bodies’ decisions are unconstitutional.16 
10 9/19992 (I. 30.) CC decision.
 
11 13/2013 (VI. 17.) CC decision.
 
12 56/1991. (XI. 8.) CC decision.
 
13 9/1992. (I.30.) CC decision.
 
14 See for example the 46/2003. (X. 16.) 62/2003. (XII. 15.), and 2/2007 (I.24.) CC decisions.
 
15 For an analysis of this practice see Tamás Győrfi and András Jakab, ‘Jogállamiság’ in Jakab András (ed.), 

Az Alkotmány kommentárja (Századvég Kiadó 2009) 155–170; and Zoltán Szente, ’The Rise and Fall of an 
Unenumerated Principle. The Protection of Legitimate Expectations in Hungarian Public Law’ in Kari 
Anneken Sperr and Diana zu Hohenlohe-Oehringen (eds.), The Protection of Legitimate Expectations in 
Administrative Law: A Comparative Study (Hart Publishing 2016). 
16 39/1997. (VII. 1.) CC decision. 









3 Rights-based perspective 
3.1 The domestic system of procedural rights in administrative law 
The administrative procedure has a prominent role in the effective legal protection 
of rights. Rights and obligations of individuals, private legal entities as well as public 
authorities are determined by law. The administrative procedures serve as a general 
legal framework for the realisation of fundamental rights and duties. They are regu­
lated by acts of Parliament that has the highest rank in the hierarchy of norms, so 
legislative acts cannot be modified by decrees issued by the Executive. 
3.1.1 The right to be a party in administrative procedures 
The GRAPS regulates the conditions of standing in administrative procedure. The 
Hungarian administrative law uses the term ‘client’ for the persons (or organisations) 
that have the right to be applicants in these proceedings. According to the GRAPS, 
clients can be anyone – an individual or an organisation – whose rights or legal inter­
ests are affected by a case. In judicial practice, only those can be clients, ‘on whom 
the [administrative] decision has a direct effect’.17 According to the GRAP, statutes 
or Government decrees may determine other persons who may be clients in certain 
matters, without any other condition (like personal involvement). In addition, the 
client’s status may be provided also for civil organisations registered for representing 
and promoting certain fundamental rights or public interests. Thus, since 1995, a 
law recognised the right of environment-protection organisations to be parties in the 
relevant administrative procedures. However, the judicial practice narrowly interprets 
this empowerment.18 It is a unique rule of the Code that all those public authorities 
may also participate in the administrative procedure, whose competences are affected 
by the case, unless they are themselves the decision making bodies. 
The GRAPS obliges administrative authorities to launch a procedure at the client’s 
request. Clients may submit a request to the competent authority verbally or in writ­
ing. Exclusive forms of requests are accepted as well, so as to an electronic form or an 
appropriate software may be defined by law to be used in special cases. 
It is worth noting that the GRAPS determines procedural costs for 15 different 
items (like costs incurred in connection with the client’s or witnesses’ appearance, 
experts’ fees, translation charges and so on). The most important items are proce­
dural fees and administrative service fees to be paid by clients for the service. In a 
given procedure – depending on the act or the decree specifying the rules of the 
given procedure – clients should pay a procedural fee or administrative service fee 
for the service. Their amounts are determined by the special procedural rules, so they 
can be different on a case by case basis. These fees do not hinder ordinary citizens 
in launching administrative procedures, having regard to their low amounts, and the 
fact that the administrative authority may grant exemption from paying costs to any 
17 LB Kf.II.2818/1997. 
18 Attila Vincze, ʽA közigazgatási jog europaizálódása és a felperesi legitimáció’ in Balázs Gerencsér, Lilla 
Berkes and András Varga Zs (eds.), A hazai és az uniós közigazgatási eljárásjog aktuális kérdései (Pázmány 
Press 2015) 196. 
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individual who – due to his income and financial situation – is unable to pay for all or 
for part of the procedural costs. 
Once somebody’s application has been admitted to be decided, he or she is enti­
tled to fair treatment and has the right for a decision to be adopted within the time 
limit prescribed by law. 
3.1.2 The right to appeal 
The Fundamental Law provides the right to appeal in its Art. XXVIII para 7 declaring 
that everyone has the right ʽto seek legal remedy against any court, administrative or 
other official decision which violates his or her rights or legal interests’. The GRAPS 
grants the same right in the administrative procedure in its Chapter VIII under the 
title ‘Legal Remedies’. Administrative decisions of the authorities may be appealed 
independently. GRAPS enables the clients to appeal against ʽany decision in the first 
instance’. 
General rules on administrative appeals are regulated by GRAPS. As a general rule 
the client may appeal against any administrative decision taken in the merits (called 
resolution) of the first instance. The client may present new facts and evidences in 
the recourse. 
An appeal may be launched based on any kind of reasons why the client’s rights 
or legitimate interests have been adversely affected. In special cases described by leg­
islative acts, the client should present reasons for his or her appeal. Certain injunc­
tions of the administrative body, like rejecting the request without the examination 
of the merit of the case, suspending or terminating the procedure, or imposing a 
procedural fine may be appealed by a separate recourse. In certain exceptional cases 
the possibility of an independent appeal against a first instance ruling may also be 
encouraged by legislative act if a third party is affected by the ruling. 
The GRAPS excludes the right to appeal in cases where it is not permitted by a 
legislative act or a Government decree. The decision approving the agreement of 
the clients may not also be appealed as well as those administrative decisions which 
have been made by the representative body of a local government, or by higher-level 
administrative authorities like a minister or the head of a central agency. In these 
cases legal remedy is not excluded, but may be given by a court. 
3.1.3 The right to administrative act within a reasonable time 
One of the principles of the administrative procedure stated by GRAPS is that clients 
are entitled to receive fair treatment and have the right to a decision of the compe­
tent administrative body within the time limits prescribed by law. While the concept of 
‘reasonable time’ is used as constitutional requirements by the Constitutional Court 
in certain areas, Hungarian administrative law always sets periods and deadlines for 
administrative procedures. As a general rule, administrative decisions on the merits 
of the case must be adopted within 21 days. A shorter time limit may be established 
by any form of legal regulation, whereas a longer one may be set only by a legislative 
act or Government decree. 
Beside the right to appeal in such cases discussed above, the GRAPS contains sev­
eral guarantees against the ‘silence’ of administration. It is a general requirement 
that the competent administrative body is obliged to settle every case falling within 








   






its range of responsibility. If it fails to decide within the period set by law, the client 
may turn to the superior authority which has to inquire the reason of the ‘silence’ 
within eight days, and may instruct the administrative body to conduct the procedure 
and to make a decision within 15 days. In case of a repeated failure, a disciplinary 
procedure against the head of the responsible public authority must be launched, 
and another administrative body must be designated to decide the case. When a local 
authority fails to decide, the supervisory authority calls it to settle the case within 15 
days. Eventually, if all deadlines unsuccessfully expire, the court orders the competent 
authority to settle the case. In addition, unless law prescribes otherwise, if the client 
has applied for exercising a right, but the competent body has not decided the case 
within the legally set time limit, the omission of the administrative body is considered 
as if it would have approved that right, unless an adverse party is in the administrative 
procedure. 
3.1.4 The right to access to the relevant documents 
GRAPS states as a principle that administrative authorities must provide for the right
to access to documents to clients and their representatives and other parties involved
in the case. This right is subjected to restrictions specified by law. The right to access
documents must be also applied if the client has previously not participated in the pro­
cedure. In the framework of access, the client is allowed to make copies or extracts of
these documents, or may request paid copies. The exceptions are listed by the GRAPS,
studying documents by a client is excluded if it comes to drafts of decisions and admin­
istrative regulations; documents containing data that make possible the identification
of a person if the authority earlier ordered the close treatment of that person’s per­
sonal data and address; documents containing so-called ‘qualified data’ – e.g. state
secrets – without proper clearance for access or inspection; documents containing
information that is protected by law. Providing these data can be denied if the lack of
their knowledge will not prevent the client from exercising her rights. 
Access to documents can be restricted upon a client’s claim also. A client may 
request the limitation of the adverse party’s right of access to the relevant documents 
with respect to the data expressly specified with a view to the protection of his per­
sonal data, business and other interests within reasonable limits. The administrative 
authority shall approve the request – upon carefully weighing the relevant circum­
stances of the case – if the lack of knowledge of the data in question will not impair 
the adverse party in exercising his rights conferred by law. 
3.1.5 The right to counsel 
The right to legal counsel is also recognised by the GRAPS. This means that the client 
is either assisted by the authority or by a legal representative. Administrative author­
ities themselves must give information to the client and other parties about their 
rights and obligations, in particular the clients without legal representation about the 
relevant rules pertaining to the case, the rights to which they are entitled to and the 
obligations to which they are bound, and also on the consequences for any breach 
of obligation, and on the availability of legal aid in case the client is an individual. In 
special cases with regard to the complexity of the case clients with legal representa­
tion may be required to meet certain obligations prescribed by law. 
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The notion of the right to legal counsel may be understood in a wide sense that it
is possible to take actions in the administrative procedure through legal representa­
tive. The general rule is that representation – for example by an advocate – is possi­
ble except for cases when personal actions are required by law. GRAPS states that ‘if
the client is not required by law to proceed in person, the client may be substituted
by his legal representative or proxy, and in all cases the client may proceed together
with her representative. The same person may not represent the adverse party or
parties’. 
Contrary to court proceedings, clients usually do not have legal representatives in 
the administrative procedure. Representation before an administrative authority is 
not compulsory, it is rather a possibility. There are cases where legal or other type of 
representation is expressively excluded by law (marriage for example cannot be made 
through representatives). Legal aid given either by NGOs or by advocates is thus only 
a possibility for clients in general, but at the same time providing for legal aid is an 
obligation of administrative bodies. Furthermore, legal assistance is provided by the 
Legal Aid Service which is run by the Capital and County Government’s Offices. The 
aim of the Legal Aid Service is to ensure the exercise of rights of those who are not 
capable to do so alone due to their unfavourable situation. 
3.1.6 The right to be heard 
The client has to be heard without exceptions as the GRAPS requires it declaring 
that the client has the right to make a statement in writing or verbally, or to refuse to 
make a statement in administrative procedures. It is quite common in constitutional 
complaint procedures that the claimant laments that his/her right to adequate hear­
ing was violated in the administrative and also in the following court proceedings, but 
there are no cases when the Constitutional Court accepted this claim and invalidated 
an administrative act on this basis. 
3.1.7 The right to adequate justification 
The duty to give reasons for administrative decisions is laid down in the Fundamental 
Law of Hungary in its Art. XXIV para 1. One of the principles of the administrative 
procedures declared in the GRAPS is that ‘administrative authorities shall contem­
plate in their proceedings the facts relevant to the case on hand, shall apply all evi­
dence consistently with its weight, and shall base its decisions on the facts of the case’. 
The obligation of giving reasons for a decision in its details is stated by the GRAPS 
enumerating the essential content of the administrative authority’s decision. Accord­
ing to the relevant provision of the law, an administrative decision has to contain the 
relevant facts of the case and the underlying evidence; evidence presented by the cli­
ent and found inadmissible, and the reason for this finding; for resolutions adopted 
under the principle of weighing and deliberation, the criteria and facts employed; 
reasons for any seizure carried out in the procedures; the statutes upon which the 
administrative authority has adopted the resolution; reference to the legal regulation 
conferring the authority’s powers and competencies. 
On the other hand, it is not necessary to give a statement of reasons in the decision 
if it approves the request in its entirety and if there is no adverse party in the case or 
the decision does not affect the rights or legal interests of the adverse party, or if the 





decision determines exclusively the time and date of a given step of the procedure, or 
if the content of the decision is exclusively the approval of an agreement of adverse 
parties. 
4 Institutional perspective 
By the adoption of the Fundamental Law (the new constitution) of 2011, the insti­
tutional system of legal protection of individual rights and legitimate interests has 
partially changed.19 
4.1 Internal (administrative) protection of individual rights 
The individual rights and legitimate interests are protected by a complex system of 
legal remedies. Legal protection of individual rights has internal and external mecha­
nisms. In this context, internal protection means the tools of administrative bodies 
for eliminating unlawful acts and providing devices for clients to stand for their own 
rights and interests. 
4.1.2 Administrative appeals 
Unless otherwise prescribed by a legislative act or government decree, an administra­
tive appeal must be lodged within 15 days following the date of delivery of the deci­
sion. The person entitled to appeal may resign this right. 
The appeal must be submitted to the first instance administrative authority giving 
the chance to the decision maker to revise its own act. It is also noteworthy that the 
administrative body may withdraw or change its original decision not only if it finds it 
unlawful, but also when it agrees with the content of the recourse, unless adverse par­
ties take part in the procedure. Such a decision must be delivered to the party filing 
the appeal, and to all other persons to whom the contested decision was delivered. 
It must also be noted that the decision making body, discerning that its decision has 
been illegal, may withdraw or change it within a year from its notification ex officio, 
if the decision has not been reviewed by any higher authority or court. Legitimate 
expectations are protected, however, as the decision maker may not do it, if the with­
drawal or modification of the original decision would violate rights acquired and 
exercised in good faith. 
The appeal has a suspensory effect in terms of the implementation of the act, 
except if the GRAPS itself declares it immediately enforceable or if the appellate 
authority has declared it enforceable abolishing the suspensory effect of the appeal. 
It is the case when the prompt implementation of the decision is necessary to prevent 
any life-threatening or potentially devastating situation or to mitigate any detrimental 
consequences, to maintain public order or for reasons of public security, and when 
any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm. 
If the first instance administrative authority does not agree with the appeal, it has 
to forward it to the superior body vested with powers to judge the appeal with all 
19 For a detailed description of these changes see Krisztina Rozsnyai, ʽÄnderungen im System des Verwal­
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documents attached within eight days following the deadline for appeal. It attaches 
also its own opinion about the appeal. 
The appellate authority may sustain, reverse or overturn the first instance decision.
In some cases defined by law, it may not establish an obligation more severe than
what has been adopted in the decision of the first instance under the principle of
reformatio in peius. Thus, this is not a general, but a special rule, claiming an explicit
permission by law. If the available data and information is insufficient to adopt a
decision in the second instance or if further evidence is shown up or required for
the decision, the appellate body may annul the decision and order the administra­
tive authority of the first instance to reopen the case or proceed to obtain additional
evidence on its own accord and make a decision itself. The first instance decision may
be annulled and a reconsideration may be ordered by the appellate body, if it thinks
that further clients should also be called in the case. In the reopened procedure the
first instance authority is bound by the operative part and by the justification of the
decision of the second instance. 
4.1.3 Complaint of individuals 
One of the special procedures in administrative law is the complaint procedure. Leg­
islative Act No CLXV of 2013 on the Complains and Notification of Public Interest 
gives the possibility for individuals to find a solution for their problems in certain 
cases. Complaint is a request aiming to cease the violation of an individual’s right or 
interest if the case cannot be subject of an administrative procedure under the effect 
of GRAPS or of an administrative dispute before court. A complaint may include a 
suggestion as well. The practice of this new institution raises several questions and so 
far people are not very active in gaining the full effect of this possibility. The lack of 
information can be one of the reasons for the deficiencies of this institution, but rea­
sons have also been found in the reserved mentality of the society vis-à-vis the State. 
4.2 External protection of individual rights 
4.2.1 Judicial protection 
Administrative decisions are subject to judicial review, based on Art. XVIII para 1 
(for judicial protection of individual rights and legal interests), and Art. 25 para 2 
point (b) (for judicial review of administrative decisions) of the Fundamental Law 
of 2011. According to these constitutional provisions, any (natural or legal) person 
whose rights or legal interests have been directly affected by an administrative act, can 
bring a case to the court. 
In Hungary, since 2013, enforceable administrative acts have been reviewed in the
first instance by administrative and labour courts located on the seats of regional
(county-level) courts (in the capital city Budapest and in the 19 counties). Thus, these
are specialised ordinary, rather than separate administrative courts, as they are inte­
grated into the organisational system of the uniform Judiciary. The competencies of
administrative and labour courts cover administrative suits as stated in the legislative
act on the civil procedure. Chapter XX (20) of this code under the title Administrative
Lawsuits defines that an administrative suit may be filed for the revision of an adminis­
trative decision. The notion of administrative decision is defined by the same act with






reference to the GRAPS. The lawfulness of administrative contracts are reviewed also
by the administrative and labour courts, while state liability cases (claiming compensa­
tion for damages caused by an illegal administrative act) are judged by civil law courts. 
In fact, administrative decisions only rarely are challenged before a court. Never­
theless, the exhaustion of all available administrative remedies is a precondition of 
the judicial review. The challenge of the administrative act before a court does not 
have a suspensory effect, though the plaintiff may ask the court to suspend the execu­
tion of the contested decision until the judgment of the court. 
As a major rule, the court may annul the administrative decision if the administra­
tive decision is found unlawful and may order the authority to reopen the case if it is 
necessary (cassatory power).20 It is necessary then to distinguish the simple annula­
tion of the administrative decision without ordering the administrative authority. In 
both cases the administrative authority is bound by the judgment of the court. 
The court only annuls the administrative act if no further measures have to be 
taken applying the respective rules. If the administrative authority is not ordered to 
reopen the case the only consequence of the judgment is that the administrative 
decision is not enforceable. If it was already enforced, all must be repaired that had 
been done as a result of the reviewed administrative decision. For example, if the 
administrative decision was enforceable and the client had to pay to the state budget, 
this amount is reimbursed. Enforcement of the judgment is the responsibility of the 
administrative authority involved in the case that had taken actions following the 
orders of the decision. 
If the administrative decision is annulled and the case is reopened, the adminis­
trative body begins a new procedure and makes a new decision accordingly to the 
judgment. This usually happens if the procedural rules were violated, for example 
relevant facts of the case in the decision making process were not ascertained or 
evidences were disregarded. Judicial ruling is enforced by the administrative author­
ity of first instance that took the annulled decision. Enforcement is assured by the 
operation of the hierarchical administrative structure itself because if law is not 
respected by an administrative authority – including the disregard of the ruling of the 
court – the superior organ in the hierarchy has to intervene and to order for action. 
The execution of the judicial decision is encouraged also via disciplinary responsibil­
ity of civil servants. It means that disciplinary procedure has to be launched against 
the defaulter that can be the civil servant or even the leader of the respective admin­
istrative authority. 
The relevant chapter of the Code of Civil Law Procedure grants full power to the 
courts in those cases where the competent administrative authority has only a mini­
mal discretionary power (like in tax or social security cases), or if a national-level 
public authority is the first instance decision maker (without superior authority). The 
proportion of these judicial cases is estimated as more than a half of all administrative 
disputes before the courts.21 The cases where courts are entitled to modify the final 
20 The Legislative Act No. III of 1952 on the Civil Procedure defines that ʽunless otherwise provided by 
legislative Act, court annuls the administrative decision and orders the administrative authority that 
took the resolution to reopen the case if it is necessary’. 
21 Péter Darák, ʽAdministrative justice in Hungary’ in András Patyi and Ádám Rixer (eds.), Hungarian 
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administrative decision in the merits after reviewing the procedure are enumerated 
by legislative acts.22 In these cases, the court may change the administrative decision. 
According to the law, the administrative decisions adopted in discretionary power 
may be overruled if the decision making administrative body has not established suf­
ficiently the facts of the case, or has not complied with the relevant procedural rules, 
the criteria of the discretion may not be identified, or the evaluation of evidences has 
not been reasonable. It is to be noted that not all procedural irregularities may lead to 
annulment, but only those which affected the final decision on the merit of the case. 
However, as general experience shows, the courts are usually reluctant to change the 
reviewable acts.23 
When the court finds the contested administrative decision lawful, its execution is 
the responsibility of the respective administrative body in the same way as if the deci­
sion would have not been appealed. 
Appeals lodged against the judgments of administrative and labour courts are 
decided in the second instance by regional (ordinary) courts in the country of Hun­
gary and in Budapest. 
The judgments of the administrative and labour courts may be appealed only 
exceptionally, mainly in those cases, in which no administrative appeal was permitted 
(typically when the administrative decision was made by an authority having national 
competence). In the latter cases the regional courts have competence (until 2012, the 
Administrative and Labour Court of the Capital City had an exclusive power in appel­
late cases. It is worth noting that in regional appeal courts (except for the court in 
the capital Budapest) there is no specialisation among the judges for administrative 
matters which is not favourable for effective judicial protection. 
The judgments of the appellate courts may also be challenged with an explicit ref­
erence to a violation of law, by an extraordinary remedy lodged at the Supreme Court 
(Kúria) within 60 days from their notification. It is a purely legal review, checking the 
compliance with law; the Supreme Court may not examine the evidence of the case, 
and may only annul (partially or totally) the contested judicial (and not the adminis­
trative!) decision. For this task, a separate administrative-labour law department exists 
in the Supreme Court. 
It is notable that in recent years the dispute about the establishment of the real
(separate) administrative courts has intensified,24 and the Government set up a
special commission for codifying a separate code for procedural rules of adminis­
trative disputes. The planned reform would significantly transform the system of
appeals against administrative decisions.25 The basic objectives of reform proposals
22 For example: declaration of status of refugee, authorisation of adoption or its rejection, statement of 
obligation to pay in tax and custom administration, etc. Other examples are enumerated by various 
legislative acts. 
23 Rozsnyai Krisztina, ‘Külön, de mégis együtt. A közigazgatási perjog és a közigazgatási eljárásjog.’ in Ger­
encsér Balázs, Berkes Lilla and Varga Zs. András (eds.), A hazai és az uniós közigazgatási eljárásjog aktuális 
kérdései (Pázmány Press 2015) 163. 
24 See e.g. Varga Zs. András and Fröhlich Johanna (eds.), Közérdekvédelem: A közigazgatási bíráskodás múltja és 
jövője (PPKE JÁK–KIM 2011); and Herbert Küpper, ʽMagyarország átalakuló közigazgatási bíráskodása’ 
(2014) 59 MTA Law Working Papers. 
25 One of the arguments for simplifying the appellate procedures is that in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court the single-stage appeal system satisfies the requirements of the right to appeal. 














are to accelerate the whole decision making process, and to settle the administra­
tive cases as soon as possible. For this purpose, one of the recommendations is
to make the administrative recourse exceptional, and, instead, to transform the
separate administrative courts as general appellate authorities.26 The idea of abol­
ishment of administrative recourse as a general form of appeal and its replacement
with judicial review raises some concerns, especially if the administrative court will
have full power to change the administrative acts. In this way, the courts could step
into the shoes of administration, as legality control should necessarily extend to
a complete reconsideration of the case putting burdens on the courts. So, what is
won by the exclusion of administrative appeal, might be lost by the long and com­
plicated judicial process, if the courts have to take over the job of the administrative
appeal.27 
As a very recent development, the standards of administrative justice have signif­
icantly been reduced in special cases, mainly in asylum cases, after a new type of 
state of emergency was introduced by law for the ‘mass migration crisis’ in order to 
respond the flow of migrants and refugees entering into the territory of Hungary. 
The new legislation has introduced extraordinary short deadlines and serious sanc­
tions for judging the requests of asylum-seekers and migrants.28 
4.2.2 Constitutional complaint 
The Hungarian Fundamental Law has significantly modified the competencies of the 
Constitutional Court and the role of the different constitutional institutions in con­
stitutional adjudication. Among several changes, it introduced three types of consti­
tutional complaints and abolished the former existing actio popularis. The system of 
actio popularis meant a legal possibility that anyone could turn to the Constitutional 
Court claiming that a law, legal provision or regulation is contrary to a constitutional 
provision and requesting its annulment. Constitutional complaint, under the former 
jurisdiction, was to be lodged only in case of personal injury caused by the application 
of an unconstitutional norm. 
The aim of the new constitutional complaint mechanisms was to protect against 
personal injuries caused by ordinary courts or caused in administrative procedures 
and not cured by courts. Constitutional complaint provides a possibility for consti­
tutional review also in cases where the complainant cannot turn to ordinary courts 
also in administrative matters. Moreover, the Constitutional Court may supervise the 
constitutionality of legal provisions when they, applied in certain judicial cases, lead 
to an unconstitutional court decision. Besides, the new system encourages civil peti­
tioners to turn to the ombudsman in order to initiate the ombudsman’s procedure 
Moreover, the appellate body must be independent to the organ whose act must be reviewed. Cer­
tainly, the legislator may determine more appellate forums for certain cases. See 22/1995. (III. 31.) 
CC decision. 
26	 Részletes jelentés az általános közigazgatási rendtartás koncepciójának előkészzítéséről. [Manuscript]. Source: 
Ministry of Justice. file:///C:/Users/Szente/Downloads/20150514%20Jelent%C3%A9s%20az%20%
C3%A1lta l%C3%A1nos%20k%C3%B6zigazgat%C3%A1si%20rendtart%C3%A1s%20 
koncepci%C3%B3j%C3%A1r%C3%B3l.pdf. 
27 Rozsnyai (n. 23) 160. 
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to question the constitutionality of a legal provision before the Constitutional Court. 
As a result of the introduction of the new types of constitutional complaint, ordinary 
courts must also show an elevated awareness to questions of constitutionality among 
the ordinary waves of legal adjudication with regard to the new control mechanism 
that easily sheds light on the deficiencies of fundamental rights’ adjudication. Judicial 
referral as it existed formerly stayed in force, which means that judges in pending 
cases turn to the Constitutional Court in case they state that an applicable piece of 
law is unconstitutional.29 
In constitutional complaint procedure the Constitutional Court reviews the com­
pliance of the law applied in the given case or of a court decision with the Fun­
damental Law. So far many appeals have been launched in administrative matters
ending with a court procedure, but the case law shows that only few of them gained
admission, and were adjudicated in the merits. This means that this legal instrument
is not very effective. This phenomenon can be reasoned either with poor petitions
or with the very strict admission rules of the constitutional complaint procedure.
Furthermore, if the review procedure of the administrative decision by the courts
was not violating fundamental rights, it is almost impossible to reach back to the
procedure of the administrative authorities and examine it from a constitutionality
point of view. 
4.2.3 The role of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights 
Although the actio popularis ceased to exist in Hungarian law, the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights (parliamentary ombudsman) may initiate a proceeding for an 
ex-post facto review of law before the Constitutional Court. 
The ombudsman has wide-ranging powers to investigate the work of administra­
tive authorities, and may initiate various proceedings for redress of infringements 
of rights or legitimate interests of individuals. In particular, his or her measures and 
recommendations might have an important role in the protection of rights of vulner­
able people. 
Proceedings start primarily upon complaints from citizens, but the Commissioner 
may, when justified, start proceedings ex officio as well, or on the proposal of the Dep­
uty Commissioner responsible for the interests of futures generations or on that of 
the Deputy Commissioner responsible for the protection of the rights of nationalities 
living in Hungary. The possible methods of inquiry have not changed substantially 
under the new act on the legal status of Commissioner adopted in 2011. The methods 
applied are chosen by the Commissioner from among a wide variety of possibilities 
ranging from simple requests for data to on-site inspections without previous notifica­
tion. The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights may apply any legal means which 
are necessary to discover the factual and legal background of a case. Although the rec­
ommendations and proposals of the Commissioner are not binding on the executive 
organs under his or her inquiry, the latters are bound to cooperate, and if they fail to 
do so, the Commissioner will put it on record in his report. The report is presented 
to the Parliament and the public will be informed thereof by the annual report of the 
ombudsman. 
29 3033/2013. (II. 12.) CC decision. 







4.2.4 The public prosecutor as a defender of public interests 
The public prosecutor controls the legality of final or enforceable decisions made 
by administrative authorities in case the decision was not reviewed by a court. This ex 
officio competence is often initiated by the individuals when it seems to be an effective 
way to reach legal protection in their case. 
If the public prosecutor finds any violation of law that affects the decision of an 
administrative authority in the merits, he takes an objection against the decision in 
order to cease the violation of law. The objection can be taken in one year after that 
the decision became legally binding. The public prosecutor may suggest the suspen­
sion of the decision’s execution in the objection. In such a case suspension of the 
execution is compulsory. The objection must be addressed to the superior of the 
decision making authority and if no response arrives the public prosecutor is entitled 
to turn to the court against the decision.30 
However, the relevant competences have apparently been conferred to the public 
prosecutor for a more effective defence of the objective legal order and for the pro­
motion of public interests, rather than for the protection of individual rights. 
4.2.5 Procedure of equal treatment authority 
Special form of legal protection in administrative law is the promotion of the equal 
treatment and the protection of equal opportunities in administrative procedures. It 
is assured by an administrative authority, the Equal Treatment Authority. Its status is 
‘autonomous administrative authority’ meaning that it is not subordinated to the cen­
tral government even though it is a part of state administration. One can turn to this 
authority if one’s right to equal treatment is violated by an administrative authority 
(or any other organisations except for the Parliament, Government, Courts, Consti­
tutional Court, State Audit Office). Violation of the requirement of equal treatment 
or discrimination is defined by the Legislative Act No CXXV of 2003 on Equal Treat­
ment and the Support of Equal Opportunities. 
4.2.6 State liability for the actions of administrative authorities and courts 
The responsibility of public administration is one of the most underdeveloped fields 
of law that may hinder gaining full effect for the principle of effective legal protec­
tion. However, the experience shows that it is quite difficult and complicated to justify 
the claim during a civil law proceeding in practice. The main problem is the underde­
velopment of the theory of the responsibility of public administration.31 One can turn 
to ordinary courts for compensation of damage caused by an administrative act (or by 
the lack of a decision). Ordinary courts make their decision applying the Civil Code 
in a civil procedure if the decision of an administrative authority is illegal, causes 
damages and all possible legal remedies were utilised in the administrative procedure 
and before the administrative court without success. So far, there have not been many 
cases where the responsibility of the state has been acknowledged.32 
30 See Art. 29 of the Legislative Act No CLXIII of 2011 on the Prosecution Services.
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5 Conclusions 
The establishment of administrative courts in 2011 – that started their operation in 
2012 – is one of the most important issues in Hungarian administrative law related 
to the principle of effective legal protection. The other one is the responsibility of 
administrative bodies and courts. 
According to the dominant view in Hungarian administrative law, the general func­
tion of judicial review of administrative acts is not only the legal protection of private 
interests, but also the defence of the ‘objective legal order’.33 This approach is based 
on Art. 25 para 2 point (b) of the Fundamental Law declaring that the ‘[courts shall 
decide on: (. . .) the lawfulness of administrative decisions]’. This Article requires the 
courts to control the legality of administrative acts in general, not only in case of an 
infringement of the rights and interests of private parties. Some provisions on admin­
istrative trials, like the rules on ex officio procedures or the fact that administrative acts 
can be challenged by the Public Prosecutor’s offices, and even by other administrative 
authorities, enforce the effective legal protection of the ‘objective legal order’. 
Notwithstanding, it should be noted that in recent times, the claim for the pro­
tection of the objective legal order as a basic function of judicial review has been 
associated with the efforts for establishing special procedural code for administrative 
disputes, instead of the present situation, when the civil procedural rules are used 
as supplementary in these proceedings and the administrative court procedure is 
regulated in the code of civil procedure. The main argument for the change is that 
because the functions of administrative judges (including the defence of the objec­
tive legality) differ from those of the civil courts (adjudicating competing private 
interests), they need special procedural rules reflecting this difference.34 
With the ongoing codification of the new procedural rules for administrative judi­
cial review, important issues will be reconsidered in the Hungarian legal system with 
regard to the effective legal protection in administrative law. It is certainly too early 
to judge whether the outcome of the codification will be successful, but it is to be 
emphasised that it will bring important implications for the future settlement of the 
above discussed issues. 
33 Krisztina Rozsnyai, ʽA hatékony jogvédelem biztosítása a közigazgatási bíráskodásban’ (2013) 1 Acta 
Humana 120–123. 
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1 Historical developments 
In the Italian legal order, the principle of effective legal protection for the citizens 
against the public administration could be considered the result of a long and sketchy 
evolution. In addition, the development of this principle has been following different 
paths, depending on its twofold nature: the effectiveness of access to justice, on the 
one hand, and the guarantees connected to procedures in which the public adminis­
tration exercises its powers, on the other. 
First of all, it is worth highlighting that there is no explicit and general definition 
or formalisation of the principle that can adapt to and sum up both dimensions of 
these guarantees. 
A clear definition of effectiveness in the context of access to justice, for example, 
might be found in the law regulating the judicial review of administrative action: 
Art. 1 of the Italian Code of administrative trials and proceedings1 (Codice del processo 
amministrativo; hereinafter Code) is entitled ‘Effectiveness’ and it provides that ‘[t]he 
administrative jurisdiction grants a complete and effective legal protection in accord­
ance with the principles set out in the Constitution and in European Union law’.2 
On the other hand, a corresponding definition cannot be found within the 
context of administrative procedure, even though the Italian law on this matter 
(no. 241/1990) lists and guarantees the rights of the individual with regard to the 
exercise of public powers.3 
Moreover, it is worth noting that, in Italian administrative law, the principle of effec­
tive legal protection has always been influenced by the profound and complex legal 
debate on the nature of so-called ‘legitimate interest’ (interesse legittimo).4 This is, even 
now, the definition of the individual legal position before the exercise of public pow­
ers. However, the concept was originally created only for the purposes of trials, to ease 
1 Legislative decree no. 104/2010.
 
2 About this legislative provision see Stefano Salvatore Scoca, ‘L’effettività della tutela nell’azione di annul­
lamento’ (2012) 4 Diritto processuale amministrativo 1397. 
3 For an overview, see Giandomenico Falcon, Lezioni di diritto amministrativo (Cedam 2013) volume 1, 67; 
Marcello Clarich, Manuale di diritto amministrativo (Bologna, ilMulino 2013) 225. 
4 Ibid. 78; Mario Nigro, Giustizia amministrativa (Bologna, ilMulino 2002) 93. See the theoretical and 
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access to administrative justice for the individual. It was only in a second instance that 
the notion of legitimate interest became relevant on this substantial viewpoint as well. 
In particular, the concept of legitimate interest – which is enshrined in the Con­
stitution too – is the result of the elaboration by legal scholars and judges, who 
began to firmly develop the notion since the very origin of the Italian State and, in 
particular, starting from the difficult enforcement of the relevant provision of law 
no. 2248/1865.5 This law provided that civil or political rights were part of ordinary 
judges’ jurisdiction, whereas ‘all other legal affairs’ (meaning those not included in 
the notion of civil or political rights) had to be considered as part of administrative 
jurisdiction. Following the prevailing interpretation at the time, these ‘other legal 
affairs’ arose whenever the public administration was acting as a public authority (iure 
imperiii); therefore, the individual could not resort to the common (ordinary) judge, 
but had the option to start other purely administrative remedies, within the same 
administration that adopted the act in question. 
In this context, the legal position of the citizen was soon defined as legitimate 
interest and this notion was also used during the debates for the enactment of law 
no. 5992/1889, on the institution of the IV section of the Council of State (Consiglio 
di Stato).6 This is the act on the creation of administrative jurisdiction. It has the aim, 
indeed, of giving administrative courts the power to enforce and protect this kind of 
individual positions; its jurisdictional function was definitively made clear by a royal 
decree in 1907.7 It was this process that created the idea of legitimate interest as an 
instrumental notion for those cases in which some specific ‘legal affairs’ could be 
brought before a special judge. This concept was mixed with the current idea of locus 
standi and was aimed at introducing a trial that, with the rare exception of cases in 
which the jurisdiction extended also to substantial matters, was limited to the strict 
evaluation of the legitimacy of the public administration’s acts, which could be chal­
lenged just for violation of the law (violazione di legge), lack of competence (incompe­
tenza) and ‘abuse of power’ (eccesso di potere, i.e. ultra vires). 
This framework was maintained even after the entry into force of the Constitution 
(1948), which, apart from taking into account the present status of this evolution, 
forced interpreters to reconsider, in the light of constitutional principles, the entire 
system and to adopt, especially from the 1970s onwards, a new understanding of the 
notion of legitimate interest, in more ‘substantial’ terms. This new viewpoint, in its 
multifaceted variations, gave rise to two trends, which developed in parallel, but at 
different speeds, and were only completed in the last 20 years. 
The first one concerns the progressive understanding of the concept of legitimate 
interest as a subjective situation that could play an important function of legal protec­
tion for the citizen not only in trial terms, but also from the perspective of the defi­
nition of the individual’s rights and means towards the public administration. This 
trend found normative enforcement in abovementioned law no. 241/1990, which, 
dealing with the discipline of the procedures that any public administration should 
5 Aldo Travi, Lezioni di giustizia amministrativa (Torino, Giappichelli 2014) 18. A deeper analysis is offered 
by Salvatore Sambataro, L’abolizione del contenzioso amministrativo nel sistema di giustizia amministrativa
(Milano, Giuffrè 1977). 
6 Travi (n. 4) 29. Originally the Council of State (with its three sections) had only consultative functions. 
7 Ibid. 34. 












   
    
  
 




follow while exercising its powers, affirmed the existence of specific rights for the citi­
zen in the relationship with public administration. This assumption gave rise, on the 
one hand, to the idea that these procedural rights represent the core (the substance) 
of legitimate interest and, on the other hand, to the idea that the guarantees thereby 
provided by law give shape to a very general principle of ‘due process’ (specifically 
aimed at establishing the need for the effectiveness of these guarantees and for the 
unrenounceable nature of some essential prerogatives, such as participation and the 
right to express one’s opinions and defences).8 
The second trend developed through the progressive enlargement of concretely
accessible remedies for the individual, as the owner of the legitimate interest within
the administrative trial. In fact, the administrative trial has gradually faced a process
of transformation, offering the citizen not only the traditional level of guarantee –
based on the option of challenging administrative acts and decisions on the grounds
of legitimacy – but also the option of obtaining compensation for damages9 and,
lately, of sentencing (in some circumstances, but not only in the case of ‘silence’ of
public bodies) the administration to adopt the act required. As a consequence, it is
often stated that the administrative trial has undergone an evolution, from a ‘trial on
the act’ (i.e. on the legitimacy of administrative action) to a ‘trial on the relationship
between administration and citizens’ (i.e. a trial aimed at verifying what is in the citi­
zen’s responsibility and what is within the administration’s powers).10 
This complex evolution is the product of the influence of the principles of effec­
tiveness and completeness of legal protection as expressed in EU directives on public 
procurements and of the synergy between the need to enforce these principles and 
the interpretation given by case law and legal scholars.11 Most of them had actually 
affirmed that within the administrative trial the citizen should be granted legal pro­
tection not only with regards to his (legal and patrimonial) position against admin­
istrative acts, but also with reference to the existence of an interest in obtaining a 
concretely useful act, that could properly respond to his needs.12 
2 Constitutional framework 
Keeping in mind the historical evolution of effective legal protection as expressed 
above, from the constitutional viewpoint, the relevant framework concerning the 
8 The principle of due process in administrative law gradually took a constitutional relevance. See Laura 
Buffoni, ‘Il rango costituzionale del giusto procedimento e l’archetipo del processo’ (2009) 2 Quaderni 
costituzionali 277. 
9 The generalisation of the liability rule in the Italian administrative law took place from a famous decision
of the Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione): 22 July 1999, n. 500. For a comment, see Luisa Torchia,
‘La risarcibilità degli interessi legittimi: dalla foresta pietrificata al bosco di Birnam’ (1999) 9 Giornale di
diritto amministrativo 843. In general, see Falcon (n. 2) 246; Clarich (n. 2) 287. 
10 Bruno Sassani, Dal controllo del potere all’attuazione del rapporto: ottemperanza amministrativa e sentenza civile
(Milano, Giuffrè 1997); Diego Vaiano, Pretesa di provvedimento e processo amministrativo (Milano, Giuffrè
2002). For a general reconstruction see Mariano Protto, Il rapporto amministrativo (Milano, Giuffrè 2008). 
11 E.g. Mariano Protto, L’effettività della tutela giurisdizionale nelle procedure di aggiudicazione di appalti pubblici: 
Studio sull’influsso dell’integrazione europea sulla tutela giurisdizionale degli operatori economici nei confronti delle 
amministrazioni nazionali (Milano, Giuffrè 1997); Stefano Tarullo, Il giusto processo amministrativo: Studio 
sull’effettività della tutela giurisdizionale nella prospettiva europea (Milano, Giuffrè 2004). 
12 E.g. Leonardo Ferrara, ‘Domanda giudiziale e potere amministrativo. L’azione di condanna al facere’ 
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principle of effectiveness of legal protection for the individual against public admin­
istration can be considered in two different perspectives. 
With regard to the effectiveness of jurisdictional protection for administrative 
action, the core of the guarantee is set by Art. 24.1 of the Constitution: ‘[e]veryone 
can take judicial action to protect individual rights and legitimate interests’. This 
means, first of all, complete access to justice and, as provided also by law, also includes 
the principle of concentration of all legal protections before a specific judge.13 
In this regard, Art. 103.1, has enshrined into the Constitution the distinction 
between ordinary and administrative court. Therefore, the ordinary is the one 
responsible for the protection of individual rights, whereas the other (a special court) 
is the guardian of legitimate interests. This provision goes further, affirming that, with 
regard to some specific subjects, the law could devolve upon administrative courts the 
protection of individual rights as well. This is the so-called principle of ‘exclusive juris­
diction’ (giurisdizione esclusiva) devolved to the administrative courts; subject matters 
included in this definition are now enumerated by the Code.14 Nevertheless, as stated 
by the Italian Constitutional Court in its decision no. 204/2004, this possibility is lim­
ited to those cases in which it is concretely difficult to distinguish between individual 
rights and legitimate interests and in which the public administration can intervene 
exercising its authoritative power. 
The guarantee provided by Art. 24.1 of the Constitution, moreover, has always been
interpreted as a limit to the possibility, for the law-maker, to entertain a hypothesis
of ‘conditioned jurisdiction’ (giurisdizione condizionata), meaning those cases in which
the law requires a compulsory preliminary activation of proceedings or remedies of
any nature, that could make access to justice for the individual more difficult or even
impossible. This limit could only be overtaken, in the opinion of the Constitutional
Court, through very precise dispositions, which are very unlikely to be widely inter­
preted, except in the case of particular general interests to be protected, or in the case
of risks of abuse, or for specific social interests or, finally, for higher reasons of justice.15 
The principle of full access to justice is also connected, in the field of administrative 
justice, to Art. 113.2 of the Constitution which states that ‘[s]uch judicial protection 
may not be excluded or limited in particular kinds of appeal or for particular catego­
ries of acts’. Based on this article, legal scholars are still very strict towards those provi­
sions that exclude jurisdictional action for so-called ‘political acts’.16 
The principle of the effectiveness of legal protection for administrative acts is also 
enforced, at a constitutional level, by those provisions regarding individual judges. 
These are, in particular, in Art. 24.217 and in Art. 111, paragraphs 1, 2 and 618 of the 
Constitution. 
13 This profile has been clarified by the Constitutional Court (06 July 2004, no. 204).
 
14 See Art. 133.
 
15 See Francesco Paolo Luiso, Diritto processuale civile (Milano, Giuffrè 2009) volume 1, 27–30.
 
16 For a wide and recent review of this topic see Giuseppe Tropea, ‘Genealogia, comparazione e decostru­
zione di un problema ancora aperto: l’atto politico’ (2012) Diritto processuale amministrativo 329; Luca 
Buscema, ‘Atti politici e principio di giustiziabilità dei diritti e degli interessi’ (2014) 1(1) Rivista AIC
(available at http://www.rivistaaic.it/atti-politici-e-principio-di-giustiziabilit-dei-diritti-e-degli-interessi. 
html) accessed 19 October 2014. 
17 ‘The right to defence is inviolable at every stage and moment of the proceedings.’ 
18 ‘1. The law shall be administered by means of a fair trial governed by Act of Parliament. 2. The parties 
to all trials may speak in their own defence in the presence of the other parties, with an equal status, 























   
  
The latter provisions are the results of a profound constitutional reform, enacted 
by constitutional law no. 1/1999, which, following the influence of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, was aimed at expressly acknowledging some gen­
eral principles which were already (even though implicitly) contained in Art. 24.1–2 
of the Constitution.19 
The effectiveness of legal protection for administrative acts, moreover, is granted, at 
a constitutional level, by all of those general provisions from which interpreters have 
derived a correspondence between those constitutional contents which were origi­
nally envisaged for the ordinary jurisdiction, but that are applicable even in the case 
of administrative jurisdiction. For example, reading together Art. 28 and. 24.1 of the 
Constitution, a solid basis for the constitutional guarantee of a compensatory remedy 
also for breach of legitimate interests can be postulated which was first acknowledged 
by the case law and the law maker. 
Besides, it is worth mentioning that Art. 117.1 Const. states that ‘[l]egislative pow­
ers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution
and with the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations’.
This means that legal protection of individual rights and legitimate interests, as pro­
vided for by law (not only in the field of trial proceedings), must be pursued in
accordance not only with constitutional principles, but also with the standards of
the EU and the ECtHR.20 Art. 1 of the Code represents the legislative statement of
this principle. Differently, the Constitution does not contain any express rule con­
cerning the effectiveness of the substantial guarantees provided for by the law for
the citizen against the administrative power. Nevertheless, the Italian Constitutional
Court has qualified those general principles (and the principle of due process too)
expressed by law no. 241/1990 as materially constitutional principles,21 that is as a
specific enforcement by law of those more general principles provided by the Con­
stitution.22 Law no. 241/1990, in fact, provides that the law itself shall single out
‘the guarantees for the citizens towards the public administration’ and that ‘these
guarantees are defined by the general principles established by law’. More precisely,
these are all of those guarantees that could be set forth just by the law maker at a state
level and that could not find a different discipline at a regional level, because they
are an expression of the essential level of benefits that, according to the Constitu­
tion, must be uniformly protected throughout the country. Among these guarantees,
the following provisions of law no. 241/1990 are included: those on the ‘duty of the
public administration to ensure the participation of stakeholders to the whole path
of the administrative procedure, identify a person responsible for the procedure,
to conclude the procedure within the given time limit and to ensure access to all
before an independent and impartial court. An Act of Parliament shall lay down provisions to ensure 
that trials are of a reasonable length. 6. All judicial decisions must be motivated’. 
19 Marta Mengozzi, Giusto processo e processo amministrativo: Profili costituzionali (Milano, Giuffrè 2009) 3. 
20 Silvia Mirate, Giustizia amministrativa e Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo: l’“altro” diritto europeo in 
Italia, Francia e Inghilterra (Napoli, Jovene 2007); Miriam Allena, Art. 6 CEDU: procedimento e processo 
amministrativo (Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica 2012). 
21 E.g. Constitutional Court, 23.03.2007, no. 104. 
22 Art. 97. See Buffoni (n. 8), especially for the traditional arguments of scholars in this perspective; 
Franco Gaetano Scoca, ‘Amministrazione pubblica e diritto amministrativo nella giurisprudenza cos­
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administrative documents, and those provisions regarding the maximum length of
administrative procedure’.23 
At the same time, since the law maker is obligated to respect the limits deriving 
from the EU legal order, the law no. 241/1990 might also be considered part of this 
duty. This provision in fact recalls, among the general principles of administrative 
action, those also related to the EU order and leaves for the interpreter the option of 
identifying them specifically. 
3 Rights-based perspective 
3.1 The parties’ rights in the administrative proceedings 
As for the administrative procedure, the law no. 241/1990 contains specific rules and 
principles guaranteeing individual rights and privileges for the effectiveness of legal 
protection. 
One of them is the right to obtain a decision within a due time limit.24 The law 
no. 241 provides that the individual may – in case when the competent administra­
tive body does not pursue its duties – launch a surrogate procedure before the same 
body or access to judicial remedies. Moreover, in certain sorts of procedures, the law 
provides for the right to obtain, in the case of undue delay of the decision making 
administrative body, a €30 forfeiture compensation for every day of delay.25 
The law provides also the right to receive a notification about any administra­
tive procedure.26 All those who are affected by the administrative act to be adopted
should get such a notification. This communication must contain the information
about the competent administration, the object of the procedure, the due time for
its conclusion, the person responsible for the procedure and the office to contact
for more information, to view or register relevant documents, acts or testimonials.
Another right is the entitlement to intervene into a particular administrative proce­
dure and to register and deposit acts or documents. All stakeholders are entitled to
do so. The law recognises also the right to have access to every administrative docu­
ment useful to protect one’s legal interest or position. In case of denial or silence,
the law provides for the option of making an action before the administrative court
or before the local Ombudsman or before the National Commission for access to
administrative acts.27 
23 Giuseppe Morbidelli, ‘Regioni e principi generali del diritto amministrativo’ (2010) 1 Diritto e
società 81. 
24 Art. 2. The deadline for the decision is usually 30 days since the citizen’s request. 
25 See the Decree no. 69/2013. 
26 See the Law no. 241/1990. 
27 There is another form of right of access in the Italian administrative law, especially in the context of 
the rules on transparency of public administration. It was provided by legislative decree no. 33/2013 
(Art. 5) and is called ‘civic access’. In particular, the law provides that anyone has per se a right to have 
access to a wide range of information and documents. See Mario Savino, ‘La nuova disciplina della 
trasparenza amministrativa’ 8-9 (2013) Giornale di diritto amministrativo 795; Anna Simonati, ‘La tras­
parenza amministrativa e il legislatore: un caso di entropia normativa?’ (2013) 4 Diritto amministrativo
749; Enrico Carloni, L’amministrazione aperta: Regole, strumenti, limiti dell’open government (Rimini, Mag­
gioli 2014) 231. 









   
  
The duty of the decision making body to give reasons of its act (with the exception 
of normative and general acts) is also provided as well as the right to the notification 
of the denial of the request as a condition of the validity of the act. 
All of these rights – aimed at ensuring citizens’ participation, the right to express 
one’s opinion and defences during the procedure, efficiency, transparency, publicity 
and the economy of public actions – must be granted both for every administrative 
procedure whatever their nature (revocation, ex officio annulment or validation) is. 
Nevertheless, the omission of some of these guarantees (for example, the omission 
of the guarantee on the right to communication) does not entail per se the voidness 
of the final act: the court may concretely evaluate if the result of the final decision of 
the administration would have been different if full participation were ensured to all 
stakeholders. Just in this hypothesis, the court could declare the act void.28 
3.2 Access to courts 
With reference to access to justice, the principle of effectiveness is realised through 
the recognition of a set of rights for the citizen: 
(a) The right to a judge pre-established by law:29 the judge called to decide the litiga­
tion has to be the one established by law in general and preventive terms; in other 
words, it is only for the law to determine, in the abstract, the relevant jurisdic­
tional body and judges’ competences; this could be done only before the litiga­
tion arises. The pre-establishment of the judge is functional to the realisation of 
the principle of impartiality of the jurisdictional function. 
(b) The right to claim: this could be intended as the faculty for the individual owner 
of a legitimate interest to make an action before the administrative court, in order 
(1) to challenge, within a 60-day time limit, an illegitimate act of the administra­
tion (on the grounds of breach of law, lack of competences or ‘abuse of power’) 
and to obtain its ex tunc (retrospective) annulment;30 (2) to obtain, within the 
prescribed 180-day time limit, the declaration of invalidity (nullità) of an admin­
istrative act (in the cases provided by the law); (3) to be able to sentence, within 
one year from the expiration of the deadline given to the administration by the 
legislation for the adoption of a specific act, the public administration to give 
an answer (or to adopt a certain act in all of those cases in which the use of a 
discretionary power is not required); (4) to be able to sentence, within a 120-day 
time limit, the administration to pay compensatory damages deriving from the 
adoption of an illegitimate act (or deriving from the administration’s ‘silence’). 
This remedy could be activated even without a previous challenge of the detri­
mental administrative act;31 (5) sentencing, within the 60-day time limit that the 
law provides for the challenge of a denial, the administration to adopt a specific 
28 Art. 21 octies. See Falcon (n. 2) 149.
 
29 Art. 25.1 of the Constitution.
 
30 See the relevant provisions of the Law no. 241/1990 and the Code.
 
31 However, the law provides that the judge could even decide not to compensate damages, if it is proved 

that the damage could have been avoided if the citizen would have promptly challenged the detrimen­
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measure (with the exception of those cases in which the public administration 
has to use its discretionary power – see (3) above); (6) to obtain a precautionary 
measure, which normally goes together with the complaint indicated sub no. 1 
above, but which could also be granted by the judge ante causam, if necessary;
(7) to obtain the implementation of the decision of an administrative or ordinary 
judge, even before it becomes final (this is known as ‘compliance judgment’, 
giudizio d’ottemperanza). 
(c) The right to defence: for the citizen, this includes the option of giving a personal
account to the judge, but also access (at the same conditions as the administra­
tion) to evidence, as provided by law, and to further remedies, such as the ‘addi­
tional reasons claim’ (ricorso per motivi aggiunti)32 or ‘incidental claim’ (ricorso
incidentale), which is accessible both to the administration and to the subjects
that have an interest in the preservation of the challenged act (it’s a sort of
‘counterclaim’). 
(d) The right to appeal: it is the right to claim before the Council of State (Con­
siglio di Stato) the decisions of first instance administrative tribunals, which have 
been instituted by the main administrative centre of each Region since 1971; first 
instance decisions could be challenged within 60 days from the official commu­
nication of the decision to the parties. The decisions of the Council of State can 
be challenged before the Court of Cassation (Corte di cassazione). This possibility 
is limited to jurisdictional reasons (see Art. 111.9 of the Constitution); in other 
words, the Court of Cassation could decide just on the correct identification of 
the jurisdiction (that is, to decide whether it was legally correct that the decision 
was undertaken by the administrative judge instead of by the ordinary one). 
(e) The right to access extraordinary means of appeal (in some specific circum­
stances), against final decisions: these are ricorso per revocazione and opposizione di 
terzo; the first one is aimed to challenge judiciary decisions that, for example, 
have been pronounced on the grounds of grave mistake of fact, on the basis of 
evidences which have been later declared to be false or mistakes caused by the 
malice of the parties or of the judge; differently, the second remedy is accessible 
for those that could not participate to the legal proceeding in which a detrimen­
tal decision has been adopted and become final. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that, in order to ensure the effectiveness of legal protec­
tion for the citizen against the public administration, the law provides that an error in 
identifying the correct (ordinary or administrative) jurisdiction does not jeopardise 
the effects of the issues presented before the judge, except for the decadence of the 
effects intervened in the meantime. 
In addition, the provision of several ‘special trials’ (i.e. in case of ‘silence’ of the 
administration, or for the protection of the right to have access to administrative 
documents, for the challenge of some specific acts, such as those regarding public 
procurements, or for electoral litigations, etc.) and the possibility that the trial could 
come to an end already after a precautionary decision or after a ‘brief decision’ (that 
32 By this remedy, the citizen that has already filed a complaint could challenge, in the same complaint, 
other administrative acts that have been at a later stage adopted by the administration (or that were not 
already known to the claimant) and that are connected to the challenged acts. 
182 Fulvio Cortese 
 






means a decision adopted in eased terms) are not per se a factor that alters the prin­
ciple of the effectiveness of legal protection in administrative proceedings. These 
provisions have the same ratio, which is to speed proceedings and to make, this way, 
more effective the protection that the legal order could grant to the individual in case 
of interests that deserve quick decisions or – in other words – to grant more time and 
more space to those litigations that need more complex judicial evaluations. 
The main factors that influence the above-described framework could be identified 
as follows. 
(a) A first factor concerns the multifaceted and ‘classical’ theme of the division of 
jurisdiction between ordinary and administrative courts, on the basis of the dis­
tinction between individual rights and legitimate interests. As mentioned above, 
this distinction is the result of legal scholars’ and case law interpretations, that 
tends to detect a legitimate interest every time the public administration is using 
its authoritative power and when the citizen has an interest which is not com­
pletely and directly granted by the law. Nevertheless, there are still some areas 
of conflict between the interpretation given by the Court of Cassation and the 
Council of State as to the substantial boundaries of these hypotheses.33 For the 
Court of Cassation, the presence of a legitimate interest is excluded if the power 
of the administration is bound or if there is an inviolable or fundamental right 
or when the act adopted by the administration is void. The Council of State tends 
to reiterate its traditional perspective, even when the administration is adopting 
merely unfair behaviours or when the existence of requirements provided by law 
needs to be ascertained. 
(b) A second factor is the absence of specific and direct remedies for the protection 
of individual legal positions of constitutional rank or for the guarantee of general 
interests that could undergo a prejudice at the moment of the adoption of nor­
mative acts (regulations). 
In the Italian legal order, direct access to constitutional adjudication for the protec­
tion of fundamental rights and freedoms is not given to the individual. At the same 
time, the individual does not have the right to challenge before the administrative 
court a normative act per se either: normative acts (regulations) can, in fact, be chal­
lenged only if they contain specific provisions that are directly detrimental to the 
individual or to a particular category of subjects (in this latter case, the law provides 
for a particular kind of power to make an action for those associations, such as envi­
ronmental or consumers ones, that pursue a general interest). Except for these cases, 
to challenge the legitimacy of normative (or general) administrative acts, the indi­
vidual should wait for an administrative act that gives concrete application to what 
is provided by the normative (or general) act and challenge the second act. This act 
has to be addressed to the individual. This way, he/she can make an action before the 
administrative court, challenging the administrative act and, through it, bringing the 
normative act before a court. 
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that the so-called ‘complaint for the efficiency of
public administrations and authorities’ (regulated by legislative decree no. 198/2009)
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allows persons who have a direct interest in the adoption of an administrative act,
but also some categories of subjects identified in the law, to initiate a trial before the
administrative courts in order to complain about a failure in fulfilling the rules for
the correct implementation of a public service and also about the failure to adopt a
‘compulsory general administrative act that does not have a normative content’ and
that was supposed to be adopted within a due date. This is a sort of ‘class action’ that
has not been used very often until now and whose concrete significance is still contro­
versial among legal scholars.34 
(c) A third factor is the absence of a significant space for alternative dispute resolu­
tion remedies (i.e. different from jurisdictional ones), even in the case of admin­
istrative acts characterised by wide guarantees or by the highly technical nature 
of the evaluations to be made by the administration. As mentioned above, the 
principle of full access to justice does not permit the law maker to provide for 
different ways of dispute resolutions in the cases in which individual rights and 
legitimate interests are at stake. The Constitutional Court has stated that the law 
can provide previous administrative complaints or preliminary and conciliatory 
stages, but affirmed also that these could not completely block access to jurisdic­
tion. At the same time, it should be excluded that the administrative court should 
restrain from granting legal protection to those cases in which the public author­
ity is acting on the basis of a specific (technical) expertise or through special 
procedures provided by law (for example, with independent authorities); in fact, 
the administrative court has progressively recognised the option of varying his 
control over administrative acts and adopting even a strict control over technical 
administrative acts, even recurring to the advice of technical experts.35 
(d) A fourth factor regards the circumstance that the administrative adjudication of 
the courts has always had a leading role to define the effectiveness of jurisdic­
tional legal protection. 
In the Italian law on judicial review of administrative action, several principles and 
instruments have been defined through judicial interpretation. More precisely, 
through case law judges have recognised the option of claiming compensation in 
the case of damages arising from unlawful acts; they clarified judicial powers in the 
case of ‘silence’ of the administration and recognised a particular condemnation for 
the administration, aimed at obtaining a particular act. Moreover, apart from the 
requirements set by the institutions of the European Union, the administrative court 
has always emphasised its powers in the definition of boundaries and limits of parties’ 
prerogatives. This happened, in particular, with regard to the hypothesis of ‘abuse of 
process’ (abuso del processo), which has been connected to the principles of solidarity 
and effectiveness of legal protection before the judge.36 This way, the letter of the
34 For a first and general comment see Umberto G. Zingales, ‘Una singolare forma di tutela del cittadino 
nei confronti della p.a.: la class action’ (2010) 3 Giornale di diritto amministrativo 246. 
35 About this topic see Gian Claudio Spattini, ‘Le decisioni tecniche dell’amministrazione e il sindacato 
giurisdizionale’ (2011) 1 Diritto processuale amministrativo 133. 
36 Fulvio Cortese, ‘Il giudice amministrativo e l’abuso del diritto’ (2012) 10 Giornale di diritto amministrativo
959. The leading case – in which it has been stated the existence of a general principle of prohibi­
tion of abuse of trials – was decided by the Plenary Session of Council of State, 23 March 2011, no. 3. 













Italian Code of administrative trials and proceedings has sometimes been interpreted 
as a real general interest in a fair trial, which is able to prevail even against the private 
interest of the parties. 
4 Institutional perspectives 
As mentioned above, in Italy, judicial remedies against the action of public admin­
istration could be activated by citizens before a specialised judge, the administrative 
jurisdiction. This happens, in particular, when citizens are willing to defend their 
legitimate interest. Differently, if the issue concerns a subjective right, the jurisdiction 
belongs to the ordinary judge.37 
Based on the above mentioned 1971 reform,38 regional administrative tribunals 
(for the first instance proceeding) and the Council of State (for appellate decisions) 
are the judges in charge for administrative jurisdiction.39 
The first ones (regional administrative tribunals: tribunali amministrativi regionali – 
TAR) are located in the chief town of the Region, even if in some Regions there might 
be secondary seats. They have a territorial competence, which cannot be derogated. 
Their competence is established on the basis of an alternative criterion: either the 
competence is identified looking at the seat of the administration that adopted the 
act to be challenged or that adopted the behaviour considered to be detrimental (in 
this case the competent tribunal will be the one located in the same Regions of the 
administration), or relevance is given to the effects of that act or of that behaviour 
(in this case, the competent tribunal will be the one in the regional district in which 
those effects arise; if they have a national range, the competent tribunal will be the 
one seating in Rome, for Lazio Region – TAR Lazio). 
The Council of State seats in Rome. It should be noted that, with regards to Sicily, 
the functions of the Council of State are performed by the Council of Administrative 
Justice for Sicily, which works as a ‘section’ of the Council of State. 
Regional administrative tribunals normally function by boards composed of three
judges; at every regional administrative tribunal are normally instituted one or more
sections. The Council of State is also organised into sections. Nevertheless, not all of
them are deputed to work as appellate judges: three of them have a consultative func­
tion and issue opinions for the Government. These consultative sections are also called
to decide on extraordinary claims presented before the President of the Republic.40 
About this topic see: Piera Maria Vipiana, ‘Il Consiglio di Stato e l’abuso del processo amministrativo 
per contraddittorietà dei comportamenti processuali’ (2012) 6 Giurisprudenza italiana 1429; Federico 
Dinelli, ‘La questione di giurisdizione fra il divieto di abuso del diritto e il principio di parità delle parti 
nel processo’ (2012) 7-8 Foro amministrativo CDS 1998; Annalisa Giusti, ‘Principio di sinteticità e abuso 
del processo’ (2014) 1 Giurisprudenza italiana 149; Giuseppe Tropea, L’abuso del processo amministrativo: 
Studio critico (Napoli, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2015). 
37 See above, chapter 1. 
38 See above, para 3.2. 
39 On a general basis, administrative judges are employed through a public competitive exam, which is 
open just to some specified categories of individuals. However, one-fourth of the members of the Coun­
cil of State are nominated by the Government. 
40 The extraordinary claim before the President of the Republic (ricorso straordinario al Capo dello Stato) is 
a non-jurisdictional remedy, which is not challengeable. It could be activated by any citizen in alterna­
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The other sections are jurisdictional in nature; their decisions are issued by a board
composed of at least five judges. 
A specific commitment, in the Council of States, belong to the Plenary Assembly 
(Adunanza Plenaria): it is a particular board that authoritatively represents all juris­
dictional sections. These latter can or have to (depending on the cases) submit to 
the Plenary Assembly particularly relevant issues and this board is called to guarantee 
a uniform interpretation and application of the law. Even if a stare decisis rule is not 
properly existing in Italy, the Plenary Assembly’s decisions are generally binding the 
other sections of the Council of State to defer to the Plenary Assembly all litigations 
that are reasonably considered to end up with a decision that moves away from the 
official and funded jurisdictional interpretation. 
In general, administrative judges should restrain to the evaluation of the legitimacy 
of the administrative action, by verifying the subsistence of the grounds provided by 
law (law violation, lack of competence, abuse of power). This means that they could 
not substitute themselves to the administration, unless the law expressly gives them 
the power to intervene in the merits of the litigation (this happens, for example, in 
the hypothesis in which the public administration does not respect a final decision 
pronounced by an administrative or ordinary judge).41 As mentioned above, how­
ever, the law provides that in some circumstances the administrative judge could indi­
cate to the administration the correct behaviour: this happens, for example, in the 
case of ‘silence’ of the administration, when it does not have a discretionary power; 
nevertheless, the same could also happen, sometimes, also in cases in which the judge 
is called to verify administrative evaluation which are technical in nature. 
Administrative trials are grounded on the principle of demand, as happens for 
ordinary trials. In some cases, though, the administrative judge could also decide to 
get evidence ex officio, in consideration of the traditional ‘superiority’ of the admin­
istration and of the difficulties that the citizen has in getting all relevant documents 
and evidences before the beginning of the trial. 
Legal protection of citizens against the public administration does not exclusively 
belong to courts, even if extra-jurisdictional or alternative remedies are very few 
(according to the constitutional principles on the prohibition of cases of ‘conditioned 
jurisdiction’),42 except for administrative claims and, in particular, the extraordinary 
claim before the President of the Republic (cited above). 
Some functions for the protection of rights and legitimate interests of citizens 
could also be played by the Ombudsman, seating in every Region. This particular 
organism, however, does not have the power to void or to declare unlawful the acts 
of the public administration; his commitments are limited to persuasion and solici­
tation, except for some specific hypothesis in which the Ombudsman could give a 
non-binding opinion on the correctness of the administrative action (this happens 
could be presented within 120 days from the communication of a detrimental administrative act. This 
claim is addressed to the competent Ministry, even if it has to be decided by the Council of State, by an 
ad hoc opinion. The discipline of this remedy is provided by Art. 8 of the decree of the President of the 
Republic n. 1199/1971. This decree sets also the law regulating two other types of general administra­
tive remedies: a ‘hierarchical claim’ (ricorso gerarchico) and an ‘opposition remedy’ (ricorso in opposizione) 
before the same body that adopted the detrimental administrative act. 
41 This is the so-called ‘compliance judgment’, see supra, at para 3.2. 
42 See supra, chapter 2. 










   
   
   
  
in the already mentioned hypothesis of the protection of the right to have access to 
administrative documents).43 
Finally, there are some specific remedies (in the form of arbitration or alternative 
dispute resolution) provided by the discipline on public procurements, especially 
for some sorts of litigations that might arise during the execution of contracts in this 
area.44 There are other similar remedies foreseen by the discipline of some independ­
ent authorities. 
5 European perspectives 
As mentioned above, the influence of the obligations deriving from European Union 
law constitutes a structural element, both from the viewpoint of judicial protection 
and under the perspective of the principles that the administration shall respect dur­
ing procedures. 
First, most recent developments in the area of judicial legal protection in adminis­
trative law received a critical impulse from the national implementation of the Euro­
pean directives on public procurements. 
Some of the most significant examples of this influence are: 
(a) The official recognition of new rights for the individuals. Is the case, for example, 
of the acknowledgement of compensatory damages for the breach of legitimate 
interests or for the admissibility of cautionary remedies even ante causam (before 
the formal claim). These extensions (originally admitted only in the field of pub­
lic procurements)45 became compulsory for all types of litigations, in compliance 
with the principle of equality. 
(b) The official recognition of new judicial powers. A similar path has been followed 
with regards to the admissibility of a very special claim, with very strict time lim­
its, in which the judge can decide – depending on the concrete case – either for 
the inefficacy of the contract on public procurement stipulated as a result of an 
unlawful procurement race (giving the victory to the claimant), or deciding on 
mere compensation for the damage.46 
(c) The provision of new kinds of stronger legal protection. This is the case of the 
new wording of the law no. 287/1990, which gives the Italian Antitrust Authority 
the prerogative to access to administrative courts against all the general admin­
istrative acts, regulations and any other act issued by a public administration in 
violation of the rules on fair competition and market.47 
(d) The recent evolution of the national judicial opinions about some relevant rem­
edies. It is the case of the concrete rules on the ‘incidental claim’ (mentioned 
above) in the field of public procurements. The ECJ, in particular, ruled that 
the Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application 
43 See supra, at para 3.1.
 
44 See legislative decree no. 163/2006, Art. 239–243.
 
45 See legislative decree no. 80/1998, Art. 35.
 
46 See legislative decree no. 163/2006, Art. 245–245 ter.
 
47 Travi (n. 4) 196.
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of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts 
‘must be interpreted to the effect that, if, in review proceedings, the successful 
tenderer – having won the contract and filed a counterclaim – raises a prelimi­
nary plea of inadmissibility on the grounds that the tenderer seeking review lacks 
standing to challenge the award because its bid should have been rejected by the 
contracting authority by reason of its non-conformity with the technical require­
ments under the tender specifications, that provision precludes that action for 
review from being declared inadmissible as a consequence of the examination of 
that preliminary plea in the absence of a finding as to whether those technical 
requirements are met both by the bid submitted by the successful tenderer, which 
won the contract, and by the bid submitted by the tenderer which brought the 
main action for review’.48 Before that judgment the Council of State ruled that 
‘the counterclaim contesting the locus standi of the party which has brought that 
action must always be examined first, even in cases where there were only two 
tenderers, namely the unsuccessful tenderer (the applicant in the main action) 
and the successful tenderer (the counterclaimant)’.49 
More generally, it is important to note that the need to guarantee principles set at the
EU level has widened, also from the procedural perspective, the spectrum of remedies
actionable by the individual. Among these, it is worth mentioning the remedies that
could be activated to protect legitimate expectations. This principle is, actually, one
of the cornerstones of the system of guarantees concerning the fair administrative
procedure, which has sometimes been expressly stated by the law-maker;50 it also consti­
tutes a parameter for the possibility of compensating damages that are somehow inde­
pendent from those that arise in specific acts. Therefore, if the acts or behaviour of
administrative bodies generate legitimate expectations, the private parties may claim
for damages caused by subsequent acts or behaviour that breach those expectations.51 
There is another relevant example that deserves mention: the principle of collabo­
ration between citizens and public administration during the preparatory phase of 
a procedure.52 This principle has been affirmed especially in those procedures that 
find their main source in EU law (i.e. antitrust), but administrative courts generally 
tend to extend it. 
The case law of the ECtHR has played a seminal role as well, especially with regard 
to the guarantees offered in administrative procedures or before administrative 
courts. Its most relevant effect could be found in the legislative interventions, follow­
ing the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court that attempted to make trials quicker 
(either by providing for special trials, or providing that persons that suffered a dam­
age caused by unreasonable delays of the judicial proceeding could activate an ad hoc
reparatory remedy)53. 
48 See Case C-100/12 Fastweb SpA ECLI:EU:C:2013:448.
 
49 See Plenary Session of Council of State, 7 April 2011, no. 4.
 
50 See, for example Law no. 241/1990 and no 311/2004.
 
51 Fulvio Cortese, ‘La revoca negli appalti pubblici tra danno precontrattuale e indennizzo’ (2013) 2 

Giornale di diritto amministrativo 169. 
52 Anna Simonati, Procedimento amministrativo comunitario e principi a tutela del privato (Padova, Cedam 
2009) 66. 
53 See law no. 89/2001. 














      
Some other relevant effects derived from the need to respect ECtHR’s case law. 
In particular, a very significant example in the Italian legal order is represented by a 
highly controversial case, regarding a particular way for the public administration to 
have access to property through occupation (without a formal taking procedure).54 
In this particular case, the Italian law maker, as a consequence of ECtHR decisions, 
has been forced by the Constitutional Court to address the issue and, therefore, to 
change the law: as a result, the rules concerning the compensation payment has 
been changed and adapted to the Conventional principles, by making them more 
adherent to the value of the damage suffered by the private subject who endured the 
occupation.55 
6 Conclusion 
From this general framework, some conclusive remarks could be drawn on the evolu­
tion of the principle of effectiveness of legal protection in the Italian legal system, 
from the administrative law viewpoint. 
Historically, the principle of effectiveness (both in procedure and in trials) repre­
sented a goal to pursue and implement. For example, the emergence of the notion 
of legitimate interest was functional in recognising the possibility of having access 
to subjective situations that, otherwise, would not find legal protection. The consti­
tutional recognition of this principle, moreover, has boosted the importance of this 
target, highlighting the substantial dimension of legitimate interest and driving the 
law-maker to the adoption of a dedicated law (the legislative decree no. 104/2010), 
that enumerates rights and principles that are instrumental to the effectiveness of 
legitimate interests before the concrete exercise of public powers. These outcomes, 
though, were mainly characterised by a specific attention to the subjective profile of 
legal protection: that is the set of prerogatives and benefits that the citizen can take 
advantage of in his relationship with the public administration. The result to be pur­
sued for legal scholars and for courts was to transform the legitimate interest into a 
subjective legal position having the same value as a subjective right. 
The most recent reforms of the Italian administrative system, on the one hand,
are characterised by the acceleration of this process of assimilation between legiti­
mate interests and subjective rights, especially with regard to the need to improve
the standards of legal protection of legitimate interests in the field of EU law. On
the other hand, they show the emersion of a new kind of objective impulse, in which
legal protection and its effectiveness are to be considered a value of the legal order
as a whole, to be protected even beyond ‘egoistic’ interests of private or public par­
ties. From this perspective, another viewpoint that deserves due consideration is the
attitude that can be observed in the last reforms, for example in those concerning
the taxes that the citizens have to pay to have access to justice, which have been
considerably increased. In the last few years, the rules on taxes to be payed to have
54 Antonio Gambaro, ‘Giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo e influenza sul diritto 
interno in tema di diritto di proprietà’ (2010) 2 Rivista di diritto civile 115. 
55 Constitutional Court, 24 October 2007, no. 349; Constitutional Court, 08 October 2010, no. 293. 
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access to justice have undergone profound changes, especially due to budgetary rea­
sons. The trend – which has been deeply criticised –56 is for a progressive increase of
these expenses, with the general goal of discouraging specious claims and to reduce
litigations before the administrative courts. In this new scenario, the role of the
courts has become more and more relevant. But also the role of the law maker has
strengthened. 
56 The issue regarding the compatibility of the italian legislation and the principle of access to justice 
(as stated in the European public procurement law) was raised recently before the ECJ: Tribunale 
Regionale di Giustizia Amministrativa, Trento, 29 January 2014 (for a comment of this decision, see 
Luca Presutti, ‘L’incompatibilità del contributo unificato negli appalti pubblici con la direttiva ricorsi’ 
(2014) 6 Urbanistica e appalti 709). However the ECJ rejected the question: see Case C-61/14 Orizzonte 
salute ECLI:EU:C:2015:655. 
11  The principle of effective legal 




The principle of effective legal protection is one of the general principles of Euro-
pean legal order. In Lithuania this principle is a constituent part of the constitu-
tional principle of the rule of law. This topic is extensively discussed in Lithuanian 
legal scholarship. Various aspects of the right to effective judicial protection have 
been addressed by Lithuanian scholars, like the correlation of the principle of effec-
tive judicial protection with other constitutional principles,1 the right to judicial 
protection in criminal procedure,2 the implementation of the right to judicial pro-
tection in administrative procedure,3 and the implementation of the right in civil 
procedure.4 One should also note respective comparative researches on the imple-
mentation of the principle in administrative law. Lithuania’s case is usually analysed 
in a comparative perspective with some EU Member States – Germany,5 or France.6
1 E. Kūris, ‘Konstitucinių principų plėtojimas konstitucinėje jurisprudencijoje’ in Konstitucinių principų 
plėtojimas konstitucinėje jurisprudencijoje: Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinio Teismo ir Lenkijos Respublikos 
Konstitucinio Tribunolo konferencijos medžiaga (Vilnius, Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinis Teismas 2002) 
208–334.
2 A. Abramavičius, ‘Teisė į teisminę gynybą Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinio Teismo jurisprudencijoje’ 
(2009) 3 Jurisprudencija 21–40.,G. Goda, ‘Konstitucinė justicija ir baudžiamojo proceso teisės mokslas’ 
(2011) 78 Teisė 68–92.
3  Dainius Raižis, ‘Žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos konvencijos įtaka administracinių teismų 
praktikai teisės į teisingą teismą kontekste’ (2010) 4 Visuomenės saugumas ir viešoji tvarka 161–174; Dainius 
Raižis, Procesas pirmosios instancijos administraciniame teisme: daktaro disertacija (Mykolo Romerio univer-
sitetas 2008) 170; Virgilius Valančius, ‘Žmogaus teisių užtikrinimas administraciniuose teismuose tai-
kant Europos žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos konvenciją’ in Teisė besikeičiančioje Europoje 
(Mykolo Romerio universitetas 2008) 497–524; Virgilius Valančius and Rimvydas Norkus, ‘Nacionalinis 
teisinis diskursas dėl administracinio proceso’ (2006) 3 Jurisprudencija 91–98; Dainius Pelenis and Jur-
gita Paužaitė-Kulvinskienė, ‘Effektiver gerichtlicher Schutz’ in Albrecht Weber (ed.), Fundamental Rights 
in Europe and North America (Martinus Nijoff Publishers 2008) 137–149; Jurgita Paužaitė-Kulvinskienė, 
Administracinė justicija: teorija ir praktika (Justitia 2005) 245.
4  Egidius Laužikas, Valentinas Mikelénas and Vytautas Nekrošius, Civilinio proceso teisė: II tomas (Justitia 
2004) 640; Vytautas Nekrošius, ‘Kai kurie civilinio proceso teisės klausimai Lietuvos Respublikos Kon-
stitucinio teismo doktrinoje’ (2007) 63 Teisė 76–87.
5 Jurgita Paužaitė-Kulvinskienė, ‘Der Aufbau der deutschen und litauischen Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit’ 
(2000) 36 Teisė 75–84.
6  Ligita Ramanauskaité, ‘Lithuanian administrative procedure by contrasting it with French administrative 
procedure’ (2004) 50 Lithuanus 45–53.
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1  The principle of effective legal protection and  
the constitutional framework in Lithuania
The principle of effective judicial protection (teisė į teisingą teismą) is a constituent part 
of the system of constitutional principles7 and takes part in developing the aspects 
of the constitutional principle of rule of law. The principle of rule of law (teisinės 
valstybės principas) which encompasses many interrelated imperatives, the content of 
the principle of effective judicial protection shall be revealed in the context of other 
constitutional principles, for example good administration, limitation of powers of 
the state authority, service of state institutions to the people and other principles.
In the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court (Lietuvos Respublikos konstitucinis 
teismas) the principle of effective legal protection is first of all related to the right of 
effective judicial protection.8 This was determined by the active stand taken by the 
Constitutional Court while developing the catalogue of constitutional rights where 
the priority was given to the interpretation of the right to access the court. Art. 
30(1) of the Constitution, which sets forth the right to access to court expressly, 
does not establish the principle of effective judicial protection. Its features and 
content are defined by systematic interpretation of other provisions of the Con-
stitution in the constitutional jurisprudence and at present may be regarded as 
the principle of effective judicial protection. Constitutional jurisprudence employs 
similar terms: ‘due legal process’ and9 ‘due legal procedure’.10 At present it is not 
clear whether the content of effective legal protection will be interpreted as a unit 
encompassing the rights of effective judicial protection together with the rights 
to proper procedures of public administration and whether it will be referred to 
the interrelation of judicial procedure with procedures of public administration 
and their influence on each other. In the context of the aforementioned constitu-
tional cases the Constitutional Court has noted that executive authorities in their 
activities are bound by the requirements of due legal procedure deriving from 
the Constitution. The requirements of proper legal procedure that are applied to 
the procedures of public administration are implemented in a more concrete way 
within the principle of good administration11 rather than the principle of effective 
judicial protection.
 7  Ruling of 13 December 2004 of the Constitutional Court, Valstybės žinios, 2004, No 181–6708; Ruling of 
2 June 2005 of the Constitutional Court, Valstybės žinios, 2005, No 71–2561.
 8 Lietuvos Respublikos konstitucinio teismo 2002  m. liepos 2 d. nutarimas ‘Dėl karių galimybės kreiptis į 
teismą’ Valstybės žinios. 2002, Nr. 69–2832; Lietuvos Respublikos konstitucinio teismo 2004 m. rugpjūčio 
17 d. nutarimas ‘Dėl teisės kreiptis į teismą’, Valstybės žinios. 2004, Nr. 146–5311; Lietuvos Respublikos 
Konstitucinio Teismo 2006 m. rugsėjo 21 d. nutarimas ‘Dėl teismų sprendimų motyvų surašymo ir skel-
bimo, sprendimo už akių, taip pat dėl apeliacijos’, Valstybės žinios. 2006, Nr. 102–3957; 2008 05 28 dėl 
ATPK tyrimo principo apimties; 2010 05 13 dėl ABTĮ 16 str. 2 d.
 9  Ruling of 31 May 2006 of the Constitutional Court [on quota of the white sugar export] Valstybės žinios, 
2006, No 62–2283.
10  Ruling of 30 June 2008 on the Constitutional Court [on recovery of a state loan] Valstybės žinios, 2008, 
No 75–2965.
11 Jurgita Paužaitė-Kulvinskienė, ‘Das Recht auf eine gute Verwaltung in der Rechtsprechung des litauis-
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The principle of effective legal protection in administrative justice from the proce­
dural point of view is related to other procedures – constitutional, civil, and criminal 
procedure. Thus, this principle cannot be interpreted ‘autonomously’, that is only 
in the sphere of administrative procedure. The constitutional framework creates a 
universal system for judicial protection and joins judicial procedures, which are dif­
ferent by their essence and nature. The universality of judicial protection was first 
recognised by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania as early as 1996.12 
Subsequent rulings in 200213 and 200414 referred to the principle of judicial protec­
tion as a value category, that is as dynamic and one of the most important constitu­
tional objectives. 
Secondly, the principle of effective legal protection at the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court is discussed in relationship with the right to a fair trial. So, the 
legal protection means at the first step the judicial protection or the right to a fair 
trial. Art. 30(1) of the Constitution provides that ‘the person whose constitutional 
rights or freedoms are violated shall have the right to apply to court’. In the consti­
tutional jurisprudence15 and legal theory16 this right is regarded as an absolute con­
stitutional right. This means that every individual shall have the possibility to defend 
their rights and freedoms in a court against both illegal actions of other people and 
public authorities and their officials. Pursuant to the Constitution (Konstitucija) the 
legislator is bound by the positive duty to establish legal regulation that allows for 
the resolution of all disputes concerning the violations of rights and freedoms of 
individuals, as well as acquired rights, before courts. Since the right to access a court 
is an absolute one it shall not be unnecessarily restricted and there shall be no unjusti­
fied burden to be put on the implementation of the right. Otherwise, this regulation 
would be just an inactive declaration. 
In the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court the principle of the effective judi­
cial protection consists of three elements: 
(a) right to access the administrative court; 
(b) right to a fair trial; and 
(c) rights to defence. 
This grouping is based on the classification provided by the digest of official consti­
tutional doctrine in Lithuania and the legal regulation laid down in Art. 47 of the 
12 Ruling of 18 April 1996 of the Constitutional Court [on the Law on Commercial Banks] Valstybės žinios, 
1996, No 36–915. 
13 Ruling of 2 July 2002 of the Constitutional Court [on the opportunity for soldiers to apply to court] 
Valstybės žinios, 2002, No 69–2832; Ruling of 23 October 2002 of the Constitutional Court [on the pro­
tection of the private life of a public person and the right of a journalist not to disclose the source of 
information] Valstybės žinios, 2002, No 104–4675. 
14 Ruling of 17 August 2004 of the Constitutional Court [on the right to apply to court] Valstybės žinios, 
2004, Nr. 146–5311; Ruling of 29 December 2004 of the Constitutional Court [on the restraint of organ­
zsed crime] Valstybės žinios, 2005, No 1–7. 
15 Ruling of 30 June 2000 of the Constitutional Court [on the right to compensation for damage inflicted 
by unlawful actions of interrogatory and investigatory bodies, the prosecutor’s office and court] Valstybės 
žinios, 2000, No 54–1588. 
16 Armanas Abramavičius, ‘Teisė į teisminę gynybą Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinio Teismo jurispru­
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Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union taken as a source and which 
provides insight into the universal system of judicial protection. The imperatives 
developed by the Constitutional Court have an impact on all branches of procedural 
law and are peculiar not only to administrative but also to civil and criminal proce­
dure. These imperatives may be divided into two groups. 
The first group of constitutional imperatives concerns the institutional ones. These 
requirements are significant for establishing fundamental and the most important 
principles that must be applied to the organisation and activities of the judicial sys­
tem. In this regard, one should note the approach of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Lithuania on the establishment of the specialised system of administra­
tive courts. Having interpreted the Constitution, the Constitutional Court provided 
respective provisions that were highly relevant to administrative procedure law and 
administrative law. 
The second group of constitutional imperatives, which can be conditionally titled 
procedural imperatives, are relevant for laying down the constitutional foundations 
of trial (administration of justice) to different stages of the proceedings; however, 
these procedural imperatives may have certain peculiarities depending on the cat­
egory of the case under consideration. 
2 Rights-based perspective 
2.1 Participation 
Procedural rights of legal protection during the procedure at the entities of public
administration and during the court procedure are mainly supplemented by both the
provisions of the Law on Public Administration (LPA, Viešojo administravimo įstatymas) 
and legal norms laid down in the specialised legal regulation or by the provisions of
the Law on Administrative Procedure (LAP, Administracinių bylų teisenos įstatymas). 
The administrative procedure is regulated by the LPA for all matters of administra­
tive law. Other laws and legislative acts regulating the specific protection in different
fields of public administration (tax law, municipality law, environmental law, social
security law, asylum law) are adopted on the basis of the general provisions of this
law. The LPA foresees the main principle for the handling of the entities of public
administration – the administrative decision. There are two of kinds of administrative
decisions: individual administrative decision (e.g. construction permit, license for
business etc.) and normative administrative decision (legislative acts of the minister,
acts of the government, acts of the local authorities etc.). The procedure of admin­
istrative decisions in different sectors of administration are regulated in special laws
and other legislative acts. In these acts are written the requirements for administra­
tive decisions, the institutions who are responsible for that and sometimes specific
rules concerning the procedure. 
The LPA implicitly establishes that administrative decisions cannot, in the absence 
of statutory provision, be revoked. Under general rule, administrative decisions com­
municated to the person concerned become final. This naturally leads the individual 
concerned to reasonably expect that the initial legal decision will not be amended 
by the subsequent decision. In Lithuania neither the legislator nor administrative 
courts have ever recognised the position that the public authorities have an inherent 
power to amend or withdraw a formal decision. In the LPA the Lithuanian legislator 
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implicitly has established that the public authorities do not hold the power to revoke 
formal a administrative decision they adopt. This general rule applies to all types of 
decisions immaterial of their legal consequences, i.e. lawful and unlawful, favourable, 
declarative and other formal decisions are all irrevocable in the absence of express 
statutory power. The single exception to the rule set out in the LPA provides that 
a formal decision may be amended only to the extent necessary to correct clerical 
errors. 
In this context one should note that until 2007 Lithuanian law did recognise the 
power of the public authorities to alter or withdraw the formal decision subject to the 
consent of the individuals affected. In the absence of the consent of the individuals 
concerned, the errors were remedied by the quasi-judicial bodies or courts. In addi­
tion to this, the legal regulation in effect until 2007 provided that the public authori­
ties ex officio were entitled to correct legal errors as long as it was not regarded as an 
interference with respective rights and interests of the individuals concerned. The 
rationale for the amended legal regulation may be linked to the loyalty to normativ­
ism or the reluctance to give more powers to the public authorities. One may argue 
that this approach will slow down the rate of administrative change and introduce 
unwelcome conservative decision making. Nevertheless, Lithuanian administrative 
courts have accepted these changes in legal regulation rather easily and coherently. 
Faced with the choice between legality and individual justice the Lithuanian courts 
tend to find for the principle of legality on this point. The courts have stated on more 
than one occasion that the public authorities shall act in accordance with the princi­
ple that they are allowed to do only what is expressly set out in the laws. Thus, under 
these circumstances one may rightly assume that the priority is given to the principles 
of legality and primacy of law. In this regard, the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Lithuania has stated that the principle of legality shall mean that the formal decision 
is valid until it is annulled by the superior body of public authorities or the court.17 
The same approach is evident in another case wherein the Supreme Administrative 
Court has emphasised that when the public authority decides the matter by adopting 
a formal decision it creates certain rights and duties to the individuals concerned. 
The Court went on to state that the practice where the public authority kept changing 
its mind was compatible neither with the principle of good administration nor with 
the principle of legal certainty or legality. Thus, the administrative decision adopted 
by the public authority shall be binding and legal, that is it shall not be altered or 
withdrawn ex officio by the public authority which had adopted it.18 
The exceptions to the aforementioned rule of irrevocability are only found in the 
special legal regulation which expressly provides that respective public authorities are 
entitled to amend or revoke their final decisions. One should note that Lithuanian 
administrative law precludes the secondary legislation which introduces the power of 
the public authorities to revoke formal administrative decision. The right to revoke 
the adopted decision which confers rights to individuals shall be regulated by the 
law and cannot be set out in the secondary legislation.19 The statutory intervention 
into the final administrative decision can be initiated by both the parties concerned 
17 Case No. A-602–2104/2012, 27 April 2012. 
18 Case No. A-602–227/2012, 12 March 2012. 
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and the public authorities themselves. In most of the cases the provisions of the spe­
cial legal regulation entitle the administration to amend the final decision if it was 
obtained in bad will (by fraud, false information etc.), or the factual circumstances 
which were the ground to adopt the respective decision change. 
Nevertheless, the absence of general rules on the revocation of administrative deci­
sions and the tendency to be against the ability to revoke the initial decision imma­
terial of the type of the act and its legal consequences create the tension between 
legality, legal expectations, and public interest. This is readily apparent in the case law 
of administrative courts and can be exemplified by the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Lithuania.20 
2.2 Right to appeal 
The appeal to a superior administrative authority against an administrative decision 
can be an obligation (only in the cases foreseen in special law and only after this 
stage is possible to appeal to the administrative court) or an alternative (the person 
can choose between the appeal to an authority or direct to the court). There is a pos­
sibility to apply to an administrative dispute commission prior to bringing the case 
to an administrative court. Application to administrative dispute commissions prior 
to bringing a case to an administrative court is not compulsory, save for the matters 
provided by laws. In the absence of specific rules provided by law about the necessity 
of an administrative claim prior to bringing a case to an administrative court, admin­
istrative decisions can be brought to an administrative court directly. 
The court shall not offer assessment of the disputed administrative acts and acts 
(or omission) from the point of view of political or economic expediency and shall 
only establish whether or not there has been in a particular case a violation of a law or 
any other legal act. Art. 89 of the LAP describes grounds for annulment of contested 
acts (e.g. illegality in essence, i.e., conflicting by its contents with legal acts of supe­
rior power, illegality, as it was adopted in violation of the basic procedures, etc.). The 
contested act (or a part thereof) may also be annulled on other grounds recognised 
as material by the administrative court. 
The scope of control by administrative courts depends on the nature of the case.
There is no clear provision in Lithuania, whether administrative courts are entitled
to examine advantages and drawbacks of the administrative decision. However, Lithu­
anian administrative courts carry out control of compatibility of administrative acts
with the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality, objectivity and other principles
of public administration, as they are set down in the LPA and developed in the juris­
prudence of the ECJ. In this respect administrative acts may also be annulled, if, for
example, other possible acts to a lesser degree of influence on a person’s rights were
possible.21 Lithuanian administrative courts recognise areas which are reserved to the
exercise of discretionary powers by administrative authorities (e.g. discretionary power
of the head of state authority to decide whether a specific need exists to move a state
servant from one post to another;22 discretionary power of the municipal authority
20 Case No. A-756–35/2010, 1 February 2010.
 
21 Case No. A 1–362–2004.
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to set an expiry date of the licence to provide transport services;23 discretionary power
of the Communications Regulatory Authority to impose obligations on an operator
having significant market power on the relevant market24 etc.). Judicial control in
these areas is limited to objectivity, impartiality and criteria, which had been taken
into consideration by an administrative authority while exercising discretionary
powers. 
2.3 Right to access to administrative court 
2.3.1 The range of judicial review 
The requirements of the right to legal protection in Art. 30, para 1 and Art. 33, para 
2 of the Constitution are detailed in the Court Law and the LPA but they do not 
contain a clearly established universal principle for the jurisdiction of public disputes 
(except constitutional) as regards the administrative courts although this duty should 
be raised for the legislature by the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution. 
The competency of the administrative court is restricted on the basis of the LPA to 
only disputes concerning rights in the areas of public or internal administration. In 
addition, the principle for the establishment of the competency of the administrative 
courts by lists is established in the LPA. It duplicates the norm of the LPA establishing 
the general competency of the administrative courts. In the practice of Lithuania’s 
administrative justice, the LPA should be interpreted as an auxiliary (representative) 
list of disputes helping courts decide the problem of the jurisdiction of a dispute. The 
LPA indicates that other cases can also be assigned to the competency of the admin­
istrative courts; from a practical position this should be construed as a mechanism 
helping to avoid disputes in practice concerning the jurisdiction between general 
competency and administrative courts. 
The LPA foresees a positive restriction according to the LPA and a negative restric­
tion of the competency of an administrative court. The so-called supra-judicial acts, 
i.e. the examination of the activities of the President, Seimas, Seimas Members, Prime 
Minister, Government in corpore, and the judges of the Constitutional Court, Supreme 
Court of Lithuania, and Appeal Court of Lithuania, as well as the procedural activities 
of the judges of other courts, public prosecutors, pre-hearing investigation officials 
and bailiffs are not ascribed to the competency of the administrative courts. The 
legislature in 2000 revoked the exception in this list concerning the activities of the 
Seimas ombudsmen, recognising that there are no grounds, neither according to 
their nature nor according to the legal status of the entity, to include the activities of 
the Seimas ombudsmen on the list of exceptions. On the basis of the LPA, the legality 
of the procedural actions of judges, public prosecutors, and bailiffs has been given 
on the basis of special laws to general competency courts to hear. However, when 
these entities are not performing their procedural activities but performing public 
administration functions, both the legality of their activities and the reimbursement 
of damages should be within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. The admin­
istrative courts do not decide cases, which are ascribed to the competency of the 
23 Case No. A 5–913–2004. 
24 Case No. A 1–362–2004. 
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Constitutional Court, general courts, or other specialised courts. It is thereby sought 
in advance to avoid problematic cases where a dispute concerning a right in the area 
of public or internal administration has the features of both an administrative and a 
constitutional or civil dispute. 
2.3.2 Objectives of the legal protection 
There is no limitation for natural or legal persons to bring a case before an admin­
istrative court. There is a possibility to bring a complaint in order to protect state or 
another public interest laid down for the prosecutor, entities of administration, state 
control officers, other state institutions, agencies, organisations or natural persons, 
but only in the cases prescribed by law. Administrative courts can also decide cases 
relating to disputes between public administrations, which are not subordinated to 
one another, concerning competence or breaches of laws, except for civil litigation 
cases assigned to the courts of general jurisdiction. Public entities are not entitled to 
challenge their own administrative acts before administrative courts. If an unlawful­
ness of an administrative act violates public interest, only the prosecutor or other 
persons, in the cases prescribed by law, may bring this case before a court. Normally 
judges do not have the right to initiate a case. But if a judge has information about 
a criminal action, he has the obligation to inform the prosecutor. Once the case is 
ongoing, the court can ‘actively’ participate in the proceeding by asking for evidence, 
appointing witnesses, experts, etc. 
Every interested person can apply to a court for the protection of his/her infringed 
or contested right or interest protected under law. Every applicant who challenges 
an administrative act has to demonstrate a particular interest in the annulment of 
this act. Only an application to an administrative court as an individual in order 
to protect his/her own infringed or contested right or interest is admissible. The 
Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania has ruled numerous times that there are 
no grounds for the annulment of the disputed administrative act if it is determined 
that this administrative act has not violated the rights and/or legal interests of the 
claimant.25 It is possible to bring a complaint to protect the State or other public 
interest laid down for the prosecutor, entities of administration, state control officers, 
other state institutions, agencies, organisations or natural persons, but only in the 
cases prescribed by law. The participation of a public prosecutor in administrative 
procedure when defending a public interest is presented as one of the most impor­
tant exceptions to the interest of a party. The conception of an administrative dis­
putes concerning a right in the area of public administration are distinguished: (a) a 
dispute concerning the use of a right; (b) a dispute concerning the use of a subjective 
right; (c) a dispute concerning the legality and validity of an act; and (d) a dispute 
in the area of public or internal administration. Attention should be paid to the fact 
that in the area of Lithuanian positive law two concepts are distinguished: ‘public 
administration’ and ‘internal administration’ but there are no clear criteria for the 
delimitation of these concepts. The conception of public and internal administration 
should be interpreted in the sense of the provisions of the LPA, which defines public 
or internal administration by two criteria: subjective, that is an obligatory entity of a 
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public/internal administration, and material, that is the activities of a public/internal 
administration. However, positive law today does not provide an unambiguous answer 
of whether both criteria are necessary in the case of each dispute or what the relation­
ship between them is. 
Cases concerning violations of administrative law are today one of the most relevant 
problems because they are still being heard according to the Soviet-style Code of Vio­
lations of Administrative Law of 1985. From January 2017 the new modern Code of 
Administrative Violations must come into force. Until 2011 a temporary compromise 
was in force that cases concerning violations of administrative law ware heard in the 
first instance by both general competency district courts and administrative courts. In 
both cases, decisions were heard by appeal procedure in the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Lithuania, which was the last resort. This question was essentially decided 
and from 2011 only the general courts deal with the cases on administrative violations 
in first and appeal instances. 
Cases concerning the legality of normative administrative legal acts are distrib­
uted, depending on the type of act in dispute, between the Constitutional Court
of Lithuania and the administrative courts. In addition, general competency courts
can also perform the incidental control of legality. The conformity of Parlament
resolutions, Presidential decrees, and Government acts to the Constitution and the
laws and the conformity of laws to the Constitution are within the competency of
the Constitutional Court. The control of the conformity of all the remaining nor­
mative administrative acts, which are enacted by both state (territorial or central)
and municipal public administration entities, to the laws is within the competency
of an administrative court. The normative act is defined by the LPA: (a) the area of
enacting the act is in performing public or internal administration functions; (b) the
non-individualisation of entities; and (c) an act is not applied only once. The ques­
tion of the legality of normative administrative acts in an individual case can also be
decided by general competency courts, that is a person is entitled but not obligated
to petition an administrative court. The practice of the administrative courts broadly
explains the extent of the judicial control and verifies not only the statutory legality
of administrative normative acts but also their constitutionality. The principled and
the incidental forms control are examined separately. The right of incidental control
is granted to persons when a specific case concerning the violation of their rights
is being heard. In the case of principled control, there is a finite group of specific
entities, which can file a petition concerning the legality of a normative administra­
tive act. Such entities include Seimas (Parlaments) members, Seimas (Parlaments)
ombudsmen, state ombudsmen, government representatives, public prosecutors,
and courts (i.e. not necessarily entities of the public administration). 
2.3.3 Content of protection 
Following the given classification, administrative courts in Lithuania carry out a 
full review of administrative acts. According to the LAP, upon hearing the case, the 
administrative court can: (1) revoke the contested administrative act (part thereof) 
or obligate the appropriate entity of administration to remedy the committed viola­
tion or carry out other orders of the court; (2) oblige the appropriate entity of munic­
ipal administration to implement the law, a Government resolution or another legal 
act; (3) settle the dispute in any other manner provided for by law. So the decision 
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of the court may contain this new administrative act; (4) award damages or redress 
of a moral wrong caused to a natural person or an organisation by the unlawful acts 
or omission in the sphere of public administration performed by state or municipal 
institutions, agencies, services and their employees in the discharge of their official 
functions (extra-contractual liability). 
In the cases relating to omission by an entity of administration, that is failure to 
perform official duties or in the cases regarding the delay in settling the matters, the 
administrative court may adopt a decision obligating the appropriate entity of admin­
istration to make a relevant decision or comply with any other court order within the 
prescribed time limits. 
It should be noted, however, that administrative courts do not offer assessment 
of the disputed administrative acts (or omission) from the point of view of politi­
cal or economic expediency and only establish, whether or not there has been, in a 
particular case, a violation of a law or any other legal act, whether or not the entity 
of administration has acted within the limits of its competence, also whether or not 
the act (action) complies with the objectives and tasks for the purpose whereof the 
institution has been set up and vested with appropriate powers. 
As there is no concept of administrative contract in Lithuania and all the disputes 
arising from contracts (including contracts with administrative authorities) fall under 
the jurisdiction of courts of general jurisdiction, administrative courts do not deal 
with contractual liability of administrative authorities. 
The LPA determines the limits of the control by an administrative court: the control 
of the formal legality of the actions of a public entity is restricted to the verification 
of whether an incompetent entity passed the act being appealed or in passing it the 
principle procedures were violated; and during the control of the material legality, an 
administrative court analyses whether the act being appealed is in essence wrongful 
because by its substance it conflicts with legal acts already in force. The factual and 
legal grounds for passing discretionary administrative decisions are not controllable 
because in frequent cases the legal acts are lacking, pursuant to which the discretion­
ary authorisations in the specific area are being implemented. In addition, the LPA 
prohibits the control of the legality of the activities of the public administration from 
the standpoint of economic and political expediency. However, it does not thereby 
prevent the possibility of the verification of the acts of the public administration from 
the standpoint of expediency in respect to human rights. It should be noted that 
the LPA does not contain a finite list of the grounds for the revocation of acts being 
appealed just like no finite list has been established for the kinds of demands which 
can be filed with an administrative court (or kinds of administrative claims). 
In the procedure of cases concerning the legality of normative administrative acts, 
it is verified as to whether the specific normative administrative act conforms to a law 
or a Government normative act. These grounds are general for an administrative and 
general competency court but the practice of the administrative courts explains the 
extent of judicial control broadly and verifies not only the statutory legality but also 
constitutionality of normative administrative acts. 
2.3.4 Procedural rules for administrative litigation 
The Law on Administrative Proceedings expressis verbis covers only some principles 
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independence, public hearing, public pronouncement of the judgment, equality of 
arms between the parties, binding effect of the judgment. However, other important 
principles of judicial proceedings follow from the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Lithuanian Constitution, jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and Lithuanian Constitutional Court, and are applied in Lithuanian adminis­
trative courts as well: access to legal aid, adversarial hearing, secrecy of judicial delib­
eration, obligation to motivate judgments, etc. The Supreme Administrative Court of 
Lithuania often uses procedural principles as a source of law and refers to them in its 
judgments. 
A complaint/petition may be filed with the administrative court, within one month 
from the day of publication of the contested act, the day of delivery of the individual 
act to the party concerned, the notification of the party concerned of the act (or 
omission), within two months from the day of expiry of the time limit set by a law, 
or any other legal act for the compliance with the demand. If the public or internal 
administration entity delays the consideration of a certain issue and fails to resolve 
it within the due date, a complaint about the failure to act (in such delay) may be 
lodged within two months from the day of expiry of the time limit set by a law or any 
other legal act for the settlement of the issue. No time limits shall be set for the filing 
of petitions for the review of the lawfulness of administrative legal acts by the admin­
istrative courts. The decision taken by an administrative disputes commission or any 
other institution for preliminary extrajudicial investigation of disputes, adopted after 
investigating an administrative dispute in accordance with the extrajudicial proce­
dure, may be appealed to an administrative court within 20 days after the receipt of 
the decision. 
If it is recognised that the time limit for filing a complaint has not been observed 
for a good reason, at the claimant’s request, the administrative court may grant resto­
ration of the status quo ante. The petition for the restoration of the status quo ante shall 
indicate the reasons for failure to observe the time limit and present the evidence 
confirming the reasons for failure to observe the time limit. There are no special 
screening procedures before administrative courts. Only the compliance of the com­
plaint with the formal requirements and the time limits for lodging a complaint are 
verified in order to decide whether a complaint is acceptable. The LAP sets minimal 
standards of the complaint to administrative courts. Except for cases provided for by 
law, complaints/petitions shall be received and heard by the administrative courts 
only after the payment of the stamp duty. The assistance of a lawyer is not compulsory 
in administrative courts. The parties to the proceedings can defend their interests in 
court themselves or through their representatives. 
Complaints shall be made in writing. The LAP sets prerequisites of the complaint to
administrative courts. The complaint needs to include some information about the par­
ties of the administrative dispute (the claimant’s and respondent’s name, surname (name
of the institution), personal code number, place of residence (seat) etc.), the particu­
lar contested action (omission) or act, date of its performance (adoption), the circum­
stances upon which the claimant’s claim is based, supporting evidence and the claimant’s
claim. There is no need to give legal grounds of the complaint, only factual circumstances
have to be presented. There are no specific templates of the complaint at hand and the
claimant is free to choose one him- or herself. 
There is a possibility of bringing proceedings via information technologies. Whilst 
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specific code issued by the court or by using the so-called ‘e-government gateway’, 
which is accessible via online banking data, e-signature, personal identity or civil serv­
ant cards. Making an effective use of this procedural right to institute proceedings via 
information technologies leads to significant concessions, such as exemption from 
the duty to provide the court with additional copies of one’s complaint or a require­
ment to pay only 75% of respective stamp duty. Moreover, in the cases prescribed by 
LAP the subpoena may be also received by electronic means. 
Cases in regional administrative courts relating to the compensation for material 
and moral damage inflicted in the sphere of public administration, tax disputes, 
office-related disputes or disputes related to the execution of settlement agreements 
reached by the parties shall be heard by one judge, whereas other cases shall be 
heard by a chamber of three judges. In certain cases a chamber of judges may also be 
formed for the hearing of cases where the hearing by a single judge is provided. At 
the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania cases shall be heard before a cham­
ber of three judges. An expanded chamber of five or seven judges may be formed for 
hearing complex cases or such a case may be referred to the plenary session of the 
court. 
The judge whose opinion in the case differs from that of the majority of the judges 
may write his dissenting opinion. The dissenting opinion shall not be announced 
publicly, but shall be attached to the case file. There is no difference between lower 
and higher jurisdictions in this respect. The LAP also provides that if the case in 
which the judge has presented his separate opinion has not been heard on appeal or 
where a dissenting opinion has been expressed by a judge of the court of appeal, after 
the decision becomes effective the case with the judge’s separate opinion attached 
shall be referred to the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania and the Presi­
dent of the Court shall decide whether to make a recommendation to resume the 
proceedings. 
The injunction relief is available in administrative cases in all matters. The court 
or the judge may, upon a motivated petition of the participants in the proceedings or 
upon his/its own initiative, take measures with a view to securing a claim. The claim 
may be secured at any stage of the proceedings if failure to take provisional measures 
to secure a claim may impede the enforcement of the court decision or render the 
decision unenforceable. 
The right to access to a court also concerns the procedural rules, including proce­
dural rules of non-judicial level. This matter has been dealt with by the Constitutional 
Court of Lithuania. The Court held that non-judicial systems for settling disputes are 
constitutionally justified26 where certain public authorities and officials have authority 
to settle respective disputes in out of court procedures. However, judicial protection 
shall remain the priority form for protection.27 Non-judicial administrative procedure 
26 For the cases where granting respective jurisdictional authority to public authorities and officials is 
expedient and justified see the Ruling of 2 July 2002 of the Constitutional Court [on an opportunity of 
soldiers to apply to court] Valstybės žinios, 2002, No 69–2832; Ruling of 4 March 2003 [on restoration 
of the rights of ownership] Valstybės žinios, 2003, No 24–1004; Ruling of 7 February [on social insurance 
indemnities for occupational diseases] Valstybės žinios, 2005, No 19–623; Ruling of 13 December 2004 
[on Civil Service] Valstybės žinios, 2004, No 181–6708, 2004.12.29, No 186. 
27 Ruling of 4 March 2003 of the Constitutional Court [on restoration of the rights of ownership] Valstybės 
žinios, 2003, No 24–1004. 
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cannot replace nor can it become an alternative to judicial procedures for settling 
disputes.28 The establishment of non-judicial procedures is possible where respective 
preconditions are met: (1) the authority to settle the disputes granted to respective 
institutions shall be established by the law and cannot be derived from any other form 
of legal acts; and (2) there shall be a right to appeal against the decision adopted by 
the institutions before a court; and (3) the pre-litigation procedure shall not unneces-
sarily restrict or put a burden on the implementation of the right to access to court.
It is clear from the case law of administrative courts in Lithuania that the pre-
litigation procedure is regarded as a jurisdictional procedure that compliments the 
judicial procedure. Judicial and non-judicial procedures are two forms for settling 
the dispute29 and both of them are constitutionally justified30 and do not compete 
with each other. The choice between the desirable forms belongs to the individual 
concerned – judicial or non-judicial protection. The functions of the pre-litigation 
system may vary depending on the type of category. However, the pre-litigation pro-
cedure cannot replace the judicial procedure and shall be employed as a compulsory 
or chosen stage before applying to a court.
The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on the pre-litigation procedure in 
the sphere of administrative law is not particularly rich. It was recognised in a Consti-
tutional Court ruling31 that when the service contract with the professional soldier or 
that with the volunteer soldier had to be terminated, an appeal may be lodged with 
the court regarding not only the violation of the dismissal procedure established by 
legal acts but also the reasonableness of his dismissal from military service.
Meanwhile, the ruling of 15 May 2007 of the Constitutional Court32 reviewed 
respective provisions on the Law on State Secrets and Official Secrets. The challenged 
legal regulation laid down that the Commission for Secrets Protection Co-ordination 
was a special administrative pre-judicial institution; however, its decisions were not 
final and could be directly appealed before an administrative court under the rules 
of the Law on Administrative Proceedings. The imperatives on the right to access to a 
court and pre-litigation procedure, which were developed in the constitutional juris-
prudence, were further developed by the case law of administrative courts.
The case law of administrative courts provides that the rules on pre-litigation pro-
cedure shall be clearly established, i.e. it shall set the institution (institutions) and 
the principal activities of the respective institution shall be jurisdictional (settling of 
disputes) rather than activities related to public administration.33 In Lithuania there 
are cases where the pre-litigation procedure is identified with the activities of public 
administration. The ambiguity in legal regulation is interpreted to the advantage of 
the individual concerned. Nevertheless, even though the objective of the pre-litiga-
tion procedure is not to make the protection of infringed rights or interests more 
28  Friedrich Schoch, Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann and Rainer Pietzneer, Kommentar VwGO, I Band (C. H. 
Beck 2003) Rn. 16–17.
29  Activities for settling disputes are called jurisdictional activities.
30  Jurgita Paužaitė-Kulvinskienė, ‘Administracinė justicija: teorija ir praktika’ 38.
31 Ruling 2 July  2002 of the Constitutional Court [on an opportunity of soldiers to apply to court] Valstybės 
žinios, 2002, No 69–2832.
32  Ruling of 15 May 2007 of the Constitutional Court [on state secrets and official secrets] Valstybės žinios, 
2007, No 54–2097.
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complex but on the contrary, to establish an additional mechanism in pursuit of set­
tling legal issues,34 the case law of administrative courts allows to carry out the judicial 
and non-judicial procedures at the same time.35 It is clear from the case law that the 
courts do not accept administrative complaints if the individual has initiated a non-
compulsory pre-litigation procedure and still has not exhausted it.36 Meanwhile, non-
compulsory pre-litigation procedure may be initiated in parallel with judicial civil 
procedure in civil matters.37 
One more issue on access to court concerns the accessibility of judicial protec­
tion. The accessibility means that a non-compulsory pre-litigation procedure shall 
not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of the right 
of judicial protection. A compulsory single-stage out of court procedure for settling 
disputes could satisfy this condition. On this point, it should be observed that there 
might be problems with compulsory multi-stage non-judicial procedures. One should 
note the peculiarities of administrative dispute (Ruling of 2 July 2002 of the Consti­
tutional Court). In Lithuania multi-stage non-judicial procedure in administrative 
cases is prescribed by several laws. Not all of these cases where compulsory multi-stage 
pre-litigation procedure (i.e. where more than one subsequent decision adopted by 
different authorities of public administration is required) is established can be con­
stitutionally justified. No constitutional doubts arise regarding the disputes related 
to public order and security. For example, the actions (decisions) of institutions and 
their officials which enforce criminal penalties may be appealed before the head of 
institution of penalties’ enforcement.38 The decisions adopted by the head of the 
institution and their actions may be appealed before the Director General of the 
Prison Department. Meanwhile, the actions and decisions of the Director General of 
the Prison Department may be appealed within 20 days before the regional adminis­
trative court. It appears that the multi-stage compulsory non-judicial procedure laid 
down in the Code of Enforcement of Penalties is in compliance with the criterion of 
constitutional objectivity to guarantee public order and security. However, the recog­
nition of expert qualification or registration of weapons and ammunition is a rather 
34 Case No A143–191/2010. 
35 It should be noted that the Law on Administrative Proceedings does not provide an explicit ground 
for the court to refuse to accept an administrative complaint submitted to it if it is established that the 
non-compulsory pre-litigation institution has received a complaint filed by the same parties regarding 
the same subject-matter and background. There are also no restrictions on the right to access to a court 
where the dispute is settled at the non-compulsory pre-litigation institution in civil matters. Pursuant 
to the Law on Administrative Proceedings, the complaint may be inadmissible where the complaint 
concerning the dispute between the same parties and identical subject matter and background is heard 
at the compulsory pre-litigation institution and the applicant has not exhausted it. 
36 Case No AS438–502/2008. 
37 For example, pursuant to the Law on Consumer Protection, the parties to the dispute shall be entitled 
to appeal to the court of general jurisdiction requesting to settle the dispute in essence during the 
process of settlement of the dispute in the authority for the settlement of disputes as well as after this 
institution takes a decision. 
38 Pursuant to the Code of Enforcement of Penalties of the Republic of Lithuania, the actions and deci­
sions of institutions and their officials who enforce penalties of community service, deprivation of indi­
vidual freedom, detention, custodial sentence, and life imprisonment may be appealed before the head 
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regular procedure of public administration and no specific or extraordinary objec­
tives regarding public order and security are attained in the sphere. 
2.3.5 Appeal against the first court decision 
As a general rule, the decisions of the court of first instance which have not been 
appealed against become effective after the time limit for appeal has elapsed (deci­
sions of regional administrative courts may be appealed against within 14 days of the 
pronouncement of the decision). A court decision adopted after a case had been 
heard on appeal becomes effective from the day of the adoption of the new deci­
sion. A regulatory administrative act (or a part thereof) is considered to be annulled 
and, as a rule, may not be applied from the day of the official announcement of the 
effective decision of the administrative court declaring it as illegal. However, having 
regard to the specific circumstances of the case and having assessed the possibility of 
the negative legal consequences, the administrative court may establish in its deci­
sion annulling a regulatory administrative act (or a part thereof) that it may not be 
applicable from the day of its adoption or may suspend the validity of the regulatory 
administrative act (or a part thereof) recognised illegal until the coming into effect 
of the court decision. 
The Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania acts as an appellate instance for 
most of the cases heard by regional administrative courts (in certain cases – by district 
courts), as well as the single and last instance for the cases relating to the lawful­
ness of regulatory administrative acts adopted by the central entities of state admin­
istration as well as for the lawfulness of acts of general character passed by public 
organisations, communities, political parties, political organisations or associations. 
It is also the last instance for deciding the issues concerning the assignment of cases 
to the relevant administrative courts. The Court was formed and started its activities 
from 1 January 2001. The Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania is the appellate 
instance for cases from decisions, rulings and orders of regional administrative courts 
as the courts of the first instance. Rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Lithuania are final and not subject to appeal. It is also the first and final instance for 
certain categories of administrative cases assigned to its jurisdiction by law. For exam­
ple, members of the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania (the Seimas), courts, the 
Seimas ombudsmen, the Children’s Rights Ombudsman, national audit officers and 
prosecutors are entitled to challenge the lawfulness of normative administrative acts 
by applying directly to the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania. Furthermore, 
the resolution of disputes concerning violations of the laws on election or referen­
dum is also assigned to the jurisdiction of administrative courts. Individuals speci­
fied in the Law on Presidential Election, the Law on Election to the Seimas, the Law 
on Referendum and the Law on Election to Municipal Councils are entitled to file 
petitions concerning decisions of the Central Electoral Commission directly to the 
Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania. In such cases the Court adopts decisions 
as a court of sole and final instance. 
Upon appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court will review the contested ruling 
in full. It is also not bound by the arguments raised by the parties in the appeal. The 
Court is responsible for the developing of uniform practice of administrative courts 
in interpretation and application of statutes and other legal acts. For that purpose it 
periodically issues its bulletin under the title ‘Practice of Administrative Courts’. 
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2.3.6 Suprajudicial acts
The right to access to court embodies not only an absolute but also universal fea-
ture of procedural subjective right. This feature was emphasised by the Constitutional 
Court in its jurisprudence. The Court held that infringed rights of an individual, inter 
alia acquired rights and legitimate interests, must be protected without prejudice to 
the fact of whether they are directly established in the Constitution. Effective protec-
tion of rights does not limit itself to the protection of rights and freedoms laid down 
in the Constitution. The same effective protection must be granted to the rights and 
freedoms of an individual which are not directly conferred by the Constitution as the 
rights and freedoms which are established in the Constitution. Moreover, in accord-
ance with the Constitution the protection shall be granted to rights and freedoms 
laid down in international legal acts, the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, European Union law and international 
bilateral treaties which are a constituent part of Lithuanian legal order.
In 2010 the Constitutional Court addressed the issues concerning jurisdiction 
within different legal systems and the peculiarities of suprajudicial acts. This matter 
was also discussed by one of the most prominent interwar legal scholars in Lithuania 
Mykolas Roemeris.39 This is the so-called problem concerning the general or attribu-
tive jurisdiction of the administrative court. It is clear from the dynamics in European 
administrative law that there are two principles on the jurisdiction of administrative 
court: the principle of universal competence over public disputes (except constitu-
tional ones) (so-called universal clause, Generalklausel) and principle of enumeration. 
Different countries nowadays combine both principles, however one of them is given 
priority. The choice of which principle on the jurisdiction of administrative court is 
established in the law on administrative procedure also depends on constitutional 
jurisprudence. Art. 111(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania does not 
specify the jurisdiction of administrative courts. There are no provisions on the distri-
bution of jurisdiction between administrative courts and courts of general jurisdiction.
The Law on Administrative Proceedings establishes the principle of universal com-
petence over administrative disputes, that is every individual is entitled to access to a 
court where their rights are infringed in public administration matters. Meanwhile, 
the Law establishes the enumeration principle and sets cases of negative and posi-
tive restrictions on the jurisdiction of administrative courts.40 The combination of 
both principles in one legal act indeed brings certain confusion into legal regula-
tion. In legal theory the definition of jurisdiction of the administrative court is mostly 
dealt with in the perspective of distribution of jurisdiction between courts of general 
jurisdiction and administrative courts.41 In practice disputes on the distribution of 
39 Mykolas Roemeris, Konstitucinės ir teismo teisės pasieniuose (Pozicija 1994) 63. The author also formulated 
the definitions of both terms: ‘body of general jurisdiction is a body entitled to perform all actions, 
except those which the law clearly takes out of the jurisdiction; meanwhile, the body of attributive 
jurisdiction is a body which only is entitled to perform actions that the law clearly assigns to it, it cannot 
engage in other activities’.
40  Jurgita Paužaitė-Kulvinskienė, ‘Administracinė justicija: teorija ir praktika’ 76.
41 See e.g. Deividas Poška, ‘Bendr ųjų ir administracinių teismų kompetencijos atskyrimas. Probleminiai 
aspektai’ (2006) 59 Teisė 88–106 and Janina Stripeikiené in Administraciniai teismai Lietuvoje: nūdienos 
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jurisdiction between courts of general jurisdiction and administrative courts are 
heard by a specially designated body – the Board on Jurisdiction. In establishing the 
scope of the jurisdiction of administrative courts it is equally important to address
the question of suprajudicial acts, i.e. acts which are allocated neither to adminis­
trative courts nor courts of general jurisdiction. The activities of the Parliament, 
members of the Parliament, the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the 
Government (as a collegial body) and judges of supreme courts (the Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeal) do not fall into the jurisdiction 
of administrative courts. 
The special Board on Jurisdiction interprets this provision as a rule delimiting the
jurisdiction between administrative courts and the Constitutional Court; however it
basically has no prejudice to the right to access to court. The fact that the dispute is
related to the activities of the Parliament or the President of the Republic of Lithuania
does not affect the jurisdiction of courts. It is necessary to establish whether the activi­
ties of those subjects are regulated by the norms of public law and if so, the case will
be resolved by administrative court. It is appropriate to point out that in its previous
practice42 the Board on Jurisdiction was assigning the disputes to the courts of general
jurisdiction even where the cases concerned the activities of respective authorities regu­
lated by norms of public law. The dispute concerning a decree of the President by which
an individual was removed from the list to receive a state award was assigned to the
court of general jurisdiction. One should also note the case43 where a dispute concern­
ing an application filed by a public education organisation asking to annul a resolution
adopted by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania (as a collegial body) by which
the permit to engage in the organisation of studies, was assigned to the court of general
jurisdiction. Even though the Board on Jurisdiction recognised that by adopting the dis­
puted resolution the Government as a collegial body exercised the functions assigned
to it by legal acts, it ruled that the dispute cannot be assigned to the administrative court
and thus should be heard by the court of general jurisdiction. 
The principle of legal clarity presupposes that legal regulation on administra­
tive procedure shall be clear and unambiguous; however, it is not easy to establish 
whether the right to access to administrative court encompasses the possibility to 
appeal against the activities of the President of the Republic and the Government. 
On the one hand, infringed rights, including administrative ones, may be defended 
before a court despite the fact of whether the constitutional right to access to a court 
is established by the law or other legal act.44 Moreover, the rights of an individual 
42 Applicant asked the court to rule on the decree adopted by the President of the Republic of Lithuania 
which was adopted in implementing the provisions of the Law on State Awards. Thus, pursuant to the 
LAP, the dispute cannot be assigned to the jurisdiction of administrative court. Having regard to the 
fact that the applicant was challenging an individual act which directly concerned his rights and legiti­
mate interests and having referred to the Code of Civil Procedure which establishes a broader jurisdic­
tion to the court of general jurisdiction rather than administrative courts, the Board on Jurisdiction 
ruled that the legal dispute shall be heard in courts of general jurisdiction. The Board on Jurisdiction. 
Decision of 16 April 2007 in case public body Tarptautinė Baltijos akademija v the Government of the Republic 
of Lithuania. 
43 The Board on Jurisdiction. Decision of 7 July 2005 of in the case public body Tarptautinė Baltijos akademija 
v the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. 
44 Ruling of 23 June 1999 of the Constitutional Court [on transfer of premises to societies of many-flat 
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shall not be defended in a perfunctory manner, but in reality and effectively, inter 
alia against unlawful actions of state institutions.45 In the decision adopted in 200646 
the Constitutional Court expressed its position on the review of the legality of acts 
(omission) issued by the Government in corpore. It held that where there is no legal 
regulation due to the inaction of the Government and thus the rights of individuals 
are infringed, courts of general jurisdiction and administrative courts shall ensure 
the protection of infringed rights against the omission of public authorities by apply­
ing the provisions of the Constitution directly. The right to access to administrative 
court concerning the activities of the Government was addressed by the Constitu­
tional Court also in 2010.47 In this case the Court directly reviewed the constitutional­
ity of the LAP. Applicants – Vilnius regional administrative court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Lithuania – referred to the Constitutional Court asking to 
rule whether the provision setting forth that the activities of the President of the 
Republic and the Government (as collegial body) do not fall within the jurisdiction of 
administrative courts as laid down in this law, is in compliance with the Constitution. 
Three important aspects were emphasised in this constitutional case. First of all, 
the tendency to concentrate the constitutional review within the Constitutional Court 
was verified, that is administrative courts are not entitled to review matters that are 
assigned to the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. However, the administrative 
court is allowed to preliminarily assess the activities of the President of the Republic 
and the Government in as much as it is necessary for submitting the reference to the 
Constitutional Court where it should justify the doubts concerning the compliance of 
the act with the Constitution and statutes. Secondly, according to the Constitutional 
Court, the LAP must be interpreted as inter alia meaning that the activities of the 
President of the Republic and the Government in exercising state power cannot be 
the subject matter of an administrative dispute heard before the administrative court. 
However, it is possible that besides the discharge of state functions assigned to them, 
the institutions implementing state power also perform other activities. Thus, the 
exercise of state power may not be equated with activities embraced by the notion 
‘public administration’ which is employed in the LAP. In cases where the aforemen­
tioned subjects are not participants in constitutional but administrative legal rela­
tions the legality of their activities may be assessed in administrative court and these 
activities are not regarded as suprajudicial. In this regard, the Constitutional Court 
even defines the categories where cases of this kind are possible, that is cases on 
the omission (delay) and actions for damages and civil service disputes. Thirdly, the 
ruled that the judicial protection of infringed rights shall be guaranteed despite the fact of whether the 
rights are directly established in the Constitution. Ruling of 8 May 2000 of the Constitutional Court [on 
operational activities] Valstybės žinios, 2000, No 39–1105. 
45 Ruling of 8 May 2000 of the Constitutional Court [on operational activities] Valstybės žinios, 2000, No 
39–1105. 
46 Ruling of 8 August 2006 of the Constitutional Court [on dismissing the legal proceedings on the com­
patibility of certain provisions of the Law on Courts, the Law on Remuneration for Work of State Politi­
cians, Judges and State Officials and the Resolution of 28 December 2003 adopted by the Government 
with the Constitution] Valstybės žinios, 2006, No 88–3475, amendment – 2006.12.16, No: 137. 
47 Ruling of 13 May 2010 of the Constitutional Court [on investigation into activities of the President of 
the Republic and those of the Government in administrative courts and on the dismissal of a member 
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constitutional case under consideration also provides the decision on the jurisdiction 
of courts. It was ruled that cases concerning the result or consequence of the activi­
ties (failure to act) of the President of the Republic or the Government whereby the 
rights or freedoms of a person have been (could be) violated, inter alia concerning 
compensation for damage may be considered by the administrative court but not by 
courts of general jurisdiction. 
2.3.7 Judicial fees 
In administrative courts, the applicant should pay a court fee. There are exemptions, 
however, in cases about complaints in order to protect the State or other public inter­
ests, in cases concerning compensation for material and moral damages inflicted 
by unlawful acts or omission in the sphere of public administration, for example. 
Other litigation-related costs include: costs paid to witnesses, experts, and expert 
organisations; costs relating to the publication of hearing time and place in the press; 
transport costs; costs for the rental accommodation in the place of the court; other 
necessary and reasonable expenses. Under the LAP, each complaint (application) in 
administrative court is subject to a stamp duty in the amount of EUR 28 (excluding 
the exceptions). An appeal for the review of a court judgment must be subject to a 
stamp duty at the 50% rate payable upon the lodging of the complaint (application) 
with the first instance court. No fees in the cases on normative administrative acts. 
An estimation of expert fees and other litigation-related fees, except from lawyer 
fees and costs, associated with the application for interim relief are regulated by a 
Government Resolution in 2002. There is a recommendation from the Minister of 
Justice and the Chairman of Bar concerning lawyer fees. The general rule is that the 
losing party has to bear all costs, including stamp duties and costs related to initial 
court proceedings. The party is also obliged to reward the costs of the winning party. 
The stamp-duty, expenses for correspondence, expert costs, and other costs usually 
are paid in full. But the legal costs for legal representation during the court proceed­
ing are reduced as recommended by the Minister of Justice and the Chairman of Bar. 
However, these amounts are only recommended and depend on the complexity of 
the court proceeding, case material, and other factors. Nevertheless, in the absolute 
majority of administrative cases, state courts reduce parties’ requested legal expenses 
for their legal assistance according to the recommended amounts and reasonableness 
3 Right to be heard 
In the LAP the Lithuanian legislator has established that an individual whose rights 
and interests are challenged has the right to be heard. This expressly establishes the 
obligation on the administration to start consultations on the adoption of respective 
administrative decision. The obligation on the institution to consult with the appli­
cant is also laid down by the legal regulation passed in the special fields of administra­
tive law, e.g. in the Law on Electronic Communications, or in the Law on Provision of 
Information to the Public etc. It is clear from the regulation in respective spheres of 
administrative law that the obligation to start consultations is expressed mostly in the 
areas where the administration faces the challenge of balancing the public interest 
with private interests, e.g. in the spheres of land planning or environmental protec­
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central point in any administrative procedure. The right to provide clarification, to 
submit comments and to give opinion on the matters in question is one of the main 
ones in entire administrative procedure. However, the obligation to hear the person 
concerned is not absolute and has certain exceptions allowing the adoption of the 
decision without consultations. Under general rule, the decision is adopted without 
consultations if the application is decided at once and this decision does not infringe 
the rights or interests of third parties. 
The hearing of cases before administrative courts must be held in public. The 
presence in the courtroom of persons who are under the age of 16 is not allowed, 
unless they are parties to the proceedings or witnesses. The principle of public hear­
ing is not applicable where the law prescribes written proceedings for the hearing of 
complaints and cases. To hold oral proceedings is a default obligation for courts of 
first instance, whereas the Supreme Administrative Court holds written proceedings, 
unless the chamber of judges decides otherwise. Parties to the proceedings have a 
right to ask the court of appellate instance to hold oral proceedings instead of written 
ones, yet the court is not bound by such a motion. 
4 Right to legal counsel 
The assistance of a lawyer is not compulsory in Lithuanian administrative procedure or 
administrative courts. The parties to the proceedings can defend their interests them­
selves or through their representatives. In this regard, there is no difference between 
the procedure before regional administrative courts and the Supreme Administrative 
Court. According to the LAP, the parties can be represented not only by a lawyer, but 
also by an another capable person, irrespective of his/her background. However, in 
practice, as a rule, parties are represented by lawyers. 
5 Duty to give reasons 
The obligation to state reasons in writing for all decisions is required by the LPA, so it 
is a general principle. But LPA contains an exception to it in cases when ‘the applica­
tion of the addressee of the administrative act is satisfied and the rights and freedoms 
of third parties are not restricted’. The reasoning does not have to set out the factual 
basis for issue of an administrative act. In general, administrative decisions are issued 
in writing. However, in some situations the law allows the oral issuing of administra­
tive acts in urgent situations, when the case is objectively insignificant and the issuing 
of an administrative act in writing is impossible or insignificant. 
The LPA dos not provides any specification for the reasons, if they must be ade­
quate, clear and sufficient. In Art. 8(1) LPA regardless of the form in which ‘reasons’ is
specified, there is definitely, what could be called a ‘core definition’. Basically, stating
reasons requires giving the factual and legal basis for the issue and also the considera­
tions made when taking the decision. Administrative acts must consist of established
facts, their evaluation and the provision of legal acts on which the decision is based. 
6 Right of access to information 
An applicant who considers that his request for information has been ignored, 
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an administrative disputes commission. The commission may be appealed within 
a month after the receipt of the information or within a month from the date of 
the information has been made available. The decision of the commission may be 
appealed to the administrative court within 20 days after the day of the receipt of the 
decision. In the case of refusal, the public administration entity must adopt an indi­
vidual administrative act, which must contain, clearly formulated, all rights and duties 
and the specific appeal procedure. The reasons for a refusal should be provided to 
the applicant within 14 days after the receipt of this demand by the public authority. 
The request can be written or oral. The information can be given orally if the appli­
cant does not ask for a written answer. 
The applicant does not have to state an interest. When an applicant requests to 
make information available in a specific form (including in the form of copies), the 
public authority have to make it available (with certain exceptions). As a major rule, 
the requested information must be made available to an applicant within 14 calen­
dar days after the receipt by the public authority. An application to an administra­
tive dispute commission prior to applying to an administrative court is compulsory 
in this case. All information must be provided to the court if the court requests it. 
This information can influence the court decision. One of the types of judgments in 
administrative courts is to meet the complaint (grant the application) and rescind the 
contested act (or a part thereof), or to obligate the appropriate entity of administra­
tion to rectify the committed violation or to comply with any other order of the court. 
Courts can order information to be disclosed. 
7 Legal aid 
There is legal aid available in administrative legal protection. The current legal
aid scheme is governed by the law on legal aid. Legal aid is divided into primary
and secondary legal aid. Primary legal aid includes legal information and legal
consultations outside the judicial procedure and is accessible to all citizens, EU
citizens, and foreigners, irrespective of their financial resources. Secondary legal
aid includes preparation of procedural documents, representation in courts,
waiver of the stamp duty and other procedural costs. Access to secondary legal
aid depends on the level of estate and income and covers 50 or 100% of all pro­
cedural costs. Some groups of persons (i.e. recipients of social allowance) can
receive legal aid independent of their income. Legal aid is granted through spe­
cial services, which are accountable to the Ministry of Justice. The refusal to grant
legal aid is subject to appeal before administrative courts. Legal aid is subject to
requirements as to resources, nationality, residence and admissibility. Everybody
is entitled to primary or secondary legal aid if he/she is a Lithuanian national, a
citizen of the EU, or a foreigner who is lawfully residing in Lithuania or in another
EU state. Legal aid is given if the action is not manifestly inadmissible or devoid
of substance. 
Legal aid for NGOs is not foreseen. Law firms do not provide pro bono legal assistance 
in Lithuania. The legal clinics are responsible for primary legal aid. The primary legal 
aid is also given by the municipalities and by Ministry of Justice Information Bureaus 
in several cities (Kaunas, Klaipėda, Šiauliai, Druskininkai and other). The second­
ary legal aid is granted through five special services (in Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda, 
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8 Reasonable time for procedure 
Meanwhile, the administration is obliged to adopt a well-motivated decision within a 
reasonable time frame. Provisions of the LPA establish the time limits on the adop­
tion of the respective administrative decision. Legal regulation laid down in particu­
lar fields of administrative law may establish different time frames (usually from two 
to six months subject to the complexity of the matter). Nevertheless, the administra­
tion is obliged to adopt a decision within a reasonable time frame irrespective of the 
particular sphere of administrative law. The general rule is the public administration 
shall complete the administrative procedure and adopt the decision of the adminis­
trative procedure within 20 working days from the beginning of the procedure. The 
public entity initiating the administrative procedure may extend the period up to 
ten extra working days where, due to objective reasons, the administrative procedure 
cannot be completed within the set time limit. A person shall be notified about the 
extension of the time limit for the administrative procedure in writing or by e-mail 
(where the complaint has been received by e-mail) and the reasons for the exten­
sion. An administrative court may initiate responsibility of a public authority when 
the administrative organ does not adopt the decision during the time limit and it has 
resulted in damage to the claimant. In several fields, the law established a regime of 
tacit acceptance. The silence of the administration causes the appearance of a tacit 
acceptance within the period fixed by law. There are some special time limits set by 
law for administrative procedures in different matters (e.g. social security and asylium 
cases). 
According to the LAP the preparation of administrative cases before the court must 
be completed no later than one month after the date of the complaint (application). 
The proceedings before the administrative court must be completed and a decision 
made in the first instance no later than two months after the order for the case to the 
court hearing date, if the law does not provide shorter duration. 
Where appropriate, the trial period may be extended up to one month. In cases 
concerning the legality of normative acts of the administration the time period may be 
extended up to three months. The judgment shall be drawn up and communicated to 
the public generally on the same day after hearing the case. Judgments relating to the 
legality of administrative acts and other complex cases may be passed and announced 
later than but not more than ten days upon the completion of the hearing of the case 
(in practice, it’s used in almost all cases). When the right to a judicial decision within 
a reasonable time has caused damage, the person can obtain compensation for the 
damage. This possibility is foreseen in the Law on Compensation of Damage caused 
by Public Authorities. 
In 2013–2014, the average length of proceedings in the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Lithuania lasted 6,53 months. According to the ‘The 2014 EU Justice Score­
board’ data, Lithuania has one of the shortest length of court proceedings in Europe, 
as well as very little pending cases in courts. Since 2009, the hearing of appeals dura­
tion was also reduced 1.6 times. 
9 Alternative dispute resolution 
Arbitration in administrative matters is not yet a possible alternative. The settlement
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only in concrete cases, where it is explicitly provided for by law. In certain spheres
the possibility of reaching a friendly agreement exists. For example, according to
the Law on Tax Administration, the taxpayer and the tax administrator may sign
an agreement concerning the sum of the tax due and the tax rate when neither
of the parties has enough proof to base its separate estimates upon. After such an
agreement is signed, the taxpayer gives up the right to contest the correctness of
the calculation of the tax, and the tax administrator – to set a higher rate than had
been agreed. 
The LAP foresees a possibility for the parties to end the dispute (or a part thereof) 
by reaching a settlement agreement. Such a settlement agreement should not contra­
vene the law and results in 50% concession of a stamp duty, once successfully accepted 
by the court. 
3 Institutional system of legal protection 
The principle of effective legal protection (efektyvios teisminės gynybos principas) pre­
supposes an institutional system of legal protection. Starting in 1990 the approach 
towards legal protection in administrative law in Lithuania changed significantly. The 
development of the model of legal protection under administrative law in Lithuania 
concerns Art. 111(2) of the Constitution which provides the possibility for founding 
specialised courts to hear administrative cases. This constitutional norm was sufficient 
foundation for starting the reforms but it took seven years to implement these provi­
sions in practice. One of the reasons is the lengthy political and scientific discussions 
concerning the need and financial possibilities of founding specialised administra­
tive courts. After 1999 judicial control of the legality of the activities of the execu­
tive branch was operated within the quasi-judicial and judicial (administrative courts) 
system. 
The principal legal acts – the LAP, the LPA, the Law on the Establishment of Admin­
istrative Courts (Administracinių teismų įsteigimo įstatymas), and the Law on Administra­
tive Tribunals (Administracinių ginčų komisijų įstatymas) – have requested a new quality 
for legal protection in the sphere of public administration. It is also necessitated by 
Lithuania’s membership of the European Union which requires taking into consider­
ation the specific features of the European Union’s acquis communitaire in the sphere 
of public administration and applying the principles developed during several dec­
ades of jurisprudence by European institutions of justice, that is the European Court 
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. In addition, one may reason­
ably question whether uniform administrative legal protection is possible in all the 
Member States and what possibilities Lithuania’s administrative justice system has in 
this process. Attention should be paid to the fact that not only new members of the 
European Union such as Lithuania or the new comers such as Croatia and Bulgaria 
with a new system of administrative court, but also the older members such as Austria, 
France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have reformed their administrative justice systems. 
Expanding discussions concerning the monitoring of the justice systems of the EU 
Member States and the initiatives such as the EU-Justice-barometer are also helping 
to implement and achieve the same level of effective legal protection in administra­
tive law. 
The dual institutional mechanism of legal protection under the current administra­
tive law in Lithuania includes a judicial system (administrative courts) (administraciniai 
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teismai) and a quasi-judicial system (administrative dispute commissions) (ne teisminio 
nagrinėjimo administracinės institucijos). The protection has some common features in 
quasi-judicial and judicial systems. The differences are: in a formal sense – accord-
ing to the status of the administrative tribunals and administrative court; in a mate-
rial sense – according to the scope of the dispute to be resolved; in a procedural 
sense – according to the law of procedures being employed; and in a functional 
sense – according to the aims in resolving the dispute.
3.1  The decision making administrative bodies
According to the LPA, the term ‘entities of public administration’ (viešojo adminis-
travimo subjektas) means institutions, agencies, services and civil servants (officials) 
having public administration rights granted to them under laws and implementing 
in practice the executive power or separate functions thereof. The entities of the 
public administration are acting on two levels: on the state administration level and 
on the local public administration level. The main legal form of acting is an admin-
istrative act (decision). Administrative decisions (acts) are classified into: individual 
administrative acts (individualus administracinis aktas) and normative administrative 
acts (norminis administracinis aktas). In most cases, the term of individual adminis-
trative act means an act of single application of law directed to a specific person or 
a definite group of persons. Normative administrative act is a legal act establish-
ing the rules of conduct and intended for an individually unidentifiable group of 
persons.
In Lithuania, there is no legal concept of an administrative contract. All contracts, 
regardless of which institution is the party thereto, are regarded as civil contracts (this 
also includes public procurement). Administrative acts can also be classified into the 
groups of administrative acts adopted by central entities of state administration, and 
acts adopted by territorial entities of state administration. The distinction between 
these acts has a jurisdictional significance. Individual administrative acts adopted 
by central entities of state administration are usually reviewed by Vilnius Regional 
Administrative Court (as part of its so-called Additional Competence), whereas 
administrative regulatory enactments adopted by the same central entities of state 
administration are within purview of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania.
3.2  Quasi-judicial administrative system
Pre-litigation procedure shall be regarded as a jurisdictional procedure supplement-
ing the judicial procedure or as an alternative procedure. Judicial and non-judicial 
procedures are two forms of dispute settlement. They are both constitutionally justi-
fied48 and do not compete with each other. It is for the individual concerned to choose 
the desirable form of judicial or pre-litigation protection. The pre-litigation system is 
not part of the judiciary; however, from a functional point of view it contributes to the 
administration of justice.49
48  Jurgita Paužaitė-Kulvinskienė, ‘Administracinė justicija: teorija ir praktika’ 38.
49  Birutė Pranevičiené, Kvaziteismai administracijos veiksmų teisėtumo kontrolės ir administracinių ginčų 
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The European Court of Justice has noted that the concept of court set forth in Art. 
267 of the TFEU is a concept of Community law50 and it may encompass not only 
judicial but also pre-litigation authorities. In the case Nidera Handelscompagne BV v 
Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos51 the Tax Dis­
putes Commission under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania was regarded 
as a ‘court’. In assessing whether the pre-litigation authority may be recognised to 
be a court within the meaning of Art. 234 EC one should note the following aspects: 
whether the authority was established in accordance with law, whether its jurisdiction 
is compulsory, whether the procedure at the institution is adversary, whether the insti­
tution applies legal acts, and whether it is independent.52 
In order to establish the pre-litigation procedure, from 1990 Lithuania implemented 
two directions of reform on pre-litigation institutions: first, already functioning 
authorities of public administration were vested with the right to resolve administra­
tive disputes (e.g. the Competition Council, the Public Procurement Office); sec­
ondly, new institutions were established for settling administrative disputes. 
The general pre-litigation system for administrative disputes was established in 
1999 together with the establishment of the system of administrative court after the 
Parliament adopted the Law on Administrative Disputes Commissions and the Law 
on Administrative Proceedings. The Administrative Disputes Commissions are pre­
litigation authorities of general jurisdiction. They are entitled to hear disputes only 
where the law does not provide for any other pre-litigation procedure. Priority is 
given to specialised pre-litigation institutions. If there is no specialised institution 
for settling the dispute out of court, then the administrative dispute is heard by 
administrative dispute commissions. The rules on the establishment of administra­
tive disputes commissions and the principles of its activities are laid down in the Law 
on Administrative Dispute Commissions (LADC). Meanwhile, the rules on activities 
of the commissions are provided by the Resolution adopted by the Government of 
the Republic of Lithuania. At present there are the Chief Administrative Disputes 
Commission and several administrative dispute commissions of municipalities (even 
though these commissions should function in 60 municipalities). 
Specialised institutions for resolution of administrative disputes out of court were 
established by adopting specialised laws: the Tax Disputes Commission under the 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the Contention Commission at the Min­
istry of Social Security and Labour, the Central Commission of Labour Experts, the 
State Social Insurance Fund Board etc. The rather broad system of pre-litigation 
institutions may be divided on the basis of different criteria. According to the place 
taken by the institution in the system of public authorities the institutions may be 
grouped into: institutions related to the authorities of executive branch (e.g. the Tax 
Disputes Commission, the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority) and institu­
tions related to the legislator (the Seimas Ombudsmen’s Office, the Office of Equal 
Opportunities Ombudsperson). 
50 European Court of Justice, Judgment of 30 March 1993, C-24/92 Corbiau v Administration des Contributions 
[1993] ECR 1–1277; Judgment of 17 September 1997, C-54/96 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v Bun­
desbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH [1997] ECR I-04961. 
51 European Court of Justice, Judgment of 21 October 2010, C-385/09 Nidera Handelscompagnie BV v Valstybinė
mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos [2010] ECR I-10385. 
52 European Court of Justice, Judgement of 30 June 1966, Case 61/65 Vaassen-Göbbels [1966] ECR 261. 
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As to the nature of their decisions, one can differentiate the institutions whether 
they make compulsory decisions or issue only recommendations. They have differ­
ent composition as there are institutions composed of professional lawyers, others 
employ specialists of different fields. According to the functions one may distinguish 
between institutions having only a jurisdictional (dispute solving) function and oth­
ers with administrative functions. 
3.3 Judicial system – system of administrative courts 
Creation of the judicial system in Lithuania had respective periods. The period from 
1992 until 1999 concerned the preparation of the legal framework on the establish­
ment of administrative courts in Lithuania. During this period no legal acts contained 
a clear institutional and procedural conception of Lithuania’s administrative justice; 
the implementation of Art. 111(2) of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Lithu­
ania had a good reason to be extended. The first stage of reform in 1999–2001 did 
not achieve the formation of an independent specialised administrative court sys­
tem in an institutional sense. Instead, an intermediate model was selected, which 
partially depended on the courts of general jurisdiction in both an institutional and 
a procedural sense. At this stage a packet of legal acts (the Law on Administrative 
Proceedings, the Law on Establishment of Administrative Courts, and Amendments 
to the Law on Courts), which was enacted on 14 January 1999, established the follow­
ing system of administrative courts: five regional administrative courts; the Superior 
Administrative Court; and the Administrative Case Division of the Court of Appeal 
of Lithuania. Administrative courts began to operate on 3 May 1999. During this 
period, the function of the supreme administrative court belonged to the Administra­
tive Case Division of the Court of Appeal of general jurisdiction. 
In the second stage of the reform, a new, two-level administrative court system 
was established. Five regional administrative courts were retained and the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Lithuania, which operates throughout the state’s territory, 
was established. The Administrative Case Division of the Court of Appeal were abol­
ished. Thus, after the new versions of the Law on Administrative Proceedings and the 
Law on Establishment of Administrative Courts came into force on 1 January 2001, 
the administrative court system that had existed for only a year and a half was reorgan­
ised and a model of independent administrative justice where administrative courts 
are independent from the courts of general jurisdiction was implemented. The essen­
tial aspect of this reform was the establishment of the Supreme Administrative Court 
of Lithuania. 
Currently, five regional administrative courts are the courts of special jurisdiction 
established for hearing complaints in respect of administrative acts and acts of com­
mission or omission (failure to perform duties) by entities of public and internal 
administration. Regional administrative courts hear disputes in the field of public 
administration and deal with issues relating to the lawfulness of regulatory admin­
istrative acts, tax disputes, etc. The Supreme Administrative Court is the first and 
final appeal instance for administrative cases assigned to its jurisdiction by law – cases 
on normative administrative acts with the central public state administration. It is 
the only appeal court for hearing administrative cases that have been examined by 
regional administrative courts. The Supreme Administrative Court develops a uni­
form practice of administrative courts in the interpretation and application of laws 
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acts. Out of this number 48 serve in regional administrative courts and the remain­
ing 17 are tenured in the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania. This number 
amounts to approximately 8% of all judicial positions. 
3.4 Ombudsman 
The Seimas Ombudsman Office (Seimo kontrolierių įstaiga) is one of the institutions 
protecting human rights and providing the legal protection in Lithuania. The Law 
of the Republic of Lithuania on the Seimas Ombudsman from 1994 enhanced the 
possibilities of the ombudsman to solve citizens’ complaints regarding the abuse of 
office and bureaucracy of state and municipal officers or other violations of human 
rights and freedoms in the field of administration. The Parlaments Ombudsman’s 
Office was established in 1994 by law. The Seimas Ombudsman’s Office has a special 
place within the system of state institutions: it is neither the legislative, nor the execu­
tive, nor the judicial branch of power.53 One of the main non-judicial remedies in 
the sphere of public administration is the petition for the Ombudsman concerning 
the abuse of office and bureaucracy of officers of the state government and munici­
pal institutions. A number of the complaints that the Seimas Ombudsman’s Office 
receives speak about the citizens’ trust in the institution as well as the advantage of 
such a means to defend one’s rights over another – it is cheap, accessible to everybody 
and it is also efficient enough. The task of the ombudsman is not to impose penalties 
on officers for violations but to prevent them from abuse of office and bureaucracy, 
and in this way improving the work of the public administration system and protect­
ing human rights. 
It may be observed that during the 20 years of activities of the Seimas Ombudsman’s 
Office that the number of grounded and ungrounded complaints has been equal. 
Thus, it may be concluded that the quality of the officers’ work is gradually improv­
ing. However, the situation in state institutions and municipal and county administra­
tions is totally different: even if there is a distinct tendency towards the improvement 
of public administration in state institutions, the situation in county and local govern­
ment is much worse. Every year the ombudsman investigates about 2,000 complaints. 
The complaints, which were found grounded, amounted to 30–40 per year%. 
The complaints received by the Seimas Ombudsmen’s Office have revealed the 
following key problems so far: inappropriate examination of requests from mem­
bers of the public and inappropriate provision of services to them, refusal to pro­
vide requested information, non-fulfilment of the functions assigned to institutions 
and unreasoned decision making. After complaints were found to be grounded, the 
ombudsman brought the established violations to the officers’ attention and the offic­
ers were asked to resolve these issues during the set period under the procedure 
provided by the law and other legal acts. Having established the contradictions or 
loopholes in the legal acts, the Ombudsman informed the Seimas and the Govern­
ment and drafted 32 proposals to amend, and supplement legal acts or pass new 
ones. Having investigated the complaints and established a violation the Office made 
a decision to refer the material to investigative bodies or bring a court action in 10–20 
cases per year. 
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The ombudsman uses mediation as an effective tool. Using this method, he/she 
turns to the institution concerned presenting the issues related to the contents of 
the complaint and asking to resolve the problem in good will. In many cases, fol­
lowing such mediation, problems raised in the complaint are resolved. Certainly, in 
some cases this method does not help, therefore, a thorough investigation of the 
complaint is conducted. The most important advantage of complaint investigation by 
mediation is that the complaint is examined and the problem is resolved particularly 
rapidly – within one month on average. This enables more efficient and speedier pro­
tection of a person’s violated rights by focusing on systematic human rights problems, 
which are relevant to the major part of the society. 
4 Conclusions 
The current institutional model of effective judicial protection in Lithuania will pre­
sumably be improved. The reforms on the system of administrative courts have been 
completed by establishing a two-stage model of administrative justice. However, the 
complex system of pre-litigation institutions in respective spheres (tax disputes, social 
insurance disputes etc.) is not capable of ensuring equal and effective standards 
of legal protection in all categories of administrative cases.54 Today no institutional 
structure for Lithuania’s administrative justice exists but the material and procedural 
aspects of its functioning are causing the most problems. 
There are dynamic changes to the procedural element of effective legal protection, 
which are determined not by the compliance of Lithuanian ordinary law on admin­
istrative procedure with supranational law but by the creativity of constitutional and 
administrative jurisprudence. Despite the fact that the scope of the relationships reg­
ulated by the LPA is very broad, the law does not address some questions at all. It also 
fails to address the need to improve its individual norms that have arisen in order to 
ensure effective legal protection and access to administrative court. One of the solu­
tions has been discussed during the preparation of a modern Code of Administrative 
Procedure and this would be the basis for hearing disputes in both administrative 
courts and administrative quasi-judicial commissions. 
54 Daniel A. Bilak, Administrative Justice in Lithuania (UNDP 2003) 31–33; Birutė Pranevičiené, ‘Kvaziteismai 
















   
 
12 Dilemmas and challenges of legal 
protection against administrative 





1 Historical developments 
After World War II, in Macedonia and generally in Yugoslavia, in which Macedonia 
was one of the six republics, basic ideas in administrative law demonstrated two spe­
cific elements: first, the citizen’s relationship to the administration was not character­
ised in terms of rights; and secondly, the means of recourse from a primary decision 
were to superior, internal administrative bodies rather than to independent external 
bodies such as courts.1 
For the first time in communism, in 1952 general administrative-judicial control of
public administration was introduced in Yugoslavia, with the Law on Administrative
Disputes. Before that period, as in other communist countries, there was a resist­
ance to submitting administrative acts to the control of the courts.2 In administrative-
judicial procedure, protection of rights and legal interests of individuals and legal
persons was established, with providing a right to submitting a lawsuit, if they
were not satisfied with the final outcome of the two-tier administrative procedure.
Administrative-judicial first instance was installed within the Supreme Court of Mac­
edonia and Federal Supreme Court, in which specialised Administrative Division was
organised. The procedure that was applied by the Supreme Courts (both federal and
Macedonian) in deciding administrative disputes was not judicial and was different
from the procedure followed in other cases. Other external forms of control, such as
ombudsmen, were non-existent. 
The second Law on Administrative Disputes in Yugoslavia was adopted in 1977, 
three years after the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia of 
1974. It was in force in Macedonia even after 1991, till 2007. The Constitution con­
tained several guarantees for legal protection in administrative law. It provided that 
administration could decide in individual cases for rights and obligations only in a 
procedure prescribed by law in which everyone would have an opportunity to defend 
his rights and interests and could submit a lawsuit or other legal remedy provided by 
law against the adopted act (Art. 265 para. 1 of the Constitution). Right to complaint 
against the decisions and other individual acts of judicial, administrative and other 
state bodies was also guaranteed. But the Constitution also enabled legal ground for 
1 Administrative Procedures and the Supervision of Administration in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia and Alba­
nia. SIGMA Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing. 16. 
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exception of the right to complaint if there was another way of protection of rights 
and of the legality (Art. 266 of the Constitution). Administrative dispute was provided 
for deciding on the legality of final individual acts (Art. 267). 
The administrative act in ex-Yugoslav legal doctrine was defined as a legal (nor­
mative), individual, unilateral, binding act of administrative authority, deciding on 
administrative matters.3 Administrative acts are individual in the sense that they 
refer to a particular case or cases and their application is limited to that case(s).4 
Although, despite the constitutional basis of the administrative-judicial protection 
of rights, important guarantees for effective legal protection were missing in the prac­
tice, like right to trial within reasonable time, right to trial by independent court, 
right to be heard etc. 
2 Current constitutional framework 
The contemporary Macedonian Constitution was adopted in 1991 and changed sev­
eral times. The right to effective legal remedy is not explicitly mentioned in the Con­
stitution, but its certain aspects are guaranteed. Effectiveness of legal remedies is part 
of the principle of the rule of law, which is guaranteed in Art.8 of the Constitution 
as a basic value of the constitutional order. The administrative procedure is a funda­
mental instrument of the rule of law, particularly in relation to a protection of the 
constitutional rights of individuals against possible abuse of power by administrative 
bodies.5 Effectiveness of legal remedies is also directly related to equality before the 
law, protection of personality and human dignity, the equal protection of rights, the 
right to judicial protection, and legality and finality. 
The right of appeal is a constitutionally recognised right. Art. 15 of the Constitution 
guarantees the right to appeal against individual legal acts issued in a first instance 
proceedings by a court, administrative body, organisation or other institution carry­
ing out public mandate. One of the fundamental principles of administrative proce­
dures is the principle of two-tier proceeding (principle of deciding in two instances). 
This principle was general till 2005, when Art. 15 of the Constitution was changed. 
Now, the principle of two-tier proceeding is not a general one. Amendment XXI of 
2005 guarantees the right to appeal against verdicts in first instance proceedings by 
a court. But it also provides that the right to appeal or any other legal protection 
against individual legal acts must be determined by law. So, current constitutional 
provision allows for the exclusion of the administrative appeal in certain administra­
tive matters, if it is prescribed by a law. Therefore, the possibility to file an administra­
tive appeal is a rule, but both Law on General Administrative Procedure and special 
laws can and do contain exceptions. 
The right to a trial within a reasonable time is not mentioned explicitly in the 
Macedonian Constitution. Instead, the principle of priority and urgency for protec­
tion of constitutional rights and freedoms is mentioned. Art. 50 of the Constitution 
3 Ivo Krbek, Upravni akt (Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umetnosti, Zagreb 1957) 16.
 
4 Vuk Cucić, ‘Administrative Appeal in Serbian Law’ (2011) 32 Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sci­
ences 52. 
5 H P Nehl, Principles of Administrative Procedure in EC Law (Hart Publishing 1999) 70–100 and Polona 
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guarantees that every citizen may invoke the protection of freedoms and rights deter­
mined by the Constitution before the regular courts, as well as before the Consti­
tutional Court of Macedonia, through a procedure based upon the principles of 
priority and urgency. In addition, the relevant requirement of ECHR is indirectly 
recognised by the Macedonian legal system, as Art. 118 of the Constitution declares 
the supremacy of international treaties over conflicting national laws. 
Amendment XXV of 2005 has created a basis for introduction of administrative 
courts in Macedonia. This constitutional amendment states that judicial power is 
exercised by courts, which are autonomous and independent. The Constitution does 
not specify the types of courts, their spheres of competence, their organisation and 
procedure, and these issues are left to a law adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of 
the members of Parliament. 
The constitutional guarantees of legal protection in administrative law are further 
developed in the General Administrative Procedure Law, adopted in 2005, several
sector-specific laws and the Law on Administrative Disputes (hereinafter LAD), 
adopted in 2006, but entered into force in 2007. The main orientation of the new 
legal regulation in administrative and administrative-judicial procedures was towards 
an optimal extent of codification, legality and substantive correctness in decision 
making and towards reliable bases of solutions. 
Some provisions of LAD gave an opportunity for the Constitutional Court to
interpret the meaning of the right to appeal as one of the elements of the principle
of effective legal protection. The LAD did not regulate this right, but allowed only
a limited possibility to submit the appeal against administrative acts which meant
limitation of this right and a substantial procedural guarantee for effective legal
protection in administrative law. The Law contained a provision that right to appeal
was guaranteed only against court decisions adopted on oral hearings, called and
held on the proposal of the parties in the proceedings. The Constitutional Court,
taking into consideration that the courts usually decide on closed sessions, and oral
hearings are only exceptions, concluded that the LAD made the appeal exceptional
legal means which could be used very selectively and restrictively, and it is contrary
to the constitutional provision guaranteeing right to appeal.6 The Constitutional
Court also noted that the LAD did not contain a systematic approach to the right
to appeal and the precise term for submitting it. Further, it pointed that the right
to appeal cannot be exercised restrictively, through norms that did not completely
regulate this right, or they regulated it selectively.7 After that decision of the Con­
stitutional Court, the Supreme Court adopted a General Legal Opinion in 2009
in which it concluded that it is competent to decide on the complaints against the
judgments of the Administrative Court following the procedure of the Law on Civil
Litigation. One year later the Parliament amended the relevant provisions of the
LAD extending the right to appeal and introducing the High Administrative Court
to decide on them. 
6 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 231/2008 of 16 September 2009. 
7 The Constitutional court also adopted another Decision on the issue of right to appeal, abolishing the 
part of the provision of the Law on Administrative Disputes regulating conditional possibility for use 
of this legal means, with the same argumentation as in its previous decision. See Decision No. 51/2010 










Challenges of legal protection in Macedonia 221 
3 Rights-based perspective 
3.1 Rights of the parties in the administrative procedure 
3.1.1 The right to be a party/right to intervention 
Every natural or legal person upon whose request the proceedings is started or 
against whom the proceedings is leaded, or who has right to participate in the pro­
ceedings in order to protect his/her rights and interests, is considered as a party in 
the administrative procedure. State bodies, branches of the companies, associations, 
municipalities, groups of people, which do not have status of legal persons, are also 
considered as a party, if they are holders of rights and duties which are decided in 
the administrative proceedings. Trade unions can also be party, if the right of legal 
interest of some of their members is decided in such procedures. NGOs, foundations 
and political parties, which have an aim of protecting of a certain rights and interest 
of their own members, may upon request or with a consent of their member, initi­
ate or intervene in an ongoing administrative proceedings concerning such rights 
or interests. Finally, the Public Prosecutor, the Public Attorney or other state organs 
with competence to protect public interest have the rights and duties of a party in the 
administrative procedures. 
3.1.2 Ex officio reparation 
The administrative body can ex officio repair its own decision in a procedure of repeat­
ing the administrative procedure and in a procedure for annulment of the decision. 
The repeating of the administrative proceeding can be initiated by the party or can be 
started ex officio by the administrative body that adopted the decision. Also, the Public 
Prosecutor can demand repeating of the procedure under the same conditions as a 
party. The procedure can be repeated if there are new evidences; the decision was 
issued on the basis of fake document or statement or was a consequence of a crimi­
nal act; the decision was based on the judgment in criminal procedure, which was 
abolished after that; the decision was reached upon a previous issue, which was later 
decided differently in its essential points etc. If the decision was subject to administra­
tive dispute, the procedure can be repeated only for the facts which were established 
by the administrative body, but not for those which were established by the court in 
its proceeding. 
The decision can be repaired ex officio in the period of five years after its delivery to 
the party. The exceptions to this term are possible if the decision is rendered on the 
basis of a criminal act or a substantially different solution on the previous issue in the 
case. The administrative body can repeal its own decision or replace it with a new one. 
The procedure for annulment of the decision is started ex officio if: 
(a) the decision, which was adopted was in court jurisdiction, or the issue that was 
solved in the decision could not be solved in administrative procedure; 
(b) the enforcement of the decision can lead to the crime or other offence; 
(c) the execution of the decision is not possible; 
(d) the decision was adopted in ex officio started procedure, which was not allowed for 
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3.1.3 Right to appeal 
The administrative procedure is two-tier. Under certain conditions the party has
a right to appeal also in the case when the body has not adopted a decision in the
determined term. Besides the parties, the Public Prosecutor, Public Attorney and
other state bodies are entitled to appeal against administrative decisions of first
instance, when the law was violated in favour of individual or legal persons against
the public interest. However, there are cases in which the parties cannot file an
appeal, because there is no higher administrative body. This is the case when the
Government issued the original decision. Notably, the interested parties may bring
these decisions before the Administrative Court. 
The administrative appeal has suspensive effect and the decision cannot be enforced 
until the decision of the body in second instance is not delivered to the party. Of 
course, there are exemptions of the suspensive effect of the appeal if the emergency 
measures should be taken or to avoid the appearance of irrecoverable damage. 
The appeal is submitted to the first instance body that issued the decision. If this 
body finds that the appeal is justifiable it can solve the issue differently and replace its 
own decision with a new one. If the first instance body finds that the proceeding was 
not completed and that could have effect on the decision, it can carry on the proce­
dure and issue a new decision. Of course, the party has also the right to appeal against 
the new decisions in both cases. 
If the first instance body does not replace its decision, it should send the appeal to the
higher body, which can reject the appeal, annul the decision in total or partially, or mod­
ify it. If the second instance body determines that a non-competent body adopted the
decision, it would annul the decision and would send the issue to the competent body.
If the higher body finds that a competent body issued the decision, but the evidences
are not properly established, or the disposition in the decision is unclear or inconsist­
ent with the reasoning, it can solve the issue and adopt the decision. If the higher body
considers that the first instance body can solve the irregularities of the procedure faster
and more efficiently, it will annul the decision and return the case to it. The party has a
right to appeal against the decision that will be issued by the first instance body. If the
new appeal is submitted against, the higher body will solve the issue. 
The parties can also submit an appeal when the administrative body does not solve
the issue and adopt the decision. If the higher body finds that the decision is not
adopted because of justifiable reasons, it will determine the term in which the first
instance body must solve the issue. That term should not be longer than 30 days. If
the reasons for delay are not justifiable, the higher body will demand from the first
instance body to send it all documents from the case and will solve the case by itself. 
3.1.4 Right to be heard 
The General Administrative Procedure Act of 1999 (GAPA) guarantees the procedural
rights to the parties, like the right to be heard and to participate in the administrative
procedure. For example, oral hearing is obligatory if two or more parties with conflict­
ing interests participate in the procedure and if there is a need for hearing of the witness
or expert witness. In the cases in which the oral hearing is not obligatory, the parties can
propose it. The law allows exceptions to the hearing in the cases of the so-called ‘short
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3.1.5 Duty to give reasons 
In general, the administrative body is obliged to give reasons in its decisions. In sim­
ple cases in which only one party participates, as well as in simple cases in which two 
or more parties participate, but none of them objects to the raised demand which is 
accepted by the administrative body, the reasoning in the decision can contain short 
explanation of the demand of the party and citation of the legal acts on the basis of 
which the case was solved. In such cases the decision can be written in a form pre­
scribed by the law. 
In other cases the reasoning of the decision should contain: a short explanation of
the demands of the parties; the established facts; the reasons that were decisive upon
evaluation of the evidence; the reasons because of which some of the demands of
the parties were not accepted; the legal acts and reasons on which the decision was
made. If the appeal does not postpone the decision, the reasoning contains refer­
ence to the legal act providing that. The reasoning should also contain explanation
on the conclusions against which the appeal is not allowed. If the administrative
body has discretionary power in decision making, it should give the reference to the
legal act that provides such competence and to give the reasons on which it based
the decision. 
The legal provisions prescribing the duty to give reasons in the decision are applied 
also to the decisions issued in the appellate procedure. The reasoning in the second 
instance decision should contain the evaluation of all statements in the appeal. 
3.1.6 Decision within reasonable time 
In order for efficiency, the law regulates the duration of administrative procedures, 
which can take 15 or 30 days depending on the difficulty of the case. In 2008, a new 
legislation introduced the institution of the ‘silence of administration’. According to 
the new regulation, if the competent administrative body does not decide the case, it 
has to be regarded as the request of the party has been accepted. Since the law had 
set strict conditions for this outcome, it was criticised as declaratory, frivolous, unreal­
istic and inoperative. As a consequence, the relevant law was modified in 2011 again, 
deleting the provision that silence is acceptance and providing procedure that follows 
after the silence of administration and enabling the interested parties to turn to the 
State Administrative Inspectorate for demanding oversight over the ‘silent’ adminis­
trative body. If the oversight does not result in adoption of a decision in an additional 
period of time, the party has the right to start an administrative dispute. Nevertheless, 
the critiques have not ceased even after the amended regulation, because, ‘under the 
current legal framework, the principle of tacit administrative approval was applied 
inconsistently, causing uncertainty and delays for citizens’.8 
3.1.7 Other fair process rights in administrative procedure 
In Macedonian administrative procedure, the parties have the right to access to the 
file and to make a copy of it, bearing the costs for that. This access is provided in the 
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presence and oversight of the official person. Right to access to the file has also every 
person who has legitimate interest for that. 
In addition, the GAPA prescribes obligation for the administrative body to take 
care that the ignorance of the parties and other persons participating in the proce­
dure does not damage their legal rights. The administrative body is also obliged to 
inform the parties for the course of the proceeding. 
3.2 Rights of the parties before the court 
If an administrative act violates the rights or legitimate interests of the parties, or the 
objective legal order, its judicial review can be launched by a special form of action, 
administrative suit. The object of the judicial proceeding is the final (legally enforce­
able) administrative act. The administrative act can be disputed if the law is applied 
incorrectly; the act was adopted by an incompetent body; the procedure for adoption 
of the law was incorrect (the facts are not established correctly; or an incorrect con­
clusion was derived from the facts). 
Everyone who can be a party in administrative procedure can also be a plaintiff
in the administrative dispute before the Administrative Court. So, every natural or
legal person whose right or legal interest is violated by an administrative act can
submit the administrative suit. State bodies, branch of companies, municipal bod­
ies, or groups of people who do not have legal personality can start an administra­
tive dispute if they can be holders of rights and obligations, which were decided
in administrative procedure. Municipal bodies can also be party of administrative
dispute if the right to local self-government was violated. The trade unions, political
parties and NGOs under the same conditions as in administrative procedures, can
be party in the administrative dispute. Besides these, if the law or public interest is
violated with administrative act or administrative contract, the State Attorney can
submit administrative suit. 
The administrative suit does not have suspensive effect. Exceptions to this rule are 
provided in the law. 
Before 2008, the Administrative Court had the power to control the legality of all 
government acts (individual and general) regulating individual relations. However, 
the Constitutional Court abolished this competence, arguing that the power to con­
trol legality of general legal act falls within its own competence.9 
It is to be noted that in some cases private interests might remain unprotected.
The Government, for example, often issues decrees on inter partes relations impos­
ing obligations on citizens which may not be reviewed by any court.10 The prob­
lem arises from the restrictive definition and interpretation of the general act by
the Constitutional Court. Some acts are considered by the Constitutional Court
as individual ones and it refuses to decide on their legality. On the other side, the
Administrative Court does not consider itself as competent to decide on the legality
of these acts. That leaves ‘empty spaces’ in which no judicial protection is provided
in certain cases. 
9 Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 75/2007. 
10 Borce Davitkovski and AnaPavlovska-Daneva, ‘Realizing Citizens’ Rights Through the Administrative Pro­
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The administrative disputes are decided before the Administrative Court in special
proceeding, regulated by the LAD. Generally, the Court decides in administrative cases
in closed sitting on the basis of the record, petition and the response to the petition. The
Court will hold oral hearings in certain cases.11 The parties of administrative disputes
have the right to get a judicial decision within a reasonable time on the basis of LAD. 
An important measure for greater effectiveness of the legal protection is the right 
of the Administrative Court to decide in full jurisdiction. According to the LAD, these 
cases are, for example, in case of error in law, in legal disputes about administrative 
contracts; in legal disputes about acts passed in a misdemeanour procedure, in the 
situation of silence of administration, etc. 
The Court is obliged to give reasons for its decision. The statement of reasons 
should include the facts and evidence, and the relevant law that has been applied. 
The Administrative Court has also to show why particular arguments or evidence sub­
mitted by a party have not been accepted. 
The right to appeal against the first instance judicial decision has been regulated in 
details since 2010. The appeal can be submitted to the Higher Administrative Court 
within 15 days from the delivery of the decision. The appeal is allowed in case of the 
essential violations of the procedure, if the facts were wrongly and only partially estab­
lished, or in the case of alleged error in law. 
The law also provides extraordinary legal remedies: a party may demand the repeti­
tion of the proceedings if: 
•	 new facts and evidence have been raised and they can contribute to a different 
decision; 
•	 an interested person was not given a chance to participate in the administrative 
dispute; 
•	 it is needed after the concerning judgment of the ECtHR; or 
when the objected decision: 
•	 was adopted as a result of criminal offence; 
•	 is based on an abrogated judgment; 
•	 has been grounded on false documents. 
4 Institutional perspective 
4.1 Judicial protection in administrative law 
In 2007, the Administrative Court, as a special judicial tribunal for adjudicating 
administrative disputes was established. Before, the Supreme Court had the power to 
control the lawfulness of administrative acts. In June 2011 the High Administrative 
Court started working as an appellat court in administrative disputes. 
11 In those cases in which (a) it is needed because of the complexity of the administrative dispute;
(b) it is necessary for better clarification of the administrative matter or for establishing factual situ­
ation; (c) when the court takes evidence; (d) when there is a silence of the second instance admin­
istrative body; (e) when the court cannot take decision on the basis of the facts determined in the 
administrative procedure (because there is contradiction between them, they are not fully established 
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The reason for changing the model of the administrative adjudication in the 
Republic of Macedonia was systematic delay in the resolution of administrative 
appeals, which lead to expensive, protracted and exhausting administrative-judicial 
procedures.12 The time from the beginning of the lawsuit until the final judgment in 
administrative disputes before the Supreme Court ranged from six months to several 
years.13 Each year in the administrative department, from around 3000 cases only 
about 2000 were decided, or about 67%.14 
When the Administrative Court came into existence, it ‘inherited’ 5,804 cases from 
the Supreme Court that had been competent in administrative disputes beforehand. 
The Law establishing the Administrative Court entered into force in May 2006, but 
the Court started working on December 2007. In the meantime the administrative 
cases were pending, enhancing the case load of the new court. In fact, the Administra­
tive Court cannot solve even the number of new cases that it receives each year. The 
number of cases that remain undecided was progressing till 2011. While the Supreme 
Court decided an average of 45% of its cases before 2007, the Administrative Court 
decides only 37% of its pending cases. 
If we take the high number of unresolved cases as an indicator of inefficiency, 
one of the reasons for the shortage is the technical and personal deficiencies of the 
Administrative Court. The insufficiency of the assistants as well as the inexperience of 
the judges of the Court has contributed to its inability to cope with its increasing case 
load. Another obstacle for efficient administrative judiciary is lack of cooperation 
between Administrative Court and state bodies, which did not deliver to the Court the 
acts that were needed for deciding the lawsuits.15 
The High Administrative Court was introduced by law in 2010, but started working 
with delay (on 30 June 2011). Nevertheless, its efficiency is better than the first-degree 
court, as Table 12.2 shows. 
Table 12.1 The case load of the Administrative Court 2008–2013 
Year New cases Total number of cases Decided cases Unresolved cases 
2008 8497 14301 5147 9154 
2009 9043 18197 7857 10340 
2010 9792 20132 6322 13810 
2011 11867 25726 9746 15980 
2012 14675 30591 16363 14228 
2013 12754 27005 14544 12461 
Source – The Reports for the work of the Administrative Court 2008–2013 
12 Strategy for Reform of Judicial System, 2004, 15–16 and Draft Law on Administrative Disputes, 
April 2006. 
13 Natasa Pelivanova and BrankoDimeski, ‘Efficiency of the Judicial System in Protecting Citizens against 
Administrative Judicial Acts: The Case of Macedonia’ (2011) 1 International Journal for Court Administra­
tion, 45–53. 
14 Strategy for Reform of Judicial System, 2004. The inefficiency of the Supreme Court in deciding admin­
istrative matters was also noted in the reports of the Ombudsman. Report for the work of the Ombuds­
man for 2000, 14. 
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Table 12.2 Complaints submitted to High Administrative Court from 2011–2013 
2011 2012 2013 
Cases from previous year 5 40 
New cases 55 1750 1982 
Resolved cases 50 1715 1935 
Unresolved cases 5 40 87 
The inefficiency of the administrative judiciary is criticised in the reports of the 
Ombudsman. In 2009, the Ombudsman received 79 complaints for violation of the 
right to trial in reasonable time in administrative matters (10.62% of all complaints 
for trial in reasonable time); in 2010 from all complaints for trial in reasonable time, 
10.04% were about administrative disputes, and 9.56% in 2011. The Ombudsman 
noted that the duration of the ‘judicial procedures in administrative matters lasts 
two or three years, beside the fact that the Administrative court does not decide in 
adversarial procedure’.16 
The Supreme Court of the Republic of Macedonia according to current law is com­
petent for extraordinary legal remedies in administrative law as well as to decide on 
the demands for protection of the right to trial in reasonable time in all types of court 
proceedings, including administrative ones. It means that parties whose right to trial 
within the reasonable time in criminal, civil or administrative procedure is violated, 
can initiate procedure before the Supreme Court for its protection. That is a new 
competence given to the Supreme Court under the influence of the judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights against Macedonia on the basis of Art.6 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. 
According to the Constitution, the parties of administrative disputes, after exhaust­
ing all available judicial remedies, in defence of certain basic rights like freedom of 
conscience, freedom of expression or right to association, may submit a constitu­
tional complaint to the Constitutional Court. The Constitution uses the term ‘claim 
for protection of freedom and rights’ for this special procedure, and entitles only 
citizens to launch it. Such a complaint may be submitted against an administrative act 
or activity within two months from the day of the final legally valid individual act, or 
from the day when the citizen got information about the activity, but not later than 
five years. In these cases, ‘the Constitutional Court may provide direct protection for 
the mentioned freedoms and rights only if they are violated by a final individual act 
of an ordinary court’.17 
4.2 The role of the Ombudsman in the rights protection in administrative law 
Although the institution of Ombudsman (People’s Defender) was introduced by the 
Constitution of 1991, the Law on Ombudsman was adopted in 1997. In accordance 
with the law, the Ombudsman is competent for protection of the constitutional and 
legal rights of citizens when violated by state and public administration, and other 
16 Report for the work of Ombudsman for 2011.
 
17 Svetomir Skarich, ‘Constitutional Courts of the Republic of Macedonia’ in Giussepe deVergottini (ed.), 
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bodies performing state functions and organisations with public mandates. The 
Ombudsman cannot interfere in the cases, which are in court procedure. 
The procedure before the Ombudsman can be initiated by a person whose rights 
are violated, or by the Ombudsman himself/herself. But, if the Ombudsman is to 
institute the proceedings, either on his own initiative, or upon a petition, which has 
been lodged on behalf of the aggrieved person by a third party, the consent by the 
aggrieved person shall be required to start the proceedings. The proceedings before 
the Ombudsman are not formal and free-of charge for the petitioners. That makes 
the Ombudsman more accessible to the individuals. The Ombudsman will not insti­
tute the proceedings if more than one year has elapsed from the wrong-doing or the 
last decision of the body, except when he assesses that the petitioner has been late for 
justifiable reasons. 
The administrative bodies are obliged to furnish the Ombudsman with all the infor­
mation and data, within their competencies, irrespective of the level of secrecy, and 
shall enable him/her to carry out the investigation. All officials and other employees 
of the body must respond to the Ombudsman’s call to co-operate in an investigation 
and provide all necessary explanations. The Ombudsman may summon any witness 
or expert to an interview about the case he/she is dealing with. 
When the Ombudsman considers that the right of complainant is infringed by the 
administrative bodies, he/she may give recommendations, proposals, opinions and 
indications on the manner of the removal of the determined infringements. Ombuds­
man can also raise an initiative for commencing disciplinary proceedings against an 
official or even submit a request to the competent Public Prosecutor for initiation 
of a criminal procedure. The Ombudsman may also request temporarily postpone­
ment of the implementation of the administrative act until the decision by the second 
instance body or competent court is adopted if he/she estimates that infringements 
of rights and execution of the administrative act may cause irreparable damage to the 
right of some of interested persons in the proceeding. 
The administrative organs and other organisations have the obligation to act upon
the proposals, opinions, and recommendations of the Ombudsman, and within a time
framework, not longer than 30 days, inform the Ombudsman about the undertaken
measures and actions initiated by his requests. If they fail to comply and do not inform
the Ombudsman about the implementation of his proposals and recommendations,
or only partially adopt said activities, the Ombudsman can inform the next higher
organ about it, an authorised ministry, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia,
and, with a special report, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, or publicise
the case. After the procedure is completed, the Ombudsman notifies the petitioner. 
The Ombudsman in Macedonia is not always satisfied by the attitude of the bodies of
state and public administration and other organisations towards him. He has declared
many times that the responsible officials did not respond to invitations for conversa­
tion. Sometimes they sent lower administrative officials, and often their responses were
not on the satisfactory level. Also, there is a remarkable percentage of recommenda­
tions and suggestions of the Ombudsman, which were not fulfilled by the respective
bodies. For example, in 1998, in 42.20% of the cases, the bodies did not respect the
recommendations of the Ombudsman, in 1999 it was 37.65%,18 in 2000 it was 39.03%.19 
18 Report for the work of the Ombudsman for 1999, 18. 
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5 European perspectives 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights has influenced the Macedo­
nian legal frame in the field of respect and protection of the right of trial within 
reasonable time. 
ECtHR practice had contributed to the already mentioned improvements in the 
Law on Administrative Disputes with the changes guaranteeing the right to appeal 
and increasing the transparency and possibility for oral hearings in the administrative 
dispute procedure, too. At the beginning, LAD did not regulate the right to appeal, 
but introduced a very limited possibility to submit it. Actually, LAD was missing a sys­
tematic approach to the right to appeal and there was no precise term for submitting 
it. But, following the ECtHR case law, the legal changes were introduced guarantee­
ing the right to appeal in administrative court procedure. Also, firstly, Macedonian 
LAD stipulated oral hearings as an exception, only as a possibility, not as an obligation 
for the Administrative Court. This provision was criticised as not complying with the 
right of fair trial as it is regulated in ECHR and was changed in 2010. After Macedonia 
was condemned for violation of Art. 6 and Art.13 of ECHR in many cases, including 
those on administrative disputes,20 in order to improve the effectiveness of judicial 
proceedings, the Law on Courts was changed in 2006, introducing a special proce­
dure for complaints on violation of the right to trial in reasonable time. An interested 
party could apply to the immediately higher court if he/she considered that the court 
deciding his/her case breached the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The 
immediately higher court was to deal with the length complaint within six months 
after the application had been lodged and to decide whether the court below had 
breached the right in question. It would award just satisfaction to the claimant if it 
found a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The just satisfac­
tion was payable from the court’s budget. 
The ECtHR criticised these provisions of the 2006 Act, because they contained 
terms that were open to various interpretations and it was not clear which court 
was competent to decide upon the length of remedy.21 The criticism was useful and 
resulted in changes to the Law in 2008, according to which the Supreme Court had 
exclusive competence to decide upon the length of remedy. A special department was 
created within the court to deal with length-of-proceedings cases. An interested party 
can seek protection of his or her right to a hearing within a reasonable time while 
proceedings are pending, but not later than six months after the decision becomes 
final. The Supreme Court decides, at two levels of jurisdiction, within six months after 
the complaint is lodged. In doing so, the court applies the rules and principles of the 
European Convention and the criteria established in the Court’s case law, namely 
the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and the conduct of the compe­
tent authorities. If it finds a violation, the Supreme Court awards compensation and, 
where appropriate, sets a time-limit for the court in question to determine the case 
on the merits. Decisions at first level may be appealed against before the Supreme 
Court’s second instance panel. The compensation is paid to the successful claimant 
within three months after the Supreme Court’s decision becomes final. 
20 Dumonovski v Macedonia App no 13898/02 (ECHR, 8 December 2005); Docevski v Macedonia App no 
66907/01 (ECHR 1 March 2007). 
21 Parizov v Macedonia, App no. 14258/03 (ECHR 7 February 2008) §§ 44 and 46. 
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The Government of Macedonia in 2012 adopted a Strategy for adoption of a new 
Law on the General Administrative Procedure. The Strategy points that provisions 
which regulate the silence of the administration should be carefully reviewed and also 
envisages a review of legal remedies in order: to introduce an effective, convenient 
and economical way to protect the legal rights of the parties before filing an appeal to 
the administrative courts; to provide the opportunity and duty to effective self-control 
of administrative authorities; and to reduce the administrative burden on the courts 
by resolving cases within the internal procedures for legal remedies. It also points to 
the need for increasing control over the legality of administrative acts and actions 
within the administrative procedure in order to reduce the number of initiation of 
administrative disputes. 
6 Conclusion 
We have many dilemmas about the level of effectiveness and efficiency of the Mac­
edonian system of legal protection in administrative matters, led by detected short­
comings. First, besides the legal changes, there are still legal gaps in the competence 
regulation of the Administrative and other courts that leave certain rights without 
judicial protection. Secondly, rights of the parties to be heard in the administrative 
dispute procedure are still not properly and strongly guaranteed, in the absence of 
strict and precise obligation for oral hearings. Thirdly, we are lacking complaint as 
a regular legal remedy for procedural or administrative actions towards acts which 
are not administrative. This is very important, knowing that the administrative activi­
ties are not limited only to administrative acts. Fourthly, the practice shows that our 
administrative justice is slow and delayed. Fifthly, ECtHR practice is still not given 
deserved attention and implementation. Sixthly, there is no permanent and adequate 
cooperation among courts, state and public administration and other relevant organs. 
To those legal problems, we can add political ones, such as: problems with inde­
pendence and impartiality of our judicial system as well as lack of professional, 
competent and depoliticised administration, recruited by merit system; absence of 
developed legal culture, as a result of authoritarian heritage, weak institutions and 
partitocrazia; fragile civil society, that is often object of instrumentalisation; weak pub­
lic opinion, created by media under state, oligarchic and party pressure; unheard sci­
entific community. All these factors are obstacles to effectiveness of legal protection 
in administrative matters in Macedonia. 
Macedonia became a candidate for EU membership in 2005 and since then has 
achieved many times positive reports by the Commission, but has not been given a 
date for negotiations by the Council. EU itself has defined the terms under which 
accession could occur (the Copenhagen criteria). Membership criteria are also 
related to a democratic political system and system of public administration. Knowing 
that the EU–prospective is the key force and a powerful motive for positive demo­
cratic developments, Macedonia has to work on the ability to take on the obligations 
of membership. Independent and efficient judiciary, including the administrative 
one that protects citizens against administrative acts and activities is both an obliga­
tion and challenge for us. 
  
  








   
   
  
13	 The principle of effective legal 
protection in administrative 
law in The Netherlands 
Karianne Albers, Lise Kjellevold and Raymond Schlössels1 
Introduction 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, discussions on the administrative judicial
system in the Netherlands gained momentum. Under the influence of developments
in France (e.g. recours pour exces de pouvoir) and Germany (Verwaltungsrechtsschutz) an
extensive debate took place about the desirability of an independent administrative
judiciary with a general jurisdiction. However, the discussions did, to put it mildly,
not go smoothly. Not everyone shared the opinion that a State under the rule of law
(Rechtsstaat)2 required independent judicial control of (decisions of) the administration. 
This started to change in the beginning of the twentieth century. The Netherlands 
legislator finally established specialised administrative courts. The first major admin­
istrative court became the Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van Beroep, 1902), 
which, for example, adjudicates social security disputes. Nevertheless, it took a long 
time before the final settlement of disputes by the administration itself came com­
pletely to an end. Only in 1985 did the European Court of Human Rights in Benthem 
v The Netherlands3 put an end to the appeal to de Kroon (The Crown). The Crown 
(from a constitutional viewpoint: the Government) was, for a long time, the body that 
decided in the highest instance regarding many administrative disputes. 
The present system of administrative justice came into being at the beginning of 
the 1990s. The enactment of the General Administrative Law Act (hereafter GALA) 
was especially important. This law strengthened the position of private persons with 
regard to the administration. It emphasises sound administration and the procedural 
rights of private persons (for example, the principle of hearing both sides of the argu­
ment). Under the influence of the GALA, effective and timely legal protection has 
become increasingly important. In 2013, new reforms of administrative procedural 
law took place.4 These are intended to lead to a less time-consuming and more effec­
tive administrative justice. 
1 Raymond Schlössels is professor of Constitutional and Administrative law at Nijmegen University. Lise 
Kjellevold-Hoegee is a staff lawyer at the Dutch Bar Association and Karianne Albers is associate profes­
sor of Constitutional and Administrative law at Open University Netherlands (Heerlen). 
2 During the nineteenth century the German concept of Rechtsstaat dominated the discussion of admin­
istrative justice in the Netherlands. J. van der Hoeven, De drie dimensies van het bestuursrecht (Alphen aan 
den Rijn, Samsom H. D. Tjeenk Willink 1989) gives an analysis of the history of Netherlands administra­
tive justice. 
3 Benthem v The Netherlands App no 1/1984/73/111 (ECHR, 23 October 1986). 
4 The changes with respect to digital litigation will not be dealt with here. 
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In this contribution we will explore the general principle – or the basic assumptions −
of effective legal protection in Netherlands administrative law.5 We will discuss the his­
tory of administrative justice and its constitutional framework (II). We then go on to 
discuss the present-day system of administrative legal protection (III). Thereafter we 
focus on the characteristics of Netherlands administrative procedure and the specific 
rights of parties (IV). We also pay attention to some European aspects (V) and spe­
cific problems of the Dutch system of administrative justice (VI). This contribution is 
drawn together by a conclusion (VII). 
1 Netherlands administrative justice and the  
constitutional framework 
1.1 Rule of law and administrative justice 
The principle of the rule of law and democracy are closely connected. The administra­
tion has to act in accordance with democratically granted and clearly regulated pow­
ers. It goes without saying that the government must respect the fundamental rights 
of its citizens. Judicial control of the administration and legal protection against the 
infringement of civil rights are essential building blocks in a careful system of checks 
and balances. 
At present, we can speak of constitutional cooperation6 between legislator, judiciary
and administration. This is crucial for the legal protection of the rights of private per­
sons with respect to the administration. Principles of sound administration and many
procedural rights protect private persons’ interests. In many countries, the situation was
different a century ago. Unwritten administrative law hardly existed. The administration
could act freely within the limits of its powers (pouvoir discretionaire, freies Ermessen). There
was little room for judicial intervention and control, except, for example, where the
administration had infringed property rights. The situation in the Netherlands fit into
this image. This explains why proposals made in 1905 for the introduction of general
administrative courts in the Netherlands still met with fierce opposition.7 The convic­
tion that administrative courts were unnecessary fit the legal culture of that period.
In the Netherlands there was great faith in the integrity of the administration. So, the
necessity of administrative legal protection by courts was not felt. 
However, in the twentieth century, a ‘rights-based perspective’ made considerable 
headway. The position of private persons with respect to the administration became 
stronger. Legal protection against (decisions of) the government (and administrative 
bodies) developed in the Netherlands along different lines: 
(a) specialised administrative courts were set up in certain fields (among other areas, 
civil servants law, social security law and economic administrative law); 
(b) various administrative legal disputes were decided by the administration itself 
and in particular by ‘the Crown’ (for example, environmental disputes); 
5 We do not deal with the specific legal protection with respect to administrative decisions involving a 
‘criminal charge’ (for example, administrative penalties). 
6 B. W. N. de Waard, Samenwerkende machten: Wetgeving en rechtspraak in dienst van het bestuur (Zwolle, W. E. 
J. Tjeenk Willink 1994). 
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(c) since 1976 the Council of State (Law Department) provided, more or less, as a 
general administrative court (appeal against single case-decisions); 
(d) the civil courts were given an important task in providing general and additional 
legal protection (among which, the granting of compensation for damages). 
The result was a complex system of legal protection in which the Crown’s position 
was striking. For many years this instance – the highest Dutch administrative body –
functioned as ‘pseudo court’. It was only in the 1980s that efforts were made to fun­
damentally reform this system. We will describe the present system below (in para 3 
of this chapter). 
1.2 The constitution 
Since 1887, the Netherlands Constitution (de Grondwet) has contained a legal basis 
for the legislator to design an administrative judicial system.8 However, there is no 
constitutional requirement to actually set up (separate) administrative courts. Even 
the present-day Constitution regulates amazingly little with respect to legal protection 
against the government. For example, unlike the German Grundgesetz, the Nether­
lands Constitution does not provide for an explicit right of access to court and fair 
trial.9 This is remarkable. However, the Constitution does contain provisions on the 
organisation of the judiciary. The Constitution also provides, for example, for the 
right to a public hearing and the requirement of giving a reasoned judgment. 
The Constitution even contains one provision that plainly seems to be in conflict 
with effective legal protection. Netherlands courts may not review national legislation 
for its conformity with the Constitution (constitutional review), or with general legal 
principles.10 Moreover, the Netherlands does not have a (separate) constitutional 
court. This is a controversial point and may even be incomprehensible to non-Dutch 
lawyers. Nevertheless, in practice it does not lead to a less effective legal protection. 
Netherlands law stands in an open relationship with international law (monist sys­
tem). All Netherlands courts may review whether national legislation is in accordance 
with provisions in treaties that are self-executing (‘are universally binding’).11 Most 
basic rights, as they are codified in the international human rights treaties fall within 
this category. From this perspective, there is in fact an effective constitutional review. 
By reviewing whether Dutch administrative law provisions are compatible with the 
relevant treaties the administrative courts have, for example, held that many discrimi­
natory provisions in social security laws are in conflict with the principle of equality. 
2 The present system of legal protection in administrative law 
The Dutch system of legal protection against administrative decisions generally has
three phases. First, there is a mandatory preliminary procedure (usually an objection
procedure), subsequently appeal is open to the administrative department of the district
8 C. A. J. M. Kortmann, P. P. T. Bovend’Eert, J.L.W. Broeksteeg, C.N.J. Kortmann, B.P. Vermeulen Consti­
tutioneel recht (7th edn., Deventer, Kluwer 2012) 62–267. 
9 However, there is a draft law in consultation to amend the Constitution on this point. 
10 Binding regulations of the Government and ministers, as well as regulations of provinces and munici­
palities may be examined for compatibility with the Constitution. 
















234 Karianne Albers, et al. 
court (Rechtbank) and finally appeal (in second instance) is open to the Administrative
Law Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State).
Yet, there exist a lot of exceptions and procedural abnormalities. For example, in sev­
eral administrative cases no preliminary procedure is required. In other cases there is
no appeal in second instance. Besides, specialised administrative courts are competent
in tax disputes, social security matters and in economic administrative law (see below). 
2.1 The mandatory preliminary procedure 
A preliminary administrative procedure generally precedes appeal to the adminis­
trative court. Key functions of this procedure are reconsideration and correction of 
(legal) errors. The GALA contains two preliminary administrative procedures: the 
objection procedure and the administrative appeal. 
The objection procedure is the usual preliminary procedure. In this phase the 
administrative body which originally gave the (disputed) decision examines its own 
decision’s lawfulness. The objection procedure contains a number of guarantees, 
such as, the duty to hear the arguments of the interested parties. The objection pro­
cedure has to be initiated by an interested party which has also the right to appeal to 
the administrative court (after the reconsideration is completed). There are no costs 
for the objection procedure. 
In the Netherlands it is thought that such a mandatory preliminary (objection) pro­
cedure offers a number of advantages. First, the influx of cases at the administrative
court can be limited. A second advantage is that if appeal is nevertheless lodged with
the administrative court following the decision on the objection, the dispute will have
been to a certain extent delimited during the objection procedure. As a result, the
administrative court can more easily get to the core of the case. The objection proce­
dure can also be used to clarify the facts and to remedy legal errors. Thirdly, the objec­
tion procedure offers the possibility to resolve the dispute informally (for example,
through mediation). In the Netherlands the interest of informal dispute resolution
between the administrative bodies and private persons has grown significantly in the
recent years. For example, by means of a simple phone conversation the administra­
tion will often try to settle a dispute without the objection procedure having to be used. 
Administrative appeal is another mandatory preliminary procedure. This proce­
dure is only applicable where this has been provided for in a special statutory regula­
tion. Administrative appeal excludes the objection procedure. Administrative appeal 
means a review of the original decision by a different administrative body (generally 
one higher in the hierarchy). An example is the lodging of administrative appeal with 
the provincial administration against a decision of the Municipal Executive (made up 
of mayor and aldermen). 
2.2 The organisation of the Dutch administrative justice 
The objection procedure results in a new decision (the reconsidered decision). 
Administrative appeal results also in a (new) decision of the (higher) administrative 
body. An interested party may lodge an appeal with the competent administrative 
court against those (new) decisions. An administrative court may only examine the 
lawfulness of a decision and not its effectiveness. 
The district court (Rechtbank) is the general administrative court in first instance 
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Figure 13.1 Administrative and civil courts in the Netherlands 
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Parties and administration may thereafter (so in second instance) appeal against the 
judgment of the district court. The nature of the case determines which high admin­
istrative court is competent. At present (2016), there are (still)12 five highest adminis­
trative courts that hear administrative appeals: 
(a) the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad, HR),13 competent in tax law cases; 
(b) the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrecht­
spraak van de Raad van State, ABRvS), the highest administrative court with gen­
eral jurisdiction; e.g. competent in cases involving planning law, environmental 
law and immigration law; 
(c) the Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van Beroep, CRvB), which, for exam­
ple, adjudicates social security disputes; 
(d) the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven, 
CBB), which rules on disputes in the field of economic administrative law; and 
(e) the Appeals Court Arnhem-Leeuwarden (Gerechtshof in Arnhem-Leeuwarden), 
competent in cases of administrative penalties for traffic violations. 
12 There are plans to reform the organisation of the high administrative courts by limiting the number 
of them. The continued existence of the Central Appeals Tribunal (CRvB) and the Trade and Industry 
Appeals Tribunal (CBB) are uncertain. 
13 The Supreme Court is not an appeals but a cassation court. In tax cases, after appeal with the district 
court, appeal may be lodged with a court of appeal. Thereafter, cassation before the Supreme Court is 
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2.3 Bottlenecks in the organisation of administrative justice 
There are a number of bottlenecks in the Dutch system of administrative justice. 
Some of these are important with regard to effective legal protection. 
First, the limited jurisdiction of the administrative courts is a subject that comes up 
repeatedly in the Dutch legal literature.14 The jurisdiction of the Netherlands admin­
istrative court is linked to the concept of decision. If a dispute between a private per­
son and the administration does not involve an appealable decision, the civil court is 
generally competent. Disputes which come within the jurisdiction of the civil court 
concern e.g. acts with no intended legal effect (factual acts), civil law acts, or decisions 
which are ex lege excluded from appeal. This system has the disadvantage that private 
persons sometimes have to bring the dispute with both the administrative court and 
the civil court in order to get a full settlement. 
A second point of criticism is that, in a system with various highest administrative 
courts (see above), the unity of the law is insufficiently guaranteed (e.g. the inter­
pretation of the GALA). The involved courts try to reach agreements on the inter­
pretation of the law through consultation. However, such informal discussions and 
agreements are not very transparent. Since 2013, three of the highest administrative 
courts (ABRvS, CRvB, and CBB) may use a five-judge section in leading cases. These 
judges, some of whom are active in different courts, can easily exchange information. 
At the same time there is now a possibility to request one of the members of these 
courts to give a (non-binding) opinion in administrative cases. These facilities should 
improve a more uniform application of the law. 
A third and final point of criticism is that appeal (to a higher court) is not open in 
every administrative law case. The choice for one or two instances is not always well 
grounded. 
2.4 The position of the civil courts 
The Dutch civil courts play an odd – but crucial – role in the legal protection against 
the administration. To put it simply: the civil court offers supplementary legal pro­
tection whenever the administrative judicial process is inadequate. Since 1915, the 
Supreme Court has held that the civil courts have a very broad competence,15 includ­
ing administrative law disputes. 
The broad competence of the civil court is very valuable but it does have less attrac­
tive aspects. The civil court is not allowed to ‘get in the way’ of the administrative 
court. The civil court has to ensure that inconsistent case law does not arise and that 
private persons do not try to by-pass the administrative court. In order to prevent the 
civil courts from hindering the administrative ones, the Supreme Court has devel­
oped a number of rules giving precedence to the administrative courts. Thus, for 
example, the civil court must refer a private person to an administrative procedure 
that offers sufficient guarantees. A claim may also be inadmissible if there was an 
administrative procedure available (which was not used). 
14 See, for example, R. J. N. Schlössels, Het besluitbegrip en de draad van Ariadne (inaugural lecture Nijmegen, 
Boom Juridische uitgevers 2003); F. J. van Ommeren, P.J. Huisman, G.A. van der Veen, K.J. de Graaf Het 
besluit voorbij (Den Haag, Boom Juridische uitgevers 2013). 
15 Hoge Raad, 31 December 1915, NJ 1916/407. 
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Further, there are rules on the basis of which the civil court has to follow the judg­
ments of the administrative court. We will only mention two of the most important 
ones here. If the administrative court has quashed a decision, the civil court will 
assume that the decision was indeed unlawful (assume a tort).16 On the other hand, 
if the administrative court has held that an appeal against a decision is unfounded, 
the civil court will assume that the decision was lawful. Moreover, lawfulness is 
assumed – apart from some exceptions – if the private person has not appealed the 
decision even though it was possible to do so.17 
2.5 The position of the national Ombudsman 
The office of National Ombudsman has existed in the Netherlands since 1 January 
1982. The control by the Ombudsman covers – in brief – all acts by the (civil servants 
of the) central administration and the police. Acts of the local and regional authori­
ties may be covered as well. The legislator allows the municipalities and provinces to 
set up their own independent ombudsman or committee by way of alternative. An 
ombudsman examines whether an administrative act is an act of sound administra­
tion. The National Ombudsman cannot make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, 
his decisions have a great deal of authority. His recommendations are generally fol­
lowed by the administrative body. 
3 The Dutch administrative procedure in more detail 
3.1 Access to the administrative courts 
Access to the Netherlands administrative courts is to a large extent based on the 
concepts of ‘administrative body’ (bestuursorgaan), ‘decision’ (besluit) and ‘interested 
party’ (belanghebbende). 
3.1.1 The administrative body 
The definition of administrative body is provided for by the GALA. Under the defi­
nition fall, first of all, the bodies of the central, local and regional authorities, such
as the Government, the ministers, the Municipal Executive (made up of mayor and
aldermen) and the mayor. In addition, there are many special administrative bodies
that have been set up under specific laws. A well-known example is the ‘Administra­
tion Agency for Employed Persons Insurance’, which deals with the implementa­
tion of various social security laws. Legal persons under private law are sometimes
administrative bodies as well. This is the case to the extent public law powers are
granted to a private law legal person. The private law legal person is considered
to be an ‘administrative body’ when it exercises those public law powers, but only
then. An example is the Authority for the Financial Markets, which, among other
things, supervises securities transactions. This authority is a foundation under pri­
vate law. 
16 Hoge Raad, 31 May 1991, AB 1992/290. 
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3.1.2 The decision 
The concept of decision is defined by the GALA in a way that it is a written decision 
of an administrative body containing a legal act that has the character of public law. 
The competence of the administrative court is linked to the concept of decision. As 
the GALA declares, ‘[a]n interested party may appeal a decision with the administra­
tive court.’ 
Only a written decision by an administrative body is a decision within the meaning 
of the law. As a result, there is no possibility of appealing an oral decision with the 
administrative courts. The fact that a decision must entail a legal act means that the 
decision must be aimed at having legal effect. A negative decision, such as the refusal 
to grant a permit, has no legal effect. However, the GALA has provided for several 
‘corrections’ in such cases. As a negative decision has far-reaching consequences for 
the applicant, the legislator has provided that the denial of a request for a single-
case decision18 is equated with a decision. In addition, in the interest of effective legal 
protection, the non-timely grant (or denial) of a decision has been equated with the 
taking of a decision. 
An administrative decision has a public law character. Hence, private law legal acts 
by the administration (for example, the buying and selling of land) are not decisions. 
It must generally be based on the powers given to the administration by the legisla­
tor. Both single-case decisions and decisions with general implications (such as the 
decision to make a street one way) fall under the concept of administrative decision. 
The main rule is that appeal may be lodged with an administrative court against 
a decision within the meaning of the GALA by a natural or legal person who is an 
‘interested party’ (see below). Nevertheless, there are several important exceptions 
to this rule. 
The most controversial one is that appeal is not permitted against generally bind­
ing provisions, such as municipal regulations. Nor is appeal possible against national 
laws. This, however, is because the national legislator is not an administrative body. 
The prohibition of appeal against generally binding provisions has its origin, 
among other things, in the principle of separation of powers. The Netherlands legis­
lator was of the opinion that, for example, the administrative court may not quash by­
laws enacted by democratically chosen municipal councils. This legislator’s ‘antique’ 
standpoint is no longer valid. In practice, there is actually no real limitation to the 
review of generally binding provisions. After all, a private person (with sufficient 
interest) can generally challenge a by-law in the civil courts. These courts provide 
supplementary legal protection (see above). 
There is also a possibility to challenge a generally binding provision before the 
administrative courts ‘by way of exception’. This works as follows: an interested party 
lodges an appeal against another decision which is based on a generally binding pro­
vision. He then argues that this decision is unlawful because the generally binding 
provision on which it is based is unlawful. The administrative court will then (also) 
review the generally binding provision. 
18 Compare: P. Craig, D. Curtin, G. della Canea, H.C.H. Hofmann, O. Mir, J.P. Schneider, M. Wierzbowski, 
J. Ziller ‘Single Case Decision-Making’ (Book III of the Research Network on EU Administrative Law 2014) 
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3.1.3 The interested parties 
In the Netherlands only interested parties may appeal with the administrative court 
(and follow the objection procedure that precedes appeal). The GALA defines ‘inter­
ested party’ as: ‘that person whose interest is directly affected by a decision’. The 
administrative court sets five requirements when applying the concept of interested 
party: 
(1) The party must have its own interest. A (written) authorisation is required if one 
contests a decision on behalf of someone else. 
(2) The interest must be capable of being objectively determined. Interests involving 
matters of principle or of a purely emotional, psychological, or instinctive nature 
are not sufficient. 
(3) A current interest must be at stake. A future interest is not sufficient. 
(4) The interest has to be personal. It must be sufficiently differentiated from that 
of a random person. Hence, for environmental, construction and planning deci­
sions the distance to, and the view from, the property dealt with in the decision is 
relevant: a person who lives 150 metres from a new wind turbine may contest the 
permit, but a person who lives 1000 meters away may not. 
(5) A direct interest must be at stake. A derived interest is, in principle, not sufficient. 
There can often be said to be a derived interest if a person is indirectly affected by 
a decision, via a contractual relationship with an interested party. Thus, a supplier 
of a supermarket will generally not have an interest in the permit to build that 
supermarket. 
Netherlands administrative law broadens the concept ‘interested party’ for legal per­
sons that promote general and collective interests. That these interests are being pro­
moted has to be evident from the statutory aims of the legal person (for example, a 
foundation) and from its actual activities. The statutory aim must also be sufficiently 
defined. In particular in environmental law, the right of appeal of interest groups (for 
example, organisations that are involved in natural and environmental conservation) 
can contribute to an effective legal protection. 
3.2 Time periods for objection and appeal 
Objection and appeal are admissible only if the objection and appeal notice is filed 
in a timely fashion. Netherlands administrative law generally uses a relatively short 
objection and appeal period of six weeks. In many cases a pro forma objection or 
appeal is made. The applicant then has the opportunity to provide grounds for the 
appeal during a given period (often four weeks). 
3.3 Financial thresholds 
There are no costs for filing an objection. A financial contribution (court fee) for the 
administrative court procedure19 has to be paid by the parties. In 2016, this is EUR 
46-EUR 168 for natural persons in district court procedures. For legal persons and 
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administrative bodies the fee is EUR 334. The court fees are higher for appeal. In 
most cases natural persons have to pay EUR 251 and legal persons and administrative 
bodies, EUR 503. Court fees are intended to act as a threshold for the lodging of an 
appeal. Although the financial threshold has been kept relatively low, the threshold 
should not be so high that private persons are denied access to a court (cf. Art. 6 
ECHR). 
3.4 The ‘reformed’ Netherlands administrative procedure 
Netherlands administrative procedure has undergone a major metamorphosis in 
the past 20 years. In the past ten years in particular the court-culture has changed. 
The most recent legislative reforms took place in 2013. The buzz words nowadays 
are: speed, effectiveness and efficiency. Digitalisation (electronic proceedings) is also 
receiving much attention. 
The new approach aims at dealing with cases more ‘expeditiously’ during the pro­
ceedings. Long pleadings by the parties are no longer welcomed. The administrative 
judge will try to get to the core of the case as quickly as possible. 
3.5 Scope of the proceedings 
A first, important step toward present-day administrative legal procedure was taken 
in 1994. At that time the legislator abandoned what is known as the classical control 
and examination model. This model assumes that an administrative judge will exam­
ine ex officio whether a decision is compatible with the law (legality control). Ex officio
review of decisions for their conformity with the law can have serious disadvantages 
for private persons. For example, their legal position may be worse than it was before 
the appeal (reformatio in peius). Furthermore, a judge may go beyond what the private 
person has requested (ultra petita). These weaknesses have been acknowledged in the 
Netherlands and have led to a revision of the administrative procedure. 
Since 1994, the main rule is that the administrative court will give a judgment on 
the grounds of the notice of appeal. Only in exceptional cases is examination ex offi­
cio permitted.20 Naturally, the court must check whether it is competent and whether 
the appeal is admissible. However, the appellant himself may determine which issues 
he wants to put before the court and which not. In other words, he must bring the 
dispute regarding a decision before the court. In Dutch administrative procedure 
private persons do not have to be represented by an attorney (although it is often wise 
to have legal representation because cases and administrative procedure law are com­
plex). The appellant may formulate the appeal in his own words. The administrative 
judge can ask questions and may ‘delimit’ the scope of the appeal. Simply stated: the 
judge must examine closely why the decision is challenged. The judge then applies 
the law: iura curia novit (‘the court knows the law’). 
The end of ex officio legality control since 1994 has not led to a conflict with the Euro­
pean requirements of an effective and non-discriminatory legal protection and the 
principle of effective legal protection (requirements of equivalence and effectiveness; 
20 D. Brugman, Hoe komt de bestuursrechter tot zijn recht? (dissertation Nijmegen) (Den Haag, Boom Juridi­
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the principle of effective judicial protection).21 In the Van der Weerd case22 the Court 
of Justice of the European Union made it clear that EU law does not require that 
the national court make an examination ex officio if the rights of one of the parties 
protected by Union law are at stake. Of great importance, however, is that during the 
procedure a party is in fact given the real opportunity to put forward appeal grounds 
that are based on Union law. The Netherlands administrative procedure meets this 
requirement. 
3.6 Individual legal protection 
The Dutch legislator has also emphasised the principle of individual legal protection.
This is in fact one of the fundamental goals of administrative justice. Unlawful actions
of the administration become relevant only if the private persons are prejudiced in
their interests. Hence, nowadays the administrative courts do not ‘simply’ quash deci­
sions in case of violation of the law. The administrative court may even ‘ignore’ viola­
tions of the law on the strict condition that it is plausible that interested parties did not
suffer damages because of the infringement. Annulation requires that a violated rule
or principle protects the interests of the involved party in an evident way. After quash­
ing the administrative courts must attempt to settle the dispute in a final way, if pos­
sible by deciding the case themselves (instead of the competent administrative body). 
3.7 The judgment of the administrative court; effectiveness 
The Dutch administrative courts may give a final judgment in a dispute if the appeal 
succeeds. Thus, after quashing a decision, it may confirm the legal effects of the 
quashed decision. Further, after quashing a decision, it may give a decision itself 
(instead of the administration). However, the administrative courts for a long time 
did not often make use of this possibility. 
The reason for this restraint is because under the separation of powers doctrine the 
administrative court is not allowed to step into the shoes of the administration. Con­
sequently, the administrative courts usually use this power only if the administration 
reasonably could have taken only one decision. 
In the period 2008–2010, the administrative courts have moved away from this 
‘reserved’ approach. From 2008, the judgments handed down by the highest admin­
istrative courts put more emphasis on the fact that an effective and definitive legal 
protection is of great importance. Both the Administrative Law Division of the Coun­
cil of State and the Central Appeals Tribunal take the position in their judgments 
that when an administrative court quashes a decision it must consider whether
it is possible to settle the dispute definitively. On the basis of the new case law23 the
21 In relation to Netherlands law, see J. H. Jans, R. de Lange, S. Prechal and R. J. G. M. Widdershoven, 
Europeanisation of Public Law (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing 2007), chapter II. 
22 Joined cases C-222/05 to C-222/05 J. van der Weerd and Others v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voed­
selkwaliteit- [2007] ECR 1–04233. 
23 ABRvS 17 March 2010, ECLI:NL:RVS:2010:BL7777, JB 2010/109; ABRvS 17 March 2010, 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2010:7778, JB 2010/110; ABRvS 23 June 2010, ECLI:NL:RVS:2010:BM8841, JB 2010/179; 
CRvB 3 November 2010, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2010:BO4110, JB 2011/11 and CRvB 14 March 2011, 
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administrative court must investigate if it can give a new decision to replace the deci­
sion being quashed. 
This approach was given a legal basis in the 2013 revision of the GALA.24 It follows 
from the GALA that if an administrative court quashes a decision, it must assess ex offi­
cio whether it can settle the dispute definitively within the limits of the law. Of course, 
the views of the parties need to be heard before the dispute is settled in a final way. 
If a final settlement of the dispute is not possible, the administrative court has the 
authority to give an interim ruling. In this ruling it can ask the administration to 
remedy the defect. In appeal (higher court) the administrative court can also give an 
order for it to do so. The interim ruling with feedback to the administration is known 
in the Netherlands by the somewhat odd name ‘administrative loop’ (bestuurlijke lus). 
This concept is interesting because the administrative court can give the administra­
tion the ‘opportunity’ to remedy or revise its own decision. This can speed things up 
a lot. Moreover, the law provides that other parties’ interests may not be dispropor­
tionately prejudiced. If (even) an interim ruling does not lead to settlement of the 
dispute, the court will then decide that the administration must take a new decision 
on the basis of its judgment. 
3.7.1 Confirming the legal effects of a quashed decision 
In a number of situations the administrative court may confirm the legal effects of 
the quashed decision. First, this may be done for reasons of efficiency (procedural 
economy). One example of this is where a new decision is of no help to an interested 
party because the decision was quashed for procedural irregularity. Accordingly, the 
administration will likely take a new decision with the same substance as the one that 
was quashed. If the new decision will not deviate from the original one, it may be 
more efficient to confirm the legal effects of the quashed decision.25 
Secondly, it may be efficient to confirm the legal effects if the quashed decision
has had factual consequences that cannot be changed. In such a case the administra­
tive court may conclude that it is better to confirm the legal effects of the quashed
decision. Before arriving at this assessment, the court will have to weigh all the inter­
ests at stake. A well-known example is that of a house that has already been built.
If the building permit is quashed ex post, it does not mean that the house will be
demolished. Demolition would often be a very far-reaching measure. This is cer­
tainly the case if the defect in the permit is a minor one. In this case it is better for
the administrative court to confirm the legal effects of the permit. Damages may be
granted for other interested parties (if they so request) if the conditions for liability
have been met. 
Lastly, the administrative court may confirm the legal effects of a quashed decision 
to avoid reformatio in peius. An example is found in the law on subsidies: during the 
proceedings in appeal, the administrative court may conclude that the administra­
tive body has incorrectly interpreted the regulations on the granting of a subsidy; 
24	 Staatsblad 2012, 684. See C. L. G. F. H. Albers, ‘Het wetsvoorstel aanpassing bestuursprocesrecht. Knip­
pen en plakken in plaats van een fundamentele herbezinning’ (2011) 50 De Gemeentestem. 
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nevertheless, a correct application of the regulation would lead to a lower amount of 
subsidy. 
3.7.2 The power of the administrative court to settle the dispute itself 
If the administrative court cannot confirm the legal effects of a quashed decision, it 
must investigate whether, after the quashing of the decision, it is possible to decide 
the case itself. The court’s authority to give a decision itself (in other words, instead 
of the administration) is laid down by the GALA. If, following the quashing of the 
decision, the administrative court does give a judgment itself, the court’s judgment 
will replace the quashed decision. The administrative court will thus determine what 
the administration’s decision should be. 
In any case, the administrative court may give a decision itself if it is clear that 
there is only one lawful decision that the administration can take.26 If, after the annul­
ment of the administrative decision a number of lawful actions can be taken, the 
situation is different.27 In order to prevent the administrative court from taking over 
the constitutional role of the administration, it may not, for example, step into the 
administration’s shoes and weigh the relevant interests. Nevertheless, under certain 
circumstances the administrative court may decide itself, even though the adminis­
tration does have some discretionary powers. Nowadays the administrative court is 
allowed to decide itself if the court is certain that the new (lawful) decision that would 
be taken by the administration will not be any different than the decision it is going 
to take.28 This approach attempts to build a bridge between the requirement of the 
separation of powers and effective and timely dispute settlement. 
Where the administrative court itself takes a decision the case must either involve a 
decision where the administration has no discretion (whereby on legal grounds only 
one correct decision is possible) or a case in which it is clear to the court what the 
(new) decision must be. The court can take into consideration standard policy and 
the standpoints taken by the parties during the proceedings. In any case, the parties 
(administration and private persons) may, if they so agree, request the administrative 
court to decide the dispute itself. 
3.7.3 Administrative ‘loop’ and the instruction to the administration 
Since 2010, the Netherlands administrative courts have another interesting compe­
tence: they have the power to give an interim ruling, as has been mentioned above. In 
this interim ruling the court can give the administration the opportunity to remedy 
a defect in the decision (or to have it remedied). This power (which, as noted above, 
is given the rather odd name ‘administrative loop’) offers the administration the pos­
sibility to repair the decision before the final judgment is handed down. 
The ‘administrative loop’ is also part of the contemporary practice of effective dis­
pute settlement. If the administration had the opportunity to remedy the defect, the 
administrative court may continue to hear the case. Parties then have the chance to 
26 CRvB 3 January 2003, ECLI:NL:RVS:2003:AF3991, AB 2003/99.
 
27 ABRvS 31 July 2013, ECLI: NL:RVS:2013:529, JB 2013/183.
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comment on the changes made and the way the defect was remedied. The improve­
ments in the decision can then be taken into consideration by the court in its final 
judgment. 
In the first instance (district court), the administration is not required to follow the 
court’s request to remedy the decision. This is not the case in an appealing proceed­
ing. The appellate court, by means of an interim ruling can order the decision to be 
repaired. If the administrative body does not remedy the defect, the administrative 
court (on its own) will review the original (disputed) decision. It will likely to be 
quashed. For an effective and final dispute settlement it seems obvious that the court 
then will order the administrative body to take a new decision, taking into considera­
tion the court’s judgment. The court is not, however, required to do this. 
If the court chooses to order the administration to give a new decision, it can give
instructions with respect to that new decision. The court can also require the adminis­
tration to take a different action on the basis of the court’s judgment. Even if the court
does not give (after quashing) an explicit order that a new decision is to be given, it
is obvious that the administration will use the judgment as basis for its new decision. 
3.7.4 The competence of the administrative court to award damages 
The competence of the Dutch administrative court to award damages is limited. At 
the request of an interested party damages may be awarded for, among other things, 
an unlawful decision, an illegal action in the course of administrative procedure and 
a non-timely decision. The request can be made during the proceedings concerning 
the decision or in a separate procedure. 
However, even in these cases the administrative court does not always have compe­
tence. Since 2013, the competence to award damages has been regulated as follows. In 
certain cases the administrative court has exclusive competence: roughly speaking, in 
tax, social security and civil servants cases. The civil court has competence in all other 
disputes above a threshold of EUR 25,000 (larger and more complex claims). Below 
this threshold, the interested party can choose between the administrative court and 
the civil court. The background to this distinction is that in the Netherlands the civil 
court has traditionally been viewed as the court with the most expertise in the area 
of liability and damages. This can easily be explained because in the Netherlands the 
liability of the government is based on the (civil-law) doctrine of tort. The civil courts 
have considerable experience with this doctrine. 
3.8 Duration of the procedure 
The (lengthy) duration of administrative decision making and legal procedures is 
a recurring theme in the Netherlands literature and legal practice. Administrative 
bodies are bound to legal decision periods. If statute law does not provide a spe­
cific period, single case decisions should be taken within eight weeks of receiving the 
application. The problem is that these decision periods are not always met. 
In the Netherlands a private person has various possibilities to seek relief if the 
duration of the decision making process exceeds the period set by law. He can, for 
example, complain to the National Ombudsman. However, the National Ombuds­
man cannot compel the administrative body to finalise a decision within a certain 
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time period. But the Ombudsman may express that the administrative body acts in an 
improper way. Administrative bodies will take this ‘hint’ very seriously. 
Appeal to the administrative court is also possible if no decision is given at all. In 
that case the court will not look at the substance of the case. It will only determine 
that the decision was not taken within a reasonable time and that the decision still has 
to be given. As a rule, the administrative court will set a term of two weeks and will 
also impose a default penalty. 
As to the delay during the administrative legal procedure, on the basis of the juris­
prudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the highest Nether­
lands administrative courts have embraced the right to compensation of damages 
when a ‘reasonable period of time’ is exceeded.29 It is important to note that under 
the principle of legal certainty they have extended this right to cases that formally 
do not fall under Art. 6 ECHR. The administrative case law assumes that if a ‘reason­
able period of time’ has been exceeded, this will cause stress and frustration. This 
forms the grounds for compensation for immaterial damages. This period starts at 
the moment when an objection or appeal is brought against a decision. For the Dutch 
administrative law this means that the period usually starts at the same point in time 
as the day on which the notice of objection is filed. The end of a ‘reasonable period 
of time’ is at the moment at which a dispute is definitively settled. If the administrative 
court quashes a decision with an order to the administration to take a new decision, 
the period needed in which to take a new decision and the length of any possible pro­
cedures count as well. There can only be said to be a definitive settlement of the dis­
pute if the decision is no longer challenged or – when it is still being challenged – if 
the highest national court has given a final judgment. 
Since the beginning of 2014, a reasonable period of time for regular procedures 
in administrative law (objection, first instance and appeal) is considered to be four 
years. Of this, there is a period of a half year for the objection procedure, for the 
procedure at the district court a period of a year and a half 30 and for appeal (sec­
ond instance) a period of two years. If these periods are exceeded, the responsible 
governmental body31 must pay, as a major rule, EUR 500 in immaterial damages for 
each extra half year. The complexity of the case, the way in which administration and 
administrative court have dealt with the case and the actions of the litigating parties 
are circumstances that may lead to a different outcome. 
4 European aspects 
4.1 Access to an independent tribunal: The case of appeal to the ‘Crown’ 
For a long time the Dutch system of legal protection against administrative decisions 
leaned firmly on the system of appeal to the Crown (see Introduction). In Benthem 
v The Netherlands, however, it was held by the European Court of Human Rights that 
29 Kudla v Poland App no 30210/96 (ECHR, 26 October 2000). See also Pizzati v Italy App no. 62361/00 
(ECHR, 29 March 2006). 
30 In 2012, approximately 80% of the cases in first instance were decided within one year. 
31 This can be the administrative body that was responsible for the non-timely judicial process or the State 
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appeal to the Crown was not access to an independent tribunal. This did not come as 
a surprise. Because many administrative disputes fall under the protection of Art. 6 
ECHR, the conclusion was inevitable: the Crown’s function in settling administrative 
disputes had to be replaced with an independent tribunal (or court). 
The present system of administrative justice came into existence in 1994. It pro­
vides for a broad range of independent administrative justice, often in two instances 
(first instance and appeal). In general, the system works well. A fundamental criti­
cism can be made with respect to the position of the Council of State as it is involved 
not only in the judicial process but also in giving advice on the quality of legislative 
proposals. As a result, its (objective) impartiality is questionable.32 However, impor­
tant legal measures have been taken to prevent conflicts with Art. 6 ECHR. Thus, the 
various functions of the Council of State (advice on legislation and administrative 
justice) have been (more) strictly separated. The situation is nevertheless considered 
by some to not (yet) be ideal. The present Government has plans to further reform 
the administrative judicial system but at the moment it is not clear what the result will 
be. It is unlikely that the Council of State will lose its judicial function. Discussions are 
going on (2016).33 
Access to the court is guaranteed in the Netherlands by Art. 6 ECHR. Where the 
fundamental rights and freedoms protected by European Union (hereafter EU) law 
are at stake the right to access to the court is also given strong protection by Art. 47 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Further, specific treaties 
provide for access to the courts. We note the well-known Treaty of Aarhus with respect 
to environmental law.34 
Although access to the courts is thus not explicitly anchored in the Netherlands 
Constitution (see above), this right is sufficiently guaranteed under treaties and EU 
law. Factors that might limit access to the administrative courts, or make access difficult 
(for example, court fees, short periods for appeal, and the mandatory administrative 
preliminary procedure) are not particularly egregious. If access to the administrative 
courts is nevertheless restricted too severely, the (civil) courts offer supplementary 
legal protection. 
4.2 Fair trial and requirements of a proper administration of justice 
Art. 6 ECHR and EU law are extremely important with regard to the substantive 
requirements for effective legal protection. It goes without saying that the require­
ments of a ‘fair trial’ and ‘full jurisdiction’ find their expression in the GALA.35 There 
the rights of parties are provided for. Clear examples are the principle of hearing both 
sides of the argument, the requirement that all documents must be made available 
(adversarial proceeding; equality of arms), the right to a public trial and the right to 
32 Procola v Luxemburg App no. 48/1993 (ECHR, 28 September 1995). See also Kleyn e.o. v The Netherlands
App nos. 39343/98, 39651/98, 43147/98, 46664/99 (ECHR, 6 May 2003). 
33 See R. J. N. Schlössels and L. J. M. Timmermans, ‘Baron von Münchhausen aan het werk in de polder: 
de hoogste bestuursrechtspraak als (Never) Ending Story?’ (2015) 2 Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht
124–149. 
34 Tractatenblad 2001, 73. 
35 See in depth R. J. N. Schlössels and S. E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht in de sociale rechtsstaat (6th edn., Deventer, 
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a reasoned judgment. In the Dutch system of legal protection in administrative cases 
an administrative judge is in charge of the proceedings and has many powers which 
can be exercised ex officio (for example, appointing an expert witness). Even so, the 
court will nevertheless still have to hear testimony and to provide information. In this 
respect, Netherlands law has a tradition of following the principles of sound admin­
istration of justice. According to a widely shared approach in the Dutch administra­
tive law, there are four basic principles: (1) the right to access to court and to a final 
decision within a reasonable time, (2) equality of arms and the adversarial principle, 
(3) the principle of impartiality, and (4) the right to a reasoned judgment.36 These 
principles are also enshrined and elaborated37 in the GALA, or based on Netherlands 
case law. 
5 Some problems of the Dutch administrative justice 
The above does not mean that there is no criticism of administrative justice in the 
Netherlands. On the contrary, a lively debate is going on. We would like to mention 
some of the points that have led to discussion. A point of criticism has to do with the 
effectiveness and timeliness of administrative justice. For many years there were com­
plaints about the administrative courts’ inability to reach a final settlement of disputes 
between the administration and private persons. One major problem was that deci­
sions were too often quashed by the administrative courts on grounds of technicalities 
(inadequate reasoning, a lack of due care in the preparation of the case). After the 
decision was quashed, the administration had to take a new decision and the whole 
procedure often started all over again. Many viewed this as ‘viscous’. It weakened the 
fundamental right to a final decision as well. After all, legal certainty means that per­
sons must be cognizant of their situation. Measures (new legislation, new case law) 
have since been taken to solve this problem. The administrative courts nowadays try, 
as seen above, to settle disputes in a final way.38 Determining the extent to which the 
administrative judicial system is effective is difficult as a theoretical exercise. For this 
reason empirical research on administrative justice – often commissioned by the Min­
istry of Justice – is conducted on a regular basis.39 It can be seen from this research 
that in the majority of cases the administrative court decides in favour of the admin­
istration.40 Accordingly, taking a case to the administrative courts seems to be not 
particularly ‘effective’ for a private person. This may be because often appeals are 
lodged that have no chance of succeeding (the threshold for lodging an appeal in 
the Netherlands is namely not very high). That in most cases the administration is the 
successful party may also mean that the quality of its decision making is high. It could 
also indicate that the administrative courts are too passive or reserved. Some critics 
36 B. W. N. de Waard, Beginselen van behoorlijke rechtspleging (dissertation Utrecht, Zwolle, W. E. J. Tjeenk 
Willink 1987). 
37 E.g. the right to be heard, the right to access to relevant documents and the right tot respond to advice. 
38 Between 2007 and 2012 the percentage of cases in which the administrative courts have attempted to give 
a final judgment has risen enormously, to above 60% at the very least. 
39 See, for example, A. T. Marseille, Effectiviteit van bestuursrechtspraak (Den Haag, Boom Juridische uit­
gevers 2004). 
40 In 2004, this occurred in 70% of the cases. 
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even claim that the administrative courts are too ‘administration-friendly’. However, 
in our view, this criticism cannot be substantiated. 
Much attention has been paid to the substantive judgment of the court. The prin­
ciple of ‘full jurisdiction’41 (as one aspect of the requirement of effectiveness) leads 
to questions when the administrative court reviews the discretionary powers of the 
administration. Traditionally, administrative law in the Netherlands uses a ‘test of 
reasonableness’. The court respects the weighing of interests made by the admin­
istration. This is all the more so where the court is examining generally binding 
regulations (e.g. municipal regulations). It will make a ‘correction’ only where the 
administration has not exercised its powers reasonably. 
The court’s review is becoming intensified under the influence of EU law and the 
proportionality principle.42 Efforts to achieve effective and final dispute settlement 
also affect the intensity of review. Hence, it appears that, in practice, the Netherlands 
administrative courts nowadays are not overly reserved in their review of the adminis­
tration’s discretionary power. 
6 Conclusion 
The administrative law – in particular the establishment of administrative courts – has 
had a turbulent history in the Netherlands. The Dutch system (influenced by French 
and German administrative law) developed in the twentieth century by trial and 
error. During the twentieth century more or less specialised administrative courts 
had been established. Moreover, from 1915 onwards, the civil courts had offered sys­
tematic ‘supplementary‘ legal protection in administrative disputes. And since 1976 
the Council of State (Law Department) provided legal protection against single case-
decisions. Consequently, an effective (but not very tidy) system of legal protection 
with respect to the administration had come into being. 
The present system of administrative courts was substantially established in 1994. 
If we ignore all the exceptions, one can say that in the Netherlands appeal with an 
administrative court is possible against decisions taken by the administrative bodies. 
An important exception is formed by generally binding provisions. In principle, pri­
vate persons must seek relief regarding such provisions in the civil courts. The admin­
istrative legal procedure generally begins with an objection procedure. Thereafter, 
it is possible to appeal to the district court (in first instance) and then appeal to the 
highest administrative courts (second instance). 
The traditional appeal for annulment has been transformed into a more ‘mod­
ern’ administrative procedure. The administrative procedure is aimed at speed and 
an effective dispute settlement. Moreover, digital litigation is becoming increas­
ingly important. The administrative court will attempt to get to the bottom of the 
case quickly. On grounds of the instructions in the law it has to try to settle the 
dispute – while respecting the procedural rights of the parties – definitively (final 
41 P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, A. van Rijn, L. Zwaak Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (4th edn., Intersentia, Antwerpen/Oxford 2006) 561–562. 
42 See Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edn., University Press 2012), chapters 19 & 20; J. H. Jans, S. 
Prechal and R. J. G. M. Widdershoven, Europeanisation of Public Law (Groningen, Europa Law Publish­
ing 2015), 183–206. 
 Effective legal protection in The Netherlands 249 
dispute settlement). An annulment is preferably combined with the confirmation of 
legal effects or a final judgment by the court. Much attention is paid to deciding cases 
within a reasonable period of time. There is also new case law on compensation for 
a non-timely judicial process. These are positive developments. The reforms of the 
Netherlands administrative legal procedure appear to have strengthened the princi­
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1 Historical development 
Poland regained its independence only in 1918. Earlier, its territory was part of three 
neighbouring countries, as the Kingdom of Prussia, Russia and Austria partitioned 
the land of the Polish State between 1772 and 1795. When Poland’s regained state­
hood was being formed, the theory of administrative law was already developed and 
abundant in other European states. Therefore, some administrative law doctrines 
of other countries inescapably influenced the Polish theory of this field of law. It 
explains many similarities to the German or Austrian legal doctrines. 
In the interwar period, the administrative court system in Poland had the form of 
a single-instance court, modelled after the Austrian system. It was not reactivated in 
the socialist Polish People’s Republic after World War II for political reasons. The for­
mer system was nevertheless re-established in 1980 with the creation of the Supreme 
Administrative Court. In 2004, it was reformed to introduce a two-level system of 
administrative courts. As a principle, the activities of administration bodies were sub­
jected to scrutiny by the courts.1 The right to access to court has a centuries-old tra­
dition in Polish legislation. Its modern sources can be traced back to the Constitution 
of 3 May 1791, the first Polish Constitution, which guaranteed that ‘the courts of first 
instance shall always be ready and vigilant to render justice to those who need it’.2 
With the political changes which occurred in Poland in 1989, the approach to 
human rights and their observance has changed fundamentally. Poland became a 
member of the Council of Europe on 26 November 1991, and it ratified the Conven­
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome 
on 4 November 1950, which came into effect on 19 September 1993.3 In accordance 
with Art. 91 para 1 of the Polish Constitution, a ratified international agreement 
(and this is the legal status of the Convention in the Polish system of sources of law) 
once published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland, becomes part of 
the national legal order and is applied directly, unless its application requires an act 
to be passed. Such a document may constitute the direct basis for the decisions of 
national authorities and, moreover, in accordance with Art. 91 para 2 of the Polish 
1 Special provisions may entrust administrative matters to the jurisdiction of courts of law, for example, 
issues related to the social security system, or concerning the delimitation of the property. 
2 Karolina Wojszkun, ‘Prawo do sądu jako podstawowa zasada prawa administracyjnego’ (2012) 1 (14) 
Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa Kwartalnik 24. 
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Constitution, it has precedence over national acts, if those cannot be reconciled with 
it. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although formally the Convention did not 
apply in Poland until 1993, its provisions were respected in practice. 
2 Constitutional framework 
The concept of a fair trial in the Polish Constitution is not one-dimensional, but 
rather composed of different elements in the form of procedural rights.4 Until the 
entry into force of the new Constitution, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał 
Konstytucyjny) derived the right to trial from Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Polish 
People’s Republic, amended in 1989, which defined Poland as a democratic state of 
law and implementing the principles of social justice. 
In its judgment of 7 January 1992, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal stated that 
one of the fundamental principles of a democratic state of law (demokratyczne państwo 
prawne) is the principle of public access for the citizens to court in order to enable 
them to defend their interests before an independent body guided solely by the law 
in force in the country. According to the Tribunal, an individual’s right to a fair and 
public trial in which his or her administrative, civil rights are decided upon, as well 
as the proceedings in which he or she is presented with criminal charges, followed 
from the principle included in Art. 1 of the Constitution, stating that Poland is a state 
of law.5 The current Constitution of 1997 expressly provides in its content the right 
to trial, and Art. 456 is the key in this matter. According to its content, everyone shall 
have the right to a fair and public hearing of his case, without undue delay, before 
a competent, impartial and independent court. Exceptions to the public nature of 
hearings may be made for reasons of morality, state security, public order or protec­
tion of the private life of a party, or other important private interest. In shaping this 
regulation, premises specifying the subject of judgment were excluded. In fact, Art. 
45 of the Constitution uses the general term ‘case’ (sprawa). This concept covers all 
situations in which there has been a violation of freedoms or rights. On the other 
hand, its creators used the concepts defining all the basic components of the right to 
trial (fair trial). 
As it has been pointed out, the right to court has been regulated in the provisions 
of the Polish Constitution in a manner different from that specified in Art. 6 of the 
ECHR. The main difference consists in the fact that the right to trial is referred to in 
two provisions of the Constitution: the above-mentioned Art. 45 and Art. 77 para 2.7 
While the former Article defines the right to trial in positive terms, the latter concerns 
the prohibition of barring the judicial settlement of the infringement of freedoms 
and rights. This approach complements the constitutional guarantee of the right to 
4 Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, ‘Prawo do rzetelnego postępowania w europejskiej przestrzeni prawnej Jaka 
procedura? Jakie prawo?’ (2013) 1(11–12) Palestra 69 
5 The Constitutional Court’s judgment of 7 January 1992, K 8/91, OTK 1992/1, Item. 5. 
6 Art. 45 of the Constitution says ‘[e]veryone shall have the right to a fair and public hearing of his case, 
without undue delay, before a competent, impartial and independent court. Exceptions to the public 
nature of hearings may be made for reasons of morality, State security, public order or protection of 
the private life of a party, or other important private interest. Judgments shall be announced publicly.’ 
7 According to Art. 77 of the Constitution ‘[s]tatutes shall not bar the recourse by any person to the courts 
in pursuit of claims alleging infringement of freedoms or rights’. 
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court. This regulation is supplemented by constitutional provisions concerning the 
issue of the access to the courts and the structural requirements for court proceed­
ings. According to Art. 176, court proceedings must have at least two stages. 
It is worth noting that the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
provide a standard of protection higher than that indicated in the Convention 
stipulations.8 
It should also be noted it was not intended that the disputes in the field of public 
administration be permanently excluded from the scope of Art. 6 para 1 of ECHR.9 
In one of the key decisions in this field, Ringeisen v Austria,10 the European Court 
of Human Rights clearly stated that Art. 6 para 1 of the ECHR concerns any proce­
dure the result of which has a decisive impact on the civil rights and obligations. The 
character of the legislation which governs how the matter is to be determined (civil, 
commercial, administrative law, etc.) and that of the authority which is invested with 
jurisdiction in the matter (ordinary court, administrative body, etc.) are therefore of 
little consequence. This allowed to take include typical administrative matters in the 
right to trial. As it is pointed out, the ECtHR considers procedures which fall within 
the scope of public law under national law, but the outcome of which determines the 
rights and obligations of a private nature.11 
The existence of adequate review of judgment in the due administrative course of 
instance understood as one of the types of internal review is not classified as a manda­
tory European standard.12 But today, the role of the administrative review in the due 
course of the proceedings is largely to act as a ‘filter’ (prior to judicial procedure) to 
prevent the flooding of the courts with complaints, and allowing substantive settle­
ment of at least a portion of cases without the need to involve the courts.13 So, the 
obligation to initiate a specific verification administrative procedure before bringing 
the case to court is justified by the need to prevent the excessive load on the courts, 
and in the long term to ensure adequate efficiency of judicial review.14 That is why it 
would be considered desirable to introduce administrative appeals, prior to the court 
review. 
In Art. 78 of the Polish Constitution of 1997,15 all citizens are guaranteed the right 
to appeal against decisions, including administrative ones, issued in the first instance. 
This provision is general in nature and it is included in the second chapter of the 
Constitution devoted to the human and citizen freedoms, rights and obligations, in 
8 Adam Zieliński, ‘Wokół reformy polskiego sądownictwa’ (2009) 1(2) Państwo i Prawo 20. 
9 Zbigniew Kmieciak, Postępowanie administracyjne i sądowoadministracyjne a prawo europejskie (Oficyna 
Wolters Kluwer SA, Warszawa 2010) 99. 
10 Ringeisen v Austria (1971) Series A no 13, thesis 94. 
11 Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights (Guide to Art. 6 RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (civil 
limb) (available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_ENG.pdf) accessed 8 July 2015. 
12 See Art. 22.2, section III, Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)7 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States on good administration/The committee of ministers (Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)7 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on good administration) (available at https://wcd.coe.int/ 
ViewDoc.jsp?id=1155877) accessed 8 July 2015. 
13 Kmieciak (n. 9) 82. 
14 Ibid. 115. 
15 Art. 78 of the Constitution: ‘Each party shall have the right to appeal against judgments and decisions 
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the section which regulates the measures of protecting freedoms and rights. This 
is a provision which guarantees the right to a second instance trail, regardless of 
Art. 45 of the Polish Constitution, which regulates the appropriate right to trial. Any 
deviation from the principle of two instances can only be introduced by an act, and 
as an exception to the rule, it must be clear and unambiguous, and at the same time, 
it should be dictated by particular circumstances and comply with the principle of 
proportionality.16 
3 The rights-based perspective 
3.1 Administrative procedure 
3.1.1 Principle of two instance 
The Polish Code of Administrative Procedure (Kodeks Postepowania Administracyjnego, 
Act of 14 June 1960, hereinafter CAP) provides the principle of two instance in Art. 15. 
The principle of two-instance proceedings means the right to have the same admin­
istrative case examined and settled by two different public administration bodies. In 
the Polish legal system, those include remedies such as an appeal, complaint17 or 
application for re-examination of the case, and in the case of acts and actions which 
are non-actionable in one of these forms – a written request to remedy the infringe­
ment. A party or entities enjoying the rights of a party, may appeal against the deci­
sion issued in the first instance to a higher level body. In the case of a decision issued 
in the first instance by a government minister or the Local Government Court of 
Appeal (Samorządowe Kolegium Odwoławcze), which do not have a higher level body of 
similar nature, another appeal measure is possible: an application for re-examination 
of the case (by this body) to which the provisions on appeals apply. An administrative 
appeal is a regular appeal measure, submitted against non-final decisions, unlike in 
the case of extraordinary measures, which may be submitted against final decisions. 
3.1.2 Administrative appeal 
Administrative procedure – as a necessary condition prior to the submission of a com­
plaint to an administrative court – should not be excessive, and the applicant must be 
guaranteed a reasonable period of time to lodge a judicial complaint. The duration 
of such preliminary procedure should be taken into account when conducting it is 
required before lodging a complaint with the court. A reasonable period of time for 
hearing the case, as it is imposed by Art. 6 para 1 of the ECHR, starts from the date 
of lodging a complaint on the decision of the administration authority and not later 
than the date of lodging the appeal (complaint) with the administrative court.18 
16 Andrzej Wróbel (Komentarz aktualizowany do art.15 Kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego) 
(available at http://lex.online.wolterskluwer.pl/WKPLOnline/index.rpc?#content.rpc—ASK—nro=
587633099&wersja=-1&localNroPart=0&reqId=1436361715383_283328973&class=CONTENT&loc=4& 
full=1&hId=3) accessed 11 May 2014. 
17 Complaints relate to the principle of procedural cases. 
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An administrative appeal is submitted to the second instance body by the agency
of the first instance body in the period of 14 days from the date of delivery or
announcement of the decision, unless an act provides otherwise. In the period of
seven days from the date on which the appeal was submitted, the first instance body
should decide, by way of the so-called self-control, if the appeal should be allowed
in full. If the appeal has been submitted by all the parties and the administrative
organ finds that such appeal should be allowed in full, it may issue a new decision in
which it may repeal or amend the decision appealed against, with reservation that it
is not possible to allow the party’s request in the new decision only partially; the par­
ties are also entitled to appeal against the new decision. Meanwhile, should the first
instance body find that the appeal should not been allowed in full, in the prescribed
period of seven days, the body should send the appeal together with the files of the
case to the second instance body and should notify the parties to the proceedings
of this fact. 
3.1.3 Duration of administrative procedure 
The CAP includes the principle of fast proceedings. According to this law, adminis­
trative bodies should act penetratingly and fast, using the simplest measures possible 
which aim to settle the case. The CAP sets specific periods for certain procedures,19 
which means that administrative bodies are obliged to settle cases without undue 
delay. As a general rule, appeal proceedings should be settled within one month from 
the date of receipt of the appeal. 
A party has the right to complaint to a higher instance administrative body in the 
case of a body’s failure to settle a case in the period specified by law. The complaint 
is, therefore, a specific remedy against the public authority’s actions (or failure to 
act). If the higher instance administrative body finds the complaint justified, it sets 
an additional period for settlement of the case and orders explanation of the reasons 
and determination of persons responsible for failure to settle the case in time, and, 
if necessary, also adoption of measures which prevent further failures to settle cases 
within the prescribed periods in the future. This provision is not perfect, because it 
does not remove at all the body’s inaction state. 
Somewhat in anticipation of the presentation concerning administrative courts, 
one may add that according to the act on proceedings before administrative courts, 
an administrative court is competent to examine a complaint against inaction in issu­
ing an administrative decision. Nevertheless, if such complaint is allowed, the court 
may only establish another date for settlement of the case by the body. Also this regu­
lation does not fully prevent inaction of administrative bodies. However, the deter­
mination of an additional period for the settlement of the case may be important 
from the perspective of potential civil law claims for compensation due to delay in 
administration’s activity. 
19 Art. 35 of the CAP: ‘§ 1 Public administration bodies are obliged to settle cases without undue delay.
(. . .) § 3. A case which requires explanatory proceedings should be settled within one month at the
latest, and a particularly complex case not later than within two months from the date of institution
of the proceedings, while in appeal proceedings – within one month from the date of receipt of the
appeal.’ 
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Polish jurisprudence, especially in the scope of appeals against the decisions of pub­
lic authorities, provides numerous examples of violating the analysed requirement, 
combined with exceeding the specified statutory time for the settlement of the case in 
the appeal procedure. To make a complaint to the administrative court, the applicant 
must – in the case of the authority’s failure to act – first initiate measures aimed to 
remedy the situation (in extreme cases, including a complaint on the administrative 
court’s failure to act), which inevitably prolongs the duration of proceedings classi­
fied as pre-trial (preliminary) procedures. The interests of the applicants are better 
protected when lodging a complaint to the administrative court must be preceded 
by a written request to remedy the infringement. In the absence of response to this 
request, the complaint must be lodged within 60 days from the date of referral to the 
competent public authority.20 
3.2 Judicial procedure 
3.2.1 Object of review 
Administrative courts in Poland control public administration activities. This control 
is exercised on the basis of the legality criterion, that is, compliance of the activities of 
an administrative body with generally binding law. 
This review should be carried out in three areas: the compliance of the settlement 
(decision or another act) or the action with the substantive law; the observance of 
procedures required by law; and also complying with the rules of competence.21 
Control of public administration activities by administrative courts covers judg­
ments in cases where complaints have been filed against: 
(a) administrative decisions (building permit, etc.); 
(b) orders issued in administrative proceedings, or ending proceedings, and also orders
resolving cases on their essence (e.g. decision to suspend construction work); 
(c) orders issued in enforcement and injunction proceedings; 
(d) acts or activities other than those specified in points 1–3 as regards public admin­
istration concerning rights or obligations stemming from provisions of law; 
(e) written interpretations of tax law issued in individual cases by fiscal chamber 
directors; 
(f) local and government legislation (communal, district, provincial); 
(g) decisions of local and state authorities and their associations, other than specified 
in point 6 above, 
(h) acts of supervision over local authority bodies’ activities, 
(i) inactivity of administrative authorities in cases specified in points 1–5 above. 
Some issues were expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the administrative courts, 
for example those relating to matters arising from the organisational hierarchical 
20 Kmieciak (n. 9) 116. 
21 Kabat A., Komentarz do art.3 ustawy – Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi, Lex as 
of 2013.04.30/Andrzej Kabat, Komentarz do art. 3 ustawy – Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administra­
cyjnymi (LEX Wolters Kluwer SA 2013). 
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relations between public administration bodies; visas issued by the consuls. These 
cases are, however, of marginal importance for the public administration. 
3.2.2 The right to lodge a complaint – formal and fiscal requirements 
Prohibitive legal fees may be a factor impeding access to the court. The level of 
fees applicable in administrative court proceedings in Poland can be considered as 
moderate. 
A provincial administrative court first examines the propriety of a complaint from a 
formal legal standpoint. If no legal defects are established, it is accepted for substan­
tive review. 
The right to lodge a complaint with the administrative court is combined with the 
concept of legal interest. It is permissible for a complaint to be lodged also by other 
entities than those having a legal interest, namely, the prosecutor, the Ombudsman 
and a social organisation in the scope of its statutory activities, in matters concerning 
the legal interests of other persons, if it participated in the administrative proceed­
ings. Parties to the proceedings before administrative courts are the appellant, whose 
rights or obligations are alleged to have been infringed by unlawful acts or omissions 
of state authorities (natural persons or organisational units, even though they do not 
possess a legal personality) and the public administration authority issuing an appeal 
the decision (resolution, etc.) or other entity exercising public tasks. 
3.2.3 The right of all sides to be heard in the proceedings 
Proceedings before the administrative court are held on the basis of an adversarial 
procedure, and the parties have equal rights and the possibility to present all argu­
ments, without any forms of preference or discrimination. 
3.2.4 Duration of court procedure 
The deadline provided the Act on proceedings before administrative courts (Prawo o 
postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi) corresponds to the standard reasonable 
period of time necessary to lodge a complaint. 
Complaints against decisions and orders (administrative acts) are filed at the pro­
vincial administrative court within 30 days via the administrative authority that issued 
the decision or order at last instance. The period of 30 days for lodging a complaint 
is counted from the date of delivery to the applicant of the decision on the case. After 
receiving a complaint, an administrative authority is obligated to send the complaint 
together with the reply thereto to the provincial administrative court within 30 days. 
Failure to meet this obligation may be punishable by a fine. 
A court should issue a judgment within a reasonable time. In the Polish legal system, 
means of disciplining the course of administrative court proceedings are provided by 
regulations determining, for certain categories of cases, deadlines for setting the date 
for a trial or hearing of the case by the court. For the majority of cases, however, no 
such deadlines exist. The principle prevails that a case before an administrative court 
should conclude as swiftly as possible, generally at initial proceedings. 
In practice, the deadlines for issuing administrative courts decisions in Poland are 
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violation of the right to a fair trial, especially as in light of the case law of the ECHR, 
the Member States are responsible for organising their legal systems in a manner 
guaranteeing the right to obtain a judicial decision within a reasonable deadline, and 
therefore the excessive work load of the courts cannot be taken into account.22 The 
inefficiency of the Polish legal system has, unfortunately, led to frequent violations of 
Art. 6 para 1 of the Convention. Poland has constantly been among the countries from 
which the greatest number of complaints concerning the excessive length of judicial 
proceedings were filed.23 In response to the ECtHR’s criticism of the Polish justice sys­
tem (especially on the basis of precedent-setting case Kudla v Poland)24 the Act of 17 
June 2007 on the complaint against infringement of the right of a party to have the case 
examined in legal proceedings performed or supervised by a prosecutor and court 
proceedings without undue delay was adopted,25 which covers the proceedings before 
the administrative courts. As a result, there has been some improvement in the speed 
of operation of the Polish courts;26 however – as demonstrated by statistical data –27 
this measure is not very effective in practice. 
3.2.5 Other aspects 
In principle, unless a specific provision states otherwise, court hearings are public 
and the administrative court rules at the hearing. 
The simplified procedure for settling certain categories of cases is rarely used in 
practice. When a party submits a request for a case to be heard in this mode, its use 
is only possible in the absence of requests for a hearing by the other parties within 14 
days of the notification of the request. 
Challenging an act of the administrative authority before the administrative court 
does not suspend its execution. Therefore, the court can grant appropriate interim 
protection, but it is necessary to lodge a request in this regard. Provisions concerning 
the stay of execution of the act or action, including those issued by an administration 
authority, may be modified or revoked by the court at any time should circumstances 
change. 
As a rule, if the complaint is upheld, the administrative court prepares a justifica­
tion of the decision ex officio. This is not the case if the applicant’s claim is dismissed, 
when the grounds for judgment issued by the county administrative court shall be 
drawn up at the request of the parties, filed within seven days from the date of the 
judgment. This solution is a regression in relation to the former state of affairs, which 
provided for the obligation of preparing a justification of the decision ex officio in any 
22 Guide to Art. 6. RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. (civil limb). Council of Europe/European Court of Human 
Rights, 2013 p. 66 (available at www.echr.coe.int). 
23 See the justification for the bill of the Act of 17 June 2007 on the complaint against infringement of 
the right of a party to have the case examined in legal proceedings performed or supervised by a pros­
ecutor and court proceedings without undue delay, fourth-term Polish Parliament, no printing: 2256 
24 Kudła v Poland ECHR 2000-XI. 
25 Dz. U..U. No. 179, item.1843. 
26 Adam Zieliński, ‘Wokół reformy polskiego sądownictwa’ (2009) 1(2) Państwo i Prawo 19. 
27 Hanna Knysiak-Molczyk, ‘Skarga na przewlekłość postępowania sądowoadministracyjnego w orzec­
znictwie Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego’ in Janusz Sługocki (ed.), Dziesięć lat polskich doświadczeń w 
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case. The absence of a written justification for a judgment dismissing the complaint 
limits or even rules out the possibility of establishing the scope of res judicata desig­
nated by the decision made for the purposes of any subsequent verification of any act 
in one of the extraordinary modes of administrative proceedings.28 
4 Institutional perspective 
The use of the right to trial is to be made use of not before any court, but only before 
a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter (matter of dispute). The entry into 
force of the Polish Constitution in 1997 resulted in the formal separation of the two 
divisions of the judicial system – ordinary courts and administrative courts. 
Importantly, the above-mentioned list of matters excluded before administrative 
courts does not include the cases ‘within the jurisdiction of other courts’, an exemp­
tion which appeared in the prior regulations. At the same time, rules were intro­
duced, according to which a court of law (ordinary court) may not reject a claim on 
the grounds that the case is in the jurisdiction of a competent public authority or an 
administrative court if the public authority or the administrative court is recognised 
as having no jurisdiction in this case.29 In turn, the regulations concerning proceed­
ings before administrative courts stipulate that the administrative court cannot reject 
the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction in the case if a court of law 
found to have no jurisdiction in this case.30 As we can see, the legislators provided a 
solution in the case of a negative conflict of competence. 
The solutions do not define the rules and procedure in cases where both a pub­
lic administration authority or an administrative court and an ordinary court of law 
consider themselves to have jurisdiction to conduct proceedings in a particular case 
(positive conflicts of jurisdiction) and, consequently, in each of these procedures 
‘competitive’ decisions are taken,31 which in turn can lead in extreme cases to the 
proceeding being null if it is conducted by a court with no jurisdiction for the matter. 
4.1 Structure of polish administrative courts 
The organisational structure and jurisdiction as well as procedure of the courts are 
specified by the law. Administrative judiciary in Poland is a system of two instances. It 
comprises provincial administrative courts (wojewódzkie sądy administracyjne,) and the 
Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, hereinafter SAC). A case 
pending before an administrative court can therefore be generally heard twice (first 
before a provincial administrative court, whose judgment may then be reviewed by 
the SAC). 
In a separate constitutional provision, the tasks of the administrative court system 
are specified. According to Art. 184, the Supreme Administrative Court and other 
administrative courts shall exercise, to the extent specified by statute, control over the 
performance of public administration. Such control shall also extend to judgments 
28 Kmieciak (n. 9) 145.
 
29 Art. 1991 of the Civil Procedure Code.
 
30 Art. 58 para 4 of the Administrative Court Procedure.
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on the conformity to statute of resolutions of organs of local government and norma­
tive acts of territorial organs of government administration. 
As we know, we can create models of the jurisdiction of administrative courts:
(1) so-called full judgment; (2) verification judgment, as a rule, cassation. In accord­
ance with Art. 133, para 1 of the Act on proceedings before administrative courts, the
court issues a judgment after the close of the hearing, on the basis of the case file.
The factual state of the case is determined by the administration itself.32 Administra­
tive court conducts only supplementary evidence − on the basis of a document and
only in exceptional cases. Therefore, it does not seek to re-establish the facts of the
case, but to make the assessment whether the authorities with jurisdiction for the
case have done so in accordance with the rules applicable in the administrative pro­
cedure, and then − if they have correctly applied the provisions of the substantive law
to the findings.33 The court examines the full range of the legality of the contested
act, action or inaction of the administration authority. An administrative court is not
bound by the allegations and conclusions cited in the complaint and the legal basis
referred to therein. 
We should notice the use of cassation-type remedies by the court. If the contested
act or action is found to violate the law, the court removes the act from the legal
system with ex nunc or ex tunc effect (recognition of the action as legally ineffec­
tive). Determining that an action of an administrative body violates the law may
also result in obliging it to take some action, such as issuing an act or performing
an action by a specified date. In special situations, the court is obliged to make use
of a given measure in order to remedy the infringement in respect to acts issued or
actions taken ‘in all proceedings conducted within the limits of the matter which
the complaint concerns if it is necessary for settling it in a final manner’.34 A certain
kind of derogation towards the reformatory type of judgment is constituted by the
possibility for the judgment of the administrative court to recognise the right or the
obligation arising from the law in the event the complaint regarding an act or an
action is upheld. 
A judgment eliminates the contested act from the legal transactions and transfers
the cases back to an administrative body to decide upon, usually with instructions
concerning making a new settlement. This approach diverges from the concept of
the right to trial presented in the jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Tribu­
nal, which requires the right to obtain a binding settlement of the case by the court.
As emphasised by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the right to trial is one of the
fundamental rights of the individuals and one of the fundamental guarantees of
the rule of law, which are composed in particular of: the right of access to a court,
that is the right to initiate a procedure before the court – a body with specific char­
acteristics (independent, impartial and objective); the right to shape the judicial
procedure in accordance with the requirements of fairness and openness; and the
32 In the course of work on judicial reform, the issue posed a problem, as opinions were voiced indicating 
that the principle of fair trial means that the administrative court should not only examine the applica­
tion of the law, but also establish the facts (see Sieniawska K. and Skonieczny P., Pojęcie ‘sądu administra­
cyjnego’ w europejskiej konwencji o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności [Casus, Summer 1999] 20). 
33 The Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment of 7 February 2006, II GSK 359/05, ONSAiWSA 
2006/5/145. 
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right to trial judgment, that is the right to obtain a binding settlement of the case
by the court.35 As we can see, the latter condition is not satisfied in full; however,
as indicated in the doctrine, this does not rule out the possibility of obtaining legal
protection and can be easily explained by the particular nature of the judicial sys­
tem expressed through the exercise of the review of the legality of the actions of
public administration.36 
These doubts were resolved by the decision in Potocka and others v Poland.37 The 
applicants put forward the complaint that they had no access to the court within the 
meaning of Art. 6 para 1 of the ECHR. They argued that the Polish Supreme Admin­
istrative Court did not have full jurisdiction as to the facts and the law, because it 
was only able to examine the lawfulness of the decision under appeal and could not 
consider any other aspects of the case, such as questions of facts and of expediency. 
The Polish government, in turn, argued that the Court meets the requirements of the 
court in the sense of Art. 6 para 1 of the ECHR. The SAC is competent to examine 
whether there had been a breach of substantive law in the proceedings giving rise 
to the contested decisions and is required, in doing so, to review the merits of the 
applicant’s case as well. The ECtHR upheld the government’s view that the Polish 
Supreme Administrative Court − to the extent to which its jurisdiction has been deter­
mined − meets the standards required of a ‘court’. It admitted that although the court 
has been established to analyse the legality of administrative decisions, it has been 
provided with the authority to waive in whole or in part the contested act if it finds a 
breach of the procedural requirements of fairness.38 
It should be born in mind that what is necessary is not only an effective access 
to the court, but also access to an effective court.39 As a result of the decision of the 
administrative court, a certain state of transition is created and it is the responsibil­
ity of the public administration authorities to stabilise it.40 Even a judgment which 
implies a freedom of choice between several options for new decisions accompanied 
by proper justification often leaves a certain freedom in the choice of a variety of set­
tlement options. The fact that so understood a decision margin exists is sometimes 
abused, which may result in another complaint being made to the administrative 
court.41 There is no sanction in the event that, after the cassation judgment of the 
administrative court, the administration fails to comply with the opinion expressed in 
the judgment or re-issues identical decisions based on these motives or even fails to 
issue any decision or at least not in the deadlines specified by law. The only exception 
to this is a situation in which in the event of failure to execute a judgment upholding 
a complaint on the failure to act or an excessive time of proceeding, and in the case of 
the inactivity of the authority or an excessive time of proceeding following the judg­
ment repealing the act or action or declaring them void, the party, after prior written 
35 The Constitutional Court’s judgment of 18 December 2007, SK 54/05, OTK-A 2007/11/158, 
158/11/A/2007. 
36 Kmieciak (n. 9) 112. 
37 Potocka and others v Poland ECHR 2001-X 62–66. 
38 Guide to Art. 6. RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. (civil limb). Council of Europe/European Court of Human 
Rights, 2013 pp. 26 and 28 (available at www.echr.coe.int). 
39 Kmieciak (n. 9) 192. 
40 Ibid. 110. 
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summons to the competent authority to execute the judgment or settle the case, may 
lodge a complaint in this regard, demanding that fines be imposed on that authority. 
This is undoubtedly a weakness of the Polish system. In practice, the administrative 
courts have repeatedly repealed successive decisions issued within the same adminis­
trative cases, which causes considerable delay in the final settlement of those. Apart 
from repeatedly repealing the incorrect decision, the courts do not have at its dis­
posal any measures to discipline administrative authorities. 
For this reason, we can observe the desire to supplement the traditional system of 
judicial protection, derived from the Austro-Hungarian tradition (cassation type of 
jurisdiction) with solutions typical for the full appeal model. It is justified mainly by 
the difficulties in ensuring the proper execution (fast and consistent with legal analy­
ses and directions of the court) taking into account the appeal to judgment. But this 
is still under discussion.42 
4.2 Second instance of judicial procedure 
The right to trial does not cover guaranteeing the instance model of the judiciary 
system. Art. 6 does not in itself require that Member States organise appellate and 
cassation courts. However, if such a system exists, this Article is applicable, given that 
the applicant has a formal opportunity to appeal to a higher national court.43 Nev­
ertheless, as emphasised by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the right to trial is 
strengthened by the guarantee of the instance structure as the principle of court and 
administrative proceedings.44 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland does not 
determine on what assumptions the principle of two instances of administrative court 
proceedings should be based, leaving the legislature to regulate this issue. The court 
of first instance examines the full range of the legality of the contested act, action 
or inaction of the administration authority. The procedure is different in the case of 
instance review of a judgment made. 
A cassation appeal is a statement bound by specific formal requirements, among 
others, the need to appropriately formulate and justify charges as well as indicate 
the laws violated. The cassation appeal should be drawn up by an advocate or legal 
adviser. The Supreme Administrative Court examines the case within the limits of a 
cassation appeal. This means that the parties filing a cassation appeal must point out 
a violation of a specific law by the judgment issued and the case will be reviewed from 
this standpoint. However, the SAC ex officio takes into account the invalidity of the pro­
ceedings (which arises in the case of very serious errors in proceedings). Parties may 
cite the new justification for the grounds for cassation, but are bound by its scope. 
The system of remedies adopted for the proceedings before the administrative 
courts in Poland is a mixed model. The predominant element in the cassation-type 
model of an appeal is naturally constituted by cassation.45 An exception is observed in 
42 As pointed by Z. Kmieciak, this issue was already discussed in the 1920s. (Ibid. 107).
 
43 Dovydas vitkauskas and Grigoriy Dikov, Protecting the right to a fair trial under the European Convention on 

Human Rights (Council of Europe 2012) 22. 
44 The Constitutional Court’s judgment of 20 September 2006, SK 63/05, OTK-A 2006/8/108, Dz.U.2006 /
170/1224. 
45 Michał Kania, Zwyczajne środki zaskarżenia w postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi (Oficyna Wolters 
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the form of the possibility of the SAC issuing a reformatory ruling in a situation where 
there are no violations of the rules of procedure that may have a significant impact 
on the outcome of the case, and there is only a violation of substantial law. The solu­
tion is a compromise between the ‘weakened’ cassation model and the review model. 
Therefore, the submission of a cassation appeal does not always lead to cassation. As 
a result, the cassation appeal is a conventional name of the remedy used in admin­
istrative court proceedings.46 A cassation appeal in administrative court proceedings 
is an ordinary remedy: it is lodged concerning a judgment or the order terminating 
the proceedings issued in the proceedings before the regional administrative court. 
A cassation appeal is a devolutive. 
A cassation appeal can be based on the grounds of 47 the violation of substantive 
law through its erroneous interpretation or improper application, or based on the 
infringement of proceeding rules, if the infringement could have a significant impact 
on the outcome of the case. As a result, the SAC does not review all the decisions of 
the regional administrative court, which one of the parties contest, but only those 
containing the above-mentioned infringements. The question of so-defined bases for 
cassation raised doubts concerning the guarantee of the right to a fair trial. The solu­
tion was criticised on the grounds that the construction of cassation appeal in admin­
istrative court proceedings proposed by the legislators does not lead to resolving the 
cases pending before the court of first instance, but only to the SAC control of pro­
ceedings of the lower court. Therefore, the cassation appeal does not act as an appeal 
measure, allowing the SAC to examine a second time of case of administrative court 
second, that is a case related to the control of the activities of public administration. 
The compatibility of the rules governing the cassation bases was ruled upon by the 
Constitutional Tribunal, which, in the judgment of 20 September 2006,48 pointed out 
that so-defined cassation bases are in compliance with Art. 45 of the Polish Constitu­
tion. The Tribunal, stressing that it treats the right to trial as one of the fundamental 
rights of the individual and one of the fundamental guarantees of the rule of law, 
pointed out that while the claim based on the stipulations of Art. 45 para 1 of the Con­
stitution concerns the ‘consideration of the matter’, the principle of instances applies 
to the decision making process, and therefore the first decision in this case. There­
fore, in essence, it concerns a certain stage of settling the case. The role of the judicial 
review of instance, raised to the rank of a constitutional right, is to prevent confusion 
and arbitrariness in the first instance. At the same time, the Tribunal pointed out that 
the legislators’ freedom in shaping appropriate procedures does not extend to the 
right to introduce arbitrary solutions that limit beyond measure, and thus without an 
important reason, the procedural rights of the parties, the implementation of which 
is a prerequisite for the proper and fair settlement of the case. Therefore, if limiting 
the parties’ procedural rights is unnecessary from the point of view of the purposes 
intended by the legislators, such as ensuring greater effectiveness and speed of pro­
ceedings, and at the same time distorts the position of the parties, it prevents ensur­
ing the proper balance between their positions in the process, and thus violates the 
46 Kania (n. 45) 190.
 
47 Art. 174 of the Administrative Court Procedure.
 
48 The Constitutional Court’s judgment of 20 September 2000, SK 63/05, OTK-A 2006/8/108, Dz.U.
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basic postulate of procedural fairness or finally leads to the arbitrary resolution of the 
‘case’.49 According to the Constitutional Tribunal, the regulation, contained in the 
Polish administrative court procedure, does not establish any subjective or objective 
restrictions of the right to lodge a cassation appeal. This is due to the fact that it does 
not limit the possibility of initiating second instance proceedings or exclude obtain­
ing a judgment of the court of second instance. 
The adopted solution was also criticised for simply transferring to the adminis­
trative court proceedings the stipulations of the Civil Procedure Code, which − as 
pointed out by the Constitutional Tribunal itself − is not an option that can be con­
sidered as ideal. In fact, cassation appeals in the two types of proceedings are quite 
different. In proceedings before the civil courts, a cassation appeal is a remedy filed in 
the course of the proceedings to the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) for final review 
of the legality of decisions by courts of second instance. In the proceedings before 
the administrative courts, on the other hand, it constitutes an appeal to first instance 
decisions. Also the role of the administrative courts is different than those of courts in 
civil proceedings: they only control the activities of public administration, and exer­
cise this control most of all in terms of compliance with the law. They do not apply 
the substantive law in the same manner as the courts of law. All these fundamental 
differences lead to the conclusion that the transfer of the civil code solutions directly 
to the domain of administrative court procedures is not an appropriate solution, and 
it may lead to certain restrictions in the full examination of the case. 
5 European impacts 
As mentioned above, the guarantee of the right to trial has had a long tradition in 
the Polish legal system. After the turmoil associated with the events following World 
War II, after 1989, the Polish state faced the difficult task of restoring democracy. 
There is no doubt that in making legislative changes, legislators based on the content 
of the European Charter of Human Rights, even before it was formally ratified. The 
painful experience of previous years resulted in the fact that the newly adopted solu­
tions not only mirrored European standards (and in that scope, their impact must 
be seen as very significant), but in many cases developed those even further, which is 
also reflected in the provisions of the Polish Constitution. As a result, complaints to 
the ECtHR against Poland concerning violations of the right to trial are few in num­
ber and predominantly related to the excessive length of proceedings rather than 
the basic assumptions of the judicial system. It should also be noted that the Polish 
legislature respects and complies with ECtHR and ECJ rulings, and any finding of 
misconduct results in a corresponding change in Polish regulations (for example, 
introducing into administrative and administrative court procedures measures that 
allow eliminating the excessive length of proceedings). 
6 Conclusions 
In principle, the implementation and protection of the right to trial in the context 
of administrative procedures and administrative court proceedings in Poland needs 
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to be evaluated as positive. As emphasised by some scholars, much has been done to 
ensure that the course of court proceedings in Poland corresponds to the standards 
of fair trial.50 
The subjective scope of the right to trial is presented in the Polish Constitution
quite extensively: Art. 45 para 1 of the Constitution defines the right to trial in
positive terms. On the other hand, Art. 77 para 2 includes the prohibition of bar­
ring the judicial settlement of the infringement of freedoms and rights. Such a
formulation complements the constitutional guarantee of the right to trial. ‘Every­
one’s right to trial means that ‘no one’ (with the restriction of seeking freedoms
or rights) can be barred from judicial settlement.51 It can also be argued that this
protection is generally effective. This is confirmed by the fact that only a small num­
ber of complaints are filed against Poland at the European Court of Human Rights,
especially in the field that is the subject of the present report. Cases are heard by an
independent and impartial judicial authority. The control in itself is a two-instance
procedure, and judicial control is additionally preceded by the examination of the
case in the second instance by the administrative authorities. Certain doubts of
the manner of shaping the jurisdiction of the administrative courts, which is close
to the traditional model of verification judgment, and as a rule, based on cassa­
tion, are certainly not a hindrance to the effective protection of individual rights
through the courts.52 The cassation model of the remedies is rare in judicial systems
based on the principle of two instances. It is necessary to regulate a new institution
of remedy in our administrative court proceedings,53 for example a two-instance sys­
tem of administrative courts with reformatory–cassatory jurisdiction. Increasingly,
it is postulated that administrative courts be granted the power to rule on the mer­
its of the case, or to create, instead of a second instance of the administrative system
or an additional, lowest rung of it, specialised tribunals, modelled after the English
system, and entitled to rule on the merits of the case. However, such opinions are
merely a reaction to some of the shortcomings pointed out above and remain sim­
ply debating points. 
Basically, the biggest problem consists of the excessive length of proceedings,54 espe­
cially the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court, which in a certain perspec­
tive can lead to the need to reform the system of administrative courts in Poland 
(for example, through the creation of local branches of the Supreme Administrative 
Court). It is also pointed out that efficiency of enforcement of court judgments is still 
too small.55 Therefore, although, as indicated above, the Polish legal system provides 
a standard of requirements to ensure a fair trial higher than that provided for in the 
European standards, everyday practice would indicate the need for further changes 
aimed at a more complete implementation of this right. If we assume, after Tomasz
50 Adam Zieliński, ‘Wokół reformy polskiego sądownictwa’ (2009) 1(2) Państwo i Prawo 18.
 
51 The Constitutional Court’s judgment of 10 May 2000, K 21/99, OTK ZU No. 4/2000, pos. 109.
 




54 Hanna Knysiak-Molczyk even speaks of the ‘Achilles heel’ of Polish justice, see: Hanna Knysiak-

Molczyk, ‘Skarga na przewlekłość postępowania sądowoadministracyjnego w orzecznictwie Naczelnego 
Sądu Administracyjnego’ in Janusz Sługocki (ed.), Dziesięć lat polskich doświadczeń w Unii Europejskiej
Problemy prawnoadministracyjne (PRESSCOM 2014) 398. 
55 Adam Zieliński, ‘Wokół reformy polskiego sądownictwa’ (2009) 1(2) Państwo i Prawo 19. 
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T. Koncewicz, that the right to a fair procedure consists of two components: the right 
to judicial protection (understood as the access to the court) and the right to effec­
tive judicial review (appropriately shaped procedures),56 it should be pointed out that 
in the Polish system, we observe actual availability of judicial protection, and despite 
a slight doubt as to the quality of the procedure, overall, judicial protection may be 
deemed effective. 
56 Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, ‘Prawo do rzetelnego postępowania w europejskiej przestrzeni prawnej 














15	 The principle of effective legal 
protection in administrative 
law in Slovenia 
Erik Kerševan
 
1 Historical developments 
History has shown a continuous development of different administrative procedural
regulations valid in the territory of Slovenia already in States preceding its independ­
ence in 1991. If we start with some facts and figures, the first regulation dates back to
the General Administrative Procedure Act of Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1930, based on
an example of the Austrian regulation from 1925. Similarly, a system of judicial review
of administrative acts was introduced by unification of countries in the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia with the Act on Council of State and Administrative Courts of 1921, based
on the French model of administrative justice, since such was already in place in Serbia. 
Even in the time of the communist regime, the general principles of adminis­
trative procedure were introduced already in 1946 followed by the codification of 
judicial review of administration introduced by the Administrative Disputes Act in 
1952 and (re)introduction of the codified federal General Administrative Procedure 
Act (GAPA) in 1956, which was later changed and modernised continuously. This 
act served as a basis of regulation in force in the independent Republic of Slovenia, 
which was adopted in 1999 under the same name as a part of new legislation of the 
independent state. This act has seen a number of revisions and modifications, but its 
core structure remained basically the same. After independence a new Administrative 
Dispute Act was also adopted in 1997, which brought new development on the regula­
tory level, but its role in the democratic legal order, based on the respect for the rule 
of law, changed dramatically, since the courts were quite overwhelmed by the number 
of cases that had to be resolved. Therefore a completely new Administrative Dispute 
Act was passed in 2006 and came into force in 2007. 
This regulation has shown a division of two levels of administrative decision making 
and control: first is the very strict and detailed regulation of administrative proce­
dure, which has given a very strong importance to the intra-administrative review of 
legality: the administrative appeal is a very powerful remedy and there are a number 
of extraordinary legal remedies that can be used against final acts of administration. 
This is probably a result of historic approach that was aimed at ensuring the reso­
lution of all questions of both law and fact before administrative bodies, since the 
judicial dispute between an individual and the state was in the 50 years of commu­
nist regime very rare and also frowned upon.1 In other words, whereas the detailed 
1 Even in legal books, e.g. the legal commentaries to Administrative Disputes Act, a very detailed argu­
mentation why the ‘bourgeois’ institution of administrative dispute as judicial control of administration 
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regulation aimed at efficient functioning of administration was in conceptual accord­
ance with communist regime paradigms, the effective independent judicial control 
in a system, which did not recognise the separation of powers, was not. This gave the 
individual quite powerful protection of his legally guaranteed rights and obligations 
within administrative decision making, but very limited (in theory and practice) pro­
tection in judicial administrative dispute procedure. Together with these remarks, 
two other important aspects have to be stressed. First, there were wide administrative 
areas, where the administrative bodies had discretionary powers, which could not be 
effectively challenged by the individual, either by appeal or by other legal remedies. 
And secondly, available legal remedies, although effective, were also widely used for 
the protection of public interest: state bodies (e.g. state prosecutor, state attorney) 
had – and still have – the right to appeal administrative decisions and even start 
judicial review proceedings to protect the objective legality as a recognised aspect 
of public interest.2 Following this reasoning also many extraordinary legal remedies 
could – and still can – be used ex officio by administrative bodies themselves to annul 
or change an (allegedly) unlawful administrative act. 
The approach to legal remedies in the Slovenian legal system is derived from this 
tradition and was – and remains – ambiguous, since the effectiveness of legal rem­
edies was not aimed solely at ensuring the protection of individuals’ rights and legiti­
mate interests but also at ensuring a very strong intra-administrative control with the 
aim of protecting public interest. Still, the most obvious development in recent years 
has shown a growing understanding of the importance of effective, impartial and 
independent judicial review and more and more energy has been aimed at ensuring 
its modernisation and effectiveness. 
2 Constitutional framework 
The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia has several provisions determining not 
just the principle, but also the right to effective legal remedy and judicial protection. 
First, based on the model of Art. 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), there is Art. 25 in the Slovenian Constitution that determined that there has 
to be a right to an (effective) legal remedy: ‘Everyone shall be guaranteed the right 
to appeal or to any other legal remedy against the decisions of courts and other state 
authorities, local community authorities, and bearers of public authority by which his 
rights, duties, or legal interests are determined.’ 
This legal remedy not only has to exist in law, but it also has to be effective in 
practice, as has been repeatedly stressed by the Constitutional Court: it has to be 
available against all administrative acts, affecting the legal position of an individual, 
it has to be able to suspend the implementation of the challenged administrative 
act and the decision on appeal has to be adopted by a higher-level administrative 
is not contrary to ‘socialist society’ and the ‘general theory of Marxism-Leninism of the State dying out 
on the way to developing consistent socialist democracy in transitional period’ was presented. See e.g. 
Mirko Perović, Komentar Zakona o upravnim sporovima (Savremena Administracija, Beograd 1972) 5–11. 
2 Both are a widely reflected concept of acceptable form of administrative dispute in a socialist society, 
see Branko Majstorović, Komentar Zakona o upravnim sporovima (Izdanje Službenog lista SFRJ, Beograd 
1965) 5–11, 40–46. 




    
   
   
  
  
   
authority.3 Therefore it can be interpreted that a two-level decision making structure 
of administration is a constitutional requirement, since there has to be a body, decid­
ing on appeal within the administration itself, unless there are clear reasons in public 
interests why there has to be a final level administrative decision taken by the body 
responsible in the first instance.4 The appeal in administrative procedure was – and 
still is – seen by many scholars and recognised by jurisprudence for many years as the 
most important implementation of the constitutional right to an effective remedy in 
the area of administrative law.5 This has of course led to detailed regulation of appeal 
procedure in the GAPA and in many cases courts have examined various aspects of 
this regulation, including its conformity with constitutional requirements. 
Interesting legal debates have found ground in the combination of this consti­
tutional right with another, also enshrined in the Constitution as one of the most 
important guarantees of the rule of law: the right to judicial protection. The right of 
any person to have judicial protection is determined by Art. 23 of the Constitution, 
which has in substance copied Art. 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
but is not limited in its scope to civil matters and criminal charges, but has extended 
its validity also to administrative matters, which was confirmed by the interpretation 
of the Constitutional Court.6 Art. 23 states that: ‘Everyone has the right to have any 
decision regarding his rights, duties, and any charges brought against him made with­
out undue delay by an independent, impartial court constituted by law. Only a judge 
duly appointed pursuant to rules previously established by law and by judicial regula­
tions may judge such an individual.’ In this regard every statutory provision that limits 
the powers of the courts (Administrative Court included) can be challenged before 
the Constitutional Court and is examined in extensive scrutiny of the so called ‘strict 
proportionality test’: whether the limitation of the constitutional right to effective 
judicial protection is aimed at achieving a constitutionally acceptable goal, whether 
it is necessary and appropriate for achieving this goal and whether the values pro­
tected by this measure are in proportion with the limits set on the right of judicial 
protection.7 
The combination of the right to an effective legal remedy and the right to judicial 
protection – and its possible limits in administrative matters – have been (and still 
are) a challenge for both the parliament and the Constitutional Court. After the new 
Constitution of the independent state was adopted in 1992, these two rights were 
interpreted as being separate constitutional guarantees, aimed at effective legal pro­
tection of individuals and therefore both of them had to be implemented in relevant 
legislative provisions. This in civil and criminal matters was not so difficult, as it meant 
that after the first instance of judicial protection a right to appeal to a second-level has 
to be granted to all parties of the proceedings. But in administrative matters, where 
the procedure of administrative bodies was followed by the judicial review procedure, 
these demands of an effective legal protection led to an overburdening of the system 
3 Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I-219/03 of 1 December 2005.
 
4 Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I-313/96 of 8 April 1999.
 
5 See especially Tone Jerovšek, ‘Pravica do pritožbe (25. člen)’, Lovro Šturm (ed.), Komentar Ustave Repub­
like Slovenije (Fakulteta za podiplomske državne in evropske študije, Kranj 2002) 274–294. 
6 The scope of protection is therefore similar to the new Art. 47 (Right to an effective remedy and to a fair 
trial) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
7 See Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I-18/02 of 24 October 2003. 
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and in consequence to lower effectiveness of legal remedies. The question of guaran­
teeing both the right to an effective legal remedy and the right to judicial protection 
has also had its impact on the organisation of legal remedies and structure of admin­
istrative bodies and courts, having jurisdiction in judicial review. In the early 1990s 
it was thus interpreted as a constitutional requirement to form three levels of legal 
protection in all administrative matters, after the administrative act has been issued 
in the first instance. There is no need to stress that four levels of decision making in 
the same administrative matter has hindered efficiency of both administrative appeal 
procedures and judicial protection. These organisational and procedural require­
ments have been abandoned following a decision of the Constitutional Court, which 
confirmed that the right to judicial protection in administrative matters is equivalent 
to the right to an effective legal remedy and that provisions of Arts. 23 and 25 of the 
Constitution should be interpreted in combination, meaning that there is no consti­
tutional right to have either an administrative appeal against the administrative act or 
a judicial appeal against the first instance decision of the administrative court, if there 
is an effective judicial review of an administrative act established by law.8 The result 
is therefore now similar to the sense of Art. 47 of the Charter of EU Fundamental 
Rights. 
To summarise, all the constitutional rules and principles require that in administra­
tive matters there has to be effective legal protection of persons’ rights and legitimate 
interests, at least in the form of an effective judicial review of all administrative deci­
sions and actions, by which these rights or interests are (or can be) affected. 
3 Rights-based perspective 
The legal protection of individuals in administrative matters is regulated by two dif­
ferent laws. 
The GAPA regulates in considerable detail the administrative decision making in 
the first instance, appeal procedure and extraordinary legal remedies that can be 
used against a final administrative act, and the Administrative Dispute Act of 2006 
(ADA) regulates specialised judicial review procedure that can follow the exhaustion 
of administrative appeals. As presented above, the appeal procedure and the access to 
administrative courts together form an implementation of the constitutional require­
ment of effective legal protection in administrative law. 
In both procedural laws – although different in concept and characteristics – all 
fundamental principles of fair procedure are guaranteed: in all cases all parties to 
the proceedings have the right to access to all the relevant documents, the right to 
counsel and the right to be heard. Every formal administrative act has to give reasons, 
with only some exceptions expressly regulated by law (e.g. urgent matters, matters of 
minor importance). The Administrative Court has to give reasons for its judgments 
both in regard to facts and law, but can in parts refer to the reasoning of disputed 
administrative act, if the court agrees with it, without repeating it expressly in the 
judgment in its entirety. 
There are however, some widely used fundamental concepts that have to be briefly 
explained to understand the functioning of legal remedies in administrative matters. 
8 See Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I-219/03 of 1 December 2005. 
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Legal protection in Slovenian legal order is given in administrative matters both 
to rights and legitimate interests of legal persons or individuals affected by certain 
administrative decision making. Whereas the concept of rights under public adminis­
trative law is relatively less problematic, the role of ‘legitimate interest’ in administra­
tive law is harder to explain. It is of course clear that the ‘legal right’ is in its substance 
a legally protected interest, meaning a private interest recognised by the legislator 
and given its legal basis in appropriate form of the law. But in Slovenian administra­
tive law tradition, a weaker form of protection of private interests is also recognised, 
meaning that also in cases where the legislator has not given to a certain private 
interest the legal recognition and protection in the form of a ‘right’, there can be 
some legal empowerment of such an interest to be pertinent (relevant) also in admin­
istrative decision making. If a certain interest is individual (as opposed to general), 
directly linked to the administrative matter in question and based on a legal provi­
sion, granting it legal protection, the administrative bodies and courts in administra­
tive dispute are bound to give it appropriate protection. Examples of this legitimate 
interest are found in cases where a certain party desires a favourable administrative 
act based on discretionary powers of administration (e.g. citizenship), meaning that 
there is no legally enforceable right to attain it. Legitimate interests also have to be 
respected in cases where there is a decision to be taken about rights or obligations of 
a certain party, if there is a person is participating ex parte in these proceedings, (e.g. 
neighbour to an investor seeking a building permit) and his interest fulfils the above-
mentioned criteria.9 The legal remedies are in principle the same for the protection 
of both rights and legitimate interests under administrative law, but the recognition 
of a certain private interest as a legitimate interest (and not just a plain economic, 
moral or general interest) can be more widely left to the interpretation of adminis­
trative bodies and – above all – courts exercising judicial review of administration.10 It 
also has to be stressed that the protection of legitimate interest is in legal remedies 
limited in its scope to the issues directly affecting and/or violating the interest in 
question and cannot be extended to other aspects of legality.11 
3.1 Legal protection in administrative procedures 
The right to appeal is in the GAPA regulated as one of the fundamental principles. 
It guarantees both the protection of rights of parties to the proceedings, as well 
as the protection of public interests and the fundamental principle of legality. In 
9 Regarding these issues extensively in Vilko Androjna, Erik Kerševan, Upravno procesno pravo (GV 
Založba, Ljubljana 2006) 45–62. 
10 In practice, a very important criterion is the question of teleological interpretation of the provision of 
a law: the private interest can be found to be legitimate, if there was an intention of the legislator to 
protect this specific interest, which differentiates it from other potential or present interests and can be 
found to protect only a determined (or determinable) number of persons. This goes well with the con­
cept of German ‘Schutznormntheorie’, see, Hans-Joachim Driehaus and Rainer Pietzner, Einführung in 
das Allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht (C. H. Beck, München 1996) 49, and Klaus Stern, Verwaltungsprozessuale 
Probleme in der öffentlich-rechtlichen Arbeit (Beck, München 2000) 200, quoted also in Constitutional Court 
decision No. Up-1850/08 of 5 May 2010. 
11 Procedurally it is of course a challenge if the ex parte participant points out questions of fact and/or law, 
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administrative procedure appeal is an ordinary legal remedy, available to all persons 
affected by the decision, which was issued at first instance.12 
The right to appeal in the administrative procedure is allowed against any admin­
istrative decision, which was issued at the first instance. The persons entitled to
appeal are those, who had a formal legal status of parties to the first instance pro­
ceedings. It has to be mentioned that any person who shows legitimate interest can
formally take part in the administrative procedure initiated by a party or ex officio, 
before the administrative act is issued. Right to appeal is also granted to those, who
were not taking part in administrative procedure, if their rights or legitimate inter­
ests under public law are affected by the administrative act and they can show that
an appeal could remedy that situation. The law regulates, however, that if the person
was already invited to take part in first instance procedure, but did not respond to
this invitation, his right to appeal is limited, both in the time limit to appeal as well
as in substance. 
The appeal has in principle a suspensive effect and is decided by a superior admin­
istrative body. This is only a principle, however, since in cases regulated by law, the 
appeal does not stay the execution of the challenged administrative act, so that whole 
fields or areas of administrative law have such exceptions regulated: no appeal in e.g. 
tax law, decisions of inspections, etc. has suspensive effect. The Constitutional Court 
held in several cases that this does not violate the provisions of the Constitution.13 
An appeal can be used against a first instance decision based on questions of both 
fact and law. The points of law that can be used in an appeal are both the questions 
of procedural and substantive (material) rights and legitimate interests under public 
law, that have been violated. Discretionary decisions can also be appealed based on 
the grounds that the discretionary powers were not used within the limits of the law 
or not following the legal aim, because of which these powers were granted to the 
administration. A violation of discretionary powers can also occur if the discretion was 
not used in accordance with the principle of proportionality or could have been used 
in a more appropriate manner to satisfy public interests. 
The ‘silence of administration’ can also be a ground to appeal, on the basis of a 
legal fiction that the party’s application was rejected or that the procedural outcome 
in ex officio proceedings was unfavourable. This fiction appears after expiry of a time 
limit, given to administrative bodies by law to reach a decision, which is one month 
in simple and two months in complex matters, which can be extended for another 30 
days, if the circumstances justify it. 
While the appeal procedure cannot be started by administrative bodies on their 
own motion, there are strong elements of protection of public interest and ‘objec­
tive legality’ of administrative action. The act can be appealed also by state prosecu­
tors or state attorneys even if they were not parties to the proceedings if they claim 
that the administrative act is illegal and violating public interest. According to the 
principle of protecting objective legality of the act, the appellate administrative body 
12 The exception to the right to an administrative appeal has to be expressly regulated by an act of par­
liament and is present e.g. in cases of decisions of independent regulatory authorities (Agency for 
protection of competition, Bank of Slovenia, etc.), where these decisions can be directly subjected to 
judicial review. 
13 See Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I-297/95 of 28 October 1998. 







has extensive powers (and duty) to examine ex officio possible violations of both sub­
stantive and procedural law, even if they were not disputed by the appellant. When 
deciding on appeal it can annul the act even against the interests of the person who 
started the appeal procedure, meaning ultra petitum, in cases defined by the GAPA. 
Depending on the case, these powers can contribute to effective legal remedy of the 
persons affected by the administrative act, but can be hardly interpreted as such in 
cases where the end result of administrative appeal procedure is contrary to the inter­
ests of these persons and in effect protecting only the public interest. 
The powers of a superior body when deciding on appeal are very wide, since it 
can annul a decision (ab initio) and refer it back to the administrative body in first 
instance, but it can also change the challenged decision itself in any way it deems is 
required by law to reach a correct and just result of the proceedings. Since the appel­
lant’s interest is in acquiring a final substantive solution (in merito) to his claims, the 
question of effectiveness in this regard has been concentrating on the issue of delimit­
ing these procedural powers: when in the case of a well-founded appeal a final deci­
sion has to be taken in second instance and when can the case be referred back to first 
instance, prolonging the procedure. It is quite clear that in principle the resolution 
of the appeal case in second instance gives a finality to the decision taken, so that the 
referral back to the first instance should be an exception, when circumstances justify 
such a decision (i.e. when the procedure would be more expediently resolved by 
the capacity of the first instance administrative body). The GAPA has been trying to 
resolve this in such a way, but due to the need (or desire) of superior administrative 
bodies to lower their burden, a high number of cases of successful appeals still end as 
a repeated first instance procedure, which of course can end in a new appeal by the 
aggrieved party. 
To counter this ineffectiveness new provisions have recently been included in
GAPA, which allow the superior administrative body to refer the case back to the
first instance body only once. Following these provisions, the superior administra­
tive body is on (possible) second, consecutive appeal bound to resolve the matter
itself with a final decision, but the question still remains, how (and if) that will
contribute to the overall effectiveness of appeal as a legal remedy. There is no legal
remedy if this administrative obligation is violated and the overburdening of sec­
ond level administration could cause the legal protection to become less, not more
effective. 
After an administrative decision is final, there are several extraordinary legal rem­
edies regulated by GAPA or in certain fields of administration other laws (e.g. Act 
on Taxation Procedure) that can (and are) effectively used to remedy a violation of 
law and/or rights and legitimate interests of persons affected by this decision. These 
can be used to remedy both the errors in established facts, based on new evidence, as 
well as grave procedural violations, (e.g. when a person affected by the decision was 
not taking part in the proceedings, reopening of the administrative procedure) and 
grave violations of substantive law. There are extraordinary legal remedies that can 
be used both by persons affected as well as certain authorities charged with protect­
ing the public interest (state prosecutor, state attorney, inspector) or even ex officio by 
administrative bodies themselves. In these cases, the responsible (supervisory) admin­
istrative body adopts its decision in the form of a new administrative act, which can 
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3.2 Judicial review 
A final administrative act can be subjected to judicial review before the Administra­
tive Court. Any final administrative act that is in substance a decision on rights or 
obligations of persons can be challenged by an appropriate claim in a specialised 
judicial procedure. The Constitution does not require a special administrative court 
to be established, but it does provide for a special procedure that has to be regulated 
for the judicial review of administrative actions. There is an explicit provision in the 
Constitution stating that there is a special judicial review procedure (administrative 
dispute, upravni spor)14 of the legality of ‘final individual acts with which state authori­
ties, local community authorities, and bearers of public authority decide the rights 
or obligations and legal interests of individuals and organisations, if other judicial 
protection is not provided by law for a particular matter.’ 
This means that there has to be a judicial procedure for the review of final indi­
vidual acts and that this procedure has to be specially regulated by law in the form of 
administrative dispute or another form of specialised judicial procedure (e.g. social 
dispute against administrative acts regarding pensions, public health and other social 
rights). The possibility to bring actions against the public authorities in courts of gen­
eral jurisdiction does not satisfy this constitutional requirement, since these courts do 
not have necessary powers to ensure effective protection of legally guaranteed posi­
tion of individuals and organisations under administrative law. This constitutional 
provision is interpreted as a rule that the courts of general competence do not have 
powers to decide upon the legality and validity of administrative acts15 and cannot 
order the administration to perform actions under statutes to satisfy the rights of 
individuals under public law. 
In relation to the scope of judicial review in administrative dispute procedure the
focus of the abovementioned Art. 157 of the Constitution is on the review of ‘admin­
istrative act’16 and does not mention other forms of administrative action or relevant
remedies of judicial protection. This can be regarded as a constitutionally recognised
significance of the judicial protection against the administrative acts as the (probably
still) most important and widespread form of administrative action. It would be wrong
to interpret this provision as a limit to judicial power and the scope of judicial review,
necessary to guarantee effective judicial protection. The ADA follows the same legal
structure and the definition of the administrative act tries to encompass all forms
of administrative decision making based on powers under public law. It has to be
14 The term ‘administrative dispute’ in this case determines the judicial review process in which a (private 
or legal) person as a plaintiff brings an action against the administration in relation to its decisions or 
actions brought under iure imperii, exercising public authority (processo amministrativo, Verwaltungsprozess, 
contentieux amministratif ). Disputes in relation to public procurement are in Slovenia not a part of 
administrative dispute, since it is deemed to be a dispute related to iure negotii, since the public body 
isn’t acting in its authoritative capacity, but forming contracts of private law. The disputes are resolved 
by a special tribunal, National Review Commission for Reviewing Public Procurement Procedures. 
15 An interesting and recent example can be found in Constitutional Court Decision No. Up-457/09 of 
28 September 2011. 
16 The definition is very similar on the traditional meaning of German ‘Verwaltungsakt’ that serves as the 
basis of judicial review in Federal Republic of Germany, see Harmut Maurer, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht
(Beck, München 2002) 187 ff, also in Austria, Ludwig Adamovich and Bernd-Christian Funk, Allge­
meines Verwaltungsrecht (3., neubearbeitete Aufl., Springer, Wien 1998) 262 ff. 










   
   
stressed that the term ‘administrative act’ is defined by law: ‘Pursuant to this Act, an
administrative act shall be an administrative decision and other public law, unilateral,
authoritative individual act, issued within the framework of implementing administra­
tive function, in which a body makes a decision on a right, obligation or legal benefit
of an individual or legal entity, or of any other person who may be party to the pro­
ceeding of issuing the act’. As an important aspect of trying to guarantee extensive
scope of effective judicial protection the Constitutional Court stressed in a recent case
that the state has to act through administrative acts for its decisions ex iure imperii to
have a legally valid effect. If the State uses another form of action contrary to the law,
there can be no change in rights and obligations of individuals and legal entities.17 
This definition itself has however limited the competence of the Administrative 
Court to review administrative acts that are final not just in a formal, but also in 
a material sense, meaning that in principle the decision making in administrative 
procedure has to be concluded with a final decision, based on the merits of the case, 
before the judicial review procedure can be initiated. This gives primacy to appeal 
administrative procedure, which has to be resolved with a final decision, before the 
claim in administrative dispute can be filed with the court. If, as a result of successful 
administrative appeal, the matter is referred back to first instance for further consid­
eration, no party can start the administrative dispute procedure in court, since there 
is no substantially final administrative act yet that can be challenged. This is in effect 
a major contribution to effectiveness of legal remedies in administrative law, since it 
has enabled a coherent approach and relation between two separate procedures. In 
this way, the administrative bodies are not waiting for any courts’ judgments before 
continuing to reach a final decision in administrative procedure and the courts are 
not burdened with cases and questions, which could only be preliminary in the sense 
that no substantially final decision would have been reached by the administration in 
the time of the court’s judgment. 
According to this concept of judicial review of administrative acts, there has to be 
an authentic dispute between two sides of the case, so that it would be unconstitu­
tional to change it into something incompatible with its basic nature. Thus, it would 
be unacceptable to grant the Administrative Court the power to launch an ex officio
judicial process before the final decision in an administrative case. However, there 
are some competences and powers that the court deciding in administrative dispute 
procedure does not have and that represent an important limitation to effective­
ness of legal protection in judicial review. Foremost, although of limited importance 
because of reasons given above, the Administrative Court has no competence to rule 
on actions of the administrative bodies that do not correspond to the definition of 
an administrative act. Some of these are less problematic, since they do not affect the 
rights and obligations of individuals (e.g. governmental acts of political discretion)18 
and would therefore not give standing to any plaintiff to challenge them. The other 
17 See Constitutional Court Decision No. Up-626/12 of 12 July 2012: ‘The authoritative deciding of bear­
ers of public authority on the rights, obligations, or legal benefits of individuals is consistent with the 
principle of a state governed by the rule of law (Art. 2 of the Constitution) and possible only on the 
basis of an issued administrative decision that takes into consideration Art. 22 of the Constitution, 
which determines the right to the equal protection of rights in proceedings.’ 
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forms of action (or omission) could on the other hand represent violations or rights 
of persons who would require judicial protection, but – since there is no formal 
obligation to issue an administrative act – the possibilities are very limited.19 The 
Administrative Court can review the legality of such an action only if it violates the 
constitutional rights of the plaintiff and there is no other (primary) effective judicial 
protection available to him. 
The person entitled to start the administrative dispute as a plaintiff can only be
the person, who was a party or an accessory participant in the proceedings of issu­
ing an administrative act. This formal status is a necessary requirement, so that no
person can use this legal remedy if he has not tried to protect his interests in the
administrative procedure, or used appeal or extraordinary legal remedies to try to
rectify the violation of his procedural rights to participate in administrative decision
making process.20 However, this status is not enough to act as a plaintiff, since he
has to show that he has legitimate interest in starting these proceedings in court,
that is that the administrative act is affecting his rights and legally protected inter­
ests under public law and that success in administrative dispute could remedy this
situation, the infringement of his rights has to be shown as at least possible and not
just of negligible consequences, etc. On the other hand, there are less clear cases
of subjects having standing in administrative dispute that protect public interest
and not individual rights. For instance, there is a possibility that a public attorney
challenges an administrative act if it is contrary to the law and violates public inter­
est in favour of an individual, so that both the plaintiff and the defendant in this
case are bodies of state administration.21 Besides the plaintiff and the defendant a
position to intervene in an administrative dispute is given to persons who would be
affected by the decision of the court (e.g. losing the rights, granted by the disputed
administrative act), but is also limited to persons who had standing in the concluded
administrative procedure. 
The ADA tries to guarantee effective judicial protection of plaintiff’s rights by giv­
ing him several different claims (actions): claim to annulment of the administrative 
act, issuing or service of administrative act (action due to silence), change of admin­
istrative act (action in dispute of full jurisdiction) and action to determine the unlaw­
fulness of an administrative act. There is a risk that enumerating the fixed forms of 
actions and available remedies can prevent plaintiffs from achieving constitutionally 
19 An example occurred in a publicly reported case, where the police has put up roadblocks aimed to 
prevent a Roma family to return to their settlement, citing rules and powers regarding protection of 
public order, but no administrative acts were addressed to individuals and therefore no appeal or judi­
cial review under general rules of GAPA or ADA was possible. 
20 Against the final decision by which a person was refused the right to participate in the procedure of 
issuing the administrative act, the action may be brought by the person to whom the right to participate 
in the procedure was refused by this decision. 
21 Similar to that is the granting of formal status as a plaintiff to associations, registered as protecting the 
environment in public interest, that can challenge any administrative act, that would violate the rules of 
law, aimed at environmental protection (Art. 64 of Environment Protection Act), since these groups are 
protecting public interest against the decision of an administrative body, also charged with protection 
of public interest. The reasoning behind these solutions is to give standing to someone in cases where 
otherwise would be no (obvious) plaintiff, but the question remains whether the judicial review process 
is the right forum to do so. 




















   
  
guaranteed effective protection,22 so that a general clause in addition to the present 
forms of action, enabling the administrative court to grant ‘any necessary relief or 
take any necessary measure’ to secure the effective protection of persons’ rights and 
legal interests under administrative law would be appropriate.23 
The administrative act can be challenged both on questions of fact and of law, so 
that the court is not limited in any way to examine its legality. There can even be new 
evidence (but existent in the time when the disputed act was adopted) presented to 
the court, if the party can justify why it has not been used in administrative proce­
dure. There is an important provision in the ADA, which to raise the effectiveness of 
protection of rights of the plaintiff, provides for the court the obligation that it has to 
remedy the violations of procedural rights, which occurred in administrative proce­
dure, by granting the plaintiff these rights or enabling him to exercise his rights in the 
court’s proceedings instead. Based on these procedural measures, the lawsuit can be 
rejected even if the court realises that the procedure before the administrative body 
was unlawful, but it has by its own actions eliminated such violation in its procedure. 
The violations of substantial (material) law can of course also be claimed, but in rela­
tion to discretionary powers the court is limited in its possibility to make a ruling on 
the legality of a discretionary decision, except if these powers exceed the limits set 
by law or are used contrary to the aim, determined in the law itself, of granting these 
powers to the administration (misuse of discretion). 
The court can respond to these actions with corresponding sentences, where in case
of a successful lawsuit in the vast majority of cases the judgment annuls the disputed
administrative act and refers the case back to the responsible administrative body. The
court decides in dispute of full jurisdiction only in very exceptional cases, so that the
court decides in the matter itself, granting the plaintiff his right or determines his
obligation in lieu of administration. The principle of separation of powers is much
quoted in this regard, interestingly lately more by the theory than the practice of the
Constitutional Court and other responsible courts. There has been some pointing out
to the specifics of procedure of judicial review, especially regarding the power of full
jurisdiction in administrative dispute and the constitutionality of the limitations of the
Administrative Courts’ powers to change the challenged act and thereby decide on the
administrative matter with its own judgment.24 The regulation of ADA is deemed to be
in accordance with constitutional requirements, since in relation to the administrative
acts the possibility of their annulment has found to be a basic and effective remedy
of plaintiffs in judicial review of administrative action. The Administrative Court shall
(and should) therefore use its powers of full jurisdiction, when it is necessary to ensure
effective protection of the rights and legal interests of persons affected.25 
22 As in the case of Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I-181/09, Up-860/09, Up-222/10 of 10 
November 2011. 
23 Interestingly, a similar form is already used in Administrative dispute act in relation to a special pro­
cedure for subsidiary protection of constitutional rights of individuals that can be used before the 
Administrative Court. 
24 See Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I-181/09, Up-860/09, Up-222/10 of 10 November 2011, para 
12: the role of the courts in administrative dispute is based foremost on the judgment on legality of acts 
of administration and not on decision making about rights or obligations and consequential duplica­
tion of actions of the executive or infringement of its area of competence. 
25 ‘In conformity with the principle of separation of powers, in administrative lawsuit judicial control 
is exercised over administrative decisions, which, however, does not constitute the assuming of the 
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The judgment that annuls the unlawful administrative act is according to ADA in 
itself just a decision that causes formal cessation of the disputed act, without resolving 
the question on merits. The consequence is a referral of the case back to a respon­
sible administrative body, that has to decide again and issue a new administrative 
act, that can again be subjected to appeal (if delivered in first instance) and judicial 
review (if final both in formal and substantial meaning). This does not give a high 
level of legal protection, so to raise the effectiveness of this type of judgment the ADA 
has introduced a legal obligation for administrative bodies to follow the reasoning of 
the court in their subsequent proceedings. According to express provision of the law 
the competent administrative body must issue a new administrative act within 30 days 
of the day it received the judgment, or within the period set by the court. The law also 
states that all other administrative bodies deciding on ordinary or extraordinary legal 
remedies against the new administrative act, issued on the basis of the court’s ruling, 
are also bound by the legal opinion of the court, expressed in this ruling. 
This means that in principle the administrative bodies have to follow the legal 
reasoning of the court and in case they violate this obligation, the Administrative 
Court in the subsequent administrative dispute can use its powers to decide in full 
jurisdiction, changing the disputed act and giving a final decision on administrative 
matter. However, since – because of the reasons given above – the Administrative 
Court is reluctant to use these powers and in practice only annuls the disputed act 
again with a new referral to the administrative body, the question remains, whether 
the Administrative Courts’ judicial protection is in practice effective enough. If the 
administration in a given case does not respect a court’s decision that can in itself be 
a violation of the rule of law, and if there is no remedy to ensure that in the end the 
court’s judgment is respected, that problem should be treated very seriously. So far, 
unfortunately, no new mechanisms have been developed to ensure the stricter imple­
mentation of Administrative Courts’ rulings and this remains an open challenge to 
the effectiveness of legal protection, since there has been a quite low, but still signifi­
cant number of cases observed in judicial practice, where the administration did not 
act accordingly. 
The question of granting the affected plaintiff damages in cases that the admin­
istration has acted unlawfully is a very complex one in the Slovenian legal system. 
The Constitution guarantees that everyone has the right to compensation for damage 
caused through unlawful actions in connection with the performance of any function 
or other activity by a person or authority performing such function or activity within a 
state or local community authority or as a bearer of public authority. The competence 
for deciding on this responsibility lies with the courts of general competence, which 
base their decisions on general provisions of the Civil code, and the question whether 
they have the competence to decide on the legality of an administrative act in these 
proceedings is still a disputed one.26 The Administrative Court also has the power to 
function of State administration. The court will in the framework of administrative lawsuit only decide 
concerning a particular right itself (lawsuit within full jurisdiction) where any other action would con­
stitute inadmissible interference with the right to due process of law, for example, where because of 
failure of administration to act or for any other justified reasons the individual could in fact not exercise 
his rights or protect his legal entitlements.’ See Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I-146/98 of 24 
June 1998. 
26 Both in theory as well as in judicial practice there have been several different views, whether the com­
petence of Administrative Court to review the legality of administrative acts should be exclusive or 
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award damages to the plaintiff seeking them, if it finds the administrative act to be 
unlawful and violating the rights or legitimate interests of the plaintiff. In practice the 
Administrative Court almost never uses these powers, mainly as a measure to limit its 
overburdening, so the plaintiff is directed to lodge his claim with the court of general 
competence. 
4 Institutional perspective 
There are several institutions that have competences to ensure effective legal protec­
tion in administrative law in Slovenia. First, the appeal procedure in administrative 
institutional framework is handled by superior administrative bodies, mostly central 
government ministries (or mayors of municipalities at the local level) that have strong 
powers to annul or change the appealed administrative act and also several possibili­
ties to use extraordinary legal remedies to the same effect. 
After the administrative procedure is concluded by issuing a final administrative 
act, the lawsuit against it in administrative dispute is decided by the Administrative 
Court, which is a specialised court that is a part of judiciary,27 composed of higher 
court judges. Since the Constitution states that there is a (one) Supreme Court, which 
is the highest court in the country, there can be no Supreme Administrative Court as 
in several other European states, so that all legal remedies against the decisions taken 
by the specialised Administrative Court are decided by the Administrative Chamber 
of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia. Following these fundamental con­
stitutional rules, it can be stated that the Parliament is free to decide whether to form 
specialised courts or not, but it cannot alter the status of judges sitting in these courts 
and it cannot exclude the final jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in all matters of law. 
The role of the Supreme Court in administrative dispute is to ensure a uniform 
application of the law and decide in principle mostly on extraordinary legal remedies, 
although an appeal against the judgment of Administrative Court is possible in a lim­
ited number of cases (e.g. in cases where the judgment would change the administra­
tive act in dispute of full jurisdiction, based on new factual basis, established by the 
Court). In principle this means that judgments of Administrative Court are final and 
are to be implemented by the administration. Based on jurisprudence of the Court, 
only in cases where the lawsuit is rejected, there can be an extraordinary legal remedy 
(revision) addressed to the Supreme Court, but only based on questions of law. The 
revision is only allowed on a limited number of grounds, which justify its acceptance 
to consideration by the Supreme Court, i.e. the importance of question of law to be 
resolved, resolving the problem of diverging jurisprudence of Administrative Court 
and prevention of grave consequences, caused to the party by the disputed adminis­
trative act. In practice, only a very limited number of cases are accepted for extraordi­
nary revision by the Supreme Court. 
shared with courts of general competence in cases of claiming damages against the State. The respect 
for finality administrative acts and judgments of Administrative Court, the omission to challenge the 
administrative act in administrative dispute, etc., are complex issues that are to be further developed 
in Slovenian legal practice. See also Martina Bukovec, ‘Odškodninska odgovornost države’ (2004) 30 
Podjetje in delo 7. 
27 As already mentioned above, regular courts cannot rule on validity of administrative acts, but can award 
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The relation between the courts deciding in administrative dispute and the Consti­
tutional Court is regulated in Art. 156 of the Constitution: ‘If a court deciding some 
matter deems a law which it should apply to be unconstitutional, it must stay the pro­
ceedings and initiate proceedings before the Constitutional Court. The proceedings 
in the court may be continued after the Constitutional Court has issued its decision.’ 
This means that if the court examining the legality of an administrative act finds that 
a Government Decree (or other forms of secondary legislation), that were used as a 
legal basis for the challenged administrative act is contrary to constitutional require­
ments, it can set it aside (exceptio illegalis) and does not apply it as a basis for its ruling. 
If the constitutionality is questioned in relation to an act of Parliament, the court 
can stay its proceedings and demand the Constitutional court to decide on this ques­
tion. After the Act has been abrogated by the Constitutional Court, the administrative 
dispute continues and the court can decide its case without basing its ruling on the 
abrogated act. This gives in practice very effective legal protection against regulations 
of both Government and Parliament in administrative matters. 
It is important also to stress that the effective protection in administrative dispute
is also supervised by the Constitutional Court in cases of constitutional complaint
(Art. 160 of the Constitution). This appeal enables the unsuccessful plaintiff to claim
that in the given administrative matter the decisions of administrative bodies and/ 
or courts have violated his human rights and fundamental freedoms. The appellant
can also claim that the violation of his constitutional rights by the individual act is a
direct result of unconstitutionality of the legal basis (normative acts, laws, statutes or
regulations) of the act in question. If the Constitutional Court finds any such laws
and by-laws to be unconstitutional it can abrogate them with erga omnes effect, as well
as annul the disputed administrative act or judgment, issued on their basis to the
appellant. 
It is quite fascinating that there are no alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, 
tribunals28 or other bodies that have competence to resolve the issues and disputes in 
administrative law in Slovenia. This is probably also reflected in the GAPA which does 
not provide any legal basis for contractual resolution (settlements) of administrative 
matters in the form of public law contracts between administrative bodies and parties 
to the proceedings. The possibilities of the Ombudsman to influence these proce­
dures is therefore also limited to his opinions as to appropriate decision making in 
cases of formal procedures and legal remedies. 
5 The European perspective 
In this part also some questions of European influence and European Union Law, 
together with the European Convention of Human Rights, can be addressed, since 
together with some other facts they do form an important insight into the develop­
ment of effective legal protection in Slovenia. 
28 National Review Commission for Reviewing Public Procurement Award Procedures (shortened: 
National Review Commission) is a specific, independent, professional and expert state institution pro­
viding legal protection to tenderers at all procedural levels of the award of public contracts. There is 
no competence of Administrative Court in these matters, but the position of this Commission equals a 
status of a tribunal in the sense of EU Law. 





    
It has to be said, that after the independence of Slovenia in 1991 and through the 
whole of the process of acceding to the European Union, serious efforts have been 
made to improve our procedures and relevant legislation has been adopted to ensure 
effective legal protection, also in administrative law. At lot has been achieved also 
through other methods (informatisation, e-govt, etc.) and the situation in ensuring 
expedience in judicial review has been vastly improved after ADA was adopted in 
2006 (cases are resolved by Administrative Court on average in six months). But – and 
there is always that – since then, almost no real progress has been made on improv­
ing the system of legal protection. European influence in this regard is virtually non­
existent, since there have been very few questions for preliminary rulings made to 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Slovenia has been found to be in breach of 
European law obligations in a very limited number of cases, both by the ECJ as the 
ECtHR – and in those not related to procedural issues of administrative law. The leg­
islation has been in different areas of administration harmonised following specific 
EU Directives, so that there has been effort made to ensure compliance with these 
demands, but because of procedural autonomy of EU Member States, not much has 
been changed in general rules or principles of legal protection. 
6 Conclusion 
The debate of whether the Slovenian system of administrative law guarantees effective 
legal protection is – and will probably always be – ongoing. It can definitely be stated 
that there is no challenge to the question, whether there is an adequate minimum 
level of effectiveness of legal remedies in administrative law, which corresponds to 
constitutional requirements and demands of both EU law and ECHR standards, where 
applicable. However, there is further ground for improvement in the debate how to 
strengthen the legal protection of rights of individuals and legal entities to guarantee 
a final and timely resolution of administrative cases. The adoption of ADA and its 
implementation in 2006 has proven to be a success, since the burden of administra­
tive justice has been lowered and the time to resolve administrative disputes is in all 
surveys of Slovenia’s judicial system shown to represent the best score in comparison 
with other areas of law, being also more than comparable to other EU Member States. 
On the other hand, the handling of administrative appeals has remained a challenge 
to be resolved, since there has been a considerable backlog in several administrative 
areas and there really has been a disputable practice of constant referral of difficult 
cases back and forth between different levels of administration. The development in 
several European countries (e.g. Austria, Germany) has been directed at reducing 
the administrative appeals as a predominant legal remedy and Slovenia should study 
the results of these efforts. Of course, the balance between intra-administrative legal 
protection mechanisms and subsequent judicial review should be carefully examined 
and established in an optimal scale, so that for a small country as Slovenia the future 
model could be different from bigger legal systems. And finally, even though the cases 
of non-observance of judicial decisions by the administration is low, there has to be 
some further development of enforcement mechanisms to ensure also that the effec­
tiveness of legal protection is not dependent solely on the (good)will of administra­








16	 The principle of effective 
legal protection in Spanish 
administrative law 
Angel Manuel Moreno 
1 Historical developments 
In Spain, the Principle of Effective Legal Protection (hereinafter, PELP) in adminis­
trative law is the result of a long historical process, of which the roots may be traced 
back to the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the rule of law and the process 
of ‘constitutionalisation’ of Public Administration began to develop in the country. 
From the outset, though, an important preliminary remark should be made: in 
Spain, the ‘principle of effective legal protection’ has not been traditionally recog­
nised under that precise wording or terminology. Rather, the PELP is the result and 
the cumulative effect of different subjective rights (procedural rights, right to access 
to court, judicial review, etc.) and institutional-procedural arrangements. The closest 
terminology in Spanish would be that of ‘protección judicial efectiva’ or ‘tutela judicial 
efectiva’ (effective judicial protection), which is an important part of the PELP but 
does not convey the whole meaning of such a principle.1 
Thus, from 1812 (enactment of the very first Constitution in the kingdom) until 
1978 (promulgation of the current constitution), there was a complex and some­
how erratic development of the principle, the understanding and depth of which 
depended on the changing political momentum and the prevailing political ideology 
(conservative-liberal). Specifically, the institutional system for controlling the activity 
of Public Administration underwent several changes, due to the convulsive politi­
cal moves and phases of that period. Different statutes were passed during the nine­
teenth century (in 1845 and 1888).2 
In 1956 the first modern system of control of administrative action, performed 
by ‘pure’ and authentic judicial organs was established (Ley de la Jurisdicción Conten­
cioso-Administrativa, Administrative Courts Act). From a historical perspective, the 
paradox of this statute is that it was enacted just in the middle of General Franco’s 
regime, which, after the Spanish War (1936–39), instituted an authoritarian and
non-democratic political system that lasted for almost 40 years. The legal protection 
1 The terminology used in domestic Public Law is linked to the English version of Art. 47 of the EU Char­
ter of Fundamental Rights. Although effective protection of the courts stands at the core of the PELP, 
we understand that this principle encompasses a broader notion, and includes principles such as those 
of ‘publicity of the legal norms’, ‘non-retroactivity of criminal or sanctioning rules’, ‘legal certainty’, etc. 
2 On the historical evolution of the Spanish system, see: Juan Alfonso Santamaría Pastor, Sobre la génesis del 
Derecho Administrativo español en el Siglo XIX (1812.1845) (Madrid 2006); Juan Ramón Fernández Torres, 
Historia legal de la jurisdicción contencioso-admnistrativa (1845–1998) (Madrid 2007). 





   
  
mechanism introduced by this law was in general assessed as a good and advanced 
system of protection of subjective rights, at least from the technical point of view.
It therefore constituted a guarantee for the PELP, although many political rights and 
civil liberties continued to be ignored by the political regime, and thus remained out 
of the reach of that Act.3 
As far as the PELP in administrative procedures is concerned, during the nine­
teenth century every central government department had their own special or spe­
cialised procedures, thereby establishing a plethora of ad hoc individual procedural 
rights. However, a key legal development took place in 1958: the enactment of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo). This law unified 
the administrative procedures; established a general and multi-purpose procedure 
(procedimiento administrativo general); abrogated dozens of special administrative proce­
dural regulations and established several procedural rights. This key piece of legisla­
tion has also been evaluated as a good law, providing for the effective legal protection 
of many individual rights vis-à-vis administrative agencies. 
Therefore, the situation of the PELP in the period 1936–78 may be characterised 
as paradoxical since a comprehensive, technically good system of individual rights 
protection was attained by the two abovementioned key statutes (together with the 
Expropriations Act of 1954), but this was achieved: (a) within a political and consti­
tutional context that did not recognise fundamental rights as we understand them 
today; and (b) in the absence of a written Constitution. 
The reintroduction of democracy in the kingdom in 1975–78 opened the door 
for the framing of a new, modern Constitution. This Magna Carta, the Constitution 
of 6 December 1978,4 would eventually recognise fundamental rights and politi­
cal freedoms that were largely ignored during the previous regime. This is now the 
fundamental framework for the PELP in Spain. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 
recognises the basic material and procedural grounding principle of the entire legal 
system (Art. 9). On the other hand, it proclaims an ample list of fundamental rights 
(Arts. 14–29) and establishes a comprehensive system of protection for such rights 
(Art. 53). 
The approval of the new Constitution required a comprehensive revision of most 
of the administrative statutes and regulations passed during the preceding political 
system. For the interest of the contribution, it must be emphasised that the Adminis­
trative Procedure Act of 1956 was replaced by a new, general statute on Administrative 
Procedure: Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre, de régimen jurídico de las Administraciones 
públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común (hereinafter, L30/92). For its part, 
the Administrative Courts Act 1956 was replaced by a new statute (bearing the same 
name) in 1998: Ley de la Jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa (hereinafter, LJCA). The 
1998 Act regulates the system of administrative courts; standing and access to judi­
cial review of administrative decisions and regulations; judicial proceedings; appeals; 
3 Furthermore, this Statute was preceded in 1954 by the Expropriations Act (Ley de Expropiación Forzosa) 
which established clear limitations and safeguards of private property against the eminent domain of 
Public Administration and, even more importantly, comprehensively regulated the cases and conditions 
for governmental liability towards the individual. This statute is partly in force today. 
4 Passed by both Houses of the Parliament (Cortes Generales) on 31 October 1978; ratified by referendum 

















Effective legal protection in Spain 283 
enforcement of judgments, etc. These two statutes (as amended) are currently the 
most important pieces of ‘regular’ domestic legislation in the field of effective legal 
protection and they have a cross-cutting application in any form of administrative 
action: adjudication, planning and regulation. 
2 Constitutional framework 
In Spain, the PELP is not established in the domestic Constitution under such exact 
wording. Currently, the said principle cannot be characterised as a uniform or pre­
cisely delineated principle, but rather as the result of several sub-principles and fun­
damental rights that are recognised in the Constitution, in regular legislation and in 
case law. Since the right-based perspective is addressed infra, we should identify here 
those architectural principles. They constitute the backbone of the PELP, and they 
are proclaimed as the very foundations of the state and of the legal order: 
(a) The principle of the rule of Law (Art. 1.1 of the Constitution).5 
(b) Public authorities are bound by the Constitution and by all other legal provisions 
(Art. 9.1). 
(c) The paramount legal principles of the domestic legal system are: the principle of 
legality, the principle of hierarchy and publicity of legal rules, that of legal cer­
tainty, the non-retroactive character of punitive provisions (including administra­
tive ones), and the principle of accountability of public authorities (Art. 9.3).6 
(d) Effective judicial protection of the individual by the courts (Art. 24.1).7 
It is important to note that this group of constitutional principles has been sup­
plemented by several statutes, which may be classified in two categories. On the
one hand, special statutes regulating the basic content of the fundamental rights
enshrined in the Constitution in Arts. 14–29. These statutes must be passed by an
absolute majority of the Lower House of Parliament (Congreso de los Diputados) and
are called in Spanish ‘Leyes Orgánicas’.8 On the other hand, laws and decrees regulat­
ing the different forms of governmental action (sectoral legislation): expropriations,
law and order, telecommunications, business regulation, government intervention in
individual freedoms, etc. 
Furthermore, the precise content of those constitutional principles have been inter­
preted and clarified by the Constitutional Court. Since its establishment in 1979, the 
said court has issued hundreds of rulings dealing with fundamental rights, access to 
judicial remedies, effective protection of courts, etc. Consequently, the Constitutional 
Court (and, to a lesser extent, the administrative chamber of the Supreme Court) is 
5 ‘Spain is hereby established as a social and democratic State, subject to the rule of law, which advocates 
as the highest values of its legal order, liberty, justice, equality and political pluralism.’ 
6 ‘The Constitution guarantees the principle of legality, the hierarchy of legal provisions, the publicity 
of legal enactments, the non-retroactivity of punitive measures that are unfavourable to or restrict indi­
vidual rights, the certainty that the rule of law will prevail, the accountability of the public authorities, 
and the prohibition against arbitrary action on the part of the latter.’ 
7 ‘Every person has the right to obtain the effective protection of the Judges and the Courts in the exercise 
of his or her legitimate rights and interests, and in no case may he go undefended.’ 
8 ‘Organic acts’ would be a literal, though unsatisfactory translation into English. 














   
  
the supreme interpreter of the Constitution, and logically the highest defender of the 
PELP in Spain. 
The number and variety of rights and sub-principles constituting the PELP and 
the huge number of rulings issued by the Constitutional Court (and by the Supreme 
Court, administrative chamber) does prevent the identification of ‘landmark cases’ 
defining or circumscribing the scope and limits of the PELP in administrative law, as 
there are literally hundreds of rulings. However, the following ones (restricted to Art. 
24, effective protection from courts) should be mentioned: 
•	 Ruling 197/1988, of 24 October 1988 (access to justice and the appeals system). 
•	 Ruling 129/1995, of 11 September 1995 (access to courts). 
•	 Ruling 58/1990, of 29 March 1990 (lawsuits in administrative courts affecting 
third parties). 
•	 Ruling 39/1983, of 20 October 1983 (certain statutory limitations on access to 
justice in administrative courts held as unconstitutional). 
•	 Ruling 149/2000, of 3 June 2000 (exclusion of judicial review of some decisions 
of the electoral administration held as unconstitutional). 
•	 Ruling 32/1982, of 7 June 1982 (doctrine on the enforcement of administrative 
courts’ judgments). 
•	 Ruling 78/1996, of 20 May 1996 (constitutional doctrine on injunctive relief in 
administrative jurisdiction).9 
3 Rights-based perspective 
3.1 The domestic system of subjective rights for legal protection 
The very first title of the Constitution is devoted to ‘rights and liberties’ and covers 
Arts. 14 to 55. However, all of these provisions do not recognise a ‘right’ in the sense 
of ‘fundamental’ or ‘subjective right’. On the contrary, within this title one should 
distinguish between different kinds of rights and protected goods. Since there is a 
noticeable terminology maze in this field,10 we will try to circumvent this nominal 
problem by using a literal translation of the domestic typologies. Thus, the Constitu­
tion includes different types of protected goods: 
On the one hand, ‘Derechos fundamentales’, that is, fundamental rights fall within 
this category. In this sense Arts. 14–29 of the Constitution do enumerate a list of fun­
damental rights, which enjoy a threefold system of protection and guarantees. Most 
of these rights have a clear impact on the PELP. From this narrow perspective, the 
most important ones are: 
•	 principle of non-discrimination, equality under the law (Art. 14); 
•	 personal freedom and security (Art. 17); 
•	 right to privacy, secrecy of communications (Art. 18); 
•	 citizen participation in public affairs (Art. 22); 
9 This doctrine eventually became enshrined in an amendment to the ‘LJCA’ of 1998. 
10 Civil rights, civil liberties, human rights, fundamental rights, basic rights, public subjective rights, sim­
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•	 right to access to justice, effective protection from courts, prohibition of lack of 
defence, judicial guarantees such as the right to a lawyer, to be informed of the 
charges brought against the citizen, right to judicial proceedings without undue 
delays, to the use of evidence, not to make self-incrimination and the presump­
tion of innocence (Art. 24); 
•	 legal certainty and prior definition of offences and penalties (including adminis­
trative ones) (Art. 25); 
•	 right to petition (Art. 29). 
These rights enjoy the strongest level of legal protection. They can only be regulated 
by special Parliament Acts (called ‘organic statutes’ see, supra), and those acts may 
be found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court if they ignore the essential 
meaning or content (contenido esencial) of the corresponding fundamental right. More­
over, these rights are protected by a complete set of specific legal remedies: (1) any 
citizen can claim judicial protection through a special, summary judicial proceeding 
in administrative courts,11 and (2) any citizen can eventually have access to the Con­
stitutional Court by means of a specific judicial proceeding of ‘constitutional protec­
tion’ (recurso de amparo), after exhausting the appropriate judicial proceedings before 
ordinary courts. 
On the other hand, the Constitution recognises ‘simple’ or ‘weak’ constitutional 
rights and duties (Arts. 30–38): for instance, the right to private property, to free 
economic initiative, to form professional associations, to collective bargaining, etc. 
These items are construed as true rights in the technical sense of the word, but they 
have a weaker constitutional protection: they cannot be protected either through the 
above mentioned special judicial proceeding in administrative courts or by the recurso 
de amparo appeal in the Constitutional Court. However, these rights must be regulated 
by ordinary Parliamentary Acts (requiring no special majority). 
Finally, the Constitution establishes several ‘guiding principles of social and eco­
nomic policies’ (principios rectores de la política social y económica), in Arts. 39–52. This 
group includes a heterogeneous list of elements. On the one hand, some of those 
items may be construed as ‘social’ or ‘welfare’ rights, such as the right to an adequate 
system of social security, the right to health and to a public system of health protec­
tion, the right to adequate housing, or the right to a decent environment. On the 
other hand, the Constitution includes also vague or general mandates to the public 
authorities, which are essentially aspirations and social goals to be achieved. Art. 4812 
and Art. 4413 are good examples of such items. 
11 A special type of judicial proceedings in administrative courts is devised for the case that an administra­
tive agency clearly violates one of the ‘fundamental’ rights enshrined in Arts. 14–29 of the Constitu­
tion: recurso especial en protección de derechos fundamentales. This proceeding is a fast-track and expeditious 
procedure, but it is severely restricted to checking whether the agency committed a clear violation of 
a given fundamental right. The consideration of infringements of ‘regular’ legislation falls outside the 
scope of this proceeding. 
12 ‘The public authorities shall promote conditions directed towards the free and effective participation 
of young people in political, social, economic and cultural development.’ 
13 ‘1. The public authorities shall promote and watch over access to cultural opportunities, to which all 
are entitled. 2. The public authorities shall promote science and scientific and technical research for 
the benefit of the general interest.’ 











The very legal nature of these principles enshrined in Arts. 30–52 of the Constitu­
tion has been the source of much controversy among scholars and courts. In any 
case, these ‘rights’ do not enjoy any specific legal protection or procedural remedy, 
contrary to what happens with the rights analysed above. The sole support accorded 
by the Constitution to those ‘guiding principles’ is that: (1) ‘the recognition, respect 
and protection’ of those principles ‘will shape positive legislation, judicial practice 
and the activities of the public powers’, and: (2) they can only be invoked in courts 
in the way provided for by the statutes and regulations that regulate them (Art. 53). 
3.2 Procedural rights 
In administrative law, the PELP includes certain rights that may be characterised as
‘procedural’, that is, rights that may be exercised in the context of a given administrative
procedure in which the individual is an ‘affected party’. The Constitution recognises
some of these rights in Art. 104 and foresees a subsequent statutory regulation thereof:14 
•	 the right to be heard; 
•	 the right to have one’s affairs and applications handled through the appropriate 
administrative procedure established by the Law; 
•	 the right to access to the administrative file. 
Beyond these constitutional provisions, the majority of the procedural rights of the 
citizens are at present extensively codified in the Administrative Procedure Act (Act 
30/1992) of 1992, as amended. These rights include the following ones: 
•	 The right to initiate a procedure by filing appropriate applications (not to be 
confused with ‘petitions’). Any legal or physical person may initiate an admin­
istrative procedure by asking something that is connected with his ‘rights’ (in 
the true sense) or legitimate interests: a licence, a permit, a grant, admission at 
a public university, etc. If no genuine ‘rights’ are at stake, citizens may file mere 
‘petitions’, where the duty of the agency to form a complete file and to adjudi­
cate on the merits is lighter (for instance, a petition to the city council, asking 
for a change in the name of a street). Administrative agencies may also initiate ex 
officio administrative proceedings (for instance in the case of expropriations or 
administrative sanctions). As a rule, only those who have initiated an administra­
tive procedure, or whose rights (in the true sense) may be affected by the admin­
istrative decision have the right to intervene in an ongoing procedure, although 
some pieces of sectoral legislation (for instance, in the domain of environmental 
protection) do recognise extended participation rights to the members of the 
public at large and to NGOs.15 
14 ‘The law shall regulate: (a) the hearing of citizens directly, or through the organisations and associa­
tions recognised by law, in the process of drawing up the administrative provisions which affect them; 
(b) the access of citizens to administrative files and records, except as they may concern the security and 
defence of the State, the investigation of crimes and the privacy of individuals: (c) the procedures for 
the taking of administrative action, guaranteeing the hearing of interested parties when appropriate’. 
15 A good example is the Act 27/2006, on access to information, participation in decision making and 
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•	 The right to counsel and to the use of advisors. 
•	 The right to be heard (also explicitly recognised by the Constitution in Art. 
105(a). 
•	 The duty of the agency to give reasons (for administrative decisions): the reason­
ing of the decision should be at least briefly explained, stating the reasons or 
legal and factual considerations applicable to the case. 
•	 The right to access to the file and to all the relevant documents used for the adop­
tion of the decision. 
•	 The right to have access to administrative archives and registers. 
•	 The right to have access to ‘administrative’ information (that is, information in 
any format held by administrative agencies and bodies). Recently a new statute 
has expanded the procedural rights of the citizen, in the domain of transparency 
and access to administrative documents.16 
•	 The right to file administrative appeals. 
•	 The right to intervene and the right to obtain an administrative decision within a 
reasonable time (as a guarantee against the silence of the administrative body). 
•	 The right to identify the public officials and the civil servants that manage the 
citizen’s files and procedures. 
•	 The right to obtain information and guidance on the legal and technical require­
ments laid down by the applicable laws and regulations. 
•	 The right to file complaints and suggestions. 
•	 In some regions, the right to use other ‘co-official’ languages in administrative 
procedures, different from Spanish (Catalan, Basque, Galician). 
•	 The right to formulate claims and to produce arguments in his own defence, 
within the administrative file. 
•	 The right not to present documents which are already held by the administrative 
authority. 
•	 The right to use electronic communications and technologies in their relations 
with Public Administration.17 
4 Institutional perspective 
4.1 Available institutions and procedures for legal remedy 
The sub-principles and the substantive and procedural rights presented in the pre­
ceding points are protected by a complex system of legal remedies, which are sum­
marily presented infra: (a) first, by the system of administrative appeals, that is, 
appeals before the same or another agency or body; (b) secondly, by the system of 
judicial control of administrative activity (basically ensured by administrative courts); 
(c) thirdly, by filing an appeal in the constitutional court (recurso de amparo). These 
are described more extensively in the following headings. 
On the other hand, Spanish administrative law does recognise the possibility for
administrative agencies to withdraw or modify a previous decision (revision de oficio). In
16 Ley 19/2013, de transparencia, acceso a la información pública y buen gobierno. 
17 A specific statute regulates this aspect of administrative procedures and recognises specific rights in this 
domain: Act 11/2007, of 22 June 2007. 















reality, this is not a genuine legal remedy at the disposal of the citizen, since the agency
decides unilaterally such withdraw or modification. Therefore, this power is subject to
strict limits in the Administrative Procedure Act 1992: it may be exercised at any time
after the adoption of the decision, if the said decision is considered by the agency to be
null and void (due to serious violations of the substantive legislation or of procedure).
In other cases, different from absolute nullity, the agency must go to the judicial branch
(as a regular citizen) and ask the court to set aside its own decision. To do so, the agency
has a four-year deadline from the adoption of the decision. Special rules apply in those
cases when the administrative decision at stake imposes a restriction on the juridical
sphere of the citizen (a monetary sanction, an order to close a business, etc.). 
4.1.1 Administrative appeals 
Administrative appeals (recursos administrativos) constitute the first and easiest legal 
remedy at the disposal of the citizen in order to protect his rights and legitimate 
interests against administrative decisions (either explicit or tacit).18 As a rule, there 
is always the possibility to file an appeal within each of the different levels of Gov­
ernment (inter-governmental appeal is not feasible, as this will be contrary to the 
principle of territorial autonomy). In general, only those persons who have been a 
‘party’ (interesado) in the appropriate administrative proceeding may file administra­
tive appeals. Appeals must be grounded on an infringement of the law, or on the vio­
lation of a right. Through the institution of an administrative appeal, the citizen may 
ask the competent agency (see infra) to perform a far reaching review of the admin­
istrative decision, be it explicit or ‘tacit’: to have it annulled, modified, etc. However, 
administrative appeals may not be used against administrative regulations, or against 
administrative decisions that have become ‘firm’ (actos firmes)19. 
In general, administrative appeals do not have suspensive effects, but the citizen 
may ask for the suspension of the contested decision in some exceptional cases: (a) if 
the enforcement of the decision will produce irreversible harm on him; or (b) if the 
decision is allegedly ‘null and void’ (nulo de pleno derecho). 
The different types of general administrative appeals are regulated by the Act on 
Administrative procedure 1992: 
(a) There is an appeal to be lodged before a higher administrative authority: Recurso 
de alzada. For instance, the General Director for Industry refuses to grant a licence 
to a company. Then, the applicant can file a ‘recurso de alzada’ before the Minister 
for Industry, who is the ‘boss’ of the General Director. 
(b) When the contested administrative decision is directly adopted by the highest 
governmental official or organ within an agency (for instance a Minister, within 
a Ministry), then the affected person may lodge an appeal called ‘Recurso de 
reposición’, that has to be adjudicated by the same body. This appeal, though, is 
optional. 
18 On administrative appeals, see: Luciano Parejo Alfonso, Lecciones de Derecho Administrativo (7th edn., 
Valencia, 2015) 637–645. 
19 A decision becomes ‘firm’ at administrative level if (for instance) the citizen did not file the applicable 





Effective legal protection in Spain 289 
Apart from this, there are other types of administrative appeals which are regulated 
by sectoral legislation: for instance, there is a ‘special’ appeal on public procurement 
(recurso especial en material de contratación pública) or in the field of taxes (reclamaciones 
económico-administrativas). These complaints are lodged in specialised administrative 
or independent bodies/tribunals (not true ‘courts’). 
Concerning other independent or administrative organs/bodies that might con­
tribute to the PELP as complementary systems, the Ombudsmen (the national one 
or the several regional or local ones) play a minor role in the matter, because the 
Ombudsman cannot repeal or amend any decision or administrative regulation. Con­
sequently, these bodies are not regarded as effective and genuine legal remedies to 
guarantee the PELP in Administrative Law. 
Since this book deals with the principle of effective legal protection, we should not 
avoid the question whether the system of administrative appeals constitutes an effec­
tive mechanism or legal remedy to ensure the principle of legal protection in Spain. 
Unfortunately, I would not subscribe a positive answer to that question, or at least not 
in general terms. Several aspects justify this assessment: 
(a) First, most administrative appeals are adjudicated by the same administrative 
organisation that reached the decision to be challenged. In the case of the recurso 
de alzada, a higher authority will adjudicate the appeal, but it still belongs to the 
same department, division or body. In the case of the recurso de reposición, the effec­
tiveness of this remedy is even more reduced, since the authority that adjudicates 
that appeal is the same that took the challenged decision (for instance, the dep­
uty minister). The possibilities that a given governmental or political official will 
change his mind in the ‘second instance’ are very limited, from a realistic point 
of view. In general, the Spanish administrative tradition has not incepted true 
‘independent’ boards of appeal, as it happens in other countries or organisations 
(the USA, the UK, the EU, etc.). There are, though, some exceptions: in the field 
of tax collection, the individual may file an appeal in an independent reviewing 
body; and in the field of public procurement, the transposition of EU directives 
on the matter triggered the inception of appeals boards (tribunal administrativo de 
recursos contractuales) that are independent from the body or authority that took 
the contested public procurement decision. 
(b) Secondly, and for complex historical reasons, public administration enjoys sev­
eral privileges in the handling of administrative procedures and by taking deci­
sions. For instance, all administrative adjudications are considered, iuris tantum, 
to be rightful and correct, and sometimes it is hard for the citizen to destroy those 
legal presumptions. In the case of administrative procedures aimed at imposing 
fines or monetary sanctions on individuals and firms, the facts that are noticed 
or seen by public authority agents (for instance, a police officer) are under the 
law presumed to be true. Therefore, the citizen is confronted with the challenge 
to prove things which sometimes are hard to prove, or ‘negative facts’. Once the 
fine is finally imposed by the agency, the citizen may certainly file administra­
tive appeals, but the administrative bodies usually reject most of them on the 
ground that ‘the citizen did not destroy the presumption of certainty enjoyed by 
the claim of the agent’. Once the final decision is taken, the citizen has to pay the 
fine within a strict limit, and if he does not so the agency may seize his monies 
(in bank accounts) or other properties, without the need to going to court. That 












is, public authorities may enforce their own decisions, unilaterally and without 
the assistance, permission or approval of an independent law court. Of course 
the citizen may file lawsuits against that governmental action, but: (1) from the 
outset, it has to constitute a deposit or a bank guarantee, otherwise his lawsuit will 
not be admitted; (2) litigating is costly and (3) at the end of the day, he may lose 
the case and, on top of that, he might face the payment of all the litigation costs 
produced by both parties. 
Since the exhaustion of the appropriate administrative appeals is a common pre­
condition to sue a governmental agency in the administrative courts we may assume 
that, in too many cases, administrative appeals are not only a waste of time and money 
for the citizen, but also a procedural hurdle: for instance, if a citizen forgot about 
filing a ‘recurso de alzada’ in due time, then the administrative decision will become 
‘untouchable’ (firme) and the possibility to go to courts will be closed. 
4.1.2 Administrative courts 
As noted above, Art. 24 of the Constitution is the paramount provision in the field 
of citizens’ access to justice. It states that everyone has the right to obtain effective 
protection from the courts in the exercise of their rights and legitimate interests, and 
that no situation involving a lack of defence will be allowed. The Constitutional Court 
case law on this provision (which is huge and generous) is binding on all Spanish 
courts. 
For historical reasons, in Spain the judicial power is structured along five different 
jurisdictional tracks or court systems (jurisdicciones), according to the subject-matter 
of the lawsuit: 
• civil and commercial courts; 
• criminal courts; 
• administrative courts (jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa); 
• labour and employment courts; 
• military courts. 
Each jurisdiction culminates in one chamber (Sala) of the Supreme Court, but 
each one is regulated by a different statute on procedure, coming with a specific 
case law on standing and access to that specific jurisdiction. This five-pronged deci­
sional structure of the Judiciary is supposed to be harmonised by the case law of the 
Constitutional Court on Art. 24 of the Constitution. From the perspective of this 
contribution, the most important courts are the administrative ones (jurisdicción contencioso­
administrativa). Public Administration may also be brought to civil or labour courts, 
but these cases are of minor importance here. 
Administrative courts handle administrative law claims following a specific proce­
dural legislation: the 29/1998 Act, of 18 July 1998 (LJCA).20 Administrative courts may
control the legality of different forms of administrative action, namely: (a) the
20 For instance, the Act 27/2006, of 18 July, on the right of access to information, participation in environ­
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administrative decisions (either ‘explicit’ or ‘tacit’); (b) the administrative regulations,
issued by local, regional or state bodies; (c) the administrative inactivity; (d) and the
simple administrative activity lacking procedural grounding or de facto activity (vía de
hecho). Administrative courts also control the legality of the administrative or manage­
rial activity of the other branches of government (the Parliament, the Judiciary Gov­
erning Board, the constitutional court, the electoral administration, etc.).21 
The system of administrative courts (Jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa) is com­
posed of different judicial bodies, whose competence is defined by a complex set of 
rules or criteria relating to territorial competence, the subject-matter, and the mon­
etary value of the decision. This means that each court deals with separate types of 
decisions but some (higher) courts, on top of their ‘natural’ competences, work also 
as appeal courts of other (see infra). The names and main competences of such bod­
ies may be described as follows: 
(1) Administrative judges (juzgados de lo contencioso) either having a national or a pro­
vincial jurisdiction. These are one-person judicial bodies and may be identified as 
lower or first instance courts. Among other matters, they control the decisions of 
local authorities (land use plans and regulations are outside their competence). 
(2) The administrative chamber of the Regional High Courts. There is one such 
higher court in each of the 17 autonomous communities (‘regions’) of the King­
dom. Among other matters, they control regional agencies and departments. 
They also adjudicate judicial appeals filed against the rulings of the administra­
tive judges (recurso de apelación). 
(3) Audiencia Nacional: this is a central, high administrative chamber that has territo­
rial jurisdiction over the whole country and controls, among others, the decisions 
of Ministers and Secretaries of State. 
(4) Supreme Court, Administrative Chamber (Tribunal Supremo, Sala de lo contencioso 
administrativo). Among other powers, this court controls the decisions and regula­
tions adopted by the Council of Ministers (or ‘central Cabinet’). The Supreme 
Court has also jurisdiction to revise the rulings of the Audiencia Nacional and of 
the Regional High Courts, on cassation appeal (recurso de casación, see infra). 
The scope of review exercised by administrative courts is large, and judicial powers 
are great: administrative courts can not only declare illegal an administrative decision 
and annul (quash) it, but they also have the power: (a) to recognise an individual 
situation or right; (b) to order the agency to do or to cease to do something; (c) to 
order the agency to compensate the applicant for the damages suffered. That is, a 
citizen might seek monetary compensation for damages resulting from governmental 
activity, for instance, when she or her property is damaged or impaired as a direct 
consequence of that activity.22 
21 On the Spanish system of judicial control of administrative action, see, in general: Luciano Alfonso 
(n. 17) 655–756; J. González Pérez, Comentarios a la Ley de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-Administrativa (Ley 
29/1998, de 13 de julio) (Madrid 2008); Alberto Palomar Olmeda (ed.), Tratado de la Jurisdicción
Contencioso-Administrativa (Cizur Menor 2008); Jesús Leguina Villa and Miguel Sánchez Morón (eds.), 
Comentarios a la Ley de la Jurisdicción Contencioso-administrativa (Valladolid 2001). 
22 The criteria that must be met in order to obtain damages from governmental action result from a 
long standing case law, originating in the Expropriations Act 1956 (see, fn 3) and now codified in the 










Administrative courts can not only control the legality of ‘individual’ decisions (a
licence, a permit, a sanction) but also that of plans (land use plans, waste management
plans, water plans, etc.). Moreover, they can annul administrative regulations approved
by local or regional councils, or by the Council of Ministers, that is, rules that do not
have the nature of parliamentary legislation, and which are a very important source of
administrative law in Spain. However, administrative courts have no powers to modify
the wording or the text of unlawful regulations or plans (they can only declare them
illegal). Neither do they have powers in the cases of mere or simple governmental ‘pas­
sivity’ (for instance, bad or weak enforcement of environmental rules) which does not
meet the criteria established by the LJCA for governmental ‘inactivity’. 
As in other countries, in Spain the actual scope of review of judicial control depends 
largely on whether the governmental decision consists of a ‘law-bound’ decision (acto 
reglado) or a discretionary one. In the first case, administrative courts have no lim­
its in analysing, quashing or modifying the actual content of the decision. However, 
when the administrative decision is a discretionary one (acto discrecional), administra­
tive courts restrain themselves to checking ‘legality’ issues (procedure, participation, 
competence of the decision maker, etc.), while courts tend to defer to administrative 
discretion as to the actual content of the decision. Thus, whenever there is a case of 
complex balancing of conflicting interests, the administrative agency enjoys a large 
remit of discretion. As a rule, the court will only quash (annul) a discretionary deci­
sion when the plaintiff can demonstrate that the agency ignored clear statutory or 
procedural rights; or when the administrative decision cannot clearly be grounded 
in the facts and materials produced within the procedure; or when the decision is 
arbitrary or clearly not sound, etc. 
Judicial proceedings in administrative courts are closely related to the administra­
tive appeals, described above. As a rule, the available administrative appeals must be 
exhausted before going to court, except when the decision has been taken by the 
highest body of the relevant agency (for instance, a decision adopted by the Minister, 
or by the Council of Ministers, which have no hierarchical higher body). In that case, 
though, an optional administrative appeal is still at the disposal of the individual 
(recurso de reposición). Therefore, the different means of review (administrative and 
judicial) cannot be employed concurrently and the first one must always precede the 
judicial challenge. 
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (like arbitration, conciliation or medi­
ation) have little importance in providing legal protection against damages to the 
rights and interests of private parties produced by governmental action. Petitions and 
non-formal procedures also have little significance with respect to the PELP. 
4.1.3 Constitutional complaint 
When an administrative agency adopts a decision that clearly violates one of the ‘fun­
damental’ rights enshrined in Arts. 14–29 of the Constitution, then the citizen may 
Administrative Procedure Act 1992. These basic criteria are: (a) an actual impairment of damage, that 
the citizen is not supposed or obliged to support; (b) a governmental activity involved in the public 
services; (c) a causal link between the governmental activity and the private damage produced. This is 
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lodge an appeal in the constitutional court (recurso de amparo). This special appeal is 
regulated by the Organic Act of the Constitutional Court of 1979. The access to the 
constitutional court, though, is far from being automatic. First of all, the citizen must 
exhaust previously all the judicial remedies available in the administrative jurisdic­
tion, something that may take years of litigation. On the other hand, the plaintiff 
must have his appeal admitted by the court. In this sense, the criteria for admission 
of this special constitutional complaint have been made more and more restrictive 
over the last years by means of different amendments of the Act on the Constitutional 
Court and by the case law of the said Court. In practice, admissibility works almost as 
a discretionary system. 
4.2 The effectiveness of judicial review of administrative action 
There is no doubt that the effectiveness of any jurisdictional system is a key element 
in the field of the PELP. In this sense, the situation in Spain deserves to be carefully 
analysed, in terms of the following aspects: 
4.2.1 Standing 
The rules on standing in the administrative jurisdiction are enshrined in the 1998 
Administrative Courts Act (LJCA), precisely in Art. 19. These provisions must be 
applied and interpreted in the light of the dense case law of the Administrative Cham­
ber of the Supreme Court and that of the Constitutional Court dealing with Art. 24 of 
the Constitution. Another interpretative instrument that has to be taken into consid­
eration by courts when deciding about standing problems is Art. 53.3 of the Constitu­
tion, which states that judicial practice should be inspired by the ‘guiding principles’ 
of the social and economic policies (Arts. 39–52 of the Constitution). Therefore, the 
administrative courts must interpret in a ‘progressive’ and extensive way the wording 
of the LJCA. 
These rules on standing are general and applicable throughout the whole area 
of administrative law. The requirements for standing do not change according to 
the type of remedy requested (e.g. actions for annulment/damages) although sec­
toral legislation may establish complementary rules in a given field of governmental 
activity. 
The LJCA follows a generous approach to standing. There are several standing situ­
ations. Among these, we should focus on the following: 
•	 Any legal or physical person may have access to administrative courts, as long 
as they have a right (in the technical meaning) or a legitimate interest that is 
affected or damaged by an administrative decision or regulation. The wording 
legitimate interest has been interpreted by administrative courts in an increas­
ingly progressive way. 
•	 Associations, trade unions and groups of affected parties also have standing for 
the protection of their collective rights and legitimate interests. 
•	 And finally, ‘actio popularis’ is also recognised in several cases. Thus, the LJCA 
establishes this possibility as ‘acción popular’, where standing is recognised to any­
one, without the need to prove a personal damage or interest. This special action 




























has to be recognised by sectoral legislation.23 The paramount example is the stand­
ing recognised to NGOs and associations to defend environmental interests.24 
Therefore, although the Spanish system does not grant a universal standing in admin­
istrative courts (no domestic system does so), it is fairly generous. For the sake of this 
contribution, we might support the conclusion that standing issues do not represent 
a real problem in the field of the PELP. 
4.2.2 Timely justice 
A widely shared negative aspect of Spanish administrative justice is that it is very slow.
This seems to be an uncontroversial, well-documented conclusion, supported by the
regular statistics and data offered by legal professionals, organisations and bodies. As
a rule, the proceedings are protracted and take too long. Several reasons explain this
structural situation: the number of cases is very high, there are not enough courts and
many of these are understaffed. In some higher regional courts, the number of pend­
ing cases may be counted in the dozens of thousands. The delays in the Spanish court
system are sometimes scandalous. For instance, the Constitutional Court took twelve
years to adjudicate a claim of unconstitutionality formulated against a 1988 State Act
on local finances. In another decision, rendered in December 2000, the Constitu­
tional Court declared unconstitutional a 1991 Statute of the Balearic Islands that had
established an environmental tax. The central government challenged that legisla­
tion in 1992 and the Court accepted this claim – eight years later. A case originating
in a lower court and arriving at the Supreme Court through the route of subsequent
appeals can easily take up more than five years. At present (2015), the lower adminis­
trative courts of Madrid are giving appointments for preliminary trials of cases in 2016.
And this is just the first procedural step in the so-called ‘shortened procedure’, etc. 
As a consequence of this unsatisfactory situation, challenging administrative decisions
does not make sense for many people, especially if the economic value of the lawsuit is
small (for instance, traffic fines). In other cases, the judicial process is so slow that, when
the ruling is finally released, it may have lost its significance. Therefore, administrative
justice is often ineffective. Art. 24 of the Constitution proclaims that everyone has the
right to have a judicial proceeding without undue delays (un proceso sin dilaciones indebi­
das). However, the different procedural laws do not establish deadlines for handling a
case, nor are there precise standards to ascertain when justice has been ‘timely’. 
4.2.3 Injunctive relief 
The Constitution enshrines the right of everyone to an effective judicial protection.
In the Administrative Law arena, this certainly includes the right to injunctive relief,
that is, the possibility to suspend or paralyse the enforcement or application of a
23 Several legal provisions do grant this ‘open’ standing, like the law on coastal management (Act of 28 
July 1988); or the Decree 833/1975, on atmospheric pollution; the laws on natural parks, the legislation 
on Urban Planning and development, etc. 
24 See the 27/2006 Act, on access to information, participation and access to justice in environmental 
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challenged administrative adjudication or regulation during the handling of the
lawsuit, until the controversy is adjudicated on the merits (something that may hap­
pen several years after lodging the lawsuit). Therefore, injunctions are very impor­
tant in the Administrative Law scenario, because they are too frequently the only
means to avoid serious and irreversible damage to citizens or to diffuse, societal
interests. 
To understand the system, it is worth clarifying that, in the Spanish system of admin­
istrative litigation, a plaintiff may produce five different types of claims or petitions 
(pretensiones) in the administrative courts. Namely, the plaintiff may ask the court: 
(a) to declare illegal, and therefore annul an administrative decision or rule, in total 
or in part; 
(b) to recognise that the plaintiff has a concrete right that was disregarded by the 
agency; 
(c) to order the agency to pay compensation for damages caused or produced on the 
plaintiff by the public services; 
(d) to stop an illegal governmental activity; 
(e) to order an administrative body to act in a certain ‘positive’ way, to which it was 
obliged vis-à-vis the plaintiff on the basis of a pre-existent contract, covenant or 
another form of engagement (administrative inactivity). 
This differentiation among the possible claims is very important from a technical
point of view, since judicial review of administrative decisions and regulations is
very formal. Therefore, each type of plea may claim a specific form of injunctive
relief. 
In the Spanish system of judicial control of administrative action, interim relief (for 
instance, in the form of stopping the execution of a public infrastructure project) is 
not granted automatically. The plaintiff, though, may obtain injunctive relief under 
certain conditions, but these criteria are not clearly defined in the legislation. The 
1998 LJCA is, once more, the decisive legislative arrangement in this field. This Act 
regulates interim relief, but it does so in a laconic and broad way. First, the Act states 
that the plaintiff may ask, at any time in the proceedings, the adoption of interim 
measures ‘that will ensure the effectiveness of the final ruling’. Interim measures are 
not adopted ex officio by the court. 
Those measures may be adopted by the court ‘only when the implementation of 
the contested decision or administrative regulation could prevent the lawsuit from 
attaining its legitimate objective’. On the other hand, interim relief may be refused 
when such measures might produce a ‘serious disturbance of the general interest or 
of a third party’, something that the court ‘will weight in a reasoned manner’. There­
fore, the plaintiff has the burden to identify clearly a workable line of reasoning in 
order to convince the judge that, if the decision is not suspended, his rights or inter­
ests will suffer a serious and irreversible impairment. The other side of the coin is that 
the court has to find a balance between the possible public costs and the benefits of 
issuing a motion to stop the administrative decision or plan. The granting of interim 
measures must be preceded by a contradictory hearing. In addition, when the interim 
measure could produce ‘damages of any sort’ (for instance, to the public or general 
interest), the court may decide to impose on the plaintiff the duty to present any kind 
of sufficient insurance or warranty to cover those potential damages. For instance, 
























   
to get the suspension of a major public infrastructure project, the plaintiff may be 
obliged to constitute a guarantee, something which is often dissuasive. 
As can be appreciated, the key instrument of interim relief is not regulated in a
precise way by the controlling statute. Therefore, the legal regime of interim meas­
ures in Spain is largely controlled by the case law of the Supreme Court (adminis­
trative chamber) and that of the Constitutional Court. A high level of discretion is
left to the administrative judge or court: whether to grant injunctive relief or not;
whether to impose a warranty on the plaintiff or not; if yes, in which amount, and so
on. Consequently, injunctive relief is a complex area formed by hundreds of judicial
decisions, which do not actually form a clear line of reasoning. It is therefore difficult
to provide a clear assessment or actual figures or percentages about the frequency of
the grant of injunctive relief in administrative litigation in Spain. However, the two
extreme positions should be discarded: it is not true that courts always refuse to grant
relief, and the opposite view is also certainly false. The granting of injunctive relief
depends also on factual, case-by-case circumstances: the quality of the plaintiff’s writ­
ten arguments, the existence of a fumus boni iuris (the appearance of a good right) on
the part of the citizen, the seriousness and clarity of the alleged violation of control­
ling rules, etc. The result is a complex matrix of dialectical variables, whose result is
hard to predict beforehand. On the other hand, the slowness of the judicial process
ends up affecting the effectiveness of the injunctive relief mechanism itself. Due to
the heavy workload of the judiciary, when the court has the opportunity to consider
the application for interim measures (not the merits of the case), it is sometimes too
late. In an attempt to fix this anomaly, the Supreme Court (inspired by the law on
civil procedure) has developed since 1993 a judicial practice consisting in consider­
ing the application for interim measures through a fast-track procedure, without
waiting until the regular schedule of the case. These are ‘urgent and speedy interim
measures’ (medidas cautelarísimas).25 This fast-track procedure can only be followed
on petition of the plaintiff, when there are circumstances of extraordinary urgency,
which would not allow the court to consider carefully the granting of the interim
measures in due time. 
This judicial practice eventually became enacted by LJCA of 1998 which was modi­
fied by Act 37/2011. The most important feature of this ‘urgent and speedy’ interim 
measures mechanism is that no contradictory hearing is required, so the court may 
decide to grant injunctive relief within a very short deadline, without even listening 
to the government attorney. The court order cannot be appealed. In this order, the 
court may find either: (a) that there is a case of urgency and that interim measures 
are needed; or (b) that there is no urgency; in this case, the question of the interim 
measures will be adjudicated following the general rules. 
4.2.4 The right to appeal judicial decisions 
The right to appeal judicial decisions is a part of the fundamental right to judicial 
protection. However, this is not an absolute right, and the law may establish cases 
when a first instance court ruling will not be appealable in a higher court. In the 
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administrative jurisdictional track, most court decisions and orders are appealable 
at least once, by lodging different types of appeals either in the same court (recurso 
de súplica)26 or in a higher court (recurso de apelación, recurso de casación). As a conse­
quence of an appeal, the revising court enjoys full authority to annul or revise in any 
way the lower court ruling. Even the refusal to grant injunctive relief can be appealed. 
However, some administrative court rulings cannot be appealed if they adjudicate 
minor cases27 or the appeal is not convenient on expediency reasons.28 
The apelación appeal may be filed to challenge the rulings issued by the admin­
istrative judges (Juzgados de lo contencioso), and it is lodged in the Higher Regional 
Court (Tribunal Superior de Justicia). However, and from a legal point of view, the most 
important appeal is the ‘cassation’ one (recurso de casación). This appeal is lodged in 
the Supreme Court against rulings issued by the Higher Regional Courts or by the 
Audiencia Nacional (national court). This special appeal gives the Supreme Court the 
possibility to establish legal principles or doctrines, or to establish the right interpre­
tation of a controversial legal provision. Since many laws and regulations incorporate 
broad or imprecise wordings, the case law of the Supreme Court (jurisprudencia) is of 
paramount importance and it may be depicted as a true and genuine source of law, 
although Spain is not by tradition a common law country. 
The cassation appeal, however, is far from being a universal and open legal rem­
edy. On the contrary, this appeal may only be filed on certain limited legal grounds 
(breach of statutory or case law) and provided that the appealed ruling meets cer­
tain criteria. Furthermore, the heavy workload of the Supreme Court prompted the 
enactment of new legal rules in 2011, which in fact do restrict the possibility to file 
‘casación’ appeals in the Supreme Court. Thus, the Act 37/2011, of 19 October 2011, 
introduced new procedural rules in the administrative jurisdiction. Allegedly, the goal 
of this statute was to combat judicial slowness and to reduce the duration of lawsuits 
in the administrative courts. To this end, this Act raised the minimum value of a case 
in order to be heard by the Supreme Court (in a ‘casación’ appeal). In the current 
version of the LJCA, the case should involve a litigious affair with a monetary value 
of at least €600,000 (the previous figure was €150,000) to be admissible under a cas­
sation appeal. The idea is to prevent unimportant cases from reaching the Supreme 
Court. However, these new procedural rules may have a clear negative impact in the 
PELP, since the new rules do restrict de facto the access to Supreme Court appeals. 
A high number of cases are no longer eligible to be appealed in the Supreme Court, 
then enlarging the number of cases that will be heard only once by the judiciary. The 
same Act 37/2011 raised the threshold (monetary value of a case) required to file an 
apelación appeal: from 18.000 to €30.000. This involves an additional, negative impact 
on the effectiveness of the principle of legal protection. Not to forget that ‘cheap’ 
cases may very well be important cases, indeed. 
26 As a rule, the súplica appeal applies not to final rulings, but to interim or other types of judicial orders 
or provisions (in Spanish, providencias and autos). 
27 Thus, administrative judge rulings that adjudicate lawsuits whose monetary value is under 30.000 euros 
are not appealable to the Higher Regional Courts. 
28 Some administrative judge rulings that adjudicate electoral lawsuits are not appealable to the Higher 
Regional Courts (for instance, proclamation of candidates) because that would conflict with the timely 
development of the electoral process. 










4.2.5 The enforcement of judicial rulings 
The enforcement of judicial decisions in administrative law cases does also present 
an unsatisfactory situation in Spain. Not only is the judicial process slow in general 
terms, but judicial decisions, once released, may be ineffective because they are not 
enforced or implemented, and, if they are, this is done with undue delays. 
There are different reasons for this. Although the law states that courts are empow­
ered to enforce their own rulings, the enforcement of judicial rulings that condemn 
administrative agencies does correspond de facto to the governmental body that lost 
the lawsuit, due to the very nature of the administrative process. In most cases, and 
after a reasonable time, the enforcement of the ruling has to be demanded explicitly 
by the citizen who won the case. Here, another problem of slowness may appear, as 
the agency may take its time to enforce the judgment. Undue delays in the execu­
tion of court rulings may therefore be another cause of ineffectiveness of the PELP. 
In case of open unwillingness to apply a judicial decision on the part of the agency, 
the court may impose penalty payments on the official running the administrative 
body (director general, mayor, etc.), and even trigger criminal proceedings, but this 
option is rarely implemented. The courts can also use compulsory powers to have its 
ruling enforced, but this has to be asked for by the original plaintiff. Moreover, the 
law establishes that public-domain goods and assets of administrative agencies can­
not be seized by courts. Sometimes, the judgment is simply not implemented by the 
public administration, for reasons of bad faith, political considerations or defiance, 
high costs involved in the enforcement of the ruling, the claim that the enforcement 
corresponds to another agency, etc. This situation is not unusual, unfortunately, and 
can only be solved by means of a radical change of mentality and legal culture among 
politicians and governmental officials. 
4.2.6 Costs of administrative litigation 
The costs of litigating in the administrative courts may be an additional, deterrent fac­
tor for citizens, thus hindering de facto the effectiveness of the PELP. Therefore, the 
situation in Spain should be here presented summarily. 
4.2.6.1 GENERAL FEATURES 
To better clarify the following points, it is important to note that the expenses
generated by any legal proceeding (costas) are governed by different statutes,
depending on the ‘jurisdictional track’ (orden jurisdiccional) that is involved in the
proceedings. Therefore, attention must be paid to how the issue of expenses is
governed in the administrative judicial track by the LJCA of 1998. The costs of the
cases handled by civil or criminal courts are regulated by the procedural regula­
tion of those courts. 
In administrative litigation, the regular costs (costas procesales) include: 
(a) The lawyers’ fees. In the administrative jurisdiction, the plaintiff must be defended 
by an attorney (abogado) incorporated in a bar association and he must also be 
represented by another legal professional, called procurador or ‘legal representa­
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the plaintiff must pay the services of two legal professionals. This rule applies 
always when the proceedings take place in a collegiate court (Higher regional 
court, Audiencia nacional or the Supreme Court). However, when the proceed­
ing takes place in a one-person court (juzgados de lo contencioso) the plaintiff may 
decide to be defended and represented by the same attorney (abogado), who in 
those cases plays both roles simultaneously. 
The incidence of this dual regime on litigation costs should not be misun­
derstood. This regime does not make a given case expensive per se. A ‘single’ 
system of representation could be more expensive (for instance, in the case of 
protracted or complex litigation) than double or dual representation: the num­
ber of intervening lawyers is not what makes a case expensive, but the very nature, 
complexity and duration of the lawsuit. Therefore, the question whether lawyers’ 
fees are per se a deterrent factor in administrative litigation deserves a nuanced 
appraisal and must be answered on a case-by-case basis. 
(b) Cost of evidence: the plaintiff must bear the cost of evidence and proof proposed 
to the court and admitted by the said court. In administrative litigation, the usual 
evidence consists of reports or opinions by technical experts, empirical tests or 
laboratory analysis (prueba pericial). 
(c) Court fees: as in other countries, citizens have to pay court fees or charges (tasas 
judiciales). These fees have different amounts, depending on the jurisdictional 
track, the proceedings (first instance lawsuit, appeal, etc.), and they do vary 
according to the monetary value of the case. Theoretically, this is a payment for 
the enjoyment of the public service, but the amount of these charges has tra­
ditionally been modest and did not cover the real cost of the service.29 In the 
administrative courts, until 2012, the fees amounted to €120 for an abbreviated 
procedure (procedimiento abreviado), €210 for an ordinary procedure (procedimiento 
ordinario), €300 for an appellate proceeding (recurso de apelación) and €600 for 
a cassation appeal (recurso de casación). The situation changed dramatically in 
2012, when the Spanish Parliament passed a law which increased sharply these 
amounts.30 In the administrative jurisdictional track, the fees have two parts or 
components, the fixed part and the variable one. The fixed-part amounts are as 
follows: €200 for a ‘shortened procedure’ (previously, 120) €350 for an ordinary 
procedure (previously, €210), €800 for an appellate proceeding (previously, 300) 
and €1,200 for a cassation appeal (previously €600, meaning a 100% increase). 
The variable part consists of the 0.5% of the monetary value of the lawsuit, with 
a maximum of €10,000. 
This piece of legislation was strongly criticised by many groups, parties and law­
yers’ associations, because the new fees might have a deterrent impact on citizens 
willing to challenge an administrative decision or activity. The Cabinet, though, 
justified this initiative on the need to get funding for the appropriate running 
of the judiciary and for financing the free litigation scheme for those citizens 
under a certain income level. In this sense, persons eligible to benefit from the 
Free Legal Assistance Program (Justicia gratuita, see below) were exempted from 
29 According to official sources, the government collected €173 million in 2010 (source: Ministry of 
Justice). 
30 Act 10/2012, of 20 November 2012. 













paying those court fees. In 2015, and in the light of much social rejection, the 
Cabinet further decided to eliminate the fees when the litigant is natural person.31 
(d) Other regular costs: administrative litigation involves other regular costs: for
instance, when a lawsuit has been filed and admitted by the court, an announce­
ment or notice thereof must be published in the corresponding official gazette.
Such publication has a cost, which must be borne by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff
has asked for injunctive relief, he may be required by the court to pay a secu­
rity or bond to avoid the production of irreversible damages. This might also
be very costly and even hard to get (the usual form is a bank guarantee, aval
bancario). 
Summing up, as for the actual costs in administrative litigation, those procedures 
entail uncertainty about the monetary amount for which the losing party may be 
liable, because the actual costs are hard to predict from the beginning. The expenses 
of an administrative court case cannot be predicted in advance because they are the 
result of a number of factors, such as the complexity of the case, the number and 
nature of expert witnesses, the evidence produced, the eventual appeals that could be 
lodged, etc. On the other hand, there is no clear legal mandate that the costs related 
to administrative procedures should not be prohibitively expensive. In any case, the 
sharp increase in court fees did had a real deterrent factor for many potential liti­
gants, especially in minor cases (traffic fines, for instance). 
4.2.6.2 THE ‘LOSER-PAYS’ PRINCIPLE 
As in other legal systems, the Spanish one follows the loser-pays principle. That is, it 
shifts litigation costs to the loser of the lawsuit in some circumstances. The LJCA of 
1998 also regulates this issue but recent amendments resulted in a more restrictive 
regulation for the citizen. Until 2011, that statute established a different regime for 
first instance proceedings (proceso en primera instancia) and for appeal proceedings 
(recursos contra sentencias y autos).32 Thus, in first instance proceedings, the general 
rule was that each party had to bear its own costs (lawyers, evidence, etc.), but the 
court could declare that the loser had to pay all the costs involved in the proceedings, 
that is, the costs of both parties.33 In the second instance (an appeal against the lower 
court decision), the rule was different: the losing party had to pay for the total costs 
of the appellate proceedings. 
The precedent legal framework changed dramatically in November 2011,
when a new law on litigation costs was approved: the Act 37/2011 of 19 October34 
31 Royal Decree 1/2015, of 27 February 2015. 
32 In the administrative, jurisdictional track, an appeal instance or ‘segunda instancia’ implies that a lower 
administrative court has already adjudicated a legal challenge (recurso contencioso-administrativo) against 
an administrative decision. 
33 This possibility would apply when one party acted in bad faith, or with procedural recklessness (for 
instance, he supported a clearly unsustainable position). Furthermore, the court could also impose the 
payment of the total cost on the loser when the court found it appropriate for a higher effectiveness of 
the judicial protection. 
34 Ley de medidas de agilización procesal. This Act was published in the State Official Gazette of 11 October, 
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introduced new procedural rules in, among other domains, the Administrative juris­
diction. This statute amended the LJCA of 1998 and the traditional regime governing
the loser-pays principle. Namely, the Act establishes that, in the administrative courts,
the general rule is now that the litigation costs will be borne by the party that loses the
case entirely, also in first instance proceedings. The situation in appeals proceedings
remains unchanged: the loser-pays principle is still the rule. The court, however, may
decide otherwise and split the costs when it finds circumstances that would justify not
applying the loser-pays principle, for instance, when the case ‘presented serious doubts
about the facts or the applicable law’, as the LJCA now states. 
In those cases where none of the parties wins the case entirely (the legal challenge 
to the administrative decision has only been accepted or rejected in part), then each 
party must bear his own costs, and the common litigation costs will be split in half. But 
here again, the court may decide otherwise, then applying the ‘loser-pays’ principle 
to the loser if it finds that the said party filed the challenge or sustained the action in 
bad faith or recklessly. 
Prima facie, the goal of the new law is to combat judicial slowness, to prevent unrea­
sonable challenges to administrative action and to reduce the duration of lawsuits in 
the administrative courts. In this sense, this new provision is supposed to discourage 
frivolous appeals. However, these new procedural rules may have a clear negative 
impact in the domain of access to justice and the PELP since it may deter potential 
litigants from defending their rights and legitimate interests in courts, for fear to face 
the payment of the total costs of the lawsuit.35 Unfortunately, this is really happening 
now in many cases. 
4.2.6.3 PUBLIC PROGRAMS ON LEGAL AID 
In Spain, there is a scheme in place to provide legal aid to those wishing to take legal 
action and lacking enough financial resources: asistencia jurídica gratuita. This is a 
direct consequence of Art. 119 of the Constitution, under which ‘[j]ustice will be free 
when the laws will so say and, in any case, for those who provide evidence of lack of 
resource for litigating’. 
The system consists of a program which assists financially the litigants, and which 
applies in all jurisdictions (civil, administrative), regardless of the type of the case.36 
The cost of this program of legal assistance is entirely supported by the government, 
and is run by special bodies. The legal scheme on Free Legal Assistance is currently 
governed by Act 1/1996, of 10 January 1996, on free legal assistance (Ley de asistencia 
jurídica gratuita). This statute has a general application in any kind of legal proceed­
ings, so it also applies to administrative litigation. 
Under this statute, any physical person (or an NGO) lacking financial or mon­
etary resources may be granted free legal assistance, as long as he meets the statutory 
35 Even if a citizen is right and the agency behaves unlawfully, there are many situations where he may 
lose a case against the Public Administration (failure to solve procedural intricacies, not meeting a 
deadline, etc.). In this case, the loser-pays principle may be a very painful and harsh rule for the citizen. 
Not to forget that the decision of the court might not be appealable, and then there will be no room 
for rectifications. 
36 Techniques such as pro bono practice, ‘legal clinics’, etc. are rare and are not a part of this mechanism. 
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requirements in terms of maximum annual income. Free Legal Assistance is granted 
(on demand of the plaintiff) by different Commissions on Free Legal Assistance 
(comisiones de asistencia juridical gratuita), which are specialised governmental bodies 
acting in each province and in each autonomous community. When a citizen or an 
NGO is denied the right to free legal assistance, the applicant has the right to appeal 
in the administrative courts. 
5 European perspectives 
In general, European administrative law has had a limited influence on the actual 
implementation of the PELP in Spain. Several reasons explain this situation. On the 
one hand, the standards of protection of individual rights (as a result of domestic 
Law) are already high in comparison with European standards. When Spain joined 
the European Communities in 1986, the Constitution had already been passed some 
years earlier, and regular domestic legislation already ensured a fair protection of 
individual rights. Furthermore, and until the Lisbon treaty, the sectoral EU legal rules 
(and the corresponding ECJ case law) had little to do with fundamental rights. EU 
secondary law has had, however, some impacts that may be mentioned here: (a) the 
enlargement of standing and access-to-justice in environmental matters, due to sev­
eral EU directives on the matter (for example, Directive 2003/35); (b) the establish­
ment of a special type of administrative appeal in the domain of public procurement, 
due to the transposition of the EU directives on the matter. However, there is no 
significant impact on the material or substantive aspects of the PELP. 
On the other hand, substantial improvements could be made in the knowledge 
and use in domestic courts of EU Law principles, doctrines and case law. As a matter 
of fact, EU law courses do not have the weight they deserve in the regular curricula 
of most Spanish law schools. In addition, law graduates become judges by succeeding 
in recruitment procedures that are long and difficult to prepare, but where EU Law 
subjects have a minor importance. This is probably one of the reasons why Spanish 
administrative courts have formulated so far few preliminary rulings to the ECJ, as 
compared with the courts of other Member States. 
As far as the ECtHR is concerned, the case law of the Strasbourg court is certainly 
impressive, and the Constitution provides for the adequate connection between 
domestic practice and that European body of law. The ECtHR case law has certainly 
had a relevant impact on the PELP, but mainly in connection with criminal law. There 
have not been relevant cases having an impact on the domestic understanding or 
implementation of the PELP in administrative law. Some judgments of that European 
court are, however, noticeable in the sense that they have expanded the understand­
ing of some fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Therefore, one cannot support the view that EU Law or the ECHR changed the 
domestic understandings of the PELP in administrative law. 
6 Conclusion 
In the light of the preceding pages, some conclusions may be drawn about the recep­
tion and implementation of the PELP in Spain. The most important one is that the 
principle is well-established in domestic public law, although not under that precise 
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institutional arrangements providing for adequate legal remedies. The system may be 
evaluated as comprehensive, fair and reasonable. Administrative courts have ample 
powers to revise and control administrative action, and they are independent and 
professional. 
However, there are also negative aspects, which might have a negative impact 
in terms of the very effectiveness of the said principle. These aspects include the 
following: 
(a) The lengthy proceedings in administrative courts. Lawsuits usually take several 
years to be adjudicated. When the judicial decision is rendered, it is sometimes 
too late. 
(b) Litigation costs: challenging administrative action is in most cases costly. The 
plaintiff must pay court fees which sometimes may deter potential ligitants; as 
a rule, the citizen has to pay for not only one, but two lawyers; evidence may be 
expensive or hard to get; moreover, if the plaintiff loses the case, he must pay 
his own litigation costs, plus those of the agency (loser-pays principle); there is a 
Free Legal Assistance program but it does not cover individual citizens earning a 
regular salary. 
(c) There is also an unsatisfactory situation in the field of granting interim relief in 
the form of suspension of administrative decisions, regulations and plans. 
(d) The system of administrative appeals is in most cases ineffective. 
(e) Administrative bodies enjoy several procedural and substantive privileges, which 
are hard to combat by the individual. 
(f) The system of court rulings enforcement (which is de facto left in the hands of the 
defendant administrative authority) could certainly be improved. 
(g) There are too many restrictions for lodging cassation appeals in the Supreme 
Court, or even for a regular appeal in the higher regional courts; ‘petty’ or minor 
cases (in terms of monetary value) are only adjudicated once. 
(h) There is little possibility to sue governmental agencies in the case of simple inac­
tivity or ‘passivity’. 
As a result of these reasons, it is not unusual that citizens, groups or firms would 
decline to defend their rights against administrative bodies and agencies because of 
the shortcomings of the judicial system described previously. This situation has been 
worsened since 2011, when some procedural reforms were adopted, with the result of 
making it more difficult, hard or expensive to go to courts. 
Consequently, the situation is far from being satisfactory and there is still plenty of 
room for improvement, if we want the Principle of Legal Protection to be really effec­
tive in practice. 
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1 Historical developments 
The Swiss Constitution of 1874 guaranteed only few procedural rights (such as the 
right to be sued at one’s home court). This applies also for many substantive funda­
mental rights. Over a century, the Swiss Supreme Court has developed many proce­
dural guarantees, such as the right to be heard and other principles of effective legal 
protection.1 The legal basis of these rights was the equal protection clause.2 
Shortcomings of the procedure typically involved a deficit in independent judicial 
control. Many Swiss cantons as well as federal rules only granted limited access to 
courts in administrative matters. The typical legal recourse involved an appeal to the 
hierarchal higher administrative body, including the Federal Council or the execu­
tive of the cantons.3 Appeals to the Swiss Supreme Court were possible in some cases, 
excluded or reduced to a review with very limited scrutiny in others. 
The Swiss system was incompatible with the ECHR as far as ‘civil rights’ were con­
cerned. These civil rights included matters that were considered ‘administrative’ 
under Swiss law. Switzerland therefore had to extend judicial control on such matters 
as the bar exams which lead – among other factors – to the framework of the current 
Swiss constitution and to a reform of the judicial process.4 
2 Constitutional framework 
The Swiss Constitution of 1999 dedicates three Articles to procedural rights. Art. 29, 
29a and 30 are the cornerstones of legal protection, and they form part of the funda­
mental rights of the Constitution. 
Art. 29 of the Swiss Constitution stipulates general procedural guarantees: ‘[e]very 
person has the right to equal and fair treatment in judicial and administrative pro­
ceedings and to have their case decided within a reasonable time.’ These guarantees 
1 Regina Kiener, Bernhard Rütsche and Mathias Kuhn, Öffentliches Verfahrensrecht (Dike, Zurich/St. Gallen 
2015), 35. 
2 Ulrich Häfelin, Georg Müller and Felix Uhlmann, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (7th edn., Dike, Zurich/St.
Gallen 2016), 576; BGE [Bundesgerichtsentscheid/Decision of the Federal Supreme Court] 134 I 23, 42. 
3 René Rhinow, Heinrich Koller, Christina Kiss, Daniela Turnherr and Denise Brühl-Moser, Öffentliches 
Prozessrecht: Grundlagen und Bundesrechtspflege (3rd edn., Helbling Lichtenhahn, Basel 2014), 412. 
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apply in any proceeding, may they be administrative or court proceedings, irrespec­
tive also of whether they concern civil, criminal, constitutional or administrative mat­
ters. These guarantees encompass fundamental rights such as the right to be heard or 
the right to legal aid, as explicitly stipulated in Art. 29 paras 2 and 3.5 
Art. 30 of the Swiss Constitution provides for additional guarantees in judicial pro­
ceedings. A court must be legally constituted, competent, independent and impartial. 
Its hearings and its judgments shall be in public.6 
Art. 29a of the Swiss Constitution, which has been in force since 1 January 2007, 
sets out the conditions to access to courts: ‘[i]n a legal dispute, every person has the 
right to have their case determined by a judicial authority. The Confederation and 
the Cantons may by law preclude the determination by the courts of certain excep­
tional categories of case.’ Applicable procedural law and constitutional practice must 
specify the term ‘legal dispute’. Only the law may restrict access to courts, and as the 
Constitution points out explicitly, only exceptionally. Art. 29a was clearly inspired by 
Art. 19 para 4 of the German Grundgesetz (Rechtsweggarantie). 
The Constitution remains silent to the question of the scope of judicial review. Art. 
29a is generally understood to guarantee a onetime review of facts and law by a court. 
A right to appeal, especially an appeal to the Swiss Supreme Court cannot be deduced 
from Art. 29a;7 it is part of more specific provisions of the Constitution such as the 
right to appeal in penal matters (Art. 32) or on the Swiss Supreme Court (Art. 191). It 
is also undisputed that an (administrative) court may not review questions of adminis­
trative discretion.8 The right stipulated in Art. 29a only guarantees review of facts and 
law but not of administrative discretion. 
3 Procedural rights in Swiss administrative law 
3.1 Administrative acts (rulings) as cornerstones of legal protection 
Legal protection in Switzerland is traditionally linked to the nature of administrative 
action. Administrative action carried out in the form of administrative acts, also called 
rulings (Verfügungen, décisions, decisioni), typically triggers legal protection, either 
within the administration, to courts, or both.9 In federal law, an administrative deci­
sion must be notified to the parties in writing. It ‘must state the grounds on which [it 
is] based and contain instructions on legal remedies’ (Art. 35 para. 1 APA). 
This leads to the question what kind of administrative action must be clothed in the 
form of administrative act. According to the definition of the Federal Act on Adminis­
trative Procedure, Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ‘[r]ulings are decisions of the 
5 See, for an overview, Jean-François Aubert and Pascal Mahon, Petit commentaire de la Constitution fédérale de 
la Confédération suisse (Schulthess, Zurich/Basel/Geneva 2003), § 29 5 f. 
6 See for further details Berhard Ehrenzeller, Benjamin Schindler, Rainer J. Schweizer and Klaus A. Vallen­
der (eds.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung: St. Galler Kommentar (3rd edn., Schulthess, Zurich/St. Gallen 
2014), Art. 30 BV, 7 ff. 
7 Pierre Tschannen, Staatsrecht der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (3rd edn., Stämfpli, Berne 2011), § 6 3. 
8 Rhinow et al. (n. 3) 1120. 
9 Kiener et al. (n. 1) 1245. 















   
  
  
authorities in individual cases that are based on the public law of the Confederation 
and have as their subject matter the following: 
(a) the establishment, amendment or withdrawal of rights or obligations; 
(b) a finding of the existence, non-existence or extent of rights or obligations; 
(c) the rejection of applications for the establishment, amendment, withdrawal or 
finding of rights or obligations, or the dismissal of such applications without 
entering into the substance of the case’ (Art. 5). 
The law specifies that also enforcement measures, interim orders, decisions on objec­
tions, appeal decisions etc. fall under the scope of this clause but not declarations 
made by authorities on the rejection or raising of claims. It may be that an administra­
tive act is simply declaratory, clarifying the existence, the non-existence or the extent 
of public law rights or obligations. Such a declaratory ruling must be given if the 
applicant has an interest that is worthy of protection. 
The Swiss Cantons have codes of administrative procedure of their own. These codes
are applicable not only for cantonal acts based on cantonal law but also for cantonal acts
applying federal law (or both cantonal and federal law). Many federal laws are imple­
mented by the cantons. Although the cantons must not adhere to the federal definition
of an administrative act (and the consequences on legal protection that follow from that
approach), there are no noticeable differences in cantonal law. Hence, the definition of
administrative acts is common both in federal and cantonal procedures.10 
Administrative acts concretise rights and duties derived from primary and second­
ary legislation. The law applies to a specific case through administrative acts. They 
clarify and stabilise the legal situation for individuals.11 Administrative acts may still 
rule the individual situation even if they were originally defective or became defec­
tive from subsequent developments such as an amendment to the applicable law.12 
These acts are the predominant form of action for administrative bodies. Again, the 
cantons, although not obliged by law in most cases, more or less follow the federal 
example set out in APA. 
The critical element of Art. 5 – and hence the often critical point whether legal 
protection can be sought – is the question whether certain administrative actions 
infringe individual rights. The Swiss Courts repeatedly had to deal with this question. 
For example, they answered in the affirmative that an administrative act is needed in 
cases of a building permit, allowing neighbours to challenge that act in court.13 An 
insurance company requested an administrative act in order to challenge administra­
tive burdens of the supervisory body. The request was granted by the Federal Admin­
istrative Court.14 A police officer in Geneva challenged the decision of the authorities 
to transfer him to another post. The canton of Geneva considered the relocation of 
the employee as an internal act not triggering any form of legal protection. The Swiss 
10 Hafelin et al. (n. 2) 851; Felix Uhlmann, in Bernhard Waldmann and Philippe Weissenberger (eds.), 
VwVG, Praxiskommentar zum Bundesgesetz uber das Verwaltungsverfahren (Schulthess, Zurich/Basel/Geneva 
2009) Art. 5 16. 
11 Christoph Auer, Markus Müller and Benjamin Schindler (eds.), VwVG Kommentar zum Bundesgesetz über 
das Verwaltungsverfahren (Dike, Zurich/Basel/Geneva 2008) Art. 5 20. 
12 Häfelin et al. (n. 2) 1087. 
13 BGE 133 II 249. 
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Supreme Court disagreed and requested an administrative act.15 The cases illustrate 
the practical importance of administrative acts. Courts have typically tried to draw the 
line between administrative acts and other forms of administrative action by looking 
at the rights and interests of the private parties involved.16 
The link between administrative acts and legal protection illustrates why private 
parties are looking for – or in the words of one scholar, ‘hunting for’17 – this form 
of administrative action. Indeed, until recently, legal protection outside the scope of 
administrative acts was typically less attractive for private individuals. If there was no 
administrative act to challenge, the only possible legal remedy was a claim on state 
liability. It was typically targeted against real acts (Realakte, actes matériels, atti materiali) 
such as governmental accidents, police action, public information etc.18 A notable 
case involved a governmental warning on the consumption of Swiss cheese (Vach­
erin Mont d’Or) for fear of listeriosis, hence not legally prohibiting the selling and dis­
tribution of that cheese (administrative act), but obviously heavily affecting market 
demand. The producers of that cheese only had the possibility of a claim for state 
liability based on the allegedly disproportionate warning. They were not successful.19 
The disadvantage of state liability claims is both procedural and in substance. In state 
liability cases, claimants must prove various prerequisites such as damage, illegality 
of state behaviour, causality etc. Especially in cantonal proceedings, the procedure 
involves principles of civil procedure and burdens claimants with costs much higher 
than in a typical administrative case.20 Unlike an administrative act that usually may 
only be enforced after its legality has been reviewed in court, state liability cases take 
place after the detrimental action of the state. Financial compensation is usually the 
only legal remedy which may prove unsatisfactory. Finally, state responsibility typi­
cally requires malpractice by the state whereas administrative acts are subject to full 
scrutiny.21 
When reforming federal procedure the legislator tried to fill that gap of legal pro­
tection by introducing a new article in the Administrative Procedure Act (Art. 25a). It 
stipulates that any person who has an interest worthy of protection may request from 
the authority to decide on the legality of its own acts. The decision resulting thereof 
must be given in the form of an administrative act, hence triggering administrative pro­
tection. It is clear that the new provision tries to overcome some shortcomings that are
to be found in state liability. It tries to prevent or to stop unlawful real acts.22 Its proce­
dure follows the logic of legal protection through administrative acts: If the applicant 
possesses an interest ‘worthy of protection’,23 she or he may request an administrative 
15 BGE 136 I 323, 328 ff., E.  4.3.–4.5.. 
16 Hafelin et al. (n. 2) 851, 874 and 881; Waldmann Bernhard, Vom Umgang mit organisatorischen, innerdi­
enstlichen und anderen Anordnungen ohne Verfügungscharakter, ZSR 133/I (2014) 489 ff., 507f.; Felix Uhl­
mann, in Waldmann and Weissenberger (n. 12) Art. 5 96 f. 
17 Sergio Giacomini, ‘Vom Jagdmachen auf Verfügungen’ (1993) 94 Zentralblatt 237. 
18 Häfelin et al. (n. 2). 
19 BGE 118 Ib 473. 
20 Alfred Kölz, Isabelle Häner and Martin Bertschi, Verwaltungsverfahren und Verwaltungsrechtspflege des Bun­
des (3rd edn., Schulthess, Zurich/Basel/Geneva 2013) 1957. 
21 Hans Rudolf Schwarzenbach-Hanhart, Staatshaftungsrecht bei verfügungsfreiem Verwaltungshandeln: Mit 
praktischer Anleitung zum Vermeiden/Vermindern dieser wachsenden Risiken (Risikomanagement) (Stämpfli, 
Berne 2006) 21. 
22 Isabelle Häner, in Waldmann and Weissenberger (n. 12) Art. 25a 37. 
23 BGE 121 I 87, 91 f., E. [Consideration/Erwägung] 1b. 











act, hence opening the procedural path. Again, legal protection follows the logic of 
administrative action through administrative acts. The scope of legal protection in 
these cases is largely defined by the term ‘interest worthy of protection’.24 It is the 
same term that is used by the APA to draw a line between appellants having standing 
and those that have not. This subject will be referred to below. 
The new provision is highly relevant for legal protection. In a recent case the Swiss 
Supreme Court upheld a decision by the Federal Administrative Court that private 
parties can refer to Art. 25a APA when challenging the supervision of the federal 
authorities on nuclear plants (BGE II 315, 322 ff. E. 3, 4 and 5). Such supervisory acts 
are informal in most cases hence excluding third party intervention. Under the new 
provision, if private parties are sufficiently affected by supervisory acts (or the neglect 
thereof), they may request an administrative act on the effectiveness of supervision. 
The Swiss cantons are not bound by the new Article of the APA in their own domain. 
In some cases they have copied the provision, in others they have opted for independ­
ent solutions (such as a direct appeal against real acts) or refrained from doing any­
thing. It is disputed whether the latter is still permissible under Art. 29a of the Swiss 
Constitution as this provision guarantees judicial protection in any legal dispute. The 
Swiss Supreme Court has not yet decided upon this issue. 
3.2 Procedural rights and administrative acts 
As explained above, the duty of the administrative bodies to act through administra­
tive acts triggers a number of procedural rights.25 
The most important guarantee is the right to be heard.26 It encompasses access to 
relevant documents, the possibility to propose witnesses and other means of evidence, 
to be informed of the possible administrative act beforehand etc. It is the cornerstone 
of procedural fairness, open enough to cover new grounds (e.g. right to reply) and 
to be adapted in the concrete situation of the case. As mentioned before, it is granted 
already by the Swiss Constitution. Procedural law and court practice concretise the 
right in specific situations, such as restrictions in cases of relevant third party interests 
(e.g. business secrets) or state interests (e.g. state security). Such restrictions often 
necessitate a fair balance of interests. Courts are typically reluctant to restrict access 
to relevant documents. If a restriction is necessary, they will try to summarise the 
content of the document in order to allow a fair discussion on the relevant facts of 
the case. The court itself has access to all documents of the administration – cases of 
documents not released to the courts are extremely rare.27 
While access to documents is probably the most relevant aspect of the right to be 
heard, it should be noted that the scope of this right goes much further: the right may 
also be violated if relevant evidence is rejected by the court, such as witness hearings 
(rare in administrative cases) or the appointment of a court expert. The court must 
24 Isabelle Häner, in Waldmann and Weissenberger (n. 12) Art. 25a 34. 
25 For simplicity, the following quotations only contain constitutional and federal law. The legal situa­
tion in the cantons is very similar, partly because of the compulsory nature of constitutional law, partly 
because of the example set out by federal law. 
26 Kölz et al. (n. 19), 487 ff.; Rhinow et al. (n. 3) 309 ff. 
27 One notorious example involved constructions plans on nuclear weapons, see the investigation of the 
Swiss Parliament (Fall Tinner, Rechtmässigkeit der Beschlüsse des Bundesrats und Zweckmässigkeit seiner Füh­
rung, Bericht der Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation der Eidgenössischen Räte vom 19. Januar 2009 [BBl 2009] 5007). 
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also effectively deal with the private parties’ arguments. If a decision is already taken 
irrespective of the arguments, the right to be heard is clearly violated. The obligation 
to consider all arguments manifests in the duty of the authority to state the grounds 
for its decision. In the decision, it must also contend – if only briefly – with the private 
parties’ arguments. 
The right to be heard also requests that the administrative process is sufficiently 
transparent. The authority must clearly designate an administrative act as such. This 
means that the private parties know when the process has ended – but also that the 
process is still ongoing as long as no administrative act has been issued. This obliga­
tion goes hand in hand with the duty of the authority to be transparent on the process 
and on the possible measures intended. The authority may neither be unduly vague 
about its actions nor may it ‘surprise’ the private parties by its procedure. The latter 
is instructively illustrated by a recent decision of the Swiss Supreme Court: the local 
authorities have invited applicants for naturalisation to a first ‘get-to-know’. They had 
not made clear that they plan to test the applicants on their knowledge on Swiss cul­
ture, history etc. While it is admissible to expect applicants to have a basic knowledge 
on Switzerland, it is not correct to test that knowledge without proper notice (BGE 
140 I 99, 101 ff. E. 2 and 3). The case also shows that the right to be heard is a flexible 
instrument of courts to intervene against any form of administrative process that does 
not seem fair. 
A fair process also includes the right to a decision within a reasonable time (Art. 29 
of the Constitution).28 If the authority does not act within a reasonable time, an 
appeal may be launched at any time. The reasonableness must be determined in the 
light of all circumstances of the case. The authority may consider the complexity of 
the case, the urgency of the matter and the behaviour of the parties. No grounds for 
a delay are internal matters of the authority such as the lack of sufficient personnel. 
A last important aspect of the overall fairness of the procedure is the right to legal 
aid.29 The right to legal aid and to a counsel if necessary is clearly guaranteed by Art. 
29 para 3 of the Swiss Constitution: ‘Any person who does not have sufficient means 
has the right to free legal advice and assistance unless their case appears to have 
no prospect of success. If it is necessary in order to safeguard their rights, they also 
have the right to free legal representation in court.’ The aid can only be granted if a 
reasonable person would deem sufficient the chances of success. The need for legal 
counsel depends on the complexity of the matter and the abilities of the private party: 
if that person may represent him or herself without greater difficulties before the 
authority, a right to free legal representation will be denied. If the parties are covering 
the costs themselves, legal representation is possible in most administrative and court 
matters. However, there is no obligation to mandate a lawyer or another specialist. 
There are no procedures in Swiss administrative law that require legal representation. 
Even before the Swiss Supreme Court, cases in administrative and constitutional law 
may be brought and are brought by anybody capable of acting. 
As discussed before, the form of an administrative act implies per se that there is a 
legal remedy against that act. Administrative acts are subject to an appeal. The admin­
istrative act must contain instructions on legal remedies. Depending on the relevant 
administrative procedure, the appeal may go directly to a court or first to a higher 
28 Markus Müller, in Auer et al. (n. 10) Art. 46a 2 f. and 6 ff. 
29 Martin Kayser, in Auer et al. (n. 10) Art. 65 1 ff. 




















    
 
   
   
  
   
  
  
   
   
  
administrative authority and then to a court.30 Exceptions must be clearly stated by 
law and are restricted to exceptional cases.31 In practice, these exceptions involve 
highly political matters such as issuing a permit to build a nuclear power station or 
matters on national security (Art. 32 para. 1 lit. a and e ACA). Some exceptions con­
cern technical or subjective matters such as bonuses for civil servants (Art. 32 para. 1 
lit. c ACA). In total, the exceptions are narrowly drawn by the legislator – as requested 
by the Swiss Constitution. 
The right to an appeal may not be so obvious for third parties. It depends on the 
term ‘party’. Any party of the procedure may launch an appeal (and has the right 
to intervene earlier in the procedure). The Administrative Procedure Act defines 
parties, i.e. the holders of the procedural rights, by their material interest to partici­
pate: ‘Parties are persons whose rights or obligations are intended to be affected by 
the ruling.’32 A similar wording is used for the definition of locus standi in an appeal. 
A right to an appeal is accorded to anyone that is ‘specifically affected by the con­
tested ruling’ and ‘has an interest that is worthy of protection in the revocation or 
amendment of the ruling’ (Art. 48 para. 1 APA). Participation in the proceedings of 
the first instance is generally required for an appeal. 
3.3 Legal protection against normative acts 
Most normative acts can be challenged in a concrete case before a court (or before an
administrative body). A court will then proceed to a two-tier review. First, it investigates
whether the normative basis is legal (vorfrageweise, inzidente, konkrete Normenkontrolle) and
then, if the normative basis proves to be legal, whether the norm was applied correctly
in the case before the court.33 Art. 190 of the Swiss Constitution sensibly restricts judicial
review of statutory acts, as federal laws must be applied even in the case that the court
finds it unconstitutional.34 A direct challenge of normative acts (abstrakte, direkte Normen­
kontrolle) is possible regarding cantonal laws and ordinances. The latter includes internal
normative acts (Verwaltungsverordnungen) if these affect private parties and their review
proves impossible or impractical in a concrete case.35 The cases that are challenging
cantonal normative acts are decided directly by the Swiss Supreme Court if there is no
legal remedy on the cantonal level – which is typically the case for cantonal laws. The
Swiss Supreme Court may quash cantonal laws and render them fully or partly invalid.36 
Cantonal constitutions escape this control as they must be approved in a legal procedure
by the Swiss Parliament (Art. 51 para. 2 and 172 para. 2 of the Swiss Constitution).37 
The standing is far more generously admitted than in individual cases. A person 
may challenge a normative act if she or he can claim that there is a – even remote –
possibility that she or he will be affected by the act (virtuelles Betroffensein).38 An appeal 
30 See infra Chapter 4.
 
31 See supra Chapter 2.
 
32 Art. 6 APA, also that ‘other persons, organizations or authorities who have a legal remedy against the 

ruling’ as parties. 
33 Rhinow et al. (n. 3) 707 f. 
34 See infra Chapter 4.2. 
35 BGer [Bundesgericht/Federal Supreme Court], October 18, 2002, 1P.240/2002. 
36 Kölz et al. (n. 19) 1675 ff. 
37 Kiener et al. (n. 1) 1780. 
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against a normative act does not preclude a later legal remedy against an individual 
administrative act applying the mentioned normative act. In this respect, a normative 
act may be challenged twice, first in abstract terms how the act could be applied and 
later on how the act was actually applied. 
4 Institutional framework 
4.1 Administrative authorities 
Administrative authorities play a vital role in effective legal protection in adminis­
trative law. As shortly explained in the historical context, only hierarchical higher
administrative bodies were competent to grant legal protection.39 Although these bod­
ies were not institutionally independent – as they supervised the administrative acts
of their subordinate bodies – the level of protection should not be underestimated
for the following reasons. First, these bodies, often affiliated to the office of Justice of
the Canton or at least staffed with qualified lawyers, developed high standards of judi­
cial protection. Secondly, the superior administrative bodies usually know the daily
work of the lower units well, hence strengthening administrative oversight. Thirdly,
administrative control within the public administration has the practical advantage
of full scrutiny: Whereas courts typically do not review questions of administrative dis­
cretion, the appellant or supervisory administrative bodies show less or no restraint.40 
In the Swiss cantons – it is to be noted that the cantons as federated states also 
execute a substantial amount of federal law – the typical legal recourse goes first to 
the hierarchical higher administrative bodies, possibly involving up to three instances 
including the cantonal executive.41 The recourse then turns to the cantonal adminis­
trative courts. These courts have to guarantee Art. 29a of the Swiss Constitution which 
means that they must at least fully review questions of law and questions of fact. From 
the cantonal administrative courts, most cases can be taken to the Swiss Supreme 
Court (Bundesgericht, Tribunal fédéral, Tribunale federale). The Swiss Supreme Court
typically reviews only questions of law.42 
Administrative acts of the federal administration can be taken to the Swiss Fed­
eral Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Tribunal administratif fédéral, 
Tribunale administrativo federale). Judicial control by a higher administrative body
is the exception in the federal system. It has some practical significance in areas
that are excluded from judicial protection and may involve the Swiss Federal
Council.43 According to the existing legislation, the Federal Administrative Court
reviews questions of law, fact, and administrative discretion. However, judicial
practice has developed some restraint in the latter area; such cases often require
specialised technical understanding, knowledge of the local circumstances or sub­
jective factors (exams, administrative decisions on personnel etc.).44 Decisions
from the Swiss Federal Administrative Court may be challenged before the Swiss
Supreme Court. Some subject matter areas such as cases on immigration and
39 Rhinow et al. (n. 3) 412.
 






43 Tschannen (n. 7) § 38 20.
 
44 Häfelin et al. (n. 2) 444.
 
















   
 
  
   
   
  
  
asylum, on exams, and on subsidies are fully or partly excluded from review of the
Swiss Supreme Court (Art. 83 lit. c, d, k and t SCA), hence rendering the Federal
Administrative Court the last national instance. 
4.2 Courts 
As explained above, judicial control by courts is a constitutional requirement. Hence, 
most administrative acts may be challenged directly (like the acts of the federal 
administration) or indirectly via higher administrative bodies (e.g. acts of the can­
tonal administration) before an administrative court. The law may only ‘preclude the 
determination by the courts of certain exceptional categories of case’ (Art. 29a of the 
Swiss constitution). The rare cases of excluded matters before the Swiss Federal Court 
involve sovereign acts and highly political administrative acts (e.g. on nuclear energy) 
(Art. 32 para. 1 ACA). Judicial protection is also excluded in areas that are difficult 
to assess for courts from a practical viewpoint such as bonuses for civil servants.45 The 
cantons may exclude administrative acts of political nature. 
The most important restriction on judicial control is not based on these exceptions but
on Art. 190 of the Swiss Constitution. According to that provision, the ‘Federal Supreme
Court and the other judicial authorities apply the federal acts and international law’.
As a consequence of this provision, there is no constitutional review of federal laws, or
more precisely, Swiss courts must apply federal laws even if they are considered uncon­
stitutional.46 Judicial practice has carved some exceptions out of this rule, such as federal
laws which violate the ECHR. Still a substantial part of federal legislation is not subject to
court sanctions in case of a violation of the Constitution. The rationale of this provision
is that the last word on questions of constitutionality should not be given to a court but
to the legislator itself, being the organ with the highest democratic legitimation. The
federal legislator is not beyond the Constitution but beyond constitutional control; it
is bound by the Constitution and has to respect it. It means that the federal Parliament
itself must decide upon questions of constitutionality of federal laws – which it does
regularly, supported with expert opinion of the Federal Department of Justice. Several
attempts of the Swiss government to abolish Art. 190 of the Swiss Constitution have failed
as Parliament objected to a shift in power to the Courts.47 
It is to be noted that Switzerland does not have a special constitutional court. Con­
stitutional questions may be decided by every Swiss court including cantonal courts as 
well as courts in civil or penal matters, and in concrete cases even by administrative 
bodies.48 Switzerland, hence, has opted for a so called ‘diffuse’ system of constitu­
tional review, closer to the US court system than to the German model of concen­
trated constitutional review. 
According to the APA, ‘[t]he appellate authority shall itself make the decision in 
the case or in exceptional cases shall refer the case back to the lower instance and 
issue binding instructions’ (Art. 61 para. 1 APA). Referral to the lower instance is typi­
cally made if further fact finding has to be done by the lower instance or if the lower 
instance may exert discretion to decide the case. 
45 Rhinow et al. (n. 3) 444. 
46 Kiener et al. (n. 1) 1763. 
47 Astrid Epiney, Art. 190 BV paras. 8 ff. in Bernhard Waldmann, Eva Maria and Astrid Epiney (eds.), 
Basler Kommentar, Bundesverfassung, Helbling Lichtenhahn, Basel 2015. 




   
   
   
   
   
Figure 17.1 Appeal system before federal authorities 
Effective legal protection in Switzerland 313 
Both the appellate administrative authorities and the courts may grant interim 
relief. Typically, an appeal by itself has a suspensive effect.49 As the APA declares, a 
court may also take ‘other precautionary measures [. . .] to preserve the current situ­
ation or to temporarily safeguard interests that are at risk’ (Art. 56 APA). Swiss courts 
approach the question of suspensive effect and of precautionary measures typically 
with a balancing test between the interest of the state and of private parties. If they 
believe that the result of the case is evident, they also may take into account the prob­
able outcome of the case.50 
A simplified version of the institutional framework may be depicted as follows: 
4.3 Other bodies and procedures 
In the federal system, special committees serving as courts have been abolished, with 
the exception of the Independent Complaints Authority for Radio and Television. 
The committees have been replaced by the Federal Administrative Court, being com­
petent in all matters decided by the federal administration.51 In the cantons, special 
committees still exist, most notably in the areas of construction, taxes, culture and 
education. From there, the cases go to the cantonal administrative court and eventu­
ally further to the Swiss Supreme Court.52 
Some Swiss cantons know the institution of the Ombudsman that has some practi­
cal significance.53 On the federal level, an initiative to introduce the Ombudsman 
failed. There are however two independent, personalised functions of control of state 
set administrated prices (Eidgenössischer Preisüberwacher) and of data protection and 
publicity of the public administration (Eidgenössischer Datenschutzbeauftragter). Both 
49 For details see Rhinow et al. (n. 3) 680 ff.
 
50 Kiener et al. (n. 1) 1327 ff.
 
51 Rhinow et al. (n. 3) 783 ff.
 
52 Kiener et al. (n. 1) 1404.
 
53 Häfelin et al. (n. 2) 1768 ff.
 







     
 
may resort to legal remedies but their most efficient tools are negotiations with the 
administration and public information. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has been recently introduced into the APA 
which says that the court ‘may suspend the proceedings with the consent of the par­
ties in order that the parties may agree on the content of the ruling’ (Art. 33b para. 1 
APA). It may encourage the agreement by appointment of a neutral mediator. It is too 
early to comment on the practical consequences of this provision. 
5 European perspective 
As Switzerland is not an EU member, European law is not directly applicable. How­
ever, it may be relevant via the bilateral treaties or as autonomous decision of the
Swiss authorities to implement European law (autonomer Nachvollzug). Still, legal pro­
tection is hardly affected by European law as the procedure typically follows internal
Swiss law. 
If Switzerland should achieve an institutional agreement with the EU, questions of 
jurisdiction were a core element of such an agreement. It would clearly influence the 
administrative process in matters that are covered by EU law. However, as Switzerland 
adopted a popular referendum on mass immigration on 9 February 2014, the nego­
tiations are not likely to come to a successful end in the near future. 
In contrast, legal protection in administrative matters has been influenced by 
ECtHR decisions. As explained above, legal protection in public administration has 
not only been deemed sufficient in the case of ‘civil matters’, encompassing areas that 
fall under Swiss administrative law. The ECtHR is still influencing (administrative) 
procedure, recently for example in cases concerning the right to reply. The Swiss 
Supreme Court has now shaped a practice that should be consistent with ECtHR 
requirements: all documents submitted in court procedures must be forwarded to the 
parties, in administrative procedures all relevant documents. 
6 Conclusions 
The principle of effective legal protection in administrative law is to a large extent 
honoured by Switzerland. The main principles are strongly routed in the constitu­
tion. Deficits of legal protection that are a consequence of the (relatively narrow) 
concept and nature of the administrative act have been overcome (or should be over­
come) by the amendment of the APA on real acts. The extent of procedural rights 
seems sensitive; there are neither apparent gaps nor are these rights overly restricted 
by law or court practice. 
The most problematic provision – in my view – is Art. 190 of the Swiss Constitution. 
There is no (or only a limited) protection under the ECHR against infringements 
based on Swiss federal law. The Swiss Supreme Court must apply these laws even if 
deemed unconstitutional. A similar problem arises for more and more radical popu­
lar initiatives on the Swiss Constitution: these propositions may only be ‘softened’ by 
the Swiss Supreme Court, but the core of these initiatives typically targeting migrants, 
criminals and religious minorities are untouched by judicial control. They may well 
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1 Introduction: Historical developments 
Effective legal protection and access to justice are fundamental principles in the 
UK: it is essential that everyone be able to secure access to justice irrespective of 
their social status, race, sex, or financial power. However, it is equally true that the 
task of securing access to justice is often problematic. As a nineteenth century Irish 
judge, James Matthew, once noted, ‘[i]n England, justice is open to all – like the Ritz 
Hotel’ – in theory, everyone can access justice, but in practice only a few people may 
actually succeed in doing so. While effective legal protection is a fundamental princi­
ple, in practice it is hedged around with various practical difficulties. The challenge 
for the legal system is the extent to which it can actually secure its vision of effective 
legal protection in practice. 
This country report describes and analyses the institutions and procedures for 
securing effective legal protection in the UK. This raises a number of themes. One 
theme concerns the constitutional framework and basis for effective legal protection. 
Unlike other countries, the UK has no written constitution. The basis for effective 
legal protection is not therefore contained with an overarching higher-ranking con­
stitutional norm. Instead, it is to be found in accumulation of practice, precedent, 
case law and legislation. 
A second theme concerns the powerful position of the executive and its attitude 
toward effective legal protection. In a formal sense, the UK constitution is based upon 
a hierarchy of institutions as ordered by constitutional principles. Parliament is sov­
ereign. To ensure that the executive acts in accordance with legislation and the com­
mon law, the courts check and review the legality of executive decisions. However, 
in practice, this formal construct does not reflect the reality of how political and 
administrative power is exercised. In practice, Parliament is largely controlled by the 
executive. The courts have no power of constitutional review and must apply primary 
legislation. The executive, therefore, occupies a particularly powerful place within 
the UK’s constitutional system, which, in turn, requires an effective system of account­
ability. Yet, the executive possesses an ability to influence the design and operation 
of legal protection. The courts have a residual ability, through techniques such as 
statutory interpretation and common law principles, to ensure legal accountability 
of government. There is an inherent – and sometimes acute – tension between the 
institutions involved and the underlying political and legal forces in play (executive 
power and policy considerations versus effective legal protection), especially when 
the executive seeks to constrain access to effective legal protection. 





























   
  
  
A third major theme over recent years has been the effects of financial austerity.
Since 2010, the UK Government has significantly reduced public spending. This pro-
gramme has affected most areas of government including the legal system. Effective
legal protection costs money in terms of the resourcing of courts and tribunals and
publicly funded legal representation. An important area of debate is whether such cuts
are permissible or whether they unduly restrict access to justice and legal protection. 
Legal protection in the UK has a long history. For many centuries, the courts super­
vised and checked the decisions of inferior public bodies by ensuring that they acted
within the limits of their jurisdiction. The courts also applied ordinary principles of
private law to protect individuals. For instance, in a famous case, where a publisher’s
house and papers had been ransacked by the king’s messengers sent by the Home
Secretary, the remedy was an ordinary action for trespass for which damages were
awarded.1 However, there was no developed system of administrative law with special
administrative courts. Instead, what developed was a piecemeal system of tribunals,
which determined appeals against administrative decisions, and individual judicial
decisions. During the twentieth century, concerns over the lack of effective legal pro­
tection of individuals against government increased substantially. The courts often
adopted a deferential approach toward government decisions. As the nature and role
of the modern state changed, concerns were raised that the individual no longer had
any effective legal protection against government. Yet, in the second half of the twenti­
eth century, a number of reforms were introduced to meet such concerns.2 The courts
developed principles of judicial review to impose the rule of law on government. 
The UK now has a developed system of administrative law comprising courts, tri­
bunals, and ombudsmen. This system differs in important respects from continental
systems. First, it is the ordinary courts – not specialised administrative courts – that
review the legality of administrative decisions. At the same time, there is a degree
of specialisation: judicial review challenges are channelled into the Administrative
Court, that division of the High Court that deals with judicial review. Secondly,
while the Administrative Court sits at the apex of the whole system, tribunals deter­
mine the majority of the challenges against government decisions. A third point
is that the principles and norms governing legal protection are not codified any­
where, though there are various non-binding codes of good administration.3 The
procedures used in any particular administrative context will be an amalgam of
statute, common law, and administrative guidance. 
2 Constitutional framework 
As is well-known, the UK does not have an over-arching formal constitutional text or
framework. The constitution is a product of historical developments, political and gov­
ernmental practice, and judicial decisions. There is plenty of debate amongst academic
lawyers as to the nature of the UK’s constitution, whether it is an essentially political or
1 Entick v Carrington (1765) St Tr 1030.
 
2 See Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Administrative Law’ in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.), The British Constitution in the Twentieth 

Century (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003). 
3 Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, Principles of Good Administration (2007); Administrative 
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legal constitution. For some scholars, the UK constitution does possess a legal founda­
tion which is based upon the rule of law and the ability of the courts to expound upon
fundamental legal principles.4 From this perspective, there is an underlying normative
basis for the constitution. By contrast, other scholars start from a far more descriptive
standpoint: the constitution is what happens.5 There are two fundamental constitu­
tional principles: parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. Parliamentary sover­
eignty means that Parliament can make any law if it wishes; there are no higher-order
constitutional principles or norms against which the constitutionality of legislation can
be assessed. The rule of law means that governmental decisions must be in accordance
with legislation and common law principles as developed by the courts. 
The principle of effective legal protection is an important component of the rule 
of law. As a former senior judge, Sir Thomas Bingham has stated the core principle 
of the rule of law is that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public 
or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of law publicly made, tak­
ing effect in the future and publicly administered in the courts.6 The courts interpret 
legislation and review the exercise of administrative powers against procedural and 
substantive safeguards of legality. They presume that Parliament legislates against a 
wider backdrop of such safeguards which the courts will apply. The courts will only 
allow such principles and standards to be overridden by explicit statutory language. 
As Lord Steyn has noted, ‘[u]nless there is the clearest provision to the contrary, Par­
liament must be presumed not to legislate contrary to the rule of law. And the rule 
of law enforces minimum standards of fairness, both substantive and procedural.’7 
As a general principle, every governmental decision should be susceptible to review
before the courts. The notion that the courts are the ultimate defenders of the individual
and the providers of effective legal protection is deeply embedded in the common law.
Judicial review is one of the most important means by which the Government and other
public bodies are held legally accountable for the lawfulness of their decisions and actions,
including their compatibility with the requirements of human rights law. According to the
President of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, ‘the courts have no more important
function than protecting citizens from the abuses and excesses of the executive’.8 
The courts review administrative decisions under three general principles: legality;
procedural fairness; and irrationality. The expansion of judicial review over the last half
century has been justified by the courts on account of the deficiencies of, and weak
protection provided by, the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, that is, the political
accountability of government ministers to Parliament, in which those ministers them­
selves necessarily have a majority of MPs. In 1911, a judge robustly stated that ‘[i]f min­
isterial responsibility were more than the mere shadow of a name, the matter would be
less important, but as it is the Courts are the only defence of the liberty of the subject
against departmental aggression’.9 In 1995, Lord Mustill noted that the employment
4 See, eg, T. R. S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2001). 
5 J. A. G. Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1. 
6 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Allen Lane 2010) 8. 
7 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pierson [1998] AC 539, 591 (Lord Steyn). 
8 Lord Neuberger, ‘Justice in an Age of Austerity’ Tom Sargant Memorial Lecture 2013, 15 October 2013 
(available at http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131015.pdf) accessed 15 June 2015. 
9 Dyson v Attorney-General [1911] 1 KB 410, 424 (Farwell LJ). 




















of Parliamentary remedies against the abuse of executive power had ‘on occasion been
perceived as falling short, and sometimes well short, of what was needed to bring the
performance of the executive into line with the law, and with the minimum standards
of fairness implicit in every Parliamentary delegation of a decision making function.’10 
To avoid a vacuum in which the citizen would be left without protection against a
misuse of executive powers, the courts had no option but to occupy the dead ground
by developing judicial review to an unprecedented extent. In addition to domestic
common law of judicial review, there is also judicial review under the Human Rights
Act (HRA) 1998. This involves judicial scrutiny of administrative decisions to protect
Convention rights under the ECHR. Human rights challenges require the courts to
adopt a more intensive scrutiny by using the doctrine of proportionality.11 
A good illustration of the approach of the courts and their changing approach 
is provided by the issue of ouster clauses – statutory provisions that seek to exclude 
government decisions immune from judicial review. Such provisions present an 
inevitable tension between Parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law: should the 
court respect Parliament’s right to say what the law is and exclude judicial review? 
Or should the court interpret the relevant legislation in a manner that undermines 
Parliament’s intention? 
The classic case is Anisminic decided in 1969, in which a statutory provision that the 
determination of a particular government body ‘shall not be called in question in any 
court of law’ was construed by the House of Lords as meaning that only a lawful – not 
purported – determination could be excluded from judicial scrutiny.12 As the final 
word on whether or not a determination was lawful lay with the courts, the practical 
effect of the ouster clause in excluding judicial review was reduced to nil. Anisminic
was a direct challenge to Parliament; despite Parliament stating that the relevant 
decisions should not be challengeable, the courts insisted that they had the right to 
review. The case illustrates the court’s inherent jurisdiction to supervise and correct 
all inferior decision makers to ensure that they do not exceed their jurisdiction. Anis­
minic also provided a deft way in which courts can get around statutory attempts to 
exclude their jurisdiction, an approach applied in subsequent cases.13 However, the 
reasoning in Anisminic was rather tortuous and arcane: there was no explicit discus­
sion of the principle of legal protection or access to the courts. 
By the 2000s, things had moved on and the courts had become bolder. The imme­
diate background was the Government’s failed attempt, in 2004, to exclude all immi­
gration and asylum decisions from judicial scrutiny. In the event, that attempt failed 
because of parliamentary opposition – a good illustration of Parliament’s role in main­
taining effective legal protection. However, the episode deeply troubled the judges. 
If the executive exerts considerable power over Parliament and there is no constitu­
tional guarantee of legal protection, what then is to prevent the executive from abol­
ishing judicial review? If matters came to a head, what would the courts do? One view 
is that the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty is too deeply embedded to be quali­
fied by the courts alone. For Lord Neuberger, the courts must be vigilant to protect 
10 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1996] 2 AC 513, 567 (Lord Mustill).
 
11 See Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20, [2014] 2 WLR 808.
 
12 Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147.
 
13 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Fayed [1998] 1 WLR 763.
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individuals against the abuse of power, but they cannot go against Parliament’s will 
as expressed in statute.14 By contrast, Lord Steyn has noted that if Parliament were to 
assert an extravagant power by removing judicial review, then the courts ‘may have to 
consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parlia­
ment . . . cannot abolish’.15 Lord Hope expressed similar views, opining that ‘parlia­
mentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute’,16 and that ‘the rule of law 
enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is 
based’.17 The courts have therefore become more explicit in defending legal protec­
tion, but, given the wider constitutional position, they are in a relatively vulnerable 
position: excessive judicial activism will lay them open to criticism of unelected judges 
interfering with political matters. 
Effective legal protection is provided not just by courts, but also by tribunals. When­
ever Parliament establishes a scheme of government administration that involves 
making individualised decisions concerning whether or not an individual qualifies 
for a certain benefit or status or their financial liability, it often, though not always, 
establishes a right of appeal against negative decisions to tribunals. Tribunals have full 
jurisdiction in that they can determine appeals on issues of both law and fact. Other 
remedies, such as ombudsmen, are also statutory creations. Furthermore, perhaps 
the most important expansion of legal protection for individuals – the Human Rights 
Act 1998 – was enacted by Parliament to give further effect to the European Conven­
tion on Human Rights into domestic law. 
3 Rights-based perspective 
Traditionally, English law has not tended to use the language of rights; English law 
typically fastens, not on principles, but on remedies.18 Nonetheless, such remedies 
prioritise effective legal protection and access to justice. However, over recent years, 
the courts have become more explicit in defining justiciable errors in terms of princi­
ples or rights of which there are a number, including: the right of access to the courts; 
the principle of legality; and the general principles of judicial review (legality, proce­
dural fairness, and unreasonableness). The courts adopt a variable intensity of review: 
a low intensity of review is applied to cases involving issues that depend involve politi­
cal judgment, such as matters of national economic policy or those issues which are 
outside the normal expertise of the judges.19 In cases where fundamental rights are 
concerned, the courts adopt a more intensive scrutiny. These principles also inform 
how the courts interpret legislation. Furthermore, the courts have emphasised that 
the principle of legality requires clear statutory language before interfering with fun­
damental rights, such as access to justice and effective legal protection. The courts 
will, therefore, interpret such legislation as narrowly as possible so as to uphold effec­
tive legal protection. 
14 Lord Neuberger, ‘Who Are the Masters Now?’ (2011) The second Lord Alexander of Weedon lecture 72–73.
 






18 Davy v Spelthorne Borough Council [1984] AC 262, 276 (Lord Wilberforce).
 
19 Nottinghamshire County Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1986] AC 240, and R v Secretary of 

State for the Environment, ex parte Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1991] 1 AC 521. 
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The most important right is the right of access to the courts. ‘It is a principle of
our law that every citizen has a right of unimpeded access to a court. . . . Even in our
unwritten constitution it must rank as a constitutional right.’20 The courts are acutely
conscious of the importance of the right of access to the courts and will go to some
lengths in order to protect this right. To illustrate the point, consider the many cases
concerning the right of access to justice by prisoners. A number of cases have con­
cerned the confidentiality of communications between a prisoner and his lawyer and
whether or not the prison authorities can examine such communications. In Leech the
Court of Appeal held that a prison governor did not have the right to examine and
stop a prisoner’s letters to his lawyer.21 In Daly the House of Lords held that a blanket
policy requiring prisoners to be absent from their cells during a search of legal cor­
respondence was unlawful because the materials being searched were protected by
legal professional privilege; the possibility that a prison officer might improperly read
the correspondence and the inhibiting effect upon the prisoner’s willingness to com­
municate freely with his legal adviser, amounted to an infringement of the prisoner’s
right to legal professional privilege and therefore access to justice.22 Cases such as
these illustrate the courts’ ability to prevent indirect inhibitions on judicial protection. 
In many instances, individuals can appeal against administrative decisions (for 
instance, social security decisions) to tribunals. Tribunals are quicker, cheaper, more 
informal, and more expert than the courts.23 As tribunals are less adversarial and 
formal than the courts, the need for the parties to be legally represented, and so the 
need for legal aid funding, is reduced. They are not bound by the formal procedures 
and rules of evidence that the higher courts must follow; they can therefore deal with 
appeals in a more informal, user-friendly way. Tribunals are a relatively efficient way 
of dealing with the very high volume of cases generated by the modern administrate 
state. The relevant concept here is ‘proportionate dispute resolution’ – there must 
be a proportionate relationship between the issues at stake in a dispute and the costs 
of the procedures used to resolve it.24 For example, it would be out of proportion for 
disputes over entitlement to welfare benefits, although of immense significance to 
individuals, to be resolved through a judicial process akin to that used by the higher 
courts, which might cost more than the amount of money at stake – especially when 
the volume of such disputes is substantial. Parliament decides whether or not cases 
should be handled by the courts or tribunals. The Leggatt Report on tribunals sug­
gested three tests to inform such decisions: (i) the desirability of direct participation 
by tribunal users; (ii) the need for special expertise in the particular subject-matter; 
and (iii) expertise in administrative law.25 
Individuals can participate in the administrative process through the doctrine of 
procedural fairness. This is an especially important area protected by the common 
law. As Lord Sumption recently noted, ‘[t]he duty to give advance notice and an 
opportunity to be heard to a person against whom a draconian statutory power is to 




22 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532.
 
23 Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (Cmnd 218, 1957), [38].
 
24 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals
 
(White Paper, Cm 6243 2004) ch 2. 
25 Report of the Review of Tribunals by Sir Andrew Leggatt: Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service





























    
Effective legal protection in the UK 321 
be exercised is one of the oldest principles of what would now be called public law.’26 
When a statute has conferred on any public body the power to make decisions affect­
ing individuals, then the courts will often impose additional procedural safeguards to 
ensure that the procedure followed is fair.27 As one judge once said, ‘the justice of the 
common law will supply the omission of the legislature’.28 
The basic principles of procedural fairness are as follows: (1) Where an Act of Par­
liament confers an administrative power there is a presumption that it will be exer­
cised in a manner which is fair in all the circumstances. (2) The standards of fairness
are not immutable. They may change with the passage of time, both in the general
and in their application to decisions of a particular type. (3) The principles of fairness
are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is
dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its
aspects. (4) An essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discre­
tion, as regards both its language and the shape of the legal and administrative system
within which the decision is taken. (5) Fairness will very often require that a person
who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make repre­
sentations on his own behalf either before the decision is taken with a view to produc­
ing a favourable result; or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification; or
both. (6) Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations
without knowing what factors may weigh against his interests, fairness will very often
require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer.29 
The application of these principles will depend upon the nature of the individual
decision making process. Procedural fairness is ‘essentially an intuitive judgment’.30 
The courts have laid down the requirements of procedural fairness in many cases.
These include the following: the need for government to notify an individual of
adverse concerns before making a decision; the ability of that individual to respond
and comment upon such concerns, whether by way of an oral hearing or on the
papers; and, if there is to be an oral hearing, whether there should be cross-
examination of witnesses. The position as regards the making of secondary legisla­
tion is that government may be obliged by statute to consult affected parties or it
may do so as a matter of practice. There is no common law duty to consult before
making regulations.31 
Closely linked to the procedure before a decision is the issue of whether reasons 
should be given for a decision. There is no general duty to give reasons, but legisla­
tion often requires reasons to be given in particular contexts. If not, then the courts 
will often impose a duty to give reasons at common law if the refusal to do so would be 
unfair by adversely affecting an individual’s rights or the lack of reasons would render 
the decision aberrant.32 If reasons are given, then they must be proper, adequate and 
intelligible and deal with the substantial points raised.33 
26 Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [29] (Lord Sumption).
 
27 Lloyd v McMahon [1987] 1 AC 625, 702–703 (Lord Bridge of Harwich).
 
28 Cooper v Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (1863) 14 CB(NS) 190, 194 (Byles J).
 




31 R (BAPIO Action Limited) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 1139.
 
32 R v Higher Education Funding Council, ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 WLR 242.
 
33 Re Poyser and Mills’ Arbitration [1964] 2 QB 467, 478 (Megaw J); South Bucks District Council v Porter [2004] 

1 WLR 1953. 

































   
  
The importance of timely decisions is widely recognised; the phrase ‘justice
delayed is justice denied’ derives from Magna Carta (1215). Yet, in general terms,
there is no legal requirement for an administrative decision within a reasonable time.
Timeliness is often viewed more as a matter of quality service standards. Government
departments often have specific targets, for instance, that a certain percentage of
decisions will be taken within a certain timeframe. But, such targets are not legally
binding. There are specific legal provisions concerning the timeliness of decisions
in some contexts. For instance, if the Home Office cannot decide an asylum applica­
tion within six months, then it must either inform the applicant of the delay or notify
the applicant of the anticipated timeframe for a decision, but this does not oblige
the Home Office to take a decision within the stipulated time-frame.34 However, gov­
ernment departments are reluctant to be legally bound by time-limits. For instance,
when the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) introduced a mandatory recon­
sideration process to review initial negative decisions, it refused to introduce a time
limit. At the same time, following concerns about the absence of a time limit for
DWP decision makers to respond to social security appeals, a time limit of 28 days
was introduced in 2014.35 
The courts have, in general, been reluctant to tie down public bodies to make
decisions within specific timeframes. Many challenges against delay have arisen
in the immigration context and the cases tend to be fact-specific. The courts have
held that if someone has established the right to some benefit of significance,
such as refugee status, and all that is required is its formal grant, then the public
body must confer that benefit without unreasonable delay.36 The resources avail­
able to the authority will be part of the circumstances which can be taken into
account when determining whether the delay is reasonable. On the other hand,
in the context of the Home Office’s legacy programme of clearing an enormous
backlog of undecided asylum cases, the courts have ruled that claims based on
delay are unlikely, save in very exceptional circumstances, to succeed. Unreason­
able administrative delay is unlawful.37 The courts have also held that delay may be
a factor when assessing whether the removal of a foreign national would breach
the right to family life.38 The general position is that administrative delay does not
by itself comprise illegality, but it will be maladministration (and therefore amena­
ble to the jurisdiction of ombudsmen). The court’s proper sphere is illegality, not
maladministration. 
4 Institutional perspective 
We now consider the institutional framework for the effective legal protection. This 
comprises: courts; tribunals; and ombudsmen (see Table 18.1). 
34 Immigration Rules, r.333A.
 
35 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, Time For Action (2011).
 
36 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Mersin [2000] INLR 511.
 
37 R (FH; K; A; V; H; SW; HH; AM; SI & ZW) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 1571 

(Admin). 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Judicial reviews lodged 
Judicial reviews allowed 
Claims granted permission 
Judicial review claims are heard by the Administrative Court to determine the legal­
ity of administrative decisions. The court has an inherent common law jurisdiction 
(meaning that it is not provided by statute) which is limited to reviewing the legal­
ity of administrative decisions, not primary legislation. Broadly speaking, the courts 
can review government decisions on the following grounds: legality; irrationality; and 
procedural fairness. The general principles of judicial review also encompass many 
other principles such as: legitimate expectations; proportionality; taking account of 
relevant considerations and excluding irrelevant considerations; the principle that 
public power must not be exercised for an improper purpose; and the principle 
against the fettering of administrative discretion. The courts also have a jurisdiction 
to review the legality of regulations and secondary legislation. The courts often adopt 
a pragmatic approach. As one judge once explained, ‘the ultimate question would, as 
always, be whether something had gone wrong of a nature and degree which required 
the intervention of the court and, if so, what form that intervention should take’.39 If 
something appears to have gone wrong, then the judge searches for a legal hook to 
hang it on.40 
Claimants for judicial review must first apply to the court for permission to proceed, 
that is, they must show that they have an arguable case. Many judicial review claims 
are filtered out at this stage (see Figure 18.1). Those challenges given permission 
can then proceed to a substantive hearing to determine whether the impugned deci­
sion was unlawful. An important recent development has been the regionalisation of 
the Administrative Court. The Administrative Court has long been based centrally in 
London, but in 2009 regional centres were established to improve access to public 
Figure 18.1 Judicial review claims 
39 R v Take-over Panel, ex parte Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146, 160C (Lord Donaldson MR). 
40 Lord Carnwath, ‘From Judicial Outrage to Sliding Scales – Where Next For Wednesbury?’ (ALBA 
Annual Lecture, 12 November 2013) (available at http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131112-lord­
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law redress by enabling people to bring their cases locally.41 The Upper Tribunal also 
decides judicial review claims in certain areas, such as immigration. 
Secondly, there are tribunals. Whereas judicial review focuses upon the legality of 
decisions, tribunals determine substantive appeals. An individual who has made an 
application to a public body, for instance, for a welfare benefit or immigration status, 
can appeal against a decision to the relevant tribunal.42 Tribunals operate in many 
areas of government, such as: social security; immigration; tax; mental health; educa­
tion; transport; and information rights. First instance tribunals are concerned with 
fact-finding. They are more informal and less legalistic than the courts. For instance, 
tribunals tend to adopt an inquisitorial procedure – unlike the more adversarial pro­
cedure adopted by the higher courts. This increases the ability of tribunals to provide 
effective legal protection. Appeal rights are statutory and can therefore be created or 
withdrawn in accordance with government policy. For instance, the current UK gov­
ernment wishes to save money by reducing immigration appeal rights. In the absence 
of an appeal right, an individual may seek judicial review. Nonetheless, the courts 
have repeatedly emphasised the importance of tribunals: ‘In this day and age a right 
of access to a Tribunal or other adjudicative mechanism established by the state is just 
as important and fundamental as a right of access to the courts.’43 
Tribunals have become increasingly important for a number of reasons. They now 
comprise the principal means for challenging governmental decisions. The number 
of appeals determined by tribunals far exceeds that of the courts (Figures 18.2 and 
18.3). The previously disparate and unsystematic tribunals ‘system’ was reformed in 
2007: existing tribunals were brought together into two generic tribunals: the First-
tier Tribunal (which determines first instance fact-based appeals) and the Upper Tri­











2007/08 2009/10 2011/12 2013/14 
Year 
All tribunals Social security tribunals Immigration appeals 
Figure 18.2 Appeals disposed by tribunals 
41 S. Nason and M. Sunkin, ‘The Regionalisation of Judicial Review: Constitutional Authority, Access to 
Justice and Specialisation of Legal Services in Public Law’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 223. 
42 R. Thomas, Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeals: A Study of Tribunal Adjudication (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2011). 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effective legal protection in the UK 327 
on a point of law.44 Both of these tribunals are divided into chambers, such as the 
Immigration and Asylum Chamber. The Upper Tribunal is a specialist and expert 
body of equivalent standing to the High Court. It is expected that the Upper Tribunal 
will take a lead by producing guidance on key important issues and the higher courts 
will, in general, respect its decisions. Also, responsibility for some types of judicial 
reviews has been transferred from the Administrative Court to the Upper Tribunal. 
In 2013, most immigration and asylum judicial review cases were transferred to the 
Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) to relieve the pressure on the 
Administrative Court. 
Thirdly, there are complaint systems and ombudsmen. All public authorities will 
have some complaints processes. Complaints can also be made to Members of Parlia­
ment who will then take the matter up with the relevant government department. 
In some contexts, a complaint dissatisfied with the response from the public author­
ity, can then pursue the matter to an independent complaint handling body. For 
instance, the Adjudicator’s Office investigates complaints from individuals and busi­
nesses unhappy about the handling of their complaints by HM Revenue & Customs. 
A number of ombudsmen schemes have also been created to investigate complaints. 
The principal ombudsman schemes in the UK are: the Parliamentary and Health 
Service Ombudsman (PHSO), which investigates complaints against central govern­
ment; the Local Government Ombudsman; and the public services ombudsmen for 
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Ombudsmen have proliferated over recent 
years and there are now a considerable number of such schemes. 
The jurisdiction of ombudsmen is one of maladministration not legality. The 
Ombudsman’s Principles of Good Administration indicate the standards expected of 
public bodies: getting it right; being customer focused; being open and accounta­
ble; acting fairly and proportionately; putting things right; and seeking continuous 
improvement. Ombudsmen can intervene if there is injustice to an individual in con­
sequence by maladministration. Remedies will normally include recommendations to 
improve for the future and learn lessons as well as compensation to an individual who 
has sustained injustice. Ombudsmen recommendations are not legally enforceable, 
but they are almost always followed by government. 
5 The limits on effective legal protection 
Each of these institutions faces challenges in seeking to provide effective protection to 
individuals against the state. These challenges arise from a number of issues, includ­
ing: resources; political reasons; the inherent design of the legal institutions; and the 
relationships between different institutions. We will consider each institution in turn. 
Judicial review has expanded since the 1960s in response to the growth of admin­
istrative power and the judicial recognition that political forms of accountability 
were largely ineffective in terms of providing legal protection. The courts have also 
expanded their jurisdiction over areas of government that were previously ‘no-go’ 
areas. For instance, before the 1970s areas of government activity, such as prisons, 
immigration and asylum, and the armed forces were largely exempt from any judicial 
44 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. See further M. Elliott and R. Thomas, Public Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2nd edn., 2014), 330–9. 













scrutiny at all, yet gradually, the courts have opened up such areas to scrutiny. This has 
had the effect of exposing such areas of government to legal control. 
At the same time, the expansion of judicial review has been accompanied by the 
need to limit access to the Administrative Court. The court itself has various mecha­
nisms for regulating its own jurisdiction. An individual can only pursue judicial review 
if given permission to proceed by the court itself. Furthermore, before seeking judicial 
review, claimants must have exhausted other reasonably available means of seeking 
redress. The principle of exhausting alternative remedies is justified on two grounds: 
if Parliament has provided a statutory appellate scheme, then the courts should not 
usurp its functions; and, secondly, it is normally in the public interest that the judicial 
review jurisdiction should be exercised speedily and, given the constraints imposed by 
limited judicial resources, this necessarily involves limiting the number of cases given 
permission to proceed to judicial review.45 
The need to use limited judicial resources effectively also underlies the relationship 
between the High Court and the Upper Tribunal. For many years, tribunals were seen 
as inferior jurisdictions to be closely supervised by the High Court. In operation since 
2008, the Upper Tribunal, a superior court of record, has a status at least as equivalent 
to that of the High Court. The question has, then, arisen whether the Upper Tribunal 
(more precisely, the Upper Tribunal’s refusal of permission to appeal) is itself subject 
to judicial review. The Supreme Court’s answer in Cart was that the Upper Tribunal 
could be subject to judicial review, but only if the case raised an important point of 
principle or practice or there were other compelling reasons.46 Unrestricted judicial 
review of non-appealable decisions of the Upper Tribunal was neither proportion­
ate nor necessary for maintaining the rule of law given the Upper Tribunal’s status 
and limited judicial resources.47 The use of resources must be proportionate to the 
significance of the case and the previous opportunities for challenge. The courts are, 
therefore, willing to recognise the importance of limited resources upon effective 
legal protection, but they prefer to retain ownership of such decisions. 
Over recent years, the Government has sought to limit access to judicial review.48 
The Government’s case was that judicial review has been used too much as a political 
campaigning tool by pressure groups and by lawyers seeking to exploit the legal aid 
system.49 Furthermore, judicial review has been used to delay major infrastructure 
projects. Although the Government’s case was couched in the language of seeking 
to manage judicial review and to limit the court’s jurisdiction to its proper role, it is 
apparent that it was a thinly-veiled attempt to constrain judicial review. 
45 R v Panel on Takovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146, 177 (Lord Donaldson MR).
 
46 R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2001] UKSC 28.
 
47 See R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2001] UKSC 28, [100] (Lord Simon Brown).
 
48 Ministry of Justice, Judicial Review: Proposals for Further Reform (Cm 8703, 2013); Criminal Justice and 

Courts Bill 2014. 
49 Chris Grayling, ‘The Judicial Review System is Not a Promotional Tool for Countless Left-wing 
Campaigners’ The Daily Mail, 6 September 2013 (available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ 
article-2413135/CHRIS-GRAYLING-Judicial-review-promotional-tool-Left-wing-campaigners.html)
accessed 15 June 2015 and Chris Grayling, ‘We Must Stop the Legal Aid Abusers Tarnishing Britain’s Jus­
tice System’ The Daily Telegraph 20 April 2014 (available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ 
law-and-order/10777503/Chris-Grayling-We-must-stop-the-legal-aid-abusers-tarnishing-Britains-justice­
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The Government’s proposals to limit judicial review included the following:
(1) introducing a ‘no difference’ principle: the courts would have to refuse judicial
review where it would be ‘highly likely’ the outcome of the decision would not have
been substantially different if the public authority’s conduct complained of had not
occurred; (2) restricting legal aid for judicial review claims, so that judicial review chal­
lenges would not normally receive legal aid funding unless the case was sufficiently
meritorious to justify payment; (3) making third parties who intervene in judicial
review cases pay their own costs; and (4) capping protective cost orders, which limit
the costs exposure of a party where the legal issues raised are of general public impor­
tance. The Government’s initial proposals would have restricted the rules govern­
ing standing to bring judicial review claims, so that challenges by non-governmental
organisations would have been prohibited. The Government’s concern was that the
courts’ wide approach to standing has tipped the balance too far, allowing judicial
review to be used to seek publicity or otherwise to hinder the process of proper deci­
sion making, but this proposal was abandoned following criticism from the judiciary.50 
These proposals prompted vigorous opposition and criticism from the legal profes­
sion, the judiciary and Parliament. Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights 
recognised that the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring judicial review 
is not abused, but was highly critical of all of the Government’s proposed reforms.51 
The Committee concluded that there was a poor evidence basis for the reforms and 
that they would limit effective legal protection. The Committee’s view was that a ‘no 
difference’ principle would give rise to the risk of unlawful administrative action 
going unremedied and therefore risks incompatibility with the right of practical and 
effective access to court. The Committee also expressed concern that the reforms 
would significantly deter interventions in judicial review and that restricting the avail­
ability of costs capping orders to cases in which permission to proceed has already 
been granted by the court would be too great a restriction that would undermine 
effective access to justice. However, most of the Government’s proposals were enacted 
into legislation in 2015.52 
Another recent reform that has generated considerable concern was the withdrawal 
of legal aid for judicial review cases unless either the case has been given permission 
to proceed by the court or if the Lord Chancellor considers the case to qualify for 
legal aid.53 Concerns have been raised that the likely substantial reduction in the 
number of providers willing to provide public law assistance in legally aided cases will 
have a substantially detrimental effect on access to justice, legal protection, and legal 
accountability of government.54 The courts have though struck down part of this 
policy as unlawful.55 
50 See Lady Hale, ‘Who Guards the Guardians?’ Speech given at the Public Law Project Conference 2013 
(available at http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131014.pdf) accessed 15 June 2015. 
51 Joint Committee on Human Rights, The implications for access to justice of the Government’s proposals to reform 
judicial review (HL 174 HC 868 2013–14). 
52 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, ss 84–90. 
53 The Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations SI 2014/607. 
54 Justice, Briefing note on the Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No 3) Regulations (2014) (available at 
http://www.justice.org.uk/data/files/resources/370/JUSTICE-Judicial-Review-Legal-Aid-Regulations­
Briefing-March-2014.pdf) accessed 15 June 2015. 
55 R (Ben Hoare Bell) v Lord Chancellor [2015] EWHC Admin 523. 



















Similar themes arise in relation to tribunals. The courts have emphasised that 
access to tribunals is as fundamental as access to the courts themselves and have acted 
to protect access to tribunals. For instance, in FP (Iran), the Court of Appeal struck 
down a procedural rule which stated that the immigration tribunal had to hear an 
appeal in a party’s absence.56 The applicant had not been informed of the date of 
the appeal hearing by his representative and so had, not through his own fault, lost 
out on the opportunity to be heard in his appeal; the court therefore held that the 
rule was productive of irremediable unfairness. 
There are, though, a number of ways through which the effective legal protection 
provided by tribunals has been weakened. Appeal rights are statutory and therefore 
it is always open to Parliament, at the behest of the government, to amend or with­
draw appeal rights. In practice, government that exerts considerable influence in 
this regard. While some appeal rights, such as those in the social security context, 
are well-established, appeal rights in other areas have been repeatedly reformed and 
amended. For instance, appeals against a child’s exclusion from school have been 
downgraded to a review process applying the principles of judicial review to be oper­
ated by non-legally trained panel members. Concerns have been raised about the 
ability of non-legal members to apply the principles of judicial review. Furthermore, 
the review panels cannot order a child’s reinstatement at school, but only direct the 
school to reconsider the exclusion.57 Similarly, immigration appeals have recently 
been significantly reduced.58 This was opposed by a Parliamentary committee on the 
basis that the significant limitation of appeal rights is incompatible with the common 
law right of access to a court or tribunal in relation to unlawful decisions, and the 
right to an effective remedy. Nonetheless, the Government largely controls the legis­
lative process. Individuals who could previously appeal will now have to seek judicial 
review. 
Another concern has been that the trend toward internal administrative recon­
sideration of initial decisions in high-volume jurisdictions (such as social security
and immigration) either before tribunal appeals or as a substitute may operate to
the disadvantage of individuals seeking to challenge decisions. In the social security
context, mandatory reconsideration has been interposed between initial decision
making and access to tribunals. Benefit claimants refused initially can no longer
access the tribunal directly; they must first apply for mandatory reconsideration.
This is not necessarily objectionable: internally reviewing disputed decisions can
be quicker and cheaper than going direct to a tribunal. At the same time, there is a
risk that a system of mandatory reconsideration may operate as a barrier – especially
for vulnerable people who may find the system difficult to navigate. The concern is
that claimants with winnable cases may be deterred by mandatory reconsideration
from reaching the tribunal that might overturn initial decision. Similarly, in the
immigration context, the disparity in success rates between tribunal appeals (44%)
and administrative review (20%) casts doubt upon the latter as a means of effective
legal protection. 
56 FP (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 13.
 
57 Education Act 2011.
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Reductions in publicly funded legal advice and representation (legal aid) have also 
weakened effective legal protection provided by tribunals. Legal aid has, to some 
extent, been available for different tribunals for many years. For instance, advice 
and assistance was available for social security appellants whereas users of immigra­
tion appeals could access legal aid depending on a financial means test. It was often 
argued that legal representation significantly enhanced an individual’s ability to suc­
ceed in their appeal, but the Government has always resisted any extension of the 
limited legal aid available. That was the position until 2012. However, determined 
to cut public spending, the Government withdrew almost all legal provision for chal­
lenges against administrative decisions.59 Publicly funded advice and assistance for 
social security appellants was cut altogether – as was legal aid for immigration appeals 
(except bail and asylum cases). These measures were introduced amongst much 
opposition from the legal profession and campaigning groups on the basis that it 
would significantly reduce the ability of people to secure justice before tribunals. It 
remains to be seen what effect the legal aid changes have on tribunals. The risk is that 
people with unmeritorious cases may proceed nonetheless and people with arguable 
cases may not proceed (good advice can filter out hopeless cases and encourage peo­
ple with strong cases to appeal). 
Ombudsmen are generally considered to be a useful mechanism of investigating 
complaints, promoting the principles of good administration, and identifying defi­
ciencies in government and doing so in a way that avoids the cost, formality, and 
legalism of the courts. Nonetheless, despite their positive aspects, ombudsmen face 
challenges in providing effective protection. In 2014, the House of Commons Pub­
lic Administration Select Committee (PASC) highlighted the concern that there is a 
‘toxic cocktail’ in respect of complaints handling – a combination of a reluctance on 
the part of citizens ‘to express their concerns or complaints’ and a defensiveness on 
the part of services ‘to hear and address concerns’ – which can undermine efforts to 
deliver excellent public services.60 An effective ombudsman service can help to address 
this, but change is urgently needed if ombudsmen are to deliver a more effective 
service that is responsive and proactive. A range of concerns relate to their accessibil­
ity; for instance, the requirement for a complaint to be referred by an individual’s 
Member of Parliament to the Parliamentary Ombudsman has been a longstanding 
issue. The Ombudsman can only investigate if there is a specific complaint; it lacks 
the ability to seize the initiative for itself by undertaking ‘own-initiative’ investigations. 
The Ombudsman could also be a more high profile body and its accountability and 
oversight should be enhanced. More generally, the PASC concluded that the Parlia­
mentary Ombudsman, established in 1967, is impeded by out-of-date legislation so it 
fails to meet the expectations of today’s citizens; it is in danger of become ‘stuck in 
time’. New legislation is required for a modernised ombudsman service. The goal is 
that of simplifying the complaints maze and the fragmented ombudsmen system by 
creating a unified public services ombudsman. The current Government has pledged 
to reform the Parliamentary Ombudsman. 
59 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.
 
60 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Time for a People’s Ombudsman Service (HC 

655 2013–14). 
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6 European perspectives 
European law – both EU and ECHR – are part of UK law and a major influence. 
Before the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, the UK courts recognised the need to 
interpret domestic law in line with the ECHR. The HRA was enacted to give further 
effect to Convention rights in domestic law and there is an immense body of case 
law and literature on the impact of the HRA. At the same time, both the terms of 
EU membership and the place of the ECHR in domestic law can be highly politically 
contentious issues. There are particular historical and geographical reasons why the 
British people can be sceptical of pan-European bodies, such as the European Court 
of Human Rights. Political opinion ranges from those who support the status quo to 
those who would like to withdraw from both the EU and the ECHR. 
On the impact of EU membership on effective legal protection, a few key points 
can be highlighted. First, the UK courts have long accepted that the supremacy of 
EU law qualifies the constitutional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. In other 
words, when Parliament enacted the European Communities Act 1972, it achieved 
what had previously been considered impossible: Parliament bound its successors.61 
This important qualification of the fundamental constitutional doctrine has been 
cited as a precedent which shows that the general doctrine of parliamentary sover­
eignty is being qualified and that it may have other qualifications unrelated to the EU 
membership.62 To the extent that EU membership entails judicially enforceable limits 
on Parliament’s freedom to make law, it also contributes to the wider shift of ques­
tioning the appropriateness of an absolute doctrine of sovereignty. Secondly, with EU 
membership all of the legal doctrines and rights are enforceable in the UK courts. 
Furthermore, EU membership has exerted a ‘spillover’ effect whereby European con­
cepts of legal protection – such as legitimate expectations and proportionality – have 
been increasingly developed and assimilated into domestic law.63 
The Human Rights Act 1998 was enacted to give further effect to the ECHR in 
domestic law and to ‘bring rights home’ by making them enforceable in the domestic 
courts. A key provision states that public authorities cannot act in a way that is incom­
patible with Convention rights.64 Another important provision requires the courts, so 
far as it is possible to do so, to read and give effect to primary and subordinate legisla­
tion in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.65 If the courts cannot 
interpret legislation in accordance with the ECHR, then it may issue a declaration of 
incompatibility against the relevant Act.66 Such a declaration does not invalidate the 
legislation, but it highlights the incompatibility and the Government will virtually 
always amend the relevant Act to bring it into line with the ECHR. The courts and tri­
bunals must now therefore give effect to Convention rights under the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and there have been many cases involving human rights challenges. A prom­
inent case involved the terrorism legislation enacted after 9/11, which allowed the 
government to define suspected foreign terrorists without trial. The House of Lords 
61 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603.
 
62 Elliott and Thomas (n. 44) 330–339.
 
63 R. Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2000).
 
64 Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(1).
 
65 Ibid. s 3(1).
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declared the legislation incompatible with human rights law on the basis that it dis­
criminated between foreign and UK nationals and disproportionately infringed the 
right to liberty (Art. 5, ECHR). Despite the intensely political nature of the law, the 
Government accepted the judgment and amended the law accordingly.67 
The HRA has had a major impact as regards judicial enforcement. The courts
have had to take a far more intensive scrutiny of public decisions that has pre­
viously been the case. The domestic standard of substantive review – Wednesbury
unreasonableness – requires the courts to inquire whether or not an administrative
decision is completely unreasonable or outrageously defies logic or accepted moral
standards. Before the HRA, the courts did adopt a slightly more intensive scrutiny
to public decisions affecting human rights; they recognised the need to engage
in anxious or heightened scrutiny.68 However, even this approach is inapplicable
in human rights challenges. Instead, the courts must apply the doctrine of pro­
portionality to provide an effective remedy for protecting Convention rights. The
European Court of Human Rights in Smith and Grady made it clear that the domes­
tic test of unreasonableness effectively excluded any consideration of whether the
interference with the applicants’ rights answered a pressing social need or was pro­
portionate to the aims being pursued.69 The House of Lords subsequently accepted
that proportionality was the applicable test in human rights cases.70 
This has resulted in a bifurcated judicial review jurisdiction. The principle of pro­
portionality is, technically at least, not recognised under ordinary domestic judicial
review; the traditional ground of review, Wednesbury unreasonableness, requires the
court to adopt a less intensive scrutiny by asking whether the decision was so unrea­
sonable that no reasonable decision maker could ever have arrived at it.71 Yet, pro­
portionality must be applied in the context of human rights challenges to ensure
that the applicant is afforded an effective remedy.72 Under the Human Rights Act
1998, the court’s role is one of merits review by deciding for itself whether the deci­
sion was in accordance with Convention rights.73 By contrast, the role of the courts
at common law is ‘often more about process than merits’.74 There are some under­
lying similarities.75 However, the courts have stressed that in the context of funda­
mental rights, the scrutiny is likely to be more intense than where other interests
are involved. Furthermore, the advantage of proportionality is that it introduces an
67 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68; Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. 
68 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] AC 514, 531 (Lord Bridge). See 
also R v Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, 554 (Lord Bingham MR): ‘The more substantial 
the interference with human rights, the more the court will require by way of justification before it is 
satisfied that the decision is reasonable.’ 
69 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493. 
70 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 AC 532. 
71 Associated Provincial Pictures Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
72 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493; R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2001] 1 AC 532. 
73 Huang v Secretary of State for Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167 [11] (Lord Bingham). 
74 Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20 [245] (Lord Carnwath). 
75 In R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte First City Trading [1997] 1 CMLR 250, 278–279
Laws J noted that ‘Wednesbury and European review are two different models – one looser, one 
tighter – of the same juridical concept, which is the imposition of compulsory standards on decision 
makers so as to secure the repudiation of arbitrary power.’ 
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element of structure into the exercise, by directing attention to factors such as suit­
ability or appropriateness, necessity and the balance or imbalance of benefits and
disadvantages.76 
Standing back from the case law for a moment, the wider political picture is that 
the place of the ECHR in UK law is a highly controversial issue. The ECHR and 
human rights have often received inappropriately unfavourable media coverage, 
much of which is ill-informed. It is ironic that government ministers in the Labour 
Government which introduced the HRA (1997–2010) also occasionally criticised the 
courts for their decisions applying the HRA. Some would like to abolish the Human 
Rights Act altogether. In 2013, two senior Conservative Ministers (the Home Secre­
tary and the Secretary of State for Justice) pledged to repeal the HRA.77 In response, 
the president of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has warned that 
it would be a ‘political disaster’ for the UK to withdraw from the ECHR.78 Another 
view, expressed by the former Lord Chief Justice, is that the ECtHR has exceeded its 
limits as an unelected court. While supporting the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Lord Judge’s view is that the court, as an unelected body, has over-reached 
itself in attempting to dictate rather than influence the social legislation of Member 
States and that this raises serious questions of sovereignty.79 The prevalent attitude in 
the UK is that no court – however distinguished its judges may be – should arrogate to 
itself the power to overrule the decisions of an elected legislature. The Conservative 
Government elected in 2015 pledged to replace the Human Rights Act with a British 
Bill of Rights and to limit the role of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Whatever happens, the courts have, in the meantime, been preparing the ground 
for a possible post-HRA scenario by emphasising the importance and vigour of com­
mon law protections for fundamental rights and by viewing the common law as the 
primary springboard in human rights cases rather than the ECHR. A number of 
recent cases from the UK Supreme Court over the last year have placed particular 
and renewed emphasis on the common law as a source of fundamental constitutional 
values and rights. The courts have noted that while the Human Rights Act 1998 is of 
unquestionable importance, it does not supersede the protection of human rights 
under the common law or statute law. Human rights continue to be protected under 
domestic law. The values underlying both the Convention and the domestic constitu­
tion should be protected by a detailed body of domestic law.80 For instance, in Daly
a policy that prisoners be excluded from their cells during searches was unlawful 
when applied to a prisoner who had legal correspondence in his cell because of the 
prisoner’s common law right of legal confidentiality: the same result was required 
by both Art. 8 ECHR and the common law. According to a Court of Appeal judge,
76 Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20, [54] (Lord Reed).
 
77 May, Theresa, Speech at the Conservative Party Conference September 2013 (available at http://www.
 
conservativepartyconference.org.uk/Speeches/2013_Theresa_May.aspx) accessed 15 June 2015. See 
also ‘Theresa May: Tories to Consider Leaving European Convention on Human Rights’ BBC News 
9 March 2013 (available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21726612) accessed 15 June 2015. 
78 ‘Human Rights Row: UK Quitting Would Be Disaster – ECHR Head’ BBC News 14 January 2014 (avail­
able at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25726319) accessed 15 June 2015. 
79 ‘European Court of Human Rights “risk to UK sovereignty” ’ BBC News 28 December 2013 (available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-25535327) accessed 15 June 2015. 
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‘[t]he development of the common law did not come to an end on the passing of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. It is in vigorous health and flourishing in many parts of the 
world which share a common legal tradition.’81 
Such decisions are clearly part of a concerted judicial policy to limit the possible 
adverse consequence of any attempt to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998. If the Act 
were repealed, then the effects may be much less than anticipated by the proponents 
of such reforms. This is because the common law – including rights derived from the 
ECHR but absorbed into the common law – would remain even in the event of HRA 
repeal/ECHR withdrawal and the common law remains a vigorous source of law capa­
ble of being developed incrementally by the courts in accordance with the needs of 
society and to enable them to perform their constitutional function of maintaining 
the rule of law. 
7 Conclusion 
Legal protection is a long-established principle in the UK. Traditionally, the fore­
most purpose of the courts has been the need to protect the liberty of individuals
against the state. Over the last century or so, the scope of modern government has
increased the range of ways in which individuals interact with government. This
has prompted the development of a range of remedies to ensure legal protection
of the individual. Given the absence of a civilian tradition of administrative law and
the domestic constitutional doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of
law, the UK has developed its own system of administrative law on an incremental
and ad hoc basis based upon the three principal mechanisms: judicial review; tri­
bunal appeals; and ombudsmen investigations. This has been a collective endeav­
our with the judiciary, legislature, and executive all recognising the importance of
legal protection. Over recent years, this overall system has been enhanced: the tri­
bunal system has been brought together into a coherent system; judicial review has
expanded and the courts have emphasised the right of access to the courts as a fun­
damental constitutional principle; and the profile of ombudsmen has been raised.
Despite the strengths of this system, there are weaknesses and shortcomings, some
of which arise from poor institutional design, others from the current fiscal climate,
and others would appear to be politically motivated attempts by the executive to
reduce legal protection. So, the administrative justice still seems to be fragmented
and incoherent in part; the ombudsmen system is ‘stuck in time’ and its effective­
ness could be enhanced; legal aid provision has been restricted and tribunal appeal
rights have been reduced. In 2015, the Government has sought to reduce the role of
judicial review and plans to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998. This indicates that
the idea of the political constitution, with its emphasis upon political rather than
legal accountability, has deep roots in the UK. On the other hand, it is unlikely that
there can be a return to the past. Judicial review has grown and human rights have
become embedded in the common law. The need for effective legal protection will
remain. A government can introduce limits to effective legal protection, but cannot
abolish it altogether. 
81	 R (Guardian News and Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Courts (Article 19 intervening) [2013] QB 














19	 The principle of effective legal 
protection in international and 
European law – comparative report 
Konrad Lachmayer 
1 Effective legal protection as a European principle 
1.2 The two faces of the principle of effective legal protection in Europe 
While national constitutions do not explicitly refer to the principle of effective legal 
protection, European Law mentions it in their core documents: Art. 19 TEU, Art. 47 
CFR and Art. 13 ECHR refer to ‘effective legal protection’ or ‘effective remedy’ as a 
principle to be guaranteed by the Member States. Both the Union and the European 
human rights system request the Member States to guarantee effective legal protec­
tion with regard to their European legal obligations. It is necessary to distinguish 
these European parameters with regard to the Member States from the determina­
tion of the European institutions itself. It is common knowledge that the adequate 
duration of a judicial procedure is part of effective legal protection. 
Although the Member States are obliged to provide such procedural guarantees, 
the ECtHR is struggling to significantly fulfil the requirement of effective legal pro­
tection itself. The ECJ is concerned about access to courts in the Member States, but 
the Court itself is quite difficult to access for individuals and it is also due to the case 
law of the ECJ that this situation has not changed.1 There seems to be a discrepancy 
between the European and domestic levels when it comes to the required standards 
of effective legal protection. On the one hand, it is necessary to stress that the proper 
application of effective legal protection on a national level would relieve the transna­
tional level from the need to provide the same intensity of legal protection. The prin­
ciple of subsidiarity also supports stronger application of effective legal protection on 
the domestic level. On the other hand, the European Union also directly enforces EU 
law and is therefore in need of effective legal protection on a European level. It does 
not serve the principle of effective legal protection to create dual standards. 
When it comes to applying effective legal protection principles of the EU and the 
ECHR, one has to consider the different levels of application. The ECHR is responsi­
ble on the domestic level as well as, according to Art. 52 para 3 CFR, in the EU.2 Arts. 
6 and 13 ECHR do not, however, apply to the ECtHR itself. In contrast to this, the 
1 See Görisch in this book.
 
2 See Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty – Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010) 

232–234; David Anderson and Cian C Murphy, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights’ in Andrea Biondi, 
Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) 
155, 162–163. 
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EU principle of effective legal protection in Art. 47 CFR does not only address the 
Member States but also the institutions of the Union itself.3 Thus, while the EU and 
its Member States are bound by the principle of effective legal protection, the ECtHR 
is itself not bound by this principle. The following matrix applies: 
Table 19.1 Interrelations of different European principles of effective legal protection 
ECHR Principle (Art. 6, 13 ECHR) EU Principle (Art. 47 CFR) 
Domestic Level x x 
EU x x 
ECtHR – – 
The ECtHR, however, has to consider questions of its own effective legal protec­
tion in its case law to ensure its own credibility. The ambivalence of the extreme 
increase in court cases and the duration of court procedures on the one hand and 
effective legal protection on the other hand is challenging the possibilities of the 
ECtHR. Court procedures like the pilot judgment procedure help to find solutions to 
this dilemma. Moreover, the effectiveness of the ECtHR also depends on the enforce­
ment of the judgments, which is facing problems of the effectiveness of international 
law in general. The ECtHR has to be understood as a Court between the international 
law system and the system of the EU. It, remains, however, a court of international law 
and ultimately depends on the willingness of the Member States to comply with the 
case law of the court. 
1.2 A European principle regarding domestic procedures 
The Union and the ECHR system have created a complex system to strengthen effec­
tive legal protection in the Member States. Both supra-/international orders have 
developed procedural standards of legal protection: first and primarily by the dynam­
ics of the case law of the courts and second by additional amendments of and addi­
tions to the relevant treaties. The examples of the latter are relevant, though not as 
important to the overall developments.4 Protocol No. 7 of the ECHR, for example, 
introduced further procedural rights, especially the right to appeal in criminal mat­
ters, which might also affect criminal procedures in administrative law. The Lisbon 
Treaty did declare the CFR as obligatory, thus reforming the fundamental rights sys­
tem of the EU.5 Art. 47 CFR dispensed with all the restrictions of Art. 6 ECHR and its 
different scope and concept to Art. 13 ECHR. The result is an impressively compre­
hensive concept of effective legal protection in Art. 47 ECHR, which applies in the 
scope of EU law in the Member States.6 
3 See also Art. 41 CFR; Klara Kanska, ‘Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU: Impact of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2004) 10(3) European Law Journal 296–326. 
4 See Breuer in this book. 
5 Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty – Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford UniversityPress 2010) 193–245. 
6 See Pekka Aalto et al., ‘Art. 47 – Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair Trial’ in Steve Peers, Tamara 
Hervey, Jeff Kenner and Angela Ward (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 
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The case law of the courts, however, has created crucial dynamics to establish impor­
tant elements of the principle of effective legal protection. Over the decades, the 
ECJ and the ECtHR have developed – within their own legal framework and regard­
ing their role and function as supra-/international courts in a transnational legal
system – a particular approach towards legal protection.7 
Görisch analyses in his paper how the ECJ developed the principle of effective 
legal protection in its case law.8 Starting with the Johnson case,9 the Court developed 
several substantive elements of the principle, including the right to access to a court, 
especially on a domestic level, as well as basic standards of court procedures, includ­
ing binding effects of judgments, the duration of court procedures, liability claims, 
etc.10 The Court granted not only the rights of individuals to gain access to legal pro­
tection (by the principle of equivalence and effectiveness),11 but affected and shaped 
procedural and institutional settings of certain Member States. 
The ECtHR followed a two-fold strategy regarding Art. 6 and Art. 13 ECHR. While 
Art. 6 ECHR is dominant in the case law of the EctHR,12 Art. 13 ECHR has also con­
tributed to the overall understanding of effective legal protection in the context of 
the ECHR.13 Both Articles, however, include significant restrictions, especially when 
it comes to administrative law. The ECtHR, however, has tried to overcome certain 
limitations (e.g regarding the right to an administrative act within a reasonable time). 
The case law of the Court, moreover, includes the right of access to a court, right to 
intervention, suspensive effects, execution of national judgments, and locus standi of 
persons no longer affected or state liability. 
In a comparison of the legal starting points of two different courts in Europe (ECJ 
and ECtHR), the case law shows different characteristics due to the divergent legal 
basis and reasoning of the courts. While the ECtHR follows a rights-based perspec­
tive, the ECJ primarily follows a rule of law-based argumentation with regard to the 
concept of a ‘general principle of EU law’.14 At least some convergent developments 
can be identified when it comes to certain procedural standards. As Breuer points 
out, the ECJ referred explicitly to the ECHR regarding the principle of effective legal 
protection.15 
In conclusion, the emerging and increasing scope, intensity and details of the 
principle of effective legal protection can be traced in the jurisprudence of the 
European Courts. It had different effects on the domestic developments of legal pro­
tection, though these effects were significant, at least in certain jurisdictions.16 It can 
7 See Chapter 3. 
8 See Görisch in this book; see also Deok Joo Rhee, ‘The Principle of Effective Protection. Reaching 
Those Parts Other [Principles] Cannot Reach’ (2011) 16 Judicial Review (JR) 440–457. 
9 ECJ, Case 222/84 – Johnston [1986] ECR 1651. 
10 Anthony Arnull, ‘The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU Law: An Unruly Horse?’ (2011) 
36 EL Rev 51–70. 
11 See Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 
424–427. 
12 See B Rainey, E Wicks and C Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey The European Convention on Human Rights (6th 
edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014) 278. 
13 Ibid. 141. 
14 See Tridimas (n. 11). 
15 See Breuer in this book; Case 50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, para 39. 
16 See Chapter 3. 
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be assumed that the case law of the two courts will remain dynamic, when upcom­
ing challenges have to be resolved by an adaption of the principle of effective legal 
protection.17 
1.3 A European principle regarding European procedures 
Besides the relevance of the European principle of effective legal protection for 
the Member States of the European Union, the other dimension of the principle 
is directed at the European institutions themselves. While the principle of effective 
legal protection is not binding for the ECtHR, the Union’s institutions are bound by 
the case law of the ECJ regarding effective legal protection, as well as by the ECHR 
and the CFR, which again refers back to the ECHR, but also accedes it in its scope of 
effective legal protection. The ECtHR itself, however, restricted itself with the Bospho­
rus jurisdiction to the further review of EU law. It is thus up to the ECJ to guarantee 
the principle of effective legal protection according to its own case law, the CFR and 
the ECHR in the Union. 
The discussion of the accessibility of the ECJ itself is also part of the debate of the prin­
ciple of effective legal protection, as Görisch points out.18 The significant restrictions –
also imposed by the ECJ itself – might be legitimate to a certain extent, as domestic
courts primarily guarantee the effectiveness of legal protection in EU law. The limited
possibilities to gain legal protection against administrative action of EU agencies or insti­
tutions remain relevant.19 Moreover, the EU Treaties limit the scope of jurisdiction of the
ECJ to a certain extent.20 The application of the principle of effective legal protection,
therefore, does not seem to reach the same intensity at the Union level in comparison to
the requirements of the ECJ regarding the Member States.21 
Finally, the ECJ is not entirely opposed to other concepts or principles of EU law to 
establish effective legal protection when the Court is reviewing EU legislation. In the 
context of the European Arrest Warrant, the ECJ has limited the possibilities of legal 
protection due to the principle of mutual recognition.22 The Court does not only 
strengthen effective legal protection, therefore. While the Court lays great emphasis 
on effective legal protection to promote EU legislation in the Member States,23 it is 
more reluctant to strengthen effective legal protection, especially in cases in which 
effective legal protection would interfere with other interests or concepts in the EU 
legislation.24 
17 See Chapter 4.
 
18 See Görisch in this book.
 
19 But see the possibilities of Art. 277 TFEU.
 
20 See e.g. Art. 275, 276 TFEU.
 
21 See in legal comparison to the US in the context of administrative rulemaking, especially regarding the 

European Commission Alexander H Türk, ‘Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking: Judicial Review’ 
(2013) 19(1) European Law Journal 126, 142. 
22 Anneli Albi, ‘Erosion of Constitutional Rights in EU Law: A Call for “Substantive Co-operative Consti­
tutionalism” ’ (2015) 9 Vienna Journal on Constitutional Law 151, 175–176 
23 See Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The European Court of Justice’ in Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds.), The 
Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011) 121, 149–151. 
24 Craig, however, characterises the ECJ – in comparison to US and Canadian courts – as a court which is 
influenced by civil law tradition, which tends to reduce the independence of administration or admin­
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2 International perspectives on effective legal protection 
2.1 Effective legal protection and the international rule of law 
Unlike in European Law, the role of the principle of effective legal protection is nei­
ther crucial nor central in international law. The traditional paradigm, which is not 
based on the involvement of individuals, gives states other possibilities for managing 
conflicts, for example in the context of state responsibility.25 This does not mean that 
there are no institutional and procedural possibilities available to claim rights. On 
the contrary, the ICJ as a starting point shows the possibilities to resolve conflicts in 
international law using legal procedures. Before approaching questions of effective­
ness, the challenges of legal protection have to be addressed. Legal protection in 
international law is deeply linked to the development of an international rule of law.26 
While it is an ongoing process to strengthen the rule of law in international law and 
to expand different approaches, these developments are confronted with several set­
backs and loopholes.27 
The dynamics towards an international rule of law, therefore, are not so much 
linked to the uniform structures of international law28 as to the decentralised and frag­
mented29 character of international law. Different international treaty regimes and 
international organisations have established, especially in the last 25 years, manifold 
concepts of legal protection or quasi-court structures. Obviously these developments 
primarily address inter-state situations. International Economic Law30 and the role of 
the WTO dispute settlement bodies can serve as an example.31 
The role of legal protection in international law can and also must be seen in the 
context of the increasing role of the individual in international law. Different areas 
of international law not only address the individual but also integrate individuals
formally – at least to a certain extent – in international law.32 
Two kinds of international involvement of individuals shall be distinguished here: 
the first group refers to forms of international law which promote rights of individ­
uals against states; the second group includes the cases in which international law 
in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth (eds.), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 
2010) 461–462. 
25 See Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2010) 386–395. 
26 See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Rule of International Law’ (2006) 30 Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy 15–30; Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law? (2008) 56 American Journal of Compara­
tive Law 331–361. 
27 See a critical approach in Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader, Plunder – When the Rule of Law Is Illegal (Black­
well Publishing 2008). 
28 See e.g. the UN Charter or the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties. 
29 See Martii Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversifica­
tion and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Com­
mission, 13 April 2006 (available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf). 
30 See regarding the interrelation between European courts and the WTO Francis Snyder, The EU, the 
WTO and China – Legal Pluralism and International Trade Regulation (Hart Publishing 2010) 152–208. 
31 See Andreas Paulus, ‘International Adjunction’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), The 
Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010) 207, 214. 
32 See Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in International Law
(Cambridge Universit Press 2013). 









   














   
  
  
addresses the individual as a threat or at least as a person affected by international 
law enforcement. 
The first field of reference is obviously international human rights protection
and all forms of courts which give individuals the possibility to file a complaint
against human rights violations by states. The European human rights system is
not only the most relevant one,33 but also a model for other human rights bodies
in international law.34 As it is discussed in this article, the principle of effective
legal protection is promoted by the ECtHR regarding proceedings in the Member
States; it is, however, only of limited relevance when it comes to the European
human rights system itself. Although the European standards of international
human rights protection are significant – in comparison to other regional human
rights systems – it still remains a challenge to strengthen effective legal protection
on a European level.35 The situation becomes even more problematic with regard
to other regional human rights systems and finally ends at the point where other
human rights systems do not provide any legal protection for individuals at all. At
that point, human rights protection remains within traditional concepts of inter­
national law and does not includes individuals. Thus, the legal protection is not
guaranteed. 
Another example of this first group are bilateral investment treaties (BITs).36 The 
protection of transnational investments in international law has developed signifi­
cantly in the last 30 years and created a new field of legal protection for international 
corporations to protect their investments. The protection of the right to property 
in the context of BITs might be the most effective legal protection of individuals in 
international law. It does not grant protection to the whole population, but usually 
only to wealthy and powerful transnational corporations. It features some charac­
teristics of international law, which still depends on the power of states and other 
actors in international law. Legal protection in general and the effectiveness of legal 
protection in particular are best guaranteed in cases in which the persons concerned 
have significant influence themselves or come from powerful states which support 
the effectiveness of legal protection. In this context, the dual standards of effective 
legal protection as a principle of international law become obvious. 
The second aspect of involving individuals in international law treats them as
a potential threat to international law, addressing them in a negative sense. One
example – as illustrated by Stephan Wittich37 – in this book refers to international
counter-terrorism by the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Committees.38 The oppor­
tunities of the individuals to get any form of legal protection in the context of inter­
national counter-terrorism measures are quite limited. It is remarkable that the
UN Security Council has reacted at all and that it has at least improved the overall
33 See regarding the interrelation between the ECtHR and public international law in general C. Binder 
and K. Lachmayer (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights and Public international Law: Fragmentation 
or Unity? (Facultas 2014). 
34 See e.g. the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
35 Pal Wenneras, The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007). 
36 See Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2010) 344–353. 
37 See Wittich in this book. 
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situation with the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsperson.39 Although it
is not possible to speak of legal protection in a narrow sense, the first steps in the
direction of legal protection have been taken. 
Another example in which proper legal protection in a narrow sense is missing are 
so called peace-keeping or police missions in post-conflict situations. Individuals in 
these examples are not treated as terrorists or criminals, but are affected by interna­
tional law enforcement as regular citizens. Their possibilities to gain legal protection 
are quite limited, if at all existent. Usually, international forces or police officers have 
certain forms of immunities and legal protection is only guaranteed transnationally 
in the country where the international soldier or officer comes from or internation­
ally, for example, by the ECtHR. In a similar way to the establishment of the UN 
Ombudsperson in the context of the sanction committee, the EU Police Mission in 
Kosovo established a Human Rights Review Panel40 as a quasi- or pseudo-court system, 
which does not grant legal protection, but does at least create some sort of account­
ability and transparency. 
Finally, the concept of International criminal law, especially the establishment of 
the ICC and other ad hoc courts, shall be mentioned.41 In the context of accusing 
influential and powerful political figures of crimes, for example against humanity, a 
highly elaborate procedure has been established. The legal protection of powerful 
persons – although accused of terrible crimes – is very effective42 by international 
standards. 
In conclusion, the first and biggest challenge in international law is the establish­
ment of any legal protection for individuals at all under an international rule of law. 
Only if this first major step is accomplished in a particular part of the fragmented 
system of international law can the second step regarding the effectiveness of legal 
protection come into consideration. The effectiveness is often limited due to the 
overall concept of international law43 and is usually only improved in cases in which 
the international power of states and the interests of legal protection converge.44 
2.2 Effective legal protection in global administrative law and  
global legal pluralism 
The Global Administrative Law (GAL) approach45 is one of several different paradigms
to address the developments in international law. An interesting element of the GAL
approach is the attempt to develop an administrative law understanding in international
law, which includes analysis of international law based on rule of law. Insights from GAL
provide new structures and concepts of international law and include the institutional and





41 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 587, 604.
 
42 Which is necessary to provide the legitimacy of these procedures.
 
43 See Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin Books 2010) 110–119.
 
44 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cam­
bridge 2004) 127–136. 
45 See B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R. B. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 
68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15–61. 







   




    
  
understanding of international law, resulting in the promotion of legal protection. It is
part of the logic of its ‘administrative’ understanding of international law, which provides
the necessary institutional and procedural preconditions for effective legal protection.
Based on a GAL approach, a rights-based perspective of effective legal protection can be
set up to identify existing elements of legal protection and to develop new concepts of
legal protection to promote its effectiveness in international law. 
Another important approach towards international developments of law is Global 
Legal Pluralism,46 which not only focusses on international law, but also on the dif­
ferent layers of law between public and private law, as well as domestic, transnational 
and international law. The insight from Global Legal Pluralism into the principle of 
effective legal protection does not have a one-dimensional perspective of the possibil­
ities of legal protection. Legal protection might be guaranteed not only on different 
levels in a legal multi-level system, but also in different legal procedures. Moreover, 
Global Legal Pluralism clarifies that new challenges for the effective legal protection 
of domestic administrative law might arise from different actors or legal concepts, 
including international standard-setting bodies, transnational corporations or sub­
national autonomous regions.47 
In conclusion, both approaches promote the increasing, methodological approach 
of comparative international law,48 which is not only integrating international law 
in comparative legal efforts, but also using comparative legal methods to address the 
interrelation between the different legal regimes of international law established 
by different international treaties or international organisations. This comparative 
report also follows this strategy to create a more comprehensive understanding of the 
principle of effective legal protection. 
2.3 The interrelation between European law and international law 
A specific perspective of the principle of effective legal protection can be analysed 
due to the interrelation between international law and European Union law. The ECJ 
has increasingly defended its own rule of law regarding international law. It is worth 
evaluating two examples in this regard: first, the Kadi case; secondly, the EU’s acces­
sion to the ECHR. 
In the Kadi case, the ECJ49 argued for the independent evaluation of EU legislation 
with regard to international law in a dualistic approach. Kokott/Sobotta50 summarised 
46 See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (Cambridge Univer­
sity Press, Cambridge 2014). 
47 See Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Legal Pluralism’ (2010) 6 Comparative Research in Law & Politi­
cal Economy Research Paper 01/2010 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1542907). 
48 Ugo Mattei and Boris N. Mamlyuk, ‘Comparative International Law’ (2011) 36 Brooklyn Journal of Inter­
national Law 385–452. Martii Koskenniemi, ‘The Case for Comparative International Law’ (2009) 20 
Finnish Yearbook of International Law 1–8; Anthea Roberts, ‘Comparative International Law? The Role of 
National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law’ (2011) 60 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 57–92. 
49 Case C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commis­
sion [2008] ECR I–6351. 
50 Juliane Kokott and Christoph Sobotta, ‘The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and International 
Law – Finding the Balance?’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 1015–1024. 
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the crucial argument as follows: ‘Its central argument was that the protection of fun­
damental rights forms part of the very foundations of the Union legal order. Accord­
ingly, all Union measures must be compatible with fundamental rights. The Court 
reasoned that this does not amount to a review of the lawfulness of the Security Coun­
cil measures. The review of lawfulness would apply only to the Union act that gives 
effect to the international agreement at issue and not to the latter as such.’51 The 
Court relates to the core of the principle of effective legal protection as the Kadi was 
not granted the guarantees of judicial protection. The EU defended its autonomy 
to enable the rule of law in general and the principle of effective legal protection in 
particular. The EU/international law relationship shows that effective legal protec­
tion cannot be understood in a one-dimensional way by looking at only one level in 
a multi-level network of legal systems, but must be established by the specific inter­
relation of systems. While international law might not be able to grant effective legal 
protection, other legal orders might provide – at least regionally – a certain amount 
of legal protection. 
In an overall evaluation of the EU/international law relationship, the complete 
opposite to the previous example is also possible. When the EU fails to provide effec­
tive legal protection in a EU police mission outside the territory of the European 
Union, it might be an international court, like the ECtHR, which could provide effec­
tive legal protection to the individuals concerned. This insight into the strengths of a 
multi-level system also refers to the interrelation between the ECHR and its Member 
States. It is necessary to create an international mechanism for legal protection to 
contribute to effective legal protection in the domestic legal order. It ‘did not suf­
fice to leave protection of fundamental rights to national constitutions’.52 It is, how­
ever, also necessary to understand that the opposite argument is also valid. It is not 
possible to fully rely on the effective legal protection of international human rights 
mechanisms like the ECtHR, for example, due to the length of procedures, but it is 
primarily necessary to strengthen effective legal protection by national constitutions 
and domestic courts. 
The second example regarding the interrelation between the EU and international
law refers to the accession of the Union to the ECHR.53 The ECJ defended in its
Opinion 2/1354 the autonomy of EU law, like in the Kadi case but under different cir­
cumstances regarding the rule of law and the principle of effective legal protection.55 
While in the Kadi case, the rule of law was under threat, the accession of the EU to
the ECHR can be understood as strengthening the rule of law and the principle
of effective legal protection. The ECJ was much more defending its own European
(judicial) rule of law, which would have been significantly changed by the accession
to the ECHR. The general insights of the example are from a pro-EU perspective
that it might sometimes be necessary to avoid too close interrelations in the multi­
level system to uphold the internal concept of the rule of law. From a more sceptical
51 Ibid. 1016.
 
52 See Breuer, in this book.
 
53 See Piet Eeckhout, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue – Autonomy or 

Autarky?’ (2015) Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/15 (available at www.JeanMonnetProgram.org). 
54 Opinion 2/13 of the Court delivered on 18 December 2014. 
55 See Daniel Halberstam, ‘ “It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!” A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU Acces­
sion to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) 16 German Law Journal 105. 







Table 19.2 Influence of EU law on the domestic principle of effective legal protection 
High influence Specific influence Minor/No 
Influence 
Institutional Austria, Hungary, 
Design Lithuania France 
Procedure Germany, Denmark (Data Protection); Spain Hungary 
The (Public Procurement); Slovenia 
Netherlands, (Public Procurement); France (Data 
Poland Protection) 
Rights-based Italy, France (Legal certainty; Foreigners’ Denmark, 
United rights) Hungary 
Kingdom 
perspective, one might argue that the strengthening of effective legal protection on a
European level was prevented by prohibiting an accession to the ECHR. 
3 The influence from an international/European level on the 
Member States 
3.1 The relevance of the European Union 
The relevance of EU law to the principle of effective legal protection in the Member 
States is highly divergent.56 While some Member States like Germany, Austria or Italy 
are highly influenced in their administrative (procedural) law, other states are only 
affected by certain EU secondary laws, for example public procurement law, envi­
ronmental law,57 data protection or antitrust law (e.g. the Netherlands, Denmark or 
Spain).58 Finally, in some Member States, the EU’s principle of effective legal protec­
tion does not seem to have any significance at all. The reasons for this non-relevance 
of the EU in the context of administrative procedural law differ greatly. In the context 
of Spanish administrative law, the low level of legal education regarding EU law and 
the overall problematic situation of administrative procedural law also lead to a lack 
of application of or an ignorance towards EU law’s principle of effective legal protec­
tion. In contrast to this, the relevance of EU law in the Danish case seems to be very 
small due to the fact that the Danish system of legal protection is highly developed 
and EU law has not created the necessity to change the overall system. 
This short analysis can be furthered by looking at the different parts of effective 
legal protection presented in this book. The principle of effective legal protection 
relates to different perspectives, including the institutional and procedural perspec­
tive as well as a rights-based perspective. The influence of EU law can be distinguished 
as illustrated in the following matrix: 
56 John S. Bell, ‘Comparative Administrative Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann 

(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 1259, 1281.
 
57 Pal Wenneras, The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007); see also 

Ulrike Giera, Individualrechte im europäischen Umweltrecht (facultas 2015). 
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Moreover, it is interesting to observe the relevance of the principle of effective
legal protection in European states that are not EU members, like Switzerland or
Macedonia. On the one hand, Swiss law is highly affected by EU law, because of the
independent decision to adopt EU law in Switzerland (autonomer Nachvollzug);59 on 
the other hand, Switzerland is not committed to an accession to the Union.60 On the
contrary, recent political developments have tended to widen the distance between
Switzerland and the Union. It is interesting that, in the context of effective legal pro­
tection, the case law of the ECJ seems not to affect Swiss administrative procedural
law. In contrast to this ambivalent situation in Switzerland, the role of EU law in
Macedonia, as a state which aims to accede the Union (candidate country), is dif­
ferent. In comparison to Switzerland, however, the level of effective legal protection
in Macedonia is much lower and still requires a lot of improvement to comply with
European standards.61 
3.2 The relevance of the European Convention of Human Rights 
The ECHR introduced a rights-based approach in contrast to the broad and different 
conceptual legal approaches of EU law. However, the ECHR cannot be limited to its 
impact on individual rights in domestic law, and also affects institutional design and 
procedural law, which also affects administrative law.62 In comparison to the impact of 
EU law, it can be observed that the role of the ECHR varies in the different Member 
States. The focus on human rights is strengthening the system; the ECHR, however, is 
part of international law and is not automatically part of the domestic legal system like 
certain legislation of the Union. Thus, the legal significance also depends on the role 
of the ECHR in the particular legal system. The Austrian integration of the ECHR as 
national constitutional law is an exemption; other countries, like Switzerland or the 
UK, also give the ECHR a particular role in their legal systems. Usually, the ECHR 
is applied in a similar way to statutory law. The role of the ECHR, however, not only 
depends on its legal status, but also on the specific domestic culture and attitude 
towards the European human rights system.63 
The ECHR has created different constitutional effects. There has been broader 
influence in Austria or the UK on a constitutional level. In other countries, the ECHR 
has shaped specific provisions of the Constitution, such as in our context regarding 
the principle of effective legal protection (Art. 111 Italian Constitution, Art 45 Polish 
Constitution or Art 25 Slovenian Constitution). In other countries, like Germany, the 
impact cannot be observed in a textual dimension of the constitution, but in a sub­
stantive perspective of reasoning by the court. 
59 See Uhlmann in this book. 
60 See e.g. Melissa Eddy, ‘Swiss Voters Narrowly Approve Curbs on Immigration’, 9 February 2014 The New 
York Times (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/10/world/europe/swiss-voters-narrowly­
approve-curbs-on-immigration.html?hp&_r=0). 
61 See Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova and Renata Treneska-Deskoska in this book. 
62 See Niels Fenger, ‘New Challenges for Administrative Law Theory’ in Anna-Sara Lind and Jane Reichel
(eds.), Administrative Law Beyond the State – Nordic Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 120, 128–133. 
63 See Dean Spielmann, ‘Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional 
Systems of Europe’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012) 1232–1252. 




    
  
Table 19.3 Influence of the ECtHR on the domestic principle of effective legal protection 
High influence Certain influence Minor/No 
Influence 
Institutional Austria, Macedonia, France (Position Denmark, 
Design The Netherlands of the ‘general counsel’; Hungary, 
Only the ‘sitting’ judge can Switzerland 
bring effective guarantees 
for the protection of 
individual freedoms) 
Procedure Poland, Germany, Macedonia, France Denmark 
The Netherlands, (Judgments within a 
United Kingdom reasonable time) 
Rights-based Austria, France (Art. Switzerland Denmark, 
6–1 and 13 ECHR Spain 




The following matrix illustrates the substantive influence of the ECtHR’s case law 
towards the principle of effective legal protection: 
Art. 6 ECHR can be understood as a core complex of rights within the system of 
the ECHR and is very important when it comes to the principle of effective legal 
protection. The provision stands out in its importance in the case law of the Court.64 
Although Art. 6 ECHR is relevant for domestic administrative law, it is, however, lim­
ited in its scope with regard to ‘civil rights and criminal charges’. On the one hand, 
the different scope and concepts regarding Art. 6 and Art. 13 ECHR65 have broad­
ened the significance of the ECHR regarding effective legal protection; on the other 
hand, the limits concerning the principle of effective legal protection have become 
clear and show the potential of further developments, which are fulfilled almost com­
pletely by Art. 47 CFR. The effects of the CFR on the application of the ECHR in the 
Member States of the EU will show how the CFR can contribute to further develop­
ments of the principle of effective legal protection.66 
3.3 Conclusion 
The influence of supra-/international legal orders on domestic law does not follow a 
coherent structure. On the contrary different forms of influences on European states 
64 See Breuer in this book.
 
65 See Tanja Vospernik, ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen Art 13 und Art 6 EMRK – Absorption oder “Apfel und 

Birne”?’ (2001) 56 Österreichische Juristenzeitung 361. 
66 The scope of the CFR, however, is limited to the scope of application of EU law. Thus, a certain field 
remains which will neither be covered by the principle of effective legal protection in EU law nor by the 
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can be identified with regard to different European legal orders (EU law, ECHR). It 
might seem to be worth applying Vicki Jackson’s concept of the role of the transna­
tional in Supreme or Constitutional Courts in the context of the impact of different 
administrative legal orders too. Jackson differentiates between three modes: ‘engage­
ment, convergence, resistance’.67 When it comes to the impact of the case law of 
the ECJ or the ECtHR regarding effective legal protection, European states tend to 
develop differently. 
It is, moreover, necessary to mention that the attitude towards EU law and the 
ECHR might differ for different reasons; but in most cases the overall approach of 
each Member State will not differ as much as expected. If one takes the German 
example into consideration, for instance, one might identify a general acceptance 
of EU law as well as ECtHR case law, but in both cases it is possible to observe the 
German approach to uphold its own constitutional identity and not to accept all 
developments, but rather establish and consider certain limits due to the domestic 
constitutional system.68 Another example might be the Hungarian approach, which 
is characterised by general scepticism towards European developments and tries to 
reject judgments of the ECtHR or legal requirements of EU law.69 In this case, EU 
law might be relatively more able to achieve compliance and such convergence of 
developments. 
The first group of states usually accept the developments on a European level. 
They change their constitutions, apply case law – even if they have not been directly 
affected by the concrete case – and implement new structures in their procedures due 
to European requirements. Moreover, and maybe most important, they also grant at 
least a certain level of effectiveness to legal protection. Effective legal protection can­
not be achieved by statutory provisions alone but also have to be reflected in court 
judgments as well as by the administration’s whole legal culture of applying the law. 
Effective legal protection has to show not only legal but also real implications. The 
reasons for engaging in European developments of effective legal protection might 
be different, but will often reflect an open attitude towards European legal orders. 
Engaging in the process does not exclude a strong domestic constitutional identity. 
Although the UK legal system can be understood as engaging in the European legal 
order and applies the principle of effective legal protection domestically, political 
resistance there against the European Union (and its law) as well as against the ECHR 
and the case law of the ECtHR is increasing. The overall situation might change rap­
idly if new political developments lead to a new approach within the UK legal system. 
The second group of states might accept convergence with European develop­
ments of effective legal protection. This group includes different countries: some 
states might have constitutional provisions, but cannot provide full effective legal 
protection due to the legal culture or legal education of practitioners in the coun­
try (Italy might be an example); other countries, like Denmark, apply effective legal 
67 Vicki C Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010) 
17–102. 
68 See Diana zu Hohenlohe-Oehringen in this book. 
69 Gábor Halmai, ‘An Illiberal Constitutional System in the Middle of Europe’ in W. Benedek, F. Benoit-
Rohmer, W. Karl, M. C. Kettemann and M. Nowak (eds.), European Yearbook on Human Rights (NWV 
Verlag 2014) 497–514. 
















protection to a significant extent, but do not refer to European principles or change 
their own legal system, while still fulfilling European requirements. In both cases, a 
certain form of convergence can be observed. 
Finally, a small, third group of states resist European standards of effective legal pro­
tection. Again, different possibilities exist: one is the Hungarian example, which is step
by step developing away from effective legal protection in a European sense, though
an end to participation in the system of European rule of law cannot be observed. The
relevance of the European principle of effective legal protection is certainly on the
decline.70 Another example might be states which cannot live up to the institutional,
procedural or rights-based standards of the European principle of effective legal pro­
tection. They might not be explicitly resisting the European system, but they still fail
to comply significantly, which also creates a major lack of compliance. One example
might be Macedonia, which is not part of the Union; certain elements in the Spanish
legal system also point in the direction of resistance instead of convergence. 
In conclusion, it is possible to distinguish different intensities of influence of the 
European principle of effective legal protection in domestic jurisdictions around 
Europe. Political developments in the Member States of the Union (e.g. UK or Hun­
gary) clearly show the fragile political situation around Europe. The overall level of 
effective legal protection reached in Europe does not seem to be guaranteed in the 
next years or decades. On the contrary, it will be up to the relevant persons and insti­
tutions in each legal system to maintain the standards of effective legal protection 
already reached. From a pessimistic perspective, a decline of the standards seems 
more probable than an improvement over the coming years;71 from an optimistic per­
spective, it will be necessary to increase efforts to keep certain standards of effective 
legal protection at the same level. 
4 Effective legal protection in a multi-level system 
4.1 Complexity and heterogeneity 
As effective legal protection depends on so many different elements, like institutional 
design, for example, of courts, procedural concepts and guarantees, as well as indi­
vidual rights, the scope of effective legal protection is already complex within one 
legal system. If one tries to identify the principle of effective legal protection in the 
multi-level system of global, European and (comparative) domestic governance,72 two 
characteristics arise: complexity and heterogeneity. It would be an overly simple pic­
ture of the situation to claim a uniform concept of effective legal protection through­
out the different legal orders. On the contrary, one can identify complex structures 
and interrelations.73 The interplay of international, European and domestic law again 
70 Ibid.
 
71 See e.g. the refugee crisis and the reduced number of countries which can still be considered as secure 

states. 
72 See regarding the multi-level network in administrative law Henrik Wenander, ‘A Toolbox for Admin­
istrative Law Cooperation Beyond the State’ in Anna-Sara Lind and Jane Reichel (eds.), Administrative 
Law Beyond the State – Nordic Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 47–75. 
73 S Boyron and W Lacey, ‘Procedural Fairness Generally’ in Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner and Cheryl 
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cannot be characterised by a uniform concept, but has to be studied and analysed 
individually. This task is a crucial purpose of this book project in general. The inter­
relation between for example Hungarian administrative law and Art. 6 ECHR has to 
be viewed completely differently from the correlation between UK administrative law 
and the very same provision of the ECHR. The link between the ECHR and EU law 
in general and the CFR in particular is another example of this complex network. 
The complexity of the interrelation becomes even more demanding when one takes 
into account that the interrelations are not static but dynamic, thus always changing 
due to new case law and statutory law. It does not seem to be possible to grasp the full 
picture at one moment, while legal dynamics are already continuously shifting the 
interrelations. 
It is, however, possible to make some conclusions on the principle of effective legal 
protection within these complex and heterogeneous interrelations. First, the overall 
rising importance of effective legal protection shall be mentioned. Although in dif­
ferent states (like in Spain, Macedonia or Hungary) there is still a long way to go 
to establish legal protection, the overall importance is on the rise. Secondly, Euro­
pean legal concepts are shaping and affecting legal orders in the context of effec­
tive legal protection, although not all European states are doing so in the same way. 
Thirdly, effective legal protection is becoming a more differentiated and sophisti­
cated concept, systematically including more and different kinds of elements with 
regard to its institutional, procedural and rights perspectives. Fourthly, when it comes 
to European law itself and even more so with international law, the level of effective 
legal protection (although exceptions exist) cannot usually be compared to effective 
legal protection within most European states, which provides a much more complex, 
broader and deeper concept of effective legal protection. This situation seems legiti­
mate in the context of a multi-level system because the complexity and intensity of 
legal protection increases as the concept comes closer to the individuals concerned. 
As international and European law increasingly affect individuals themselves, it 
becomes necessary to deepen the concepts of effective legal protection on an inter­
national and European level. Fifthly, the example of the ECtHR gives an interesting 
insight into effective legal protection in general. If legal protection becomes effective, 
the applications of individuals will rise (in the case of the ECtHR dramatically); this 
effect, however, has the potential (as the example of the ECtHR illustrates) to endan­
ger the effectiveness of legal protection once again. Thus, there is a major attempt to 
open up the possibilities of legal protection as widely and as effectively as possible, but 
this optimising of legal protection will lead to a huge number of proceedings, which 
cannot be dealt with in the end. The challenge thus remains to ensure that a legal 
system which provides effective legal protection remains efficient. 
4.2 Effectiveness and flexibility 
If one tries to identify the relevant parameter for successful effective legal protection, 
it is necessary to understand that the principle of effective legal protection cannot 
remain identical – despite the differences in the particular legal systems.74 If legal 
protection is to remain effective, it has to change. As legal orders are highly dynamic 
74 See critical in this regard Arnull (n. 10) 51. 








for different reasons, for example political developments, technological progress or 
legal globalisation, the principle of effective legal protection has to adapt to be able 
to guarantee the same level of legal protection. 
The history of the development of effective legal protection clearly shows the adap­
tation to different challenges. First, the effectiveness has to be observed as a particu­
lar element. It is not enough to grant legal protection, which was already a historic 
achievement over the centuries, and it is necessary to create effectiveness within the 
institutional and procedural design. The case law of the ECtHR, as well as the case 
law of the ECJ, illustrates how the courts have developed step by step the principle 
of effective legal protection. Effective legal protection in the EU also means to deal 
legally with development in international law. The ECJ has shown in the Kadi case 
that it is necessary to clarify the interrelation between international law and European 
law to uphold a European rule of law. The same applies on a national level. If domes­
tic courts are challenged with international or European law, they have to create new 
legal techniques within national law to grant effective legal protection. 
This challenge to effective legal protection will remain in the future. The principle 
of effective legal protection has to be like a chameleon, adjusting and changing to 
stay relevant. It is first of all the task of the courts to interpret the principle of effective 
legal protection in a dynamic way to address the upcoming challenges of effectiveness 
of legal protection. The challenges for the concept of effective legal protection also 
depend on the position of the court within the multi-level system. Thus, the principle 
of effective legal protection cannot and shall not have the same contents when it is 
addressing different courts and different procedures on different levels in the multi­
level system. Finally, it is also a responsibility of the legislator to consider reforms of 
the institutional and procedural design to make effective legal protection possible. 
4.3 Permanent performance of legal protection as a basis of the rule of law 
One might identify different foundations of the rule of law: for example the principle 
of legality (as an expression of legal certainty),75 law and order (as an expression of 
legitimacy)76 or the principle of proportionality (as an expression of human rights).77 
Obviously, it is possible to develop different perspectives on the rule of law; all the 
perspectives mentioned have certain elements of relevance, which can be identified 
in each legal system (to a greater or lesser extent depending on the legal culture). It 
seems within the territorial scope of Europe78 that in our times79 effective legal protec­
tion forms the core of a rule of law. 
75 This could be described as a typically Austrian approach. See e.g. H. Mayer, G. Kucsko-Stadlmayer and 
K. Stöger, Grundriss des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts (11th edn., Manz 2015) para. 165, 569–574. 
76 See regarding the law and order aspect of the rule of law, e.g. A. W. Bradley and K. D. Ewing and C J S 
Knight, Constitutional and Administrative Law (16 edn., London, Pearson 2014) 95–96. 
77 David M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005) 159–188. 
78 In other parts of the world, the establishment of the independence of the judiciary or the guarantee 
of the principle of legality or the foundation of social justice might be a core element of the rule of 
law debate. 
79 If one looks back in legal history, it becomes obvious that other principles like the overall establishment 
of a human rights system have formed the focus of the dynamics of the rule of law. 
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Effective legal protection as a fundamental perspective of the rule of law unifies 
questions of independence of courts, individual access to courts, fair trial and further 
functions of legal protection, such as ensuring the objective monitoring of the com­
pliance of the administration regarding statutory law. The principle includes perspec­
tives regarding the institutional and the procedural design as well as a rights-based 
perspective. If one tries to identify how the rule of law principle is doing in the legal 
order, it seems necessary to look at the principle of effective legal protection to see if 
the courts are working. 
Only a permanent performance of legal protection creates the necessary funda­
ment for the rule of law in the multi-level system in Europe today. Although we have 
seen that the principle of effective legal protection is characterised by complexity and 
heterogeneity in the different legal orders, it is the flexibility of the principle of effec­
tive legal protection which makes it possible for the rule of law to remain relevant in 















   
  
  
   
 
20	 The principle of effective legal 
protection in administrative 
law – a comparison 
Zoltán Szente 
1 Comparing rights, institutions and procedures 
If we look at the real and alleged difficulties in comparing the situation of effective
legal protection in the administrative jurisdiction of 14 countries and the implica­
tions for international and European law, our task appears to be almost hopeless. The
problems and obstacles have been carefully analysed many times by legal compara­
tists. It is said that ‘while constitutional law is becoming ever more comparative (. . .),
administrative law remains bound to the nation state’.1 The extent to which admin­
istrative law can be compared is sometimes questioned because of its strong national
character.2 Another problem is the absence of a generally accepted method for com­
parison.3 Moreover, it is a common feature of public law that its rules are largely
influenced by non-legal factors.4 Consequently, the comparison must extend not
only to the relevant legal principles and rules, but also to the historical, political
and constitutional context. Another difficulty is that, sometimes, different con­
cepts are used for the same phenomenon, or the same concepts describe different
phenomena.5 
Despite all of these difficulties, there are some other circumstances which facilitate 
our undertaking. First, it is held that, while the institutional arrangements of pub­
lic administration show some specific features in various countries, the standards of 
administrative procedures often have more in common.6 Secondly, our topic is spe­
cialised enough for a fully-fledged comparison, as it focuses on the tools of legal pro­
tection of individual rights in administrative law. In spite of the national differences 
1 Tom Ginsburg, ‘Written Constitutions and the Administrative State: On the Constitutional Character of 
Administrative Law’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth (eds.), Comparative Administrative 
Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 2013) 117. 
2 Martina Künnecke, Tradition and Change in Administrative Law: An Anglo-German Comparison (Springer-
Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg 2007) 4, 7. 
3 Matthias Ruffert, ‘The Transformation of Administrative Law as a Transnational Methodological Project’ 
in Matthis Ruffert (ed.), The Transformation of Administrative Law in Europe: La mutation du droit adminis­
tratif en Europe (Sellier. European Law Publishers, Munich 2007) 4–5. 
4 Jürgen Schwarze, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht: Entstehung und Entwicklung in Rahmen der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2005) 83. 
5 With regard to this problem, see Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants” ’ (1997) 4 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 111–124. 
6 John S. Bell, ‘Comparative Administrative Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds.), 
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in terms of the methods used and the established institutions, the basic forms and 
processes of rights-protection are fairly similar. Although all modern legal systems 
are based on their own specific understanding of the rule of law, and have special 
legal institutions and approaches, the essential components of legal protection can 
be found in all of them. It is true that their systems of judicial review of administrative 
acts, for example, differ from one another, but almost all the same rights of proce­
dural fairness can be found in each of them. In other words, there are sufficient com­
mon traits in this field in European administrative systems to provide a proper basis 
for a wide-ranging comparison. 
National administrative traditions that have had a major influence on other admin­
istrative systems are identified at different levels of abstraction by postulating three 
decisive national pathways (the diverse traditions of English administrative law, 
French droit administratif and German Verwaltungsrecht) to a systemic grouping of 
countries sharing a common administrative inheritance (from the Anglo-American 
to the Islamic model of public administration, for instance).7 It is certain that the 
most influential of the above-mentioned administrative cultures, or more precisely, 
their institutions, customs or techniques, have left their mark on the systems of rights-
protection in national administrative laws. 
Moreover, the various administrative law regimes are deeply rooted in legal cul­
tures, and so their rules and principles are closely linked to the values of the civil
or common law systems.8 This classification of legal systems can also provide a well-
established analytical framework that can be used for the body of law relating to
administrative matters that evolved from the first half of the nineteenth century
onwards.9 
Finally, the different institutional settings and administrative machineries of legal 
protection could be examined within the context of Europeanisation or under the 
scheme of global administrative law. 
All the special administrative law traditions, the legal families or the convergence/ 
divergence dichotomy could probably offer an adequate analytical framework for our 
comparative study. Presumably, the major characteristics and trends of legal protec­
tion in the sphere of administrative law are influenced by various factors from the 
national traditions, the major features of the different legal systems or the harmonis­
ing effects of European or global administrative law. When we chose another con­
ceptual and analytical framework for this study, we did not do so because we wanted 
to deny the impact of all these factors. However, when we explore and compare the 
existing systems of legal protection in administrative law, and the major trends of 
development, all these elements of the wider context are potential independent vari­
ables explaining the similarities and differences for which the explanation can be the 
subject of further research. 
7 Martin Painter and B. Guy Peters, ‘Administrative Traditions in Comparative Perspective: Families, 
Groups and Hybrids’ in Linda Pearson, Carol Harlow and Michael Taggart (eds.), Administrative Law in a 
Changing State: Essays in Honour of Mark Aronson (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008) 19–30. 
8 Sabine Kuhlmann and Hellmut Wollmann, Verwaltung und Verwaltungsreformen in Europa: Einführung in 
die vergleichende Verwaltungswissenschaft (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2013) 20. 
9 Bernardo Sordi, ‘Révolution, Rechtsstaat, and the Rule of Law: Historical Reflections on the Emergence 
of Administrative Law in Europe’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth (eds.), Comparative 
Administrative Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 2010) 28. 















Our comparison does not aim to give a general assessment of the quality of the 
various systems of legal protection, nor does it attempt to compare the achievements 
of the different forms of rights-protection. However, if we can identify common stand­
ards of legal protection in administrative law, each jurisdiction can be examined in 
the sense of how far they reflect certain fundamental values, and maybe we can gain a 
better understanding of the nature and mechanisms of legal protection in this special 
field of law. 
2 The constitutional and legal fundaments of the principle  
of legal protection in administrative law 
If we look at the constitutional texts of the European countries, we cannot find the 
principle of effective legal protection in them. This term does not appear in a single 
constitution. Yet it would be a nonsense to conclude that its guarantees are not rec­
ognised by the present-day national basic laws. However, as most authors of this book 
show, not only are the crucial components of the legal protection of individual rights 
embedded in the constitutions, but also the requirement of ‘effectiveness’ of rights-
protection is indeed present in them, albeit indirectly. So even if this abstract princi­
ple does not appear at constitutional level in this special form, its composite parts and 
sub-principles are well-established in most countries. As Professor Moreno puts it in 
his contribution, the principle of effective legal protection is the result or cumulative 
effect of different subjective rights.10 
In general, it can be said that since there is a great diversity of constitutional tra­
ditions in the countries explored in our book, the level and specific features of the 
relevant constitutional regulations also differ. However, it can be observed that, while 
the more recent constitutions usually comprise the principles of due process rights 
(sometimes extending them explicitly to administrative law), the older constitutions, 
which used to be only rarely amended, like the Danish Grundloven, paid little atten­
tion to these things. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the procedural safeguards 
are unknown in the latter countries; in fact, the statutory law or the judicial practice 
may have successfully replaced them. 
Effective legal protection is recognised by most national legal systems, specified by
national legislation, and explained and extended frequently by jurisprudence of the
constitutional or ordinary courts, even if the national constitutions do not contain
any reference to the exact concept. As a matter of fact, constitutional provisions do
not stand in themselves, but are strongly linked to constitutional practice, conven­
tions and customs – not only in Britain, where an unwritten constitution exists, but in
other countries as well. Thus, a number of legal protection requirements have been
fleshed out by courts in many countries, recognising such significant principles as
the right to claim compensation for damages caused by unlawful acts or extending
the scope of judicial review to the cases of ‘silence’ of public administration (like in
Italy). It is also true that statutory law has a much greater role in establishing proce­
dural rights in some countries with civil law systems; in Denmark, for example, judicial
practice has had only minor relevance in this aspect. However, even in some countries
where the legal system is based on Roman law traditions, the constitutional court has
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played a decisive role in elaborating and expanding procedural fairness. As Diana zu
Hohenlohe-Oehringen reports, the German Federal Constitutional Court has explic­
itly declared that the judicial protection of individuals must be effective,11 but besides
that, the Bundesverfassungsgericht had a significant role in the development of stand­
ards for rights-protection. In this way, the effectiveness of legal protection is a con­
stitutional requirement in Germany, as it directly follows from the interpretation of
the Grundgesetz which guarantees legal remedies against restrictions of basic rights.12 
The constitutional courts had achieved a great deal in Central and Eastern European
countries in particular after their transition to democracy. Everything points to the
fact that these bodies contributed significantly to the establishment of the system of
tools and instruments of rights-protection in the area of administrative justice. The
extension and content of judicial review of administrative acts in these countries was
shaped by constitutional controversies, and the constitutional courts had a prominent
role in this process, as was the case in Hungary, Macedonia, Poland and Slovenia. In
Slovenia, although the right to judicial protection is not specified by the Constitution
with regard to administrative law cases, the Constitutional Court (Ustavno sodišče) has
recognised it for acts of public administration, and the Court applies a strict scrutiny
test in those cases where legislation restrains the relevant powers of the courts. 
As for the basic components of the effective protection of rights, even the dichot­
omy of the rights-based and the institutional approaches, used in this book as the 
basic conceptual and analytical framework, conspicuously emerges in most national 
constitutions in a way that certain fundamental rights are explicitly recognised, while 
other constitutional provisions add institutional guarantees to them. 
In fact, there is no constitution in the administrative law systems investigated here
which would completely ignore the claim for procedural fairness. Even those basic law
systems which pay little attention to these issues contain some sporadic guarantees,
like the Dutch constitution, which does not explicitly state the right of access to court,
nor the fair trial principle; however, some other guarantees emerge in the constitu­
tional text, like the public authorities’ duty to give reasons for their judgments or the
institutional independence of the judiciary.13 The principle of rule of law is generally
recognised by the constitutional texts, which usually comprise some of its constitu­
ent parts or sub-principles in various forms, for instance the principle of legality and
legal certainty, or the protection of legitimate expectations. Although there is a great
variety in national constitutions in terms of which procedural guarantees are embed­
ded in them and in what form, most basic law systems encompass the right to fair
trial which often emerges as a sort of ‘mother-right’ for a lot of more specific rights
and legal entitlements, like the right to be heard or the right to appeal. The right to
access to court or judicial review, or the right to remedy are also widely recognised by
constitutions. 
As for institutional guarantees, almost all constitutions examined in this book
include the principle of judicial independence and impartiality. Where ombudsman-
type institutions exist, their legal status and functions also have constitutional grounds. 
11 Hohenlohe-Oehringen in this book.
 
12 Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, Das allgemeine Verwaltungsrecht als Ordnungsidee: Grundlagen und Aufgaben der 

verwaltungsrechtlichen Systembildung (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg 2006) 228. 
13 See Albers−Kjellevold−Schlössels in this book. 









   
  
Normally, constitutional texts encompass broad principles and guarantees. Funda­
mental rights have a universal character, so the procedural safeguards of legal pro­
tection are not usually specified for administrative law. Likewise, the courts have a 
general scope of responsibility, like other public bodies which have any protective or 
controlling function. But this also implies that the application of all relevant consti­
tutional provisions, for the same reason, is not excluded in the area of administrative 
law. So the principle of rule of law, or the explicit standards of fair trial, must naturally 
prevail in administrative court procedures too. 
Notwithstanding this, the constitution in some countries also contains explicit
rules and safeguards for administrative matters. In those countries where specialised
courts are in charge of administrative review, they are explicitly recognised. The ordi­
nary and administrative courts are expressly distinguished by the Italian Constitution
specifying that the former are the guardians of individual rights, while the latter
are responsible for the protection of legitimate interests. The Danish Constitution
grants the right to citizens to bring administrative decisions before the courts. There
is a special situation in Slovenia where the constitution does not require the estab­
lishment of special administrative courts, but prescribes specific proceedings for the
judicial review of administrative decisions. On this basis, the prevailing interpreta­
tion is that the ordinary courts with general competence do not have the power to
adjudicate administrative disputes – these must be settled by special administrative
courts. 
As is usual with other legal guarantees, the scope and limits of the relevant rights 
and safeguards, as well as their components and institutions, are specified by statutory 
law and/or, depending on the national legal culture and tradition, by the judicial case 
law. The general frames and abstract phrases of constitutions provide enough scope 
for the lower-level regulation and the courts to improve the level of protection and 
its effectiveness. 
In a number of countries with civil law traditions, the body of law guiding the 
administrative procedures is gathered and systemised in a general code. In the coun­
tries examined in our book, there is a code of administrative procedures in Austria 
(1925), Denmark (1985), Germany (1976), Hungary (2004), Italy (1990), Lithuania 
(1999), Macedonia (2005), the Netherlands (1994), Poland (1960), Slovenia (1999) 
and Spain (1992). In Switzerland, not only is there a general administrative proce­
dural code at federal level (1968), but the federated states also have their own codes. 
Certainly, administrative codes cannot embrace all details of administrative proce­
dures, so it is quite usual for a number of other legislative acts to regulate the special 
or extraordinary proceedings. Although the range of these special procedures varies 
in the different countries, the proceedings of tax authorities, the nuclear supervi­
sory bodies or electoral commissions usually have specific rules. Only in Britain and 
France does no general code of administrative procedures exist. In the United King­
dom, the legal protection of individual rights is, as Robert Thomas notes in his study, 
‘an amalgam of statute, common law, and administrative guidance’.14 In France the 
relevant regulation can be found in different legal acts and in the practice of the 
Conseil d’Etat, and a number of procedural rights have been crystallised by the Conseil 
constitutionnel in the last four decades. 
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In those countries where the legality of administrative acts is reviewed by special 
administrative courts, these judicial proceedings have special rules compared to the 
procedural rules of ordinary courts. There is a special code for administrative disputes 
before the courts in all post-communist countries, except for Hungary and Slovakia.15 
Among the Western European countries featured in this book, there are specific rules 
for administrative litigation in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. 
Certainly, there are some differences in the competences of administrative courts in 
these countries, and other (criminal or civil) procedural rules might also be followed, 
mainly for state liability cases, if these disputes are settled by civil courts, for example. 
Where there is no separate code for the judicial review of administrative acts, the 
procedural rules of civil law courts are used, like in Denmark or Hungary, with some 
modifications specified for administrative disputes. 
3 Rights-based perspective 
In all likelihood, owing to the different constitutional traditions and legal cultures, 
the principle of effective legal protection does not have a uniform doctrine in the 
various jurisdictions. In Britain, for example, the doctrine of procedural fairness has a 
core importance in administrative justice, which has different standards that can only 
be determined by courts after the consideration of all circumstances of the particular 
situation. In Italy, the concept of the ‘legitimate interest’ of citizens has a prominent 
role and, as Fulvio Cortese shows in his chapter, the procedural rights represent the 
substance of this value in the new understanding of legal protection. In Germany, the 
tradition of ’subjective public-law rights’ plays a decisive role in guaranteeing enforce­
able rights for individuals against public authorities. 
However, in-depth analysis of procedural fairness is far beyond the scope of this 
book. The positive law governing the organisation and procedures of administrative 
bodies, of course, does not give any justification for the particular rights, as they do 
not follow any theoretical classification of procedural rights. Usually, the administra­
tive codes or other statutory instruments simply enumerate the relevant rights with­
out distinguishing the ‘procedural’ rights as defined above. Rather, they define the 
core content and limits of these rights. 
3.1 Participatory rights 
3.1.1 Right to be a party/right to intervene (standing rules) 
As a rule, the function of the right of citizens to launch an administrative procedure, 
or to be a party to such a process in other ways (i.e. in ex officio processes, or by inter­
vention) is to protect, recognise or grant their legal rights or legitimate interests. The 
original parties may participate in administrative appellate procedures. 
While the duality of ‘legal rights’ and ‘legitimate interests’ (or in some countries: 
’legal interests’) features in all administrative jurisdictions, whatever the legal source 
of this recognition, there are some differences both in regulations and practices 
15 Herbert Küpper, ‘Der Stand des allgemeinen Verwaltungsrechts in Ostmitteleuropa’ (2011) 52 Jahrbuch 
für Ostrecht 299. 
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concerning their scope and limits. German administrative law seems to request a 
legally acknowledged ’interest’ for being a client, while in other countries (such as 
Switzerland), the public authorities have a wider margin of appreciation to examine 
whether an interest in question is worth protection or not. 
In most countries, administrative law allows some other people or organisa­
tions to intervene in the ongoing procedure, despite the fact that their – or their
members’ – rights are not directly affected by the expected administrative decision. 
In particular, civil organisations representing general or public interests (e.g. envi­
ronmental protection or public health) are empowered to initiate an administrative 
procedure, or to get involved in an existing process. If their intervention has been 
permitted, they enjoy the same rights as the original parties of the case. By special 
arrangement, in certain carefully defined cases in Spain, everybody may file an appli­
cation (acción popular) on the basis of actio popularis. 
In the post-communist countries, the public prosecutors, as general guardians of 
the legality or public interest, may also be parties in administrative procedures, and 
they may intervene in the ongoing disputes, enjoying all rights of the parties, so they 
may initiate a reconsideration of the first instance decision of the competent admin­
istrative agency, and they have the right to appeal against the decisions (even if the 
prosecutor was not a party in the relevant procedure, like in Slovenia). Sometimes 
they have special supervisory powers as well, like in Hungary, being able to warn an 
administrative body for its illegal practice, or initiate supervisory control by a higher-
level administrative agency. In addition, people whose rights or legitimate interests 
are affected and violated by the upcoming administrative act are also allowed to 
intervene. 
3.1.2 Right to be heard (right to make statements) 
The rights of the clients of an administrative procedure to express their views both on 
facts and law of their own case, to present evidence or to react to the positions of other 
participants are an inherent element of the participation of the parties. These rights 
are generally known and recognised by administrative law in the reviewed countries. 
In most cases, the lack of the claimant’s statement does not usually prevent the 
administrative body from making a decision in the case, unless the procedure has 
been launched by the party and the act may not be brought without his or her state­
ment. However, if the applicant refuses to participate during the procedure, he/she 
must face all possible consequences of this refusal. 
Whether obliged to or not, administrative authorities may often hold public hear­
ings, usually when there are opposing parties in the case, in order to establish the 
relevant facts, to clarify the various claims, or just to hear the competing opinions. 
Notwithstanding this, there might be special sorts of procedures (e.g. ‘shortened’ or 
‘emergency’), in which no public hearing must be held, even if the conditions for 
this are met. 
3.1.3 Right to access to the documents of the case 
The right of the parties to access to the relevant information and documents of the 
case together with the right to be heard are often considered as indispensable parts 
of the right to defence. It is difficult to imagine there being any fair procedure if a 
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party does not have the opportunity to know the relevant circumstances or the posi­
tions of the opposing parties. This right usually involves all affected persons having 
the right to receive a notification about the administrative procedure or act. Another 
well-known measure to counterbalance the informational advantages of the public 
authorities is that the administrative agencies cannot require the client to provide 
information and data they have stored. 
Although the right to access to the relevant documents is a generally accepted ele­
ment of the due process in administrative law, it is not an unconditional instrument 
in the hands of the private parties. Statutory law usually makes exceptions to this rule, 
or, like in Britain or Switzerland, the judicial case law has specified its conditions 
in specific situations. In spite of diverse regulations in the various countries in this 
field, third-party interests, personal data, business secrets or public interests (from 
the protection of the documents of travail préparatoire to state security information) 
provide acceptable reasons for restrictions. In most cases, the courts are endowed 
with the power to balance the competing interests and can decide in each particular 
case which information can be made accessible to the affected parties. There is some 
evidence that the courts (in Switzerland, for example) are reluctant to restrict access 
to the relevant documents, and even if they have to do so, they try to keep the adver­
sarial parties on an equal footing (e.g. by briefly summarising the relevant content of 
the confidential documents). 
In addition, reasonable limitations can also be imposed on exercising the right to 
access to files of the case, such as requiring those demanding access to bear the costs 
of making copies. 
There are a variety of remedies employed when the competent administrative organ 
denies access to information of the case. In Denmark, such a refusal is considered as 
a separate act which itself may be appealed against. In France, the parties may turn 
to a special commission for remedy, as is also the case in Italy, where, eventually, the 
complainants may bring the refusal before the court. The prevailing rule is that, if the 
administrative authority fails to provide access to the documents, the parties should 
have some sort of legal remedy, even if the refusal does not necessarily lead to the rep­
etition of the procedure, or to the annulment of its outcome or the administrative act. 
3.1.4 The right to get an act within a reasonable time 
Normally, legal protection provides instruments and tools against administrative acts. 
Thus, it is a general rule that administrative bodies may impose any obligation or 
right for private parties only in formalised acts. In all countries explored in this book, 
administrative law provides guarantees against the ‘silence’ of public administration, 
that is to say, tools for citizens to stand up for their rights and interests even if the 
competent administrative authority fails to make a formal act in their individual case 
within a reasonable time. It means that the absence of the relevant administrative 
act does not leave the affected persons without legal defence; if the administrative 
authority gives any action (only) in an informal way, or it omits to issue an act, such 
behaviour itself becomes the subject of legal protection. 
Certainly, the meaning of ‘reasonableness’ is a crucial aspect of this procedural 
right. The question is: when is the duration of the respective administrative proce­
dure ‘reasonable’? In a group of countries, there is a standard period of time both 
for the first and the appellate bodies to settle the case, and this is set by law. It is quite 
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usual for the administrative procedural codes to determine a general deadline for the 
normal decision making processes. In some countries, mainly in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the competent public authority has to make a decision within 30 days from 
the beginning of the proceeding. Of course, this is only the general rule, and the 
various statutes determine other deadlines for administrative bodies for certain spe­
cific procedures. Taking into account the complexity or other difficulties of the case, 
these rules often allow the decision making body to extend the deadline (usually only 
once) when simultaneously notifying the parties and presentations of the reasons for 
prolongation. 
In other countries, there is no such general period, but the duration of the rea­
sonable time can be fixed only after due consideration of all relevant circumstances 
of the case. This is the case in the UK, where no such general requirement exists, 
because the timeliness, as Robert Thomas notes in this book, is often viewed as a 
matter of quality service standards.16 However, as Angel Moreno points out in his 
chapter, if no deadlines are set for handling a case (which is, as a general rule, three 
months in Spain), it is difficult to enforce the right to a decision within a reason­
able time,17 in particular when deference is the prevailing judicial attitude towards 
administrative decision making. 
There is an intermediate rule in the Netherlands, where, if the statute does not 
specify a different period, the administrative bodies have to settle the case within 
eight weeks. 
In this regard, there are also several different types of redress. One of the options 
of the legal protection is to turn to the superior authority to oblige the silent admin­
istrative body to make a decision in the case. Alternatively, where the ombudsman 
institution is known, it may also be asked to contact the body authorised for settling 
the case, and to request it to adopt the desired act. 
Other tools of legal protection against an administrative body’s silence might also 
be available. In Italy, if the competent administrative body fails to perform its duty, 
the parties of the original procedures may launch a surrogate proceeding (trying to 
force the administrative organ to make a decision), or may turn to the court to oblige 
it to do so. In Hungary, in cases launched by private parties for granting or declaring a 
right or a legal entitlement, if the competent body is silent until the end of the legally 
set procedural time, the claim is regarded as approved by the administrative body. 
This kind of praesumptio legis can be a good incentive to the competent administrative 
agency to complete the procedure with an act, otherwise it might be challenged by its 
own superior authority for its negligence. A similar solution was also used in Macedo­
nia until 2011; since then, however, the parties have to turn to a special organ instead 
to examine the reasons of silence, and if no redress is provided, the parties may then 
turn to the court. 
This latter way, that is the judicial one, is the most usual – and ultimate – remedy
open for parties whose application has remained unaddressed. Citizens may turn to
the court to oblige the administrative body to make an act in their particular case.
The courts always have to examine whether the rights and interests of private parties
involved make it really necessary to issue a formal decision. The rules of standing in
16 Thomas in this book. 
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these special disputes require the plaintiffs to prove that the silence of the competent 
administrative body is harmful to their legal rights or legitimate interests. Once such 
an action has been admitted, the court must consider the urgency of the case, the 
behaviour of the parties and other aspects, such as the complexity of the administra­
tive dispute or the possible consequences of delay. If the plaintiff’s claim is justified, 
the courts may instruct the appropriate administrative body to conduct the proce­
dure and to settle the case. In some countries, an additional incentive for the particu­
lar agency involves the law sanctioning its undue delay by a pecuniary compensation 
for every day until the decision has been taken. This is the case in the Netherlands, 
for example. 
The failure of the public administration to settle the case within the time set by law 
can also lead to a civil law claim for compensation due to the unlawful and unjustified 
delay of the competent body. However, the delay in itself only rarely causes material 
damage for which compensation could be demanded before a court. 
The same instruments, more or less, are in the hands of the parties for enforc­
ing the implementation of the final (non-reviewable) administrative act. Due to the 
legal nature of the decision (i.e. it is now legally enforceable), the complainants are 
most likely to turn to the court at this stage. In many countries, there is therefore 
a special action for legal claims to enforce the execution of the decision that was 
taken beforehand (like the request of the parties for ’compliance judgment’ (giudizio 
d’ottemperanza) in Italian administrative law). 
3.1.5 Duty to give reasons 
Today, the obligation of the public authorities to give reasons for their actions has 
become a general requirement in national administrative law jurisdictions. In some 
countries, it is a relatively new duty for administrative organs, being established only 
in 1979 in France, for example, and all indications show that in some areas it was 
encouraged by EU law. Interestingly, there is no such general duty in Britain, only 
in specific procedures or areas, as the legislation often requires it from the decision 
making bodies. In addition, if a relevant statute is lacking, the courts, under common 
law, may impose this duty if its refusal could lead to unfair consequences. 
Although there is some diversity in the various national systems of administrative 
law concerning what are the essential and indispensable elements of the compulsory 
reasoning of an act, it is a more or less accepted principle that, once the administra­
tive organ gives reasons, its statement must be proper and adequate, and the major 
points of the decision must be mentioned. In terms of form, the relevant statement 
must be given in writing, specifying the major reasons of the decision in a clear and 
easily comprehensible style. 
In some countries, the decision does not have to include reasons, if it is favourable 
to the party who initiated the procedure. 
3.1.6 The right to appeal to a higher administrative body/tribunal 
The administrative appeal is a common device of legal protection, available in all
countries examined in this book (except Austria since 2014). In some countries, it
is considered as a constitutional requirement (like in Poland or Slovenia), but this
kind of remedy plays an important role in other jurisdictions as well. 








Usually, an administrative appeal may be submitted only against the merit of the first
instance decision; this recourse may only rarely be based exclusively on procedural
faults, except those errors which are considered so serious by law that they can lead to
the annulment of the administrative act. Most formal irregularities may be objected to
during the administrative procedure, and are reviewable by the decision making author­
ity itself or by other bodies or commissions, without interrupting the whole process. 
It is a commonly shared feature that an administrative appeal is possible only once. 
Otherwise, the administrative stage of the whole procedure could be extremely long, 
also delaying the closure of the dispute, as the administrative recourse may not be 
a substitute for the judicial review of the same decision. Nevertheless, in Denmark, 
even if only exceptionally, an administrative appeal may be lodged twice to different 
administrative organs.18 
In certain procedures, no administrative appeal exists, but this is the exception 
and there must be some special reason based on the nature of the ground case or of 
the respective administrative body (usually having an exclusive power). Thus, when 
there is no higher or superior administrative body (e.g. when a ministry, an independ­
ent tribunal or a local authority was the decision maker), or if there is a particularly 
strong public interest in the speed of the procedure, the administrative appeal may 
be excluded. But the basic principle is that these cases may be brought before the 
court, so the absence of the administrative recourse does not mean the lack of judicial 
appeal; it is just that, conversely, if no right to appeal exists within the organisational 
system of public administration, the judicial protection is even more important. 
The effectiveness of legal protection of individual rights is often promoted by cer­
tain formal provisions. Thus, the appeals are addressed to the appellate authority, but 
technically they usually have to be submitted to the first instance body. The rationale 
of this solution is to give the decision making body the opportunity to check and pos­
sibly revise its own act. If the organ is aware of the parties’ objections, there might be a 
chance to convince it to change its decision, not necessarily to provide more effective 
legal protection, but to make sure whether the act was really lawful and correct. After 
all, the first-tier administrative authority has the power to change its preceding act, or 
to make a new one. In any case, the parties do not lose their right to appeal against 
the new act, if they are still not satisfied with it. 
Moreover, statutory rules usually prescribe the decision maker’s duty to give infor­
mation in its decision about the relevant recourse authority and how to complain 
against it, except if the decision is in favour of the client. Or, if a complaint has been 
submitted to the wrong authority, it must forward it to the competent one. 
Generally, an administrative recourse may only be submitted within a period of time
set by law. As in usual, it is requested by legal certainty. However, in Denmark, unless
the law orders otherwise, there are no formal requirements and time limits for appeal. 
It is also a widespread legal practice that the administrative appeal has a suspensive 
effect (however, there are some exceptions, like French administrative law), which 
means that the decision cannot be executed until the end of the appellate procedure. 
It is assumed that, till the final and enforceable act has been adopted, the administra­
tion has not settled the merit of the case. However, when a delay in implementation 
would cause irrecoverable damage (e.g. in case of emergency measures), the first 
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instance decision may be executed immediately. Besides, the legislator may define 
other exceptions to the suspensive effect of the administrative appeal as well, like in 
tax cases (e.g. in Slovenia), or the administrative authority that has made the original 
decision may suspend its execution until the complaint against it has been decided, 
though it is not obliged to do so (in Denmark). 
The appellate administrative body usually has full jurisdiction in administrative 
review cases: it may reject the appeal, or change or invalidate the decision of the first 
instance agency. In the latter case, the normal form of remedy is to return the case 
to the first-tier administrative body to repeat the original procedure and to make a 
new act. 
The silence of the administration can already be redressed in the administrative 
phase of the case, when not only the disputed act, but also the failure or inability of 
the competent body to act, may be appealed against to a higher-level administrative 
agency. The appellate administrative authority is in a position to examine the reasons 
of the silence of the competent body, and may instruct it to perform its duty to act, or 
may take over this responsibility, and substitute the missing decision with its own act. 
3.2 Right to access to court 
3.2.1 Participatory rights in judicial proceedings 
Although the procedural rules of the judicial proceedings usually show significant 
differences from those of the administrative procedure, the participatory rights of the 
parties in judicial disputes are roughly the same as in the process of administrative 
decision making. Accordingly, those whose rights or legitimate interests have been 
adversely affected by a decision are entitled to appeal against an administrative act. In 
this regard, there are also differences in the related national regulations. According 
to German administrative law, for example, a presumed violation of a subjective right 
is needed, but nowhere can the applicant’s claim be based on mere economic, politi­
cal or other interests, even if the courts may have greater freedom to acknowledge a 
specific personal interest worthy of protection than in Germany. 
The procedural codes enable social organisations that promote general and collective
interests to launch an appeal just like in administrative processes, while the ombudsman
and public prosecutor also have the right to appeal. In Macedonia, local governments
can also be plaintiffs of administrative lawsuits, if an administrative act violates the
autonomy provided for them by law. At first sight, this seems to be an exception, but
actually, it is not (or should not be): the European Charter of Local Self-Government
requires the signatory countries to provide legal protection for local authorities.19 
The right to make a statement, the right to access to the documents of the lawsuit 
and the duty of the court to make a judgment within a reasonable period, and to 
give reasons for its judgment, are also provided during the judicial review. However, 
different conditions are sometimes set for exercising procedural rights before the 
court. Thus, in certain cases, if the plaintiff refuses to make formal statements or to 
19 Art. 11 of the Charter reads as ‘[l]ocal authorities shall have the right of recourse to a judicial remedy 
in order to secure free exercise of their powers and respect for such principles of local self-government 
as are enshrined in the constitution or domestic legislation.’ 
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give information as requested by the court, this behaviour might lead to the cessation 
of the proceeding. In France, for example, if applicants have merely filed a summary 
request announcing an explanatory statement and if they do not produce this state­
ment within three months, the Conseil d’État automatically and without prior notice 
abolishes the procedure. 
In an administrative lawsuit, the right to legal counsel is of enhanced importance 
compared to the administrative process, where the parties make only exceptional use 
of the assistance of legal representatives. Judicial disputes take place according to 
stricter procedural rules and often require special legal expertise. In most administra­
tive law regimes, legal representation is not obligatory in administrative litigation, but 
neither is it prohibited, if the plaintiff covers the costs. Nevertheless, the participation 
of legal counsel is sometimes legally required, during proceedings before the higher 
courts, for example, or in extraordinary appellate proceedings. 
Normally, the parties must pay for their counsel themselves, but legal aid provided 
by the state is an important element of legal protection in administrative disputes in 
all countries. It means that the state provides help for those who lack sufficient finan­
cial resources to get legal assistance in representing their interests before the court. 
Legal aid (or partial state support) is granted on a conditional basis everywhere. Most 
frequently, it is not granted in petty cases, or if the complainant, according to the 
judgment of a reasonable person, does not have a real chance of winning the case. 
3.2.2 The scope and limits of judicial review 
In theory, all administrative acts may be challenged based on both questions of facts 
and law of the case. The plaintiff has to refer to the infringement of his or her sub­
stantive and procedural rights. In reality, however, administrative law often features 
exceptions to the right to access to court in connection with the special character 
of certain cases. The range of non-justiciable acts varies in the different countries. 
In Denmark, for example, judicial control is partially excluded in refugee matters 
and in certain other affairs affecting foreigners, where tribunals have adjudicated the 
dispute. In France, acts of government and the internal measures of administrative 
agencies are removed from the scope of judicial review. The latter is a normal excep­
tion, in any case, as internal organisational matters and governmental decisions of a 
political nature are exempt from judicial review in other places, too. In most cases, 
the application has to meet some formal requirements that mean procedural limita­
tions of judicial protection. 
Of course, the crucial issue of judicial review is the extent of the courts’ interven­
tion. As a consequence of the principle of separation of powers, the judiciary may not 
take over the functions and powers of the executive agencies – its mandate may not go 
beyond legality control. However, this postulate does not offer clear criteria to sepa­
rate the area of administrative activity from the legitimate scope of judicial power. It 
is certain that the degree of judicial intervention is in connection with the dichotomy 
of substantive and procedural rights, as judicial deference is more probable with sub­
stantive (policy) issues of administration, while it is usually much more intensive in 
judging the formal legality of administrative acts.20 
20 Hanns Peter Nehl, ‘Administrative Law’ in Jan M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law
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Besides this, in some countries, several different types of judicial review proceed­
ings may be launched depending on the legal claim of the plaintiff, like in Germany, 
where they may not only file suit for the annulment of an administrative act, but may 
also request the court to oblige the competent public authority to make an adminis­
trative act or to recognise a legal relationship (making a ‘declaratory judgment’), with 
each claim having to be adjudicated in different proceedings. 
Normally, the judicial review extends to the questions of facts and law which means 
that the court examines all the relevant facts and legal issues of the case. As the coun­
try reports of this book show, the intensity of judicial review varies not only depending 
on the nature or subject of the particular administrative action, but also in the various 
administrative jurisdictions. Although it is hard to classify clearly the possible degrees 
of judicial scrutiny, it is a general fact that the review of administrative cases involving 
political judgment or when administrative agencies are conferred with wide-ranging 
discretionary power can be characterised by judicial deference. The Polish adminis­
trative courts, for instance, do not seek to re-establish the facts of the case, but only 
check whether the relevant law has been correctly applied to the situation as stated 
by the administrative body in its own procedure. In Switzerland, the judicial practice 
has developed a deferential approach, in particular when the administrative deci­
sion requires special expertise or knowledge of local circumstances. In Italy, the role 
of administrative judges is also limited to checking the legality of the administrative 
acts. Notwithstanding this, in some circumstances, the Italian courts can indicate the 
legally correct behaviour to administrative bodies, particularly in case of the silence 
of the administration, or when there is only one proper response to the legal ques­
tion disputed in the case. The administrative judge might have the widest powers in 
France and Spain, where in most cases the courts can not only annul, but also change 
the administrative decision. 
The idea of judicial deference is probably behind the restrictive legal provisions 
which set conditions for the annulment of the enforceable administrative acts. In 
general, the courts must take account of the possible consequences of the repeal, and 
statutes often exactly circumscribe the procedural irregularities which can lead to the 
voiding of an act. One of the commonly used standards for such procedural errors 
is that a faulty act must be invalidated if it has influenced the outcome of the proce­
dure, that is to say, a different result would have been achieved without the error. On 
the other hand, if a repeated procedure, without the error, would probably produce 
the same result, then repealing the act and reconsidering the case would be unrea­
sonable. Notwithstanding this, the law may specify concrete procedural faults which 
cause the decision to be declared void. In France, for example, the lack of reasoning 
leads to the annulment of the act. 
As a result of the recent reforms of administrative law in the Netherlands, the judges
have some very special tools at their disposal. For instance, the court may call up the
decision making body to remedy the error in the administrative procedure or act. If
the administrative agency can (or is willing to) do this, the annulment of the contested
act, or possibly the repetition of the administrative procedure, can be avoided. Further­
more, the court, under certain conditions, may confirm the legal effect of the repealed
administrative decision. This serves to simplify the whole proceeding, as the court may
overlook the procedural errors, if these did not influence the merit of the case, instead
of referring the case back to the first instance administrative body for a repeated pro­
cedure. Moreover, the court may do the same if the original decision has already been
effectuated, or the previously existing situation cannot be restored. To put it bluntly,









the court’s power to resolve the case, instead of returning it to the decision making
administrative body, and thus to confirm the legal effect of a rejected act seems to
be an unprecedented extension of judicial competence in reviewing administrative
acts. Nevertheless, as Albers, Kjellevold-Hoegee and Schlössels point out in their chap­
ter, the courts use these mandates carefully and undertake to replace the decision of
the administrative authority only if there is only one legally proper solution in the
case before them. Still, these are unusual extensions of the judicial intervention in
favor of the simplification and acceleration of the whole process of administrative
problem-solving. 
In contrast to these cases, the courts have a wider power when the administrative 
act is legally bound, excluding any margin of appreciation of the competent agency. 
On such occasions, the court may quash or change the act. Of course, the cases in 
which administrative courts exercise full power in the judicial review process are 
always specified by law. 
The most sensitive issue of judicial review is, however, the adjudication of the 
administrative acts that have been released by exercising discretionary power. In gen­
eral, these acts are also appealable on several possible grounds. This is true when 
the decision has been issued ultra vires, which means that the administrative author­
ity went beyond the legal limits of the margin of appreciation, or if the competent 
body fails to follow legal criteria determined by law for exerting discretionary power. 
Furthermore, if the use of discretionary power has not been kept to the legal aim for 
which it was granted, the act may also be annulled. And finally, even if the decision 
making authority has not overstepped its limits of discretion, and this power has been 
used for a legitimate purpose, the act might be erroneous if it is not in accordance 
with certain substantive principles, such as proportionality or equality. Traditionally, it 
is believed that the courts exercise the most intense scrutiny of administrative discre­
tion in German administrative law,21 but even if this is so, it can hardly be general­
ised or typified as a systemic feature of administrative jurisdictions. 
A special form of legal protection is the tool of injunctive (or interim) relief granted 
by the court for avoiding serious and irreversible damage in the litigants’ interests. 
These are interim injunctions which do not interrupt the ongoing judicial proceed­
ing. It can be noted that such warrants may also be issued to protect public interest, 
at the request or proposal of the public prosecutor, for instance. 
When the court only has the power to annul the illegal act, but the dispute must 
be settled by a valid administrative decision, it refers the case back to the administra­
tion for a new procedure. In this case, the competent administrative body is bound 
to the judicial ruling. The courts frequently indicate in their judgments the proper 
application of law in the particular case, or give information about how the relevant 
statutes should be implemented or interpreted by the executive authorities. As men­
tioned above, in the Netherlands, if the court repeals the decision of the administra­
tive authority, it examines ex officio whether the case can be resolved immediately by 
making a new decision, or if it has to be sent back to the original administrative body. 
Certainly, the court can make a decision within the limits of the law, while respecting 
the scope of responsibility of the competent administrative agency. 
Under special circumstances, the judicial proceeding may end without a substan­
tive decision by the court. This is the case if the plaintiff withdraws his/her claim, or 
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refuses to give a formal statement needed for the continuation of the proceeding. 
The court also abandons the case when the parties, under the relevant rule, conclude 
an agreement with each other, or choose a form of alternative dispute resolution. 
In such cases, the dispute no longer needs to be adjudicated by a court, but it is not 
problematic for legal protection, as all these reasons for extrajudicial solution are 
based, at least partly, on the will of the claimant. 
In most countries, the power of judicial review extends to state liability cases as well, 
and the courts may grant compensation for damage caused by unreasonable delay or 
other acts of omission on the part of the administrative authority, or may intervene in 
the contractual relationship of the parties (e.g. modifying their contracts). 
Usually, the right to access to court embraces the parties’ right to appeal against the 
first instance judgment. The extraordinary appeal to the highest-level court, however, 
does not fall within this category, as it is not an established right of the plaintiff, but is 
subject to strict procedural conditions. 
4 Institutional approach 
As we have seen, individual rights are the foundations of procedural fairness in 
administrative law. In this regard, three types of institution must be discussed: the 
administrative authorities, the administrative courts (or ordinary courts having the 
appropriate power to review administrative acts) and the extrajudicial bodies. 
4.1 Administrative protection 
4.1.1 Ex officio withdrawal or modification of illegal actions 
In some countries, under certain circumstances, administrative law allows the deci­
sion making executive authority to revise, modify or even withdraw its own earlier act. 
This enables the decision making body, if it discovers itself that its action was illegal, 
to repair the injurious act. (This may also be requested by the parties.) This kind of 
ex officio reparation is widely known in Europe, being used by the Danish, Hungarian, 
Macedonian or Spanish administrative law systems, among others. 
As in the case of all other special mechanisms, this procedure also has some pre­
requisites, so it must be put into action within a time-limit, and the decision may be
changed or withdrawn only if it has not been adjudicated by a higher body (or a court). 
In a strict sense, the ex officio change or withdrawal of the act is not a real appeal, 
as private parties who object against the decision of the administrative organ do not 
have the right to oblige the competent body to do so. The primary function of these 
procedures is not to guarantee the legal rights and legitimate interests of the parties, 
but to preserve legality. These are really corrective mechanisms for maintaining law­
ful operation. This is true even if such a procedure is initiated by the parties of the 
respective administrative procedure. 
However, in certain countries (it is true of Dutch or French administrative law, for 
example), this form of revision, together with the formal administrative appeal, is 
classified as two types of ‘preliminary’ or ‘pre-trial’ recourse, that is to say, compulsory 
procedural stages that come before opening the judicial route, based on the logic 
that the ex officio modification or withdrawal of the original act might also redress the 
infringements of the client’s rights. 
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4.1.2 Administrative recourse
As has been described above, administrative appeals may be submitted to a higher 
authority which has the power to reconsider and override the first instance adminis-
trative act. Most frequently, executive bodies having a specialised range of responsi-
bilities are organised into a hierarchical system of administration, though in certain 
countries (such as Hungary), integrated administrative authorities exist at various 
territorial (provincial, regional) levels and examine the appeals submitted against the 
lower-level administrative units. Where administrative tribunals exist, like in Britain, 
France or Denmark, an appeal against the first instance administrative act may be 
lodged with an independent tribunal. As a special rule, if the first decision was made 
by a tribunal, the recourse authority is normally another tribunal (see Danish admin-
istrative law). In some countries (in particular in Britain and Denmark), it tends to be 
the case that the administrative appeal must be addressed to an independent tribunal 
which combines the special expertise necessary in the particular case and some ele-
ments (e.g. independence) of judicial bodies. Nevertheless, as they can be regarded 
as parts of the executive, rather than the judicial power, these channels may be con-
sidered special sorts of administrative recourse. Possibly, the place of tribunals can be 
determined more precisely at a half-way between administration and courts. They are 
surely not courts,22 but they are not administrative bodies either. It is certain that they 
exercise a different kind of administrative adjudication compared to the courts’ role 
in judicial review, as they may examine the merit of the case as well (merits review).23 
In Austria, the institution of administrative appeal was abolished in 2014 in parallel 
with the establishment of the first instance administrative courts.
It has also been mentioned that, when no higher authority exists, as in the case of 
government ministries, autonomous authorities (e.g. regulatory agencies) or local 
governments, the first instance administrative decision cannot be appealed against.
As a standard rule, the appellate authority has full power to reconsider the merit 
of the case. Their jurisdiction is wider than the judicial review power of the courts, 
as they may legitimately take account of policy aims and considerations, and they are 
never bound by the outcome of the discretion of the lower administrative authority. 
Full jurisdiction also means that the appellate body is not bound to the request sub-
mitted in the appeal (e.g. the recourse authority may change the decision, even if it 
is unfavourable to the appellant).
The administrative appellate procedures can keep the petty and unfounded claims 
away from the courts. Thus any legal claim for repealing an administrative act should 
first go through all administrative forums. However, French administrative law is an 
exception to this general rule, as the exhaustion of all possible administrative reme-
dies is not a prerequisite for the judicial route in this country, except for some special 
(e.g. tax) cases. Furthermore, as Jurgita Paužaitė-Kulvinskienė writes in his chapter, in 
the Lithuanian administrative procedural law, the claimants can choose whether they 
appeal to a higher administrative body, or turn directly to the administrative court.
22 Peter Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) 3.
23  Peter Cane and Leighton Macdonald, Principles of Administrativ Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2012) 209–237; Peter Cane, ‘Judicial Review and Merits Review: Comparing Administrative 
Adjudication by Courts and Tirbunals’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L. Lindseth (eds.), Compara-
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4.1.3 Supervision 
In some countries, such as Denmark, administrative supervision is seen as a special
form of legal protection. However, under certain circumstances, the supervisory act
itself can become the subject of judicial proceedings. In Switzerland, at least, if such
an act affects somebody’s legitimate interests, he or she may request a formal admin­
istrative act regarding the supervisory measure which can be challenged before the
court. 
4.2 Legal protection by quasi-judicial bodies 
In certain countries, special bodies adjudicate the first instance decisions of admin­
istrative organs. Their usual name (they are called ‘administrative’ or ‘independent’ 
‘tribunals’) indicates their special legal status: they are intermediate bodies between 
the administrative authorities and the courts, combining some structural and opera­
tional features of the latter institutions, with not only professional judges, but also 
often civil servants sitting on the bench, for example. 
The procedures of administrative tribunals are usually cheaper, quicker and more
flexible than those of the courts. Since they are specialised for a particular area
of administration or public service, they have the necessary expertise for proper
judgment of the facts of the case before them. They can be efficient and effective
enough to manage a high volume of similar cases and can thereby disencumber the
courts. 
Administrative tribunals operate in many areas of administration, such as social
security, education, taxation, transport or immigration. These bodies are used most
widely in Britain, where a whole system of administrative tribunals has developed,
and they rule in most appellate cases. They decide on issues of both law and fact
with full authority. Uniquely in the UK, the higher level tribunal, called the Upper
Tribunal, completely replaces the courts in certain matters, such as immigration and
asylum cases, which means that its decisions cannot be appealed against to the court.
There is a great specialisation (or, from another point of view, a fragmentation) of
the tribunals in France as well, where the decisions of these independent bodies can
be appealed against to the Conseil d’État. Tribunals or ‘commissions’ have different
areas of competence; some of them rule on remedies against administrative acts
making final or appealable decisions, others are in charge of non-judicial – even
regulatory – functions, and so on.24 Such committees also exist in some other coun­
tries, like in Denmark or the Netherlands. In Italy or Switzerland, administrative tri­
bunals operate at a regional level and are in charge of adjudicating in certain areas
like construction, taxes, culture or education. 
The rationale of the administrative tribunals is that they may filter out more effec­
tively the cases which should not go to the courts. Moreover, since they have special 
expertise in their range of responsibility and, at the same time, have certain attributes 
of judicial impartiality and independence, they have a better chance of checking the 
merit of the cases, or resolving them to the satisfaction of all parties. 
24 For an in-depth analysis of the differences and similarities of the British and French systems of tribu­
nals, see Peter Cane, ‘Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication’. 











4.3 Judicial protection 
4.3.1 Institutional arrangements of administrative litigation 
According to the conventional classification, there are three major types of judicial 
review of administrative decisions. In the tradition of the French droit administratif, 
the judicial control of administration is exercised by specialised courts, distinct corps
of judges, and special procedural rules. The administrative courts, headed by the 
Conseil d’État, adjudicate in disputes on the legality of administrative acts, but they 
also have jurisdiction over public contracts, state liability and civil service cases. In the 
British system, based on common law, all matters and judicial cases concerning public 
and private persons belong to the same (common law) courts, as the Diceyan concept 
of rule of law requires this on the grounds of the principle of equality before the law. 
And finally, in the countries following the traditions of the German Verwaltungsrecht, 
there is a separate branch of courts within the ordinary (and uniform) system of judi­
ciary.25 In a sense, this is an intermediate structural arrangement between the former 
two institutional settings. 
It is worth noting that the new generation of administrative courts created in the 
post-communist countries after their democratic transitions26 have been set up mostly 
based on the various existing models of administrative justice. 
Other classifications differentiate between ‘objective’, ‘subjective’ and ‘mixed’ 
forms of judicial protection according to the allegedly preferred functions of the 
courts, whether they protect the objective legal order, the subjective rights or both.27 
According to this categorisation, France, Italy, Greece, Poland and Spain belong to 
the first group, Germany and Austria to the second and Portugal and United King­
dom to the third.28 Certainly, not only this kind of grouping, but also the classification 
of the various national systems can be questionable. 
In reality, there are no ‘pure’ models, in the sense that the differences consist per­
haps only in degree of judicial specialisation. In Britain, which has long been con­
sidered as a separate model of administrative justice, as Robert Thomas reports, a 
separate division of the High Court was set up in 2000, named the Administrative 
Court and with regional centres since 2009. However, judicial review is based exclu­
sively on common law, and this main remedy for unlawful administrative decisions has 
developed largely via judicial case law. Moreover, the Administrative Court consists of 
judges who also adjudicate in criminal and civil law cases. Consequently, it cannot be 
regarded as a continental-style specialised administrative court. There are no special­
ised administrative courts in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Hungary,29 
either. In Denmark and the Netherlands, as a major rule, the ordinary courts review 
25 Bell (n. 6) 1280.
 
26 Before 1989/1990, there were separate administrative courts with limited jurisdictions only in Yugosla­
via and Poland. Küpper (n. 15) 298–299. 
27 Martin Kayser, ‘Rechtsschutz und Kontrolle’ in Armin von Bogdandy, Sabino Cassese and Peter M. 
Huber (eds.), Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum: Band V. Verwaltungsrecht in Europa: Grundzüge (C. F. 
Müller, Heidelberg 2014) 1070–1071. 
28 Ibid. 1071. 
29 However, in Hungary, administrative disputes are settled at first instance by so-called ‘labour and 
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the administrative decisions, but there are also some specialised courts for specific 
areas (e.g. for land registry in Denmark, or for tax or social security matters in the 
Dutch system). 
Administrative courts in France, Italy and Poland are clearly separate from the
other parts of the judiciary. It means that administrative disputes are not chan­
nelled into the ordinary judiciary at any level, but are kept within a separate and
autonomous system of administrative litigation (even if in both countries the
lowest level administrative tribunals, on account of their composition and com­
petence, are only quasi-judicial bodies). As Sylvia Calmes-Brunet shows in her
chapter, the independence and special competences of administrative courts are
considered constitutional values,30 although they only indirectly follow from the
constitutional text. 
In most countries, some sort of ’mixed’ system exists, which means that even if
administrative disputes are settled (mainly at first instance) by a specialised court,
one of the appellate courts is a high-level ordinary court having general compe­
tence. So, although ‘real’ administrative courts work in Germany, Spain, and in all
post-communist countries (except Hungary) addressed in this book, they form a
branch of the judiciary instead of there being complete separation from the organi­
sational system of ordinary courts. They consist of administrative judges having spe­
cial expertise in administrative law. This institutional arrangement does not exclude
the existence of further specialisation, as separate courts adjudicate in certain areas
(for example in fiscal and social welfare matters) in Germany, using specific proce­
dural rules. 
Certainly, whatever institutional arrangement is used for administrative litigation, 
the independence of the courts is a primary rule of law requirement. 
Where specialised administrative courts exist, apart from their structural settings, 
they and the civil courts have separate areas of competence in the field of state liabil­
ity cases, that is to say, the adjudication of compensation claims. There is more or 
less a separation of the jurisdictions between administrative courts and constitutional 
courts, where the intrinsic logic of this division is that, while administrative courts 
review the legality of individual administrative acts, constitutional courts adjudicate 
in legal controversies of a constitutional nature (like in cases of individual constitu­
tional complaints or jurisdictional disputes of public authorities). In certain cases, 
however, administrative regulations may be reviewed by other high courts, as is true 
in Hungary, where the legality of local government decrees is controlled by a special 
chamber of the Kúria (supreme court) with cassatory power. 
With the exception of Slovenia, administrative disputes in all countries are settled 
by courts at two levels, in whatever structural arrangement they exist. But even in 
Slovenia, where there is only one administrative court, an extraordinary appeal can 
be lodged at the Supreme Court. The judicial appeal against the judgment of the first 
instance administrative court is not a general right of the plaintiff in Germany either, 
but in certain matters and under certain conditions, as they are defined by law, a sec­
ond or even a third instance of review exists in that country. In the countries where 
administrative tribunals adjudicate in disputes about the legality of administrative 
30 See Calmes-Brunet’s contribution in this book. 




acts, their rulings, generally speaking,31 may be appealed against to a higher-level 
administrative court. 
In most countries, an extraordinary legal remedy is available against the enforce­
able judicial rulings, which may usually be lodged at the highest (supreme) court of 
the land. These mechanisms give the opportunity for the highest courts to establish 
general principles or doctrines for law application by the lower courts, or to give the 
right interpretation of controversial legal rules in order to promote uniform adjudi­
cation; sometimes, these emerge in a special type of appeal (e.g. as cassation appeals), 
but these cases can be selected by the highest courts on the basis of their legal signifi­
cance or the financial value that is disputed in the case. As a rule, the extraordinary 
remedy is not appropriate for reconsidering the merit of the case; instead, its purpose 
is only to check the legality of the challenged judicial decision, which can only be 
annulled if the respective court has failed to comply with the law. In addition, as its 
name shows, this route is open when extraordinary conditions are met (such as grave 
and manifest error in law, or providing new evidence), so it cannot be considered a 
very effective tool of legal protection of individual rights. 
4.3.2 Major characteristics of judicial proceedings 
In most countries, administrative litigation is conducted by special procedural rules. 
In fact, in all CEE countries, except for Hungary and Slovakia,32 and in all other juris­
dictions examined in this book, where specialised administrative courts exist, there is 
a special set of rules for administrative judicial proceedings. Alternatively, where no 
such courts operate, the procedural rules of civil law courts are applied to administra­
tive trials, often with minor modifications or specific supplements. 
While administrative procedures are inherently inquisitorial, the nature of judicial 
proceedings depends on the legal cultures and traditions of the different countries. 
Accordingly, there is some diversity in this regard. Whereas the judicial disputes are 
more or less adversarial (where the parties have an active role in submitting evidence 
to the judge, who ensures compliance with the procedural rules) in Dutch, French or 
Polish administrative law, the judicial proceeding in Germany is rather inquisitorial 
(which means that the court investigates and establishes the facts of the case ex offi­
cio). However, it would be wrong to suppose sharp distinctions between the national 
administrative jurisdictions in this respect. 
What is certain is that the position of the administrative agency is essentially differ­
ent in judicial proceedings, where it is equal to that of the claimant with regards to all 
guarantees of a fair trial, from equality of arms to the right to legal representation. It 
sheds light on the distinctive character of the judicial process compared to that of the 
administrative procedure. While in the latter, the administrative authority, as an agent 
of public power and interest, is usually (but not always) in an unequal position (as an 
arbiter of the parties’ claims, for instance), during the administrative dispute before 
a court, both the decision maker and the addressee of the decision are equal parties 
31 However, there are some exceptions to this practice. See, for example the competence of the Upper 
Tribunal in Britain. See Professor Robert Thomas’ chapter in this book. 
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of the process, which has important implications for their rights and capabilities
(e.g. the burden of proof is often reversed). As a consequence, equality of arms 
between the parties is a general principle of administrative trials, so all parties have to 
be given the same opportunities to present their evidence and standpoints. 
The availability of judicial control in administrative disputes is often limited on a 
formal basis for the sake of legal certainty and the effective working of the courts. To a 
degree, these formal requirements are similar to those used in administrative appeals. 
For example, it is a common feature of the administrative law in the countries exam­
ined here that they set a deadline for judicial appeal; where such a period is defined, 
it varies from 15 to 90 days from the notification of the enforceable administrative 
act. There is also the example of setting manifold periods for the different types 
of disputes, like in Italy or Germany, where a number of different judicial disputes 
are specified by law in administrative matters.33 Moreover, the complaint has to be 
lodged with the administrative body whose act is disputed, but it has to be addressed 
to the court. In contrast to the administrative appeal, however, the procedure can­
not be interrupted here, as the administrative body concerned may not change or 
withdraw its own decision in this phase; the judicial application is bypassed only in 
order to inform the competent public authority about the upcoming judicial dispute, 
and to receive its reply to the complaint. The requirement of the written form of the 
application gives the courts the opportunity to carry out a preliminary filtering of 
the requests and to ask the applicant to submit the missing documents or correct the 
obvious formal mistakes, if necessary. 
The object of the judicial dispute is the final (legally enforceable) administrative 
decision (apart from rare exceptions where the lack of administrative decisions is 
objected against). Only the final acts are reviewable, after the exhaustion of all avail­
able administrative remedies, and where the merit of the case has been resolved. So 
the unsuccessful administrative appeal (in a preliminary or objection procedure) is 
usually needed for judicial review. 
The duration of the judicial process is usually not set by law; however, the citizens’ right
to get a decision in their case within a reasonable time is just as important in the court
proceedings as in administrative procedures. So the unusual or unnecessary length of
a judicial process might be the subject of special remedy (e.g. in a constitutional com­
plaint where this is possible, or before the European Court of Human Rights). 
4.3.3 The effects of the judgments of the administrative courts 
The judgment of the courts has an inter partes effect in individual administrative dis­
putes. This means that it resolves concrete cases and is valid only for the parties of 
the judicial proceeding. It is also true in the case of constitutional complaints, despite 
these being decided by constitutional courts. Erga omnes rulings may be issued only 
in those rare situations where the administrative courts are empowered to review the 
legality of normative acts (administrative regulations, statutory instruments, govern­
ment ordinances, local government decrees, etc.). 
33 From this point of view, Danish administrative law is fairly special, as it generally does not determine any 
time limit for the claimants to turn to the court. 













In some countries, special judicial processes can be launched for specific aims of 
legal protection, in order to redress certain procedural mistakes or an omission by 
the competent administrative body, such as obliging it to act or to provide the right 
to access to the relevant documents, if the public authority fails to do it. The reason 
for these proceedings is to speed up the pending administrative dispute, eliminating 
possible obstacles or anticipating certain procedural mistakes at the administrative 
stage of the case. Therefore, these special actions are actually corrective measures 
taken by courts. 
There are some other widely-used guiding principles of the judicial process in 
administrative disputes affecting its outcomes. The principle of non ultra petita is fre­
quently recognised and respected by national administrative laws. It means that the 
administrative judge cannot go beyond the limits of the application of the claimant. 
Again, there can be some exceptions to this general rule. Thus, the French adminis­
trative courts are not tied to the request of the claimant in matters of administrative 
contracts. 
The national regulations vary in terms of whether the lawsuit has a suspensive
effect on the execution of the challenged act or not. Generally, the judicial review
proceeding does not suspend the implementation of the contested decision, but
the parties may ask the court to issue an injunctive relief granting provisional pro­
tection for the interests of the parties. So the court may order the suspension to
avoid serious and irreversible damage to citizens or to the public interest, or if the
implementation could make the lawsuit impossible or pointless. Nevertheless, the
reverse situation may occur, when the prohibition of the enforcement of the chal­
lenged administrative act would trigger similar effects. Thus, the national systems
of administrative law differ from each other in terms of which presumption they
consider as the major rule to which exceptions can be made: where the rebut-
table presumption of the legality of the contested administrative acts prevails, for
instance, it may indicate a judicial deference towards administrative actions. It can
be added that the interim relief of the court on the suspension can usually also be
appealable. 
In most administrative jurisdictions, special judicial actions are laid down by law for 
the execution of the enforceable judgments. Unfortunately, the failure of the admin­
istration to implement the judicial decisions can be remedied only by a new lawsuit 
wasting more and more time. Therefore, administrative reforms have tried to make 
progress in this area, introducing penalties or disciplinary rules against the adminis­
trative body or officials who are accountable for such kinds of failure. 
4.4 Legal protection against illegal normative acts; constitutional complaints 
Whatever blurred borders there are between constitutional and administrative law, 
the review of statutory rules (in general terms: normative acts) is conventionally clas­
sified as a public power of a constitutional nature. The same is true even for the adju­
dication of individual decisions, when they are challenged on constitutional grounds, 
in particular in the case of infringements of fundamental rights. 
Among the countries studied in this book, the constitutional court reviews the con­
stitutionality of parliamentary statutes and lower level regulations in Austria, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Slovenia and Spain, empow­
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constitutional review is strictly limited,34 the ordinary or administrative judge can usu­
ally turn to the constitutional court if he or she finds that legislation which is to be 
applied is unconstitutional, and should be overturned. 
No such courts exist in Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. However, in some of them (like in Denmark) the constitutionality of stat­
utes and administrative rules may be reviewed by the ordinary courts. In these coun­
tries, as a major rule, there is a praesumptio legis for the constitutionality of the statutes. 
However, it cannot be said that even in these countries the courts would be powerless 
if they were to encounter unconstitutional (administrative) rules. In Switzerland, for 
example, the Supreme Court, apart from the federal laws, may repeal the statutory 
instruments and cantonal laws, while in the other countries the ordinary courts often 
set aside or ignore the basic constitutional principles. In addition to this, as Felix Uhl­
mann indicates in his chapter, the judicial practice seems to question the applicability 
of federal laws which violate the ECHR. 
In some countries the high courts also have some power to check the legality of 
normative administrative acts. In Germany, the High Administrative Court has a lim­
ited power to review the validity of by-laws and other statutory instruments, while 
the Federal Constitutional Court has an exclusionary power of constitutional review 
of parliamentary laws. In Hungary, as described above, a specialised council of the 
supreme court exercises legality control over local government decrees. 
Besides constitutional review, some constitutional courts have other tools for
rights-protection. Adapting the doctrine of verfassungskonforme Auslegung developed
by the German Federal Constitutional Court, they may state that the reviewed stat­
ute conforms with the constitutional provision, only if it is interpreted in a certain
way (determined by the Court), without repealing it. This technique can be found
in the practice of the French Conseil constitutionnel and the Hungarian Alkotmány­
bíróság, too. 
In addition, effective tools for the legal protection of individual rights are pro­
vided by those procedures in which certain executive acts may be challenged by citi­
zens before the constitutional court. In fact, in this way, administrative disputes may 
become constitutional controversies in which it is more likely to refer to fundamental 
rights and general constitutional principles. In Austria, Germany, Hungary, Mace­
donia, Slovenia and Spain, individuals may submit constitutional complaints against 
individual administrative or judicial acts, and the adjudication of these cases by con­
stitutional courts might lead to the annulment of the underlying norm if it violates 
the constitution. Certainly, there are differences between the relevant regulation of 
the German Verfassungsbeschwerde, and the Spanish recurso de amparo and other forms 
of individual complaints, but these are transcended by the similarities (like the gen­
eral condition that the citizen must first exhaust all the judicial remedies available in 
the administrative jurisdiction) and by the inherent goal of these procedures (i.e. to 
provide an ultimate remedy based on constitutional rights). 
34 In France, for example, since the constitutional amendment of 2008, litigants may invoke the unconsti­
tutionality of the statute applied to their case before the court; only the court may initiate the constitu­
tional review through the Conseil d’État or Cour de Cassation at the Constitutional Council. However, in 
Hungary, until 2011, through actio popularis, anyone was able to lodge an application to the Constitu­
tional Court to review the constitutionality of any laws without any personal interests. 
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4.5 Ombudsman-type and other special forms of institutional protection 
The institution of the ombudsman is present in all the 14 countries examined in this 
book. As a matter of fact, several different models are used or followed by the various 
countries in respect of legal status, competences and organisational and procedural 
issues. There are ombudsmen with general jurisdiction, and (less often) commission­
ers specialising in certain types of cases. They enjoy everywhere far-reaching inde­
pendence, and they are usually only accountable to the national legislature (though 
in Italy and Switzerland they exist only at a regional level). 
But their common features and potential to offer legal protection in administrative 
decision making is now more important. It is a decisive feature of the ombudsman-
type protection that the commissioners may only give recommendations or non-
binding opinions for the respective executive agencies, but their actions cannot be 
enforced. Instead, they have to rely on their own professional prestige and moral 
authority to achieve real and effective results. In most cases, ombudsmen have wide-
ranging investigative power, and they may launch several different procedures about 
other bodies. But most of all, they may exert influence through their recommenda­
tions, aiming to eliminate maladministration, improve the quality of administration 
and promote redress of individual infringements of the clients’ rights. 
As a major rule, the competence of ombudsmen does not cover all administrative 
agencies, and tribunals, and does not extend to courts at all. Moreover, their pro­
cedure or action is not a precondition for applying for ‘normal’ (administrative or 
judicial) remedies. 
Some other public bodies might have a limited role in legal protection as far as 
administrative decision making is concerned. Thus, in particular in the CEE coun­
tries, the public prosecutor also has wide-ranging investigative powers. In contrast 
to the consultative nature of the ombudsman, he or she may bring legally binding 
actions. However, the prosecutor’s contribution aims primarily at promoting and pro­
tecting the public interest, and he or she is available only indirectly for legal protec­
tion of individual rights. 
4.6 Alternative dispute resolution 
Surprisingly, despite the fact that the tools of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) are 
aimed at making a compromise between administrative authorities and the citizens as 
their clients, these instruments and processes are hardly used in the administrative sys­
tems explored here. Certainly, the comparative evaluation of the application of these 
devices is a matter of subjective judgment. However, even when all well-known ADR 
techniques (i.e. mediation, reconciliation and arbitration) are used, as in France, 
they exist only in an undeveloped form. Many national reporters have said that these 
mechanisms have limited significance in the system of legal protection (though in 
Germany, there is a federal law on these procedures), and there is also an example for 
the lack of them (in Slovenia). In many countries, only one or two forms of ADR are 
recognised by law or used in practice, or their application is limited to some specific 
procedures (like in public procurement in Italy). There is no general recognition of 
the courts’ power to suspend the ongoing procedure, with the consent of the par­
ties, giving them the opportunity for an amicable (out-of-court) agreement, either. 
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the statutory rules (like mediation in 2004 in the Hungarian general administrative 
code), their use has remained sporadic and rare. 
What is important, as the Italian Constitutional Court has explicitly declared in a 
ruling, is that the various tools of ADR cannot replace the judicial protection of indi­
vidual rights and legitimate interests, so cannot, for example, deny citizens access to 
the courts. 
Although some authors have reported the growing use of these routes to settle 
the case, in the Netherlands and France, the main experience is the reluctance of 
the administration to employ them. One of the reasons for this can be the lack of 
relevant traditions and customs, while in certain jurisdictions (in particular in the 
post-communist countries) the old attitudes of public administration, mainly the 
deeply-rooted approach of the hierarchical relation between the public authorities 
and their clients, can also contribute to the administrative feeling of dislike or antipa­
thy towards the use of these odd and unaccustomed tools and instruments. 
5 Challenges and problems of effective legal protection 
As country studies show, institutional deficiencies, inappropriate procedures or cer­
tain attitudes of administrative bodies may cause problems for the effectiveness of the 
system of legal protection. These challenges may be classified in various ways depend­
ing on whether we concentrate on their reasons, concrete forms or consequences. 
However, I want herewith just to gather the most important problems to which most 
national administrative law systems have to face. 
5.1 Length of procedure 
It is a general problem that the access to administrative justice, or, in other words, to 
get redress for the infringements of personal rights or legitimate interests frequently 
takes too much time; the lengthiness of the remidial procedures sometimes is intoler­
ably long. The administrative decision making process might be complicated or even 
inextricable and need not only time but also money and patience. There can be more 
reasons behind this phenomenon: the large number of ongoing cases (or, otherwise, 
not enough courts); the insufficient personnel and financial resources of courts; or 
the institutional arrangements or regulation (e.g. if laws do not set deadlines for the 
judicial processes, and no standard practice of what makes procedure ‘in due time’), 
etc. Under such circumstances, many may think that the challenge of the administra­
tive acts, even if they have had adversarial effects on them, does not make sense. The 
subject or value of the lawsuit can be too small, or the personal interest for remedy 
may lose its significance until when the final decision will be taken. Some national 
authors reported about such problems, like Joanna Lemańska arguing that her coun­
try, Poland is among those countries from where a lot of complaints have been filed to 
the ECtHR for years. Sometimes, paradoxically, the length of procedure of the court 
or the tribunal, which are intended to protect individual rights, causes some delay. 
In France, for example, the average length of judicial proceedings in administrative 
cases is about nine and a half months. 
The instruments of legal protection can be misused, if they are not applied to their 
original function. Thus, for example, the unlimited submission of the same claim to 
repeat an administrative procedure, or the demand of large amount document to be 













accessed that are unnecessary for the proper protection of legal interests, the use of 
the judicial way to delay an investment project, the exercise certain rights only for 
seeking publicity or hindering the normal operation of public administration, are 
all abuses of the procedural rights. It is clear that the use of financial, personnel and 
other resources of public administration must be proportionate to the significance of 
the case in both the administrative and the judicial proceedings. But the simple refer­
ence to the potential danger of misusing procedural rights or protective tools cannot 
justify the unreasonable restriction of these instruments. 
Some countries have made efforts to cope with the problem of the slowness of the
judicial proceedings, like Spain, where a new law was introduced in 2011 in order to
reduce the duration of administrative litigation through raising the minimum value of
a case to be heard by the Supreme Court, while other countries have introduced admin­
istratice reforms with the purpose of accelerating administrative and judicial processes. 
5.2 The scope of judicial review 
Judicial review does not cover all administrative acts. In particular, administrative 
regulations, or higher-level laws often may not be challenged before a court. In Swit­
zerland, for instance, the federal laws are exempt from judicial review. The problem 
is that if a law of the Federal Parliament causes a bulk of infringments of individual 
rights or legitimate interests, there is no any institutional tool to redress them. In 
some other countries, where no constitutional review is recognised, government ordi­
nances may also be immune from judicial oversight. Sometimes exemptions originate 
in national traditions or peculiarities. In Macedonia, the Government can issue spe­
cial inter partes decrees that may impose obligations on citizens, but no judicial way 
is provided for reviewing these acts. As this example shows, sometimes the problem 
is that individual decisions come into sights in the form of normative acts, and the 
administrative courts are not mandated to review them. Consequently, there might 
be gaps in the sphere of judicial control. In Switzerland, where the direct democracy 
is a basic pillar of the political system, more and more radical popular initiatives are 
proposed on socially vulnerable groups, targeting the legal standing of migrants, reli­
gious or other minorities, and the judicial control of these political actions have only 
limited opportunities. 
Another unbeneficial tendency is the restriction of the appeal rights which can
be observed in some countries (e.g. in Britain or Hungary), in particular under spe­
cial conditions or in special situations, like in times of the mass migration or terror
dangers. Under such circumstances, political motivations may also limit the access
to courts, in order to accelerate the ongoing decision making processes, or to avoid
political inconveniences or loss of popularity. As the governments have in all countries
considerable influence on the law-making process, they have plenty opportunities to
reduce the level of rights-protection, or to disrupt the balance for the benefit of the
effectiveness of the administrative decision making at the expense of individual rights. 
5.3 Costly litigation 
The costs of administrative litigation (which may be imposed as registration fee, legal 
aid, or just charge for the judicial service) can have a deterrent effect on the citizens 
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excessive burdens, to challenge administrative acts does not make sense for many 
people, especially if the economic or other kinds of interests affected by the admin­
istrative procedure are small; or, if the judicial process is slow, the importance of the 
final court decision might lose its significance for the parties. So the costs of judi­
cial procedure might have negative effects on the rights-protection, as the payment 
requirement, whatever its legal title is, might be a too rigid condition for the citizens, 
and might hold back them from litigation, in particular if they are uncertain in the 
final outcome of the judicial procedure. 
While more countries have tried to overcome these obstacles, introducing the-loser­
pays principle or extending the legal aid programs, these attempts often have obvious 
limits; in most countries, for example, these charges do not cover the real costs of the 
administrative justice. 
Finally, it is worth noting that higher costs can have also beneficial effects on the 
effectiveness of the administrative disputes, as they keep the petty and unfounded 
cases far from the bench. 
5.4 Non-compliance of judicial decisions 
It is an undisputable case of the ineffectiveness of legal protection when the final 
judgment of the administrative judge is not implemented, or it is enforced only with 
undue delay, or only partially or falsely. The reason for non-compliance is often that 
the judicial decision should be implemented by the administrative body which just 
has lost the lawsuit. The execution can be costly, when, for instance, it needs the 
contribution of other bodies, or the restoration of an earlier legal situation. Needless 
to say, political considerations can also hinder or delay the implementation. In such 
cases, the court may, in a special (‘enforcement’) proceeding impose penalty on the 
recalcitrant administrative organ, or even may trigger criminal proceeding, as in the 
Spanish administrative law (it is not a widespread practice in Europe, however). But 
even if the judgment of the court can be enforced against the reluctant public author­
ity, the new compliance procedure takes time again reducing the effectiveness of the 
rights-protection. 
5.5 Poor institutional arrangements 
As we have seen, the tools of legal protection make a whole system in each country dis­
cussed here. However, the elements and institutions of these systems have developed 
gradually, and their establishment connected frequently to general and multipurpose 
administrative reforms. Even when the very specific instruments of rights-protection 
used to be designed, other considerations and interests were apparently taken into 
consideration. For this reason, the system of protection of rights is not always com­
plete or without flaws. Furthermore, diverging institutional interests or the lack of 
cooperative organisational culture can also make the protection of rights difficult. But 
as there are no universally good institutional arrangements, there are no structural 
‘evils’ either, so institutional setting must always be evaluated in its own (national) 
context. Still, some authors have reported on poor institutional arrangements. 
In certain countries, that makes some problems that civil courts have some overlap­
ping powers in state liability cases with specialised administrative courts. In such cases, 
it is frequently complicated and difficult to draw the line between the competences of 




these courts. Another time the lack of cooperation between the administrative courts 
and other state bodies causes conflicts, as the Macedonian report says. In the Neth­
erlands, there is some problem with the division of competences between the various 
courts. Under such circumstances, when five different (and special) appeal courts 
exist in administrative matters, it can be difficult to ensure the uniform adjudication 
which is a basic requirement of legal certainty. 
5.6 Low quality regulation 
Out-of-date or poor legislation can also reduce the level of legal protection, for exam­
ple when public authorities are given special privileges to delay the decision making 
or to initiate specific procedures (like withdrawal or a reconsideration of the case 
for public interest) which is in contrast with the principle of legal certainty. Another 
trend that can also be observed, at least in some countries, is the proliferation of 
special administrative actions. As a consequence of the growing sectoral law-making, 
the actors of various fields and branches of administration often strive for special 
procedural rules for their activities. The sectoral interests, especially when they are 
underpinned by special procedural rules might go against the established system of 
rights-protection, as the distinct features of these special rules may claim special treat­
ment. The level of protection of individual rights can be endangered also by the pop­
ular efforts to simplify and speed up the administrative dispute resolution. Secondary 
importance can be attributed to the procedural rules claiming that the procedural 
fairness would not have led to a different outcome of the procedure; consequently, it 
would be a waste of time and energy to repeat the whole procedure just for correcting 
an insignificant irregularity. 
5.7 Financial austerity policies 
The worldwide financial crisis has had some indirect negative effects not only on the 
effectiveness, but also on the availability of the instruments of the rights-protection, 
as many governments, for budgetary reasons, have made efforts to narrow or limit the 
ways of legal remedies. No doubt, the institutions and procedures of effective legal 
protection, from maintaining court-houses to financing legal aid, needs appropriate 
resources. The financial austerity programs, which were introduced in most countries 
after 2008 aimed at reducing these costs. It is a real risk to limit the scope or avail­
ability of judicial review for budgetary reasons or in order to accelerate or simplify the 
administrative process. The new Hungarian Fundamental Law, for instance, declares 
that ‘[i]n performing their duties, the Constitutional Court, courts, (. . .) and other 
state organs shall be obliged to respect’ ‘the principle of balanced, transparent and 
sustainable budget management’ (Art. N paras 1, 3), whatever it means. As we could 
see in the British report, the Government proposed the introduction of a ‘no differ­
ence’ principle which means that the judicial review should be denied if the court’s 
ruling would not have probably been substantially different than that of the adminis­
trative body’s decision. Some efforts are made from time to time to restrict the legal 
aid for judicial review in many countries. 
While the efficiency of the administrative and judicial bodies, including the mecha­
nisms of legal protection, is a legitimate objective of the government, the principle of 
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6 Major trends of effective legal protection in administrative law 
The national reports give a good opportunity to identify general trends of the devel­
opment of the principle of effective legal protection. In fact, we must be careful 
to generalise certain phenomena, even if they have been occurred in a number of 
countries examined here. Similar measures can have different reasons or motivations 
depending on the peculiar context or traditions. They can be answers to different 
challenges, inspired by diverse motivations, and they can have disparate implications. 
Still, it is worth drawing attention to certain tendencies or similarities that can be 
found in the various administrative jurisdictions in relation to the system of legal pro­
tection of individual rights and legitimate interests. All these need further research 
exploring the national context and special reasons of (the same) changes. 
6.1 Constitutionalisation of administrative law and the rise of 
human rights approach 
The constitutionalisation of administrative law is a general tendency.35 It is not surpris­
ing: administrative authorities exercise public power under constitutional limitations; 
constitutional principles permeate the whole legal system; and respect for human 
rights at all levels of government has become a general principle of constitutional 
law, affecting per se the terrain of administrative law. As we have seen in conceptualisa­
tion chapter, the procedural rights of the private parties in both the administrative 
procedures and judicial processes are seen more and more as basic human rights; or, 
they may protect or promote the enforcement of (other) human rights.36 However, 
administrative law has preserved many of its distinctive characteristics from those 
of the constitutional law.37 Procedural principles and rights have various levels and 
importance – not all of them can be regarded fundamental rights, as certain irregu­
larities that have not influenced the outcome of the decision making process, do not 
lead to the annulment of the administrative act. In fact, a delicate balance must be 
between the respect for procedural rights and the general interest for an effective 
administration. 
The rise of human rights approach manifests in the growing use of judicial con­
structions and doctrines, from the proportionality test to the verfassungskonforme 
Auslegung in administrative procedures and judicial review processes that have been 
developed for human rights adjudication. These arguments can be invoked also in 
administrative appeals not only in specialised constitutional procedures (like consti­
tutional complaint), but in the usual proceedings of legal remedy too. 
There might be similar reasons for the tendency that the classical function of legal­
ity control, that is the defence of the objective legal order has gradually been com­
pleted with the protection of rights and legitimate interests of the parties. While the 
traditional model allowed, for example, that the appellant party’s position become 
worse than before the appeal, and the court could go far beyond what has been 
35 Carol Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’ (2006) 17 The European 
Journal of International Law 205, 208; Ruffert (n. 3) 38–41. 
36 See e.g. for the common law systems Janina Boughey. ‘The Use of Administrative Law to Enforce 
Human Rights’ (2009) 17 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 25–38. 
37 Ginsburg (n. 1) 117–127. 
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requested by the recourse, the legislation and the judicial practice increasingly in 
more and more countries bypassed the principle of reformatio in peius, and ultra petita, 
once a judicial appeal was put in motion by a private party. 
6.2 Expansion of judicial review 
In historical perspective, the direction of progress of judicial review of the acts of the 
Executive goes towards the establishment of the specialised administrative courts. 
Even today, there are certain examples of such a trend (e.g. in Austria with the estab­
lishment of the first instance administrative courts in 2014, or in Macedonia, where a 
High Administrative Court was set up in 2011 as an appellate court). However, while 
the specialisation of the judiciary can prevail also in the unified organisational system 
of the courts, as many examples show, the experiences of the very recent trends to 
establish specialised administrative courts do not lead to unequivocal conclusions. In 
Macedonia, where the reason for changing the former model of administrative adju­
dication based on the ordinary courts was to speed up the relevant procedures, the 
records of the Supreme Court in administrative appellate cases have been better than 
those of the newly established Supreme Administrative Courts so far. In Hungary, 
according to some reform conceptions, the price of the establishment of the inde­
pendent administrative courts would be the abolishment of administrative appeals. 
If such a transformation would be combined with the mandate of full power for the 
administrative courts, it was an obvious risk that the courts takes over the function of 
public administration. In fact, the full independence of the administrative courts of 
the organisation system of the whole judiciary is not a principal issue; the essence is 
the independence of these courts from the executive power, and the accessibility of 
judicial way for every interested parties of administrative procedures. 
The scope of legality control has spread out in the recent decades; today, courts 
do control not only the regularity of the decision making process that is the formal 
compliance with the rules on the competence and procedure, but also the respect of 
general constitutional values and requirements and international law from the princi­
ple of proportionality to legitimate expectations. The judicial review of administrative 
acts has expanded to such areas of administrative decision making where it was for 
a long time unprecedented and unthinkable. As a matter of fact, for today, the legal 
control of these decisions became the major rule, to which only narrowly tailored 
exceptions are accepted. Even in those countries, which were traditionally mistrustful 
of judicial review of legislative acts, this expansion is observable. In Britain, for exam­
ple, since the approval of the Human Rights Act in 1998, the courts may scrutinise the 
administrative acts in order to protect the individual rights entrenched in the ECHR. 
In France, the Conseil d’État extended the scope of judicial protection to the adminis­
trative contracts, as the statutes do not refer them to judicial review. 
The extension of judicial review to new and new areas of administrative actions, or 
the principle of governmental liability for damages caused by administrative acts are 
frequently posited as achievements or innovations of EU law.38 The effects of the 
ECJ jurisprudence or the Europeanisation (i.e. standardisation of certain procedural 
forms and guarantees) cannot be denied. However, it is easy to accept that both the 
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ideas of judicial review of administrative decisions and the state liability originate 
from and deeply rooted in the national administrative jurisdictions and were found 
or even elaborated far before the emergence of the European administrative space, 
whatever it means. 
Another dimension of the expansion of judicial control is the strengthening of 
the judicial intervention. While the traditional deference of the courts to the public 
administration is strong in cases where the administrative authority exercises discre­
tionary power, the judicial supervision seems to tend to shift away from a cassatory 
review towards full jurisdiction. Such trends (or upcoming reforms, at least) can be 
observed in Poland and Hungary. It is true, however, that we do not know much 
about the real motivations of these plans – they can indicate certain distrust to public 
administration, or they can follow only the international trends of judicialisation of 
administrative governance.39 Whatever reasons motivate the extension of judicial 
review, the principle of separation of powers should prevail, leaving administrative 
organs to make policy choices and to exercise discretion conferred on them by law, 
and enabling courts to check whether these decisions have been taken within the 
limits of the legal mandate. 
Today, the judicial review of administrative acts is regarded as a constitutional 
cornerstone of legal protection, and its scope is still widening. This expansion has 
reached on many countries the normative acts of the executive too. Another direc­
tion of the development was the recognition of the fact that the unlawful adminis­
trative acts can do harms, and the damages, even if it is caused by exercising public 
power, must be compensated. The state liability thereby exceeds the terrain of the 
traditional civil law, as the claim of citizens whose rights or legitimate interests have 
been adversarial affected by an illegal act of administration, can derive not only from 
a contractual relationship with public authorities, but from the normal operation of 
the executive agencies. 
6.3 Administrative reforms for simplifying and accelerating  
administrative procedures 
In recent years, legislative reforms have been started in some countries for making 
the administrative procedures quicker, more effective and efficient. Such kind of 
rationalisation has several different ways and means: for example, the application to 
be submitted to the administrative body is less and less bound to formal requirements 
(in a way that if law does not require otherwise, the process can be set in motion by an 
e-mail, phone call or oral announcement); or, administrative organs must examine 
the merit of the requests of the individuals, rather than their forms in order to avoid 
the waste of time. 
Another trend is to find effective ways to prevent unreasonable challenges of 
administrative acts before a court. Seemingly, these efforts can make obstacles to 
39 From the huge literature of this phenomenon, see Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional 
Politics in Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000); Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, On Law, 
Politics, and Judicialization (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002); Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The 
Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London 
2004). 
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administrative justice. However, keeping petty and unfounded claims remove from 
judicial way can enhance the capacity of the courts to provide more effective protec­
tion against the significant and serious violation of individual rights and legitimate 
interests. 
At the same time, the exaggerated procedural simplification itself might weaken 
or even destroy the effective legal protection. Legal representation for instance, is 
not mandatory, but the rights and interests of private persons can be infringed if they 
do not have access to legal counsel who can help them to stand for their personal 
interests before a well-equipped and powerful administrative authority. Some formal 
requirements can also slow down the decision making process, still, they appear to 
be indispensable, like the right of the parties to present statements or to access the 
relevant documents of the case. The referral of the case by the court back to the first 
instance administrative body can be seen as a waste of time for many, but in a number 
of cases the merit of the case may be resolved more expediently and in a fair way by 
the original decision maker. Therefore, the most that can be said in this regard is that 
a balance must be struck down in each country between the diverge interests and 
considerations stipulating that the effectiveness of the legal protection of the rights 
of the parties have to be guaranteed whatever methods are used for promoting the 
simple and rapid proceedings. 
6.4 The rise of global administrative law and the Europeanisation  
of national administrative jurisdictions 
It is quite surprising how rich is the academic literature discussing the EU administra­
tion or the ʽglobal administrative law’, compared to the investigation of the ʽgrass­
root’ administration, that is the administrative systems of the nation states. Although 
the protection of the rights and interests of private parties in administrative proce­
dures is one of the fashionable and favourite topics of administrative science, the 
mainstream literature has focused on the European and/or global level of adminis­
trative activity so far, rather than on the national level where far the most individual 
cases and disputes are decided. It is a real puzzle if we know that the primary and most 
important sphere of rights-protection in administrative procedures is the day-by-day 
administration of the nation states. 
The widely shared approach behind this phenomenon is that we live today in the 
era of ʽglobal governance’ which can be ʽcharacterised by a shift away from State-
centric conceptions of power towards one in which international and supranational 
institutions, as well as informal networks and private actors, exert an increasing influ­
ence on policy preferences and outcomes’.40 According to this approach, today, in the 
ʽpost-Westphalien order’ of the European states, many institutions and procedures 
of administrative law are more and more associated with international and suprana­
tional organisations and communities which have their own institutions, rules or even 
identities. ‘There are shifts from state-centered administrative law to global admin­
istrative law’ which does not mean only the transfer of certain traditional powers of 
40 Gordon Anthony, Jean-Bernard Auby, John Morison and Tom Zwart, ‘Values in Global Administrative 
Law: Introduction to the Collection’ in Gordon Anthony, Jean-Bernard Auby, John Morison and Tom 
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the nation states to European or other international organisations, but is allegedly a 
qualitative change ‘from an autarchical and hierarchical administration to collabora­
tive administrative action’.41 The rise of global administrative law can be illustrated 
by the emergence of certain kinds of composite procedures (where both the national 
and international authorities have special roles and they must co-operate with each 
other), the growing administrative practice of international organisations, and the 
strengthening of mutual relationships between public authorities and citizens (or 
their organisations). However, even though the ʽadministration is becoming increas­
ingly international’,42 the vast majority of individual administrative actions are pro­
ceeded by national administrative authorities under the procedural rules of domestic 
law. In fact, the transfer of administrative competences means mainly the shift of 
regulatory functions, and, to a much lesser extent, adjudicatory powers from govern­
ment agencies to non-state actors.43 
The most important area of the globalisation is the rise of the European adminis­
trative law. According to the conventional wisdom, there is an intensive interaction 
between the national administrative law regimes and the growing EU law. The influ­
ence of the administrative law of the European Union is not limited to the areas of 
EU policies, but also on those fields which have remained in national competence.44 
Though the European impacts can be discovered primarily in constitutional law, 
through the European requirements of the protection of basic rights, the adminis­
trative law is also concerned.45 Besides the law-making of the European institutions, 
the jurisprudence of the European courts, and reception of the general public law 
principles belong also to the channels of the European influence.46 The adaptation to 
the European norms takes place also in a multifaceted way. Thus, while the primary 
and secondary legislation of the EU set legal harmonisation requirements, the prac­
tice of the European courts provides interpretive tools for the national authorities.47 
Many scholars expect that the impacts of European administrative law on the national 
jurisdictions will strengthen if the growing needs for a uniform EU administrative 
procedural code48 will be satisfied. 
41 Javier Barnes, ‘Towards a Third Generation of Administrative Procedure’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman 
and Peter L. Lindseth (eds.), Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton 
2013) 336. 
42 Sabino Cassese, ‘A Global Due Process of Law?’ in Gordon Anthony, Jean-Bernard Auby, John Morison 
and Tom Zwart (eds.), Values in Global Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2011) 17. 
43 ‘Rights and obligations are more loosely defined in adjudication procedures, while they tend to be bet­
ter structured in rule-making procedures’. Ibid. 51. 
44 Jürgen Schwartze (Hrsg.), Das Verwaltungsrecht unter europäischem Einfluß: Zur Konvergenz der mitglied­
staatlichen Verwaltungsrechtsordnungen in der Europaischen Union (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-





47 In the mid-1990s, a research project explored the European influence on the national systems of 

administrative law. On the ground of a comparative study of 13 countries, several special administrative 
procedures and institutions were identified where such effects may have been demonstrated, like the 
withdrawal of the unlawful decision by the decision maker, the duty to give reasons of the administrative 
acts, or the reception of interim judicial reliefs, Schwartze, n. 4 807–818. 
48 See e.g. Anne Meuwese, Ymre Schuurmans and Wim Voermans, ‘Towards a European Administrative 
Procedure Act’ (2009) 2 Review of European Administrative Law 3–35. 






The growing and continuously developing body of the EU law and the jurispru­
dence of the European courts provide a strong incentive to improve the tools and 
methods of legal protection, and play prominent role to harmonise the national regu­
lations and practices, not only in the fields of EU law, but in other areas of adminis­
trative law as well. The usual way of this harmonisation is that the EU law borrows a 
legal principle or conception from a Member State (or from the general values of the 
legal systems of its members), transforms it for Community objectives and goals, and 
generalises it, expecting the legal transplant and the uniform implementation of that 
particular piece of law. 
When the appropriate procedures and legal guarantees emerge as special require­
ments of EU law imposing duties on the Member States, it is plausible to claim that 
the principle of effective legal protection, as it is defined by the EU legislation or 
the ECJ case law, has a direct impact on national legal systems. This view might be 
strengthened by the need for a uniform and coherent application of EU law in the 
member countries, having regard also to the doctrines of its supremacy and direct 
effect. Many scholars claim that as a result of the rise of the EU administration, and as 
a consequence of the convergence of the administrative systems of the nation states, a 
European Administrative Space has been developed in the recent two decades based 
on commonly shared principles of administrative law, constituting a so-called ‘Ius 
Commune Europeaum’.49 
The supranational nature of EU law together with all of its attributes like its suprem­
acy and direct effect and applicability in the national law, can be overestimated,50 and 
can easily make an impression that the national legal systems mechanically follow the 
principles invented and set by EU law. Even if the spread of some general principles 
or certain requirements across all Member States was inspired by EU institutions, in 
most cases, these legal doctrines or methods had been borrowed from national juris­
dictions, and, they are applied, apart from the little scope of direct administration of 
the EU, in the context of national administrative law. Most institutions and mecha­
nisms of rights-protection of EU law are deeply rooted in the national legal cultures. 
It is true that the European administrative law51 has achieved real innovations in the 
areas of EU law requiring Member States to provide effective legal protection for 
individuals to enforce their rights granted by the EU law. But even in this sphere, the 
EU institutions, especially the ECJ have always played only a mediating role in the 
49 Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann, ‘Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht als Gemeinsame Aufgabe’ (2000) 12 
European Review of Public Law 11, 12; Jarle Trondal and B. Guy Peters, ‘A Conceptual Account of the 
European Administrative Space’ in Michael W. Bauer and Jarle Trondal (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of 
the European Administrative System (Palgrave-MacMillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke 2015) 79–92; H. Hof­
mann, ‘Mapping the European Administrative Space’ (2008) 31 West European Politics 662–676; J. P. 
Olsen, ‘Towards a European Administrative Space’ (2003) 10 Journal of European Public Policy 506–531; 
Eckhard Schröter, ‘Europäischer Verwaltungsraum und Reform des öffentlichen Sektors’ in Bernhard 
Blanke, Frank Nullmeier, Christoph Reichard and GöttrikWewer (eds.), Handbuch zur Verwaltungsreform
(3rd edn., VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2005) 510–518; E. G. Heidbreder, ‘Structur­
ing the European Administrative Space: Policy Instruments of Multi-Level Administration’ (2011) 18 
Journal of European Public Policy 709–727. 
50 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Conflict and Co-Operation Between European Law and the General Administra­
tive Law of the Member States’ in Karl-Heinz Ladeur (ed.), The Europeanisation of Administrative Law: 
Transforming National Decision-Making Procedures (Ashgate, Aldershot 2002) 2. 
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sense that most principles and guarantees of EU law52,53 were borrowed from national 
administrative systems and transferred into autonomous Community law doctrines.54 
The basic values and relevant body of EU law rests upon the common public law 
traditions of the various legal systems.55 In addition, most administrative and judicial 
institutions mainly serve national rather than Community purposes, so if we look at 
the real workloads of these organisations, the vast majority of cases they administer is 
national matter guided by national standards of administrative law. As a matter of fact, 
the national administrative law governs the most part of day-by-day administration, 
and it is hard to imagine how it could be otherwise. 
Nevertheless, the influence of European administrative law can hardly be under­
estimated for several reasons. Even though these principles are widely known and 
used in modern Europe, their recognition has not been universal, and they have 
been used in different ways in the national administrative jurisdictions. Today, the EU 
institutions have a separate role in shaping and harmonising the common European 
standards of legal protection. They establish a minimum level of legal protection, 
while the national regimes of administrative law are the main sources of all tools and 
instruments. The ECtHR and ECJ have defined and required the minimum stand­
ards for legal protection of individual rights and legitimate interests fermenting rap­
prochement of the national traditions to each other and to the common European 
principles. The jurisprudence of the European courts is deeply rooted in the national 
legal systems in the field of administrative law too, and is indeed the synthesis of the 
different national public law cultures and traditions. 
As a consequence, under the umbrella of EU law, there is an undeniable conver­
gence between the administrative jurisdictions of the Member States, whatever the 
original source of the various principles and institutions was. So national systems of 
administrative law continuously converge as a result of the inspiration of the princi­
ples and rules of EU law, or global administrative law.56 There is vivid scholarly dis­
course, however, on the convergence versus divergence of the national administrative 
jurisdictions and the European administration.57 It is sure, notwithstanding, that the 
52 Jürgen Schwarze, ‘Rules and General Principles of European Administrative Law’ (2004) 14 Rivista 
Italiana de Diritto Publico Comunitario 1219–1241; Claudio Franchini, ‘European Principles Governing 
National Administrative Proceedings’ (2004) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 190; Jürgen Schwarze, 
European Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) cxx–cliv; Carol Harlow and Richard Rawl­
ings, ‘National Administrative Procedures in a European Perspective: Pathways to a Slow Convergence’ 
(2010) 2 Italian Journal of Public Law 218–226. 
53 For the types and peculiarities of European administrative procedures, see e.g. Schwarze (n. 53) (2006) 
1173; Sabino Cassese, ‘European Administrative Proceedings’ (2004) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems
21–36. 
54 Ton Heukels and Jamila Tib, ‘Towards Homogeneity in the Field of Legal Remedies: Convergence 
and Divergence’ in Paul Beaumont, Carole Lyons and Neil Walker (eds.), Convergence and Divergence in 
European Public Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2002) 114, 121. 
55 Jorge Agudo González, ‘The Evolution of Administrative Procedure Theory in “New Governance” Key 
Point’ (2013) 6 Review of European Administrative Law 84. 
56 Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella, ’The Influence of European and Global Administrative Law on National 
Administrative Acts’ in Edoardo Chiti and Bernardo Giorgio Mattarella (eds.), Global Administrative 
Law and EU Administrative Law: Relationships, Legal Issues and Comparison (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Hei­
delberg 2011) 66. 
57 For a review of the pros and cons, see Chris Himsworth, ‘Convergence and Divergence in Administra­
tive Law’ in Paul Beaumont, Carole Lyons and Neil Walker (eds.), Convergence and Divergence in European 





EU law has a harmonising effect in the application of certain legal methods,58 includ­
ing the instruments of legal protection. 
6.5 Other trends 
Certainly, there are some other developments and trends concerning the effective 
legal protection which raise only in one or two countries. Still, they can be really 
important or interesting for others as well, like the mixed character of the decision 
making bodies in administrative cases at high level. 
One of these tendencies is that certain privileges that central government tradi­
tionally exercised in some countries (like the participation of a special commissioner 
of government in the administrative, or even in judicial proceedings) have been 
abolished. The spread of tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies (special commissions) 
appears to be another trend, based on the general aim to reduce the heavy caseload 
of (administrative) courts preserving the judicial way for the really important cases 
and as ultimate forums for legal remedy. These bodies often well combine the exper­
tise and professionalism of administrative organs and the independence and impar­
tiality of courts. The judicialisation of the tribunals is also a common trend in the 
countries where these bodies are employed. The use of tools of the so-called alterna­
tive dispute resolution, which have long been used in other fields, is a fairly new idea 
in administrative matters as well. 
Lastly, we can refer to the use of certain techniques and mechanisms which can 
actually substitute the traditional instruments of legal protection. Although most 
national experts have reported about the minor importance of the forms of alterna­
tive dispute resolution, the special methods of resolving administrative disputes have 
probably a great significance in practice. However, it is difficult to assess the actual 
role of the mechanisms based on cooperation between the administrative authorities 
and their clients since their aim is just to avoid the formalised controversies in which 
the instruments of legal protection are used. 
7 Conclusions 
After a careful examination and description and in-depth analysis of the national 
systems of legal protection in administrative law of their countries, most authors of 
this book concluded that the rights of procedural fairness, and the legal institutions, 
as they are enshrined in the domestic law, provide an effective legal protection for 
individual rights and legitimate interests. The national experts have reported that, 
although there are certain deficiencies and shortcomings in the national jurisdic­
tions, and there are ups and downs in the development or practice of legal protec­
tion, the basic institutions and mechanisms of rights-protection exist in the national 
administrative law. According to their assessment, the level of effectiveness of legal 
remedies corresponds to the constitutional requirements and the standards of the 
Public Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2002) 99–110. For a sceptic view, see Pierre Legrand, ‘European 
Legal Systems are not Converging’ (1996) 45 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 52–81. 
58 Silvia Mirate, ‘The ECrtHR Case Law as a Tool for Harmonization of Domestic Administrative Law sin 
Europe’ (2012) 5 Review of European Administrative Law 47–60. 
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EU law and the ECHR. Most of them hold that the national level of rights-protection 
is higher than the common European standards demand. 
Still, forms and tools, availability and effectiveness of legal protection are subjects 
of vivid political, professional and public debates and I think it is so good. The effec­
tive legal protection of rights and legitimate interests of individuals, and the efficient 
and effective performance of public administration are all real values, even if they are 
frequently in conflict with each other. Thus, whatever particular systems and solutions 
exist in the various countries, it is certain that a delicate balance between the adminis­
trative justice and the effective government is an indispensable condition of the good 
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